

**STATUS OF POW/MIA NEGOTIATIONS
WITH NORTH KOREA**

Y 4. SE 2/1 A: 995-96/47

Status of POW/MIA Negotiations with...

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BEFORE THE
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
JUNE 20, 1996



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STATUS OF POW/MIA NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE,
Washington, DC, Thursday, June 20, 1996.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:40 p.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert K. Dornan (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT K. DORNAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE

Mr. DORNAN. Ladies and gentlemen, the Subcommittee on Military Personnel of the National Security Committee will come to order.

My apologies for a one-half hour late start here, but a cluster of some votes came up at the last minute and then I had a meeting with the Speaker on this very issue and followthrough for 149 days from now. No matter how the Presidential election goes, the Republicans do hope to hold on to a majority in the House and if the leadership stays the same, Mr. Gingrich is amenable to some sort of task force with some sort of funding for followthrough, particularly when I showed him an article by a hero of his and mine, five-star general and two-term beloved President Dwight D. Eisenhower, saying that he agreed with an analysis to write off as dead, several hundred Americans that we knew to be alive, left behind in Korea. It was a total shock for me. Nobody is an angel.

President Eisenhower, in another reflection back on his wonderful life, was so angered at having walked through the Nazi concentration camps and thinking about his own proud German heritage that he denied bare subsistence to some German prisoner-of-war camps where hundreds of German POW's died. There is a Canadian documentary, well-researched, overstated, as some things are, but it turned out to be quite true for a while that although there was no torture or abuse, food conditions and sanitary conditions were so bad in some of these huge holding camps of German prisoners, at which one of my colleagues was a 19-year-old commander, the now-retiring No. 2 man on the Appropriations Committee, John Myers of Indiana. He told me it was pretty bad at his camp, but not that bad. So like all of us, we make some mistakes in life.

I would like to read my opening statement and an opening statement from Mr. Pickett and a guest Congressman from Pennsylvania, Mr. John Fox, and he would like to make a statement and

then we will proceed to take testimony from our distinguished panel.

The historic hearing on American prisoners of war who were never released from the Korean war is taking place as the United States Government has begun negotiations with North Korea on accounting for our missing heroes. The last hearing in the House on this issue until this very moment—in the House; there were 2 hours in the Senate, I understand—but in this House, the last time was 1957, nearly 40 years ago, under the chairmanship of a wonderful man, a good friend of mine, Chairman Clem Zabloski from Wisconsin, who went on to chair the Foreign Affairs Committee when I was a member of that distinguished committee.

The result was a proclamation by the House for the return of “450 American POW’s still imprisoned by the Communists.” During this postwar period, President Ike Eisenhower made numerous public statements regarding American prisoners who were known to be in captivity. For example, on Memorial Day 1955, I had just been commissioned a second lieutenant and I had just married. I was on my way to gunnery, full of respect for him and bursting with pride to be a young Air Force jet pilot.

President Eisenhower stated, “We have had long, serious discussions with the Chinese Communists, trying to make them disclose where our prisoners are being held. We have gotten back a few”—four F-86 pilots were to return that very next month, who were all shot down in Manchuria. One of them was a commander of mine, Heller, Parks, Cameron, Fisher.

A few months later, by a slip of the tongue at a cocktail party in Geneva to Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, an entire B-29 crew, Anderson’s crew, was returned through Hong Kong, 11 of the 13. Two were held back because they were the enlisted radar technicians on the airplane who could give lie to the charge that the B-29 was shot down in China when, in fact, it was shot down over North Korea. So their expertise as the two radar navigators cost them their lives, to die alone in some rotting Chinese camp facility, but at least we got back 11 of the 13 out of Jack Anderson’s crew, and I have spoken to some of them.

I spoke to one sergeant who was a schoolteacher in Cleveland and he told me he was held in a camp where he would pry apart the boards on his window. His roommate was Thomas Downey, who was a CIA man captured in China and held for almost 20 years, and Downey was his roommate for a while. He said he could pry the boards open and see in a compound, a quadrangle, Caucasian prisoners all his age or younger walking in a quadrangle, and he said he could almost tell from their demeanor the Americans from the British and some of the other nationalities. He said the Americans were, he said, I do not know to explain it, looser, more good humored, trying to accept their fate. That was never offered in testimony in Congress, either side of the Hill, until this moment, I assume.

In fact, based on statements by returned American prisoners, international intelligence reports, interviews, and statements by high-ranking former Communist officials and defectors over a 40-year period, there were at least four separate categories of pris-

oners of war that were not defectors who were exploited, held back by the Soviets, Chinese, North Koreans.

First, highly trained aviators—what I did a few years later—transonic fighter pilots, the F-86 Saber jet, with a 7-, 8-, and in some periods 13-to-1 kill ratio, victory ratio, over Soviet pilots that we now know were running the air operation in North Korea, just as they were advisors, as were the Chinese, in the Vietnam air operation with an evil human being named Robert McNamara giving sanctuary to all the MiG bases while our young second lieutenants were shot down on their first, second, third missions with MiG's coming out of the sun who were allowed to take off within view of our fighter pilots and could have destroyed their bases, sort of a replay of Korea, only worse. Highly trained aviators, technicians whose skills were coveted by our Communist enemies.

The second group included soldiers who were used for—brace yourselves—ghastly medical and psychological experiments. This is the ugliness of Harbin, unit 731, held secret by our Government for decades, one of another heroes of mine, General MacArthur, huge mistake. No war crimes trials for Japanese that equaled in the intensity of their evil Dr. Mengele, the devil of death at Auschwitz, who used to be called the angel of death.

People who would cut the arms and the legs off healthy Chinese, Russians, and now we find out by the excellent research of Gavin Dawes, Americans, Australians, and British and New Zealand prisoners in Manchuria, Harbin, unit 731, stories right out of a book titled once, "The Theory and Practice of Hell." That was applied to Nazi horrors. It went on under Japanese warlords. Where did the doctors that ran these ghastly war crimes camps end up? The head of medical schools in Japan. Only God and their conscience would drive some of them to suicide in later years. Now we find out that the Czechs built a hospital in North Korea for these same unfathomable evil experiments.

The third category, including men held back as bargaining chips for future negotiations, a Communist pattern in every conflict since Lenin taught us that lying was not lying if the end was, in his concept, just. And for manual slave labor in that third category.

And finally, those whom enemy intelligence agencies hoped to train as sleeper agents or trainers in English and American culture, trainers of sleeper agents and then infiltrated back into the United States. If the Communists would put men in Italy through the Catholic training for 10, 12 years to become a priest and they would suffer all of that as atheists, they would certainly run sleepers who had a military background.

At least 19 human intelligence documents, including at least half a dozen interviews with North Korean defectors, just some of them over the past few months, led to a report by InSung Lee. I have to assume Mr. Lee is under a lot of pressure the last week. He is a Korean American, an analyst at the Defense Department, and he issued a background paper to the Office of the Secretary of Defense that came to this conclusion, "that there are two groups of Americans in North Korea, a small group of defectors," now established factually by name and city, "and a larger group of 10 to 15 possible POW's."

I have read all of the documents that I could get my hands on and find that, unlike the recent statements by DPMO official Alan Liotta, who is with us today, that many are not thirdhand accounts but firsthand or strong secondhand accounts that are fairly consistent in their descriptions, and to use the case of the Romanians, where people who have not seen one another since 1979 could identify one another by name and then track this person and find out that they are American citizens living in the same neighborhood and did not know it.

Today, I am providing the unclassified documents from this series and I am asking at this time for the Department of Defense to declassify, given the time factors here, all of the documents.

We know that there are at least four American defectors in North Korea. They have appeared in a feature film. I hope to see that film in the next few days, "Nameless Heroes," I think is the name. The Pentagon knew about these men for many years but did not publicly admit it until the South Korean press broke the story last year. Then there were denials and admissions and finally admissions.

If the sources of recent intelligence reports honestly identify these men, serious professional investigators like InSung Lee have to seriously consider these same sources' accounts of other Americans, 60 to 70 years old, who are called prisoners of war from the war of liberation against the South.

Is survival possible? A year ago Christmas, in my office, I received, as a visit, Lt. Cho Chang-ho, who was captured in 1951, a lieutenant then, during the Korean war and was later declared killed in action, body not recovered. He escaped from North Korea, after multiple attempts, was branded a hard case. His wife turned against him, his two daughters. He took years of preparation to escape.

He only remembered that his daughter was a high school teacher. By the time he made contact through covert sources, it lucked out she was in a phone book. She was not a high school teacher but a graduated and retired college professor and she paid the money to the Chinese for the boat trip after he had to cross the Yalu River and almost died and was unconscious, in a coma when he was repatriated and woke up in a hospital 3 days later. He came to my office with his whole family and American-Koreans in his family who he had not seen in four decades.

He escaped from North Korea in 1994. He had been held 43 years as a slave laborer in coal mines in the harsh mountain climate—no German treatment for officers here like some of the stag-lag camps that we could make comedies of. Although in the remote areas he was held in he did not see Americans—he said he had never had a hint of an American—he claims there were thousands of other South Koreans, our allies, prisoners held in North Korea after the war. He said 40 to 50 at the beginning. He believes 10,000 still live.

In his opinion, there are others like himself who would desire to escape. When we ask why Americans have not escaped, here is a man, the right body structure, the facial features, the language, and born on that peninsula and it took him 43 years to get out. How in the name of God could an American escape? And if you

read the two escape overnight attempts in Vietnam, you understand that it is pretty close to impossible. This is no great escape like the 76 that escaped from Germany and Goering and he paid for this with his suicide and death sentence, had 50 British and American heroes executed for doing what is in our code of conduct, attempting to escape.

He exemplifies the reason why we can never rule out the possibility of survival of any prisoner who was last known alive.

Included in my testimony, I am submitting a written statement by a Czechoslovakian major general, Jan Sejna, who currently is employed by the United States Department of Defense, and I will track him and make sure he is not punished for this. I spent 2 hours with him 2 days ago. In 1968, he was the highest-ranking Soviet bloc intelligence officer to ever defect to the United States. He told me of the horror stories, and that is what they are, of American prisoners of war captured in Korea and then in Vietnam who were moved to third countries for technical information exploitation or these ghastly medical experiments.

He briefed me on his horribly inadequate CIA briefing, how Kissinger fired him within days of Nixon taking over, how they did not want to hear anything about POW's, how they did not want to hear anything about this Czech-built hospital, that, by the way, years later, after he had been attacked and discredited, turns out to exist. It is real. I would call that a smoking gun. And how they did not want to know about him, the Chief of Staff of the Joint Chiefs in Czechoslovakia and the strategic plan to prepare for a third world war. They were not interested in any of that.

They finally gave him \$50,000 of our taxpayers' money and picked out where he would live and sent him to Lake George to run a golf course and he was broke within months and finally became a carpenter and worked his way back and has finally been used as a valuable intelligence source the last decade by the DIA.

Thus far, the negotiations with North Korea have focused primarily on the repatriation of remains and digging up airplane crash sites, all of them 46 to 43 years old. Here we go again, the hunt for bone fragments and to hell with stories about live Americans. I believe that the first priority should be to find out the truth of Americans who were left behind. The figure given at 8th Army Headquarters in Vietnam to every CODEL I have taken there over the last 20 years, 389. I thought that was a pretty sacred figure out of the Eisenhower years and it turns out that that was one of these manipulated, pared down, squished down figures, and the 389 was lowball. It was much higher.

The second priority should be visits to the military museums and archives by honest professional researchers. I went over to the Senate Cloakroom and got a quick and dirty briefing from one of my heroes over there, Bob Smith, and he told me how he went to Korea, the first American Senator in Korea, maybe ever. I do not know how many Senators had Chosin, a Japanese-occupied area, on their visit list for CODEL's in the 1930's and 1920's. But he said he was not properly briefed on any of this by our State Department when he went over there. This is Senator Bob Smith.

This should be run by honest professional researchers to prepare Congressmen and Senators willing to go over to these dangerous

places, and they are dangerous. I flew four flights on the airplane that killed Ron Brown, about 3½ weeks, before he did, with the same pilot, Ashley Davis, and the same crew attendant, who was wonderful, Shelly Kelly, now dead. It is dangerous on these CODEL's, particularly when I fly on a Russian Antonov 12 with one of the engines missing all the way from Ulan Bator in Outer Mongolia, or from Beijing up there on a rotten airplane where I smelled vodka on the breaths of the crew. Some of these CODEL's are not trips to Hawaii, folks.

We should be able to excavate cemeteries outside of former prison camps, but not when the Czechs built a crematorium as part of the hospital so that any poor God-forsaken person who lives this miserable existence as a guinea pig before God takes them and they are burned into ashes, again Auschwitz-style, crematoria. We are not going to find any remains from some of this. But some of the former prison camps' cemeteries, we may find people.

Certainly, there are battlefields. I talked to a marine just a few years older than I am who said he could go back to Chosin and identify the area where they put 200 of his friends in a mass grave, he says, in a heartbeat, if it was winter and if there was snowcover on the ground. He said, "I have it burned in my brain. The location is like a pirate's treasure map. I made a mental note. I stared at that for an hour so I could find that location."

Crash-site excavations, while providing dramatic photos for reporters who take the danger of going to these areas, are little more than expensive boondoggles for the Communists, and we now have a GAO investigation, thanks to Senator Smith and myself, about \$4 million unaccounted for in Vietnam. The beat goes on.

The first priority should always be to resolve questions regarding men possibly alive. In addition, we must use all the means possible, including creative independent research, honest outside brokers. This has worked at the Defense Department. This has worked with outside contractors. That is why I have asked people who wrote a RAND study to come today.

In addition, we must use information from the former Soviet bloc and China. China, again, a prideful Chinese wall slammed in front of us, Soviet bloc windows opening and closing all the time, people dying off who were forthcoming. I am going to recommend to this panel, as I did to the last one, that they look at the BBC interview and tell me if these Soviet former fighter pilots, retired, again, my age or older, chest full of medals, if they do not appear to be telling the truth when they talk about getting shot down and taking a bullet from an F-86 Saber, carrying open their arm, compound fracture, and I ejected, but, of course, they are ejecting over their territory, North Korea or Manchuria, so they get patched up and go home. Our men, F-86 pilots who would lose an aerial duel, God knows what the fate was for some 40 to 50 of them.

We simply have to resolve the fate of those American heroes who are last known to be alive in communist custody. I still think well of General MacArthur and President—both five-star generals—Eisenhower, but if they could come back today, I am convinced, as a student of those two men, that they would say we were wrong and try and right those wrongs. Let us do it right.

Mr. Pickett, please, any opening remarks, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. OWEN PICKETT, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, RANKING MINORITY MEMBER, MILITARY
PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE**

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I simply want to welcome our two panels of witnesses here today and I look forward to hearing their testimony on this very sensitive subject. I do have a statement which I will simply submit for the record in order to catch up a little bit on our time here and give us an opportunity to hear more from our witnesses, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Pickett follows:]

**OPENING REMARKS -- REP. OWEN PICKETT
MILITARY PERSONNEL SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING
POW-MIA NEGOTIATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA
June 20, 1996**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in welcoming our witnesses. I also want to extend a warm welcome to those family members and friends of Korean War POW-MIAs who are attending this hearing.

This nation's ability to fully account for the more than 8,000 US servicemen who did not return following the Korean War has been stonewalled by a period of more than 40 years of intensely bitter hostility, rivalry, and even war between the United States, North Korea, and China, and an extended Cold War with the former Soviet Union.

The evidence that US Korean War POWs were held in North Korea, China and the former Soviet Union is irrefutable. That these same nations have the ability to do more than they have to date in accounting for US personnel also goes without question.

That some American POWs may still remain in North Korea is the subject of periodic credible reports.

For these reasons, the recent apparent willingness of the North Koreans to allow US investigators into that country must be seen as a positive development and I look forward to hearing more about it from both our Department of Defense and Department of State witnesses.

I am also concerned, however, that we do not underestimate the apparent willingness of the North Koreans to give little or nothing , while trying to get a lot. For example, since 1990, North Korea has returned the alleged remains of 207 US personnel. To date, only four of these remains have been officially identified as American. Nevertheless, in January of this year, North Korea broke off POW-MIA negotiations when the US refused to pay as much as \$4 million to compensate North Korea for so-called expenses incurred in the recovery of remains. Moreover, not until the US agreed in May to pay North Korea \$2 million for expenses incurred in the return of remains in the early 1990s did North

Korea agree to permit US field investigations. Why the US agreed to pay this money remains unclear. Perhaps our witnesses can clarify the matter.

Finally, I look forward to hearing from our panel of POW-MIA family members and supporters. They can help us put in to perspective the other testimony we will hear.

Thank you Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Pickett.

Before I ask our witnesses to take the oath, I am going to recognize Mr. Fox of Pennsylvania, and then I have a document dated April 27, 1992, signed by Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., who was then the Director of DIA. I will read this document. It should set the tone, and then we will swear in our first panel.

Mr. Fox.

STATEMENT OF HON. JON FOX, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. Fox. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your outstanding leadership in ensuring that our men and women who are listed as missing in action or prisoner of war are not forgotten. I share your deep commitment and that of Congressman Pickett to resolve the fate of each and every one of our brave troops and I appreciate your holding this hearing to highlight Korean war issues which must be addressed, particularly in view of recent reports of live sightings in North Korea. For more than 45 years, families of Korean POW/MIA's and those killed in action still worry about the fate of their loved ones.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to recognize the dedication of my constituent, a Charlotte Busch Mitnick—recognize yourself, please—to the cause of POW's and MIA's. On June 13, 1952, Charlotte's brother, Maj. Samuel N. Busch, was among a crew of 12 men who, alone, unarmed and unafraid, flew a sensitive reconnaissance mission over the Sea of Japan. They were shot down by two Soviet MiG-15 jet fighters. For over 40 years, family members believed what they were told by our Government, that their relatives had perished in an air accident. In 1992, President Yeltsin admitted that the plane had been shot down and that some airmen had been taken prisoner and may still be alive. Their fate is still unknown.

We need to end the paper chase so that loved ones will learn the whereabouts of their relatives who died, who are missing from the Korean war, so that their hearts and minds can be put at ease.

Mr. Chairman, with your permission, I would like to submit the compelling statement of my constituent, Charlotte Busch Mitnick, which expresses far better than I ever could the feelings of the families of our POW's and MIA's. I would ask to submit for the record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Fox. Please, that will be done.

Mr. FOX. Thank you.

[The prepared statements of Mr. Fox and Ms. Mitnick follow:]

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JON D. FOX
SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL

JUNE 20, 1996

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN, FOR YOUR OUTSTANDING LEADERSHIP IN ENSURING THAT OUR MEN AND WOMEN WHO ARE LISTED AS MISSING IN ACTION OR PRISONER OF WAR ARE NOT FORGOTTEN. I SHARE YOUR DEEP COMMITMENT TO RESOLVING THE FATE OF EACH AND EVERY ONE OF OUR BRAVE TROOPS, AND I APPRECIATE YOUR HOLDING THIS HEARING TO HIGHLIGHT KOREAN WAR ISSUES WHICH MUST BE ADDRESSED, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF RECENT REPORTS OF LIVE SIGHTINGS IN NORTH KOREA.

MR. CHAIRMAN, I WOULD LIKE TO RECOGNIZE THE DEDICATION OF MY CONSTITUENT, CHARLOTTE BUSCH MITNIK, TO THE CAUSE OF POW'S AND MIA'S.

ON JUNE 13, 1952, CHARLOTTE'S BROTHER, MAJOR SAMUEL N. BUSCH, WAS AMONG A CREW OF 12 MEN WHO, ALONE, UNARMED AND UNAFRAID, FLEW A SENSITIVE RECONNAISSANCE MISSION OVER THE SEA OF JAPAN. THEY WERE SHOT DOWN BY TWO SOVIET MIG-15 JET FIGHTERS. FOR OVER 40 YEARS, FAMILY MEMBERS BELIEVED WHAT THEY WERE TOLD BY OUR GOVERNMENT - THAT THEIR RELATIVES HAD PERISHED IN AN AIR ACCIDENT. IN 1992, RUSSIAN PRESIDENT YELTSIN ADMITTED THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN SHOT DOWN, AND THAT SOME AIRMEN MAY HAVE BEEN TAKEN PRISONER AND MAY STILL BE ALIVE. THEIR FATE IS STILL UNKNOWN.

MR. CHAIRMAN, WITH YOUR PERMISSION, I WOULD LIKE TO READ THE COMPELLING STATEMENT OF MY CONSTITUENT, CHARLOTTE BUSCH MITNIK, WHICH EXPRESSES FAR BETTER THAN I EVER COULD THE FEELINGS OF THE FAMILIES OF OUR POW'S AND MIA'S, AND TO SUBMIT IT FOR THE RECORD:

-(STATEMENT ATTACHED)

THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.

My family's paper chase started in the 50s with my father. I know little more now than he did back then. It isn't easy to find the words to express what has been in the hearts and minds of my family and the families of thousands of POW's and MIA's of the Korean and Cold Wars. For more than 45 years we have worried about our loved ones, wondered if they were alive, if they were well, or if they were ever coming home. Time after time we have asked the government to help us with our search for the truth, and all that we have ever received were lies, half-truths and misinformation. All that we have ever wanted, was to know the fate of our loved ones.

In August of 1944 one of my brothers, at age 21, was killed on the battlefield in France; he is now buried in Beverly National Cemetery in New Jersey. Upon hearing of his death my family was devastated, but there was no uncertainty about his fate. He was dead, and we mourned him, and that is the normal response. How can you mourn a POW/MIA? You can't. You don't. What you do is pray, unite with others, you question, you become assertive, aggressive, and obnoxious. You push your Senator, your Congressman, and investigative reporters. And then when we, the family members start making progress in our search for an accounting there is always someone or something that stands in the way trying to prevent us from getting that accounting. For example, Senator John McCain or the Members of the Old Boys Club at DPMO. Neither one represents the wishes of any families I know.

Why is the government afraid to tell the world what happened in the 50's, 60's and 70's? Why, after all this time, is the information on our POW's and MIA's from the Korean and Cold Wars still classified?

General Wohl stated in a letter to Mrs. Patricia Dickinson,

"concerning your question about documents remaining classified from the Korean and Cold War eras, any intelligence and operational reports that indicate intelligent sources and matters that remain sensitive today will continue to have that kind of information protected."


The questions I put forth to you again regarding the above are: What could be so sensitive after 45 years? Why

are the Korean/Cold War families being sent on such a paper chase? Why are the families being given the run-around? What is our government trying to hide? They say "Nothing." It doesn't appear that way. And last but not least, Why do we have to make laws to make people in government do what is honorable and the morally correct? For what ever the reason, it seems we must. and that is what we are fighting for here today!

There is so much we the families need to know so our hearts

and minds can be put at ease after all this time. We need to have an accounting of our loved ones' lives, so that we, and they can rest in peace.

Thank you, for your continued support of our cause.



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Sister of:

Major Samuel N. Busch,
Shot down over the Sea of Japan
June 13, 1952

S/Sgt. Morris H. Busch
KIA France August 1944

Mr. DORNAN. Just one memo before we start. I will be reading this, except for the first paragraph, for the first time myself. General Clapper, 27 April. There is a slight redaction ahead of the first paragraph:

The enclosed intelligence report summarizes the results of a DIA investigation into possible drug experimentation on United States prisoners of war during the Korean war carried out by Soviet and Czechoslovakian personnel. The purpose of this program was to develop comprehensive interrogation techniques involving medical, psychological, and drug-induced behavior modification. Information uncovered by DIA indicates that up to several dozen unwilling participants in this program may have been executed upon its conclusion in North Korea.

If we ever nail this down, can you see this article in Reader's Digest? Americans reading this on some transcontinental or transatlantic or Pacific flight?

Slight redaction, second paragraph, just one word, it looks like:

The source was well placed in that he personally saw progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded to top leadership in the Czech Central Committee and the ministry of defense. This remains a very sensitive source who has provided reliable information to the U.S. intelligence community for many years. The source is most reluctant to have his identity become known or be tied to the information he has provided. It should be noted that the source did submit to polygraph examination, during which no deception was indicated. This report is classified both to protect the source's identity and to ensure proper security is maintained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative activity.

Number three, it looks like a three letter, a redaction. "I have furnished the attached report to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for their information." This would have been Cheney in 1992, Dick Cheney. "Normally, intelligence reports concerning American prisoners of war are distributed within the Government to the military departments, the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs," which was to go out at the end of 1992, "the House POW/MIA Task Force," which has gone out of existence because I took the portfolio where it should be, in the Military Personnel Subcommittee. It should never have left here 25 years ago.

"However, as the attached intelligence report could seriously impact ongoing foreign policy activities of the United States Government, I await instructions on any further dissemination of this subject report." I just want to make sure that does not go down a big dark hole of Calcutta somewhere.

The first panel, I will introduce them and then swear them in. Malcolm Toon, former distinguished Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Cochairman of the United States-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIA's, upon which two of our former POW's in this House of Representatives served. Second will be Alan Liotta, Deputy Director, Defense POW/MIA Office. Number three, from the Department of State, David G. Brown, Director of Korean Affairs.

Gentlemen, if you would please rise. This is done at the request of the families and I concur. Please raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated.

Ambassador Toon, if you will please proceed with your statement, it will be put in its record in its entirety if you want to summarize. It is your call. Please proceed.

STATEMENT OF MALCOLM TOON, COCHAIRMAN, UNITED STATES-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIA'S

Mr. TOON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be with you again, I hope.

I would like to thank the committee for inviting me here today to discuss the work of the United States-Russian Joint Commission on POW's and MIA's. I believe the Commission's work over the past 4 years demonstrates a number of accomplishments as well as the serious obstacles we have encountered in trying to determine what the former Soviet Union may know about missing American servicemen.

I would like to begin my remarks on a positive note, highlighting some of the major achievements recorded since March 1992, when I was appointed to be the Commission's U.S. Cochairman.

Through a great deal of persistence and resourcefulness, we have established an enduring structure for pursuing a comprehensive interview and archival research program throughout the former Soviet Union. The Commission's day-by-day research and investigative efforts are handled through our staff personnel in Moscow. Their relentless search for the facts has taken them across much of Russia and its neighboring states and has produced hundreds of documents and scores of interviews that form the core of our investigative program.

I should say parenthetically, Mr. Chairman, that when I took on this job over 4 years ago, I thought it was for 6 months. I am heading into my 5th year and I am facing my 80th birthday on the Fourth of July. I think it is about time for me to quit.

Mr. DORNAN. Happy Fourth of July. Happy birthday.

Mr. TOON. The work of these dedicated people in Moscow becomes the basis for the agenda items discussed when my fellow Commissioners and I travel to Moscow to attend regular plenary sessions, of which 12 have been held to date. Discussion with Russian counterparts, which gives us a chance freely to express our views and concerns, takes place in four working groups representing the Commission's focal points: The Korean War Working Group, chaired by Congressman Sam Johnson; the Vietnam War Working Group, headed by Congressman Pete Peterson; the Cold War Working Group under Mr. Dennis Clift of the Joint Military Intelligence College; and the World War II Working Group, whose work is guided by Michael McReynolds of the National Archives.

Losses of former Soviet personnel during the war in Afghanistan and elsewhere have also been pursued by the Commission.

The working groups have compiled their findings in a comprehensive report. An executive summary of that report has just been presented to the President. In that study, the American people will receive a full report of the many initiatives that our Commission has undertaken, the results achieved, the obstacles encountered, and the avenues of further inquiry that look most promising. The summary of our report will be released this afternoon through the Defense Department's Public Affairs Office and through the Commission's congressional membership. I am pleased to leave a copy of that summary, Mr. Chairman, with you today.

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
TO THE
COMPREHENSIVE REPORT OF THE
U.S. SIDE OF THE
U.S.-RUSSIA JOINT COMMISSION ON POW/MIAS**

17 JUNE 1996

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S.-Russia Joint Commission on POW/MIAs ("the Commission") was established on 26 March 1992 under the aegis of the Presidents of the United States and Russia. Ambassador Malcolm Toon was appointed by President George Bush, and re-confirmed by President William J. Clinton, to serve as the American Co-chairman. General-Colonel Dmitrii Volkogonov was appointed by President Boris Yeltsin and served as the Russian Co-chairman until his death on 6 December 1995. In January 1996 General-Major Vladimir Zolotarev was appointed by President Yeltsin to succeed General Volkogonov.

The nine commissioners who comprise the U.S. side of the Commission include two members of the United States Senate: John Kerry (D-Massachusetts) and Robert Smith (R-New Hampshire); two members of the U.S. House of Representatives: Sam Johnson (R-Texas) and Pete Peterson (D-Florida); two senior executives from the Department of Defense: A. Denis Clift (President, Joint Military Intelligence College) and James Wold (Deputy Assistant Secretary for POW/MIA Affairs); two senior executives from the Department of State: Kent Wiedemann (Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs) and John Herbst (Principal Deputy Coordinator, Russia and the Caucasus), and a senior executive from the U.S. National Archives: Michael McReynolds. The executive secretary of the U.S. side of the Commission is Norman Kass of the Defense POW/MIA Office. The Russian side of the Commission includes officials from the Ministries of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, the Russian State Archives, the Federal Security Service, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the Russian Presidential Commission on POWs, Internees and Missing in Action. Colonel Sergei Osipov of the President's Office serves as the executive secretary of the Russian side of the Commission. In addition, the Commission has benefited from the service of numerous archivists, military historians, analysts, linguists and professional military personnel from both the American and Russian sides.

The Commission's inaugural meeting was held in Moscow in March 1992. In the ensuing four years the Commission has met in plenary session an additional eleven times - nine in Moscow and two in Washington. In addition to the plenary sessions, two other high-level meetings between U.S. and Russian commissioners have been held in Washington. Between plenary sessions, working-group-level technical talks have supported the work of the Commission. Commission members have traveled throughout Russia, as well as to the newly independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan and to Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. In each country the Commission has sought assistance in obtaining information about U.S. POW/MIAs. Meetings with high-ranking government officials have been conducted, and appeals to local citizens for information have been issued through the print and broadcast media.

During meetings of the Commission in the United States, POW/MIA family members have been afforded a unique opportunity to present their concerns and questions directly to General Volkogonov and other Russian members of the Commission. In conjunction with two technical-level meetings held in Washington, Russian members of the Commission have visited the Defense POW/MIA Office, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Armed Forces DNA Identification Laboratory, the National Archives and Aberdeen Proving Grounds. Russian members of the Commission and Russian forensic specialists have also visited the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii, where they were briefed by U.S. specialists on the most up-to-date scientific techniques and methods for identifying human remains.

The work of the U.S. side of the Commission was initially supported by Task Force Russia, an organization created by the Secretary of the Army at the request of the Secretary of Defense and responsible for research, analysis and investigation into issues identified by the Commission. In July 1993, the mission, functions and many of the personnel of Task Force Russia were incorporated into the Office of the Secretary of

Defense in the newly created Defense POW/MIA Office. The Commission continues to receive research, analytical and investigative support from the Joint Commission Support Directorate of the Defense POW/MIA Office.

Information of value to the work of the Commission is gained primarily through access to archival records and through interviews of veterans, government officials and other knowledgeable Russian and American citizens. Archival research and interviews are conducted in the former Soviet Union and in the United States.

The Commission has received more than 12,000 pages of Russian documents, many of which were once highly classified. Initially the documents are screened by U.S. analysts to determine their pertinence and significance to the work of the Commission. Those determined to be pertinent are translated into English for further analysis. To date, more than 4,000 pages have been translated into English and analyzed in detail. Copies of the original documents, screening reports and translations are forwarded to the Library of Congress and to the National Archives. Documents directly related to the fate of specific unaccounted-for American servicemen are also forwarded through the appropriate service casualty office to family members.

Through the research efforts of the Russian side, the Commission has gained access to important archival information. At this stage in its work the Commission believes that more archival information remains. Archival searches continue in both countries. The Russian side is currently considering requests by the U.S. side for specific documents and for additional Russian archival searches of Presidential, Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Foreign Intelligence, Security Service and Border Guards archives.

Hundreds of interviews with Russian and American veterans, current and former government officials and other individuals have been conducted to further the work of the Commission. Initially, interviews in Russia were conducted jointly by

Russian and American staff members. As the scope of the interview program expanded, the U.S. side was granted permission to travel throughout Russia to conduct interviews. In the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, interviews have been conducted with the consent and support of the host governments. To date, important witnesses to and participants in the Korean War, the Cold War and the Vietnam War have been interviewed. Information gained in the interviews is analyzed and collated with information from archival sources and from other interviews to form the basis for broad-based analysis and to suggest leads for further investigation.

In pursuit of information on unaccounted-for Americans, the U.S. side's representatives in Moscow have visited psychiatric hospitals, prisons and prison camps. Card files and other relevant hospital and prison records have been reviewed for evidence of unaccounted-for Americans. The Commission continues its efforts to identify and visit psychiatric hospitals and prison facilities.

To facilitate its work, the Commission established permanent working groups on World War II, the Korean War, the Cold War and the war in Vietnam. The work of the Commission and its four working groups was summarized in an interim report signed on 25 May 1995 by Ambassador Toon and General Volkogonov. The report, prepared jointly in English and Russian, was presented to President Clinton and President Yeltsin. Since that time the Commission has continued its work. The 12th Plenary session was held in Moscow from 28-30 August 1995. Following the death of the Commission's Russian Co-chairman, General Volkogonov, the plenary session scheduled for December 1995 was postponed. In February 1996 technical-level talks, at which the new Russian Co-chairman was introduced, were held in Moscow. Throughout this transitional period research, analysis and investigation have continued in Russia and the United States.

In its work the Commission has focused on three primary objectives. The first objective has been to determine whether any American POW/MIAs are still being held

in the former Soviet Union against their will. In his testimony to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs on 11 November 1992, General Volkogonov presented a statement from Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin which stated, in part: "As a result of the work done, one may conclude that today there are no American citizens held against their will on the territory of Russia." In a written statement to the Committee, General Volkogonov further said that:

"No U.S. citizens are currently being detained within the territory of the former USSR. This conclusion is based on a thorough analysis of all archival documents, interviews with witnesses, and on-site inspections of possible American housing sites."

Representatives of the Russian Federation's Federal Security Service and of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have provided similar statements. The archival research and interviews conducted by the Commission to date have produced no information which disputes General Volkogonov's statement. The Commission has investigated numerous reports of live Americans in the former Soviet Union and will continue to pursue any new information which arises concerning possible live American POWs or MIAs.

The second objective of the Commission has been to determine the fate of unaccounted-for members of the U.S. Armed Forces who were located on the territory of the Soviet Union or about whom the Russian government may have information. The Commission records uneven progress towards this objective as discussed below by each working group. One of the Commission's most significant accomplishments in this regard has been the repatriation of the remains of U.S. Air Force Captain John Dunham, lost in a shoot-down incident in the Soviet Far East in 1952.

The Commission's third objective has been to clarify facts pertaining to Soviet personnel missing from the war in Afghanistan and from Cold War-era loss incidents. Issues related to this objective have been included in the work of the Cold War Working Group and are summarized below in that working group's summary. The work of the Commission has also included resolving the fates of missing Soviet military personnel and "displaced persons" from World War II. Highlights from the Commission's work

towards this objective are set forth under the World War II Working Group section below.

PRINCIPAL FINDINGS

WORLD WAR II WORKING GROUP

The World War II Working Group (WWII WG) has conducted extensive research into the measures undertaken by both the Soviets and Americans in 1944 and 1945 to plan for, document and account for prisoners of war liberated by each side. The efforts of the working group have been based almost entirely on historical records which have been found in Russian and American archives. Thousands of pages of documents have been exchanged by the two sides of the working group.

The principal focus of the U.S. side of the working group has been to research and analyze the wartime experience of American prisoners of war liberated from German POW camps by the Soviet Red Army. In its comprehensive report, the U.S. side of the WWII WG provides a detailed analysis of the historical record regarding the numbers of U.S. POWs freed from the German camps in the Soviet zone of occupied Germany.

Research completed thus far by the WWII WG confirms that over 28,000 U.S. prisoners of war were repatriated under extremely chaotic and stressful circumstances from Soviet occupied territory during the final months of World War II. Information collected to date by the working group indicates that American servicemen were not held against their will as a matter of Soviet policy. However, as General Volkogonov noted on several occasions, at the end of World War II the repatriation of some American servicemen with Slavic, Baltic or Jewish names was delayed because of their

ethnic origin. The U.S. side has received no documentary information to support General Volkogonov's statements.

The prime issue of concern to the Russian side of the working group has been to account more fully for more than 450,000 Soviet citizens who were located in displaced persons camps in the American and British zones of occupation at the end of World War II. The U.S. side provided more than 5,500 pages of archival documents which shed light on the fates of more than 300,000 former Soviet POWs and displaced persons. The Commission's efforts to clarify the "displaced persons" question were lauded at celebrations in Moscow commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe.

There are a number of ongoing issues of concern to the U.S. side of the WWII WG and the Commission. They deal primarily with details on the fates of individual American servicemen. Requests for additional information from the Russian side have been made. Research to clarify details related to the fates of these servicemen continues in U.S. archives.

KOREAN WAR WORKING GROUP

The Korean War Working Group (KWWG) has engaged in a concerted effort to clarify the fates of American servicemen missing from the Korean War. In the course of their work, Russian and American researchers have interviewed more than one hundred people and have obtained several hundred pages of documentation from Russian and American archives. In addition, investigators have visited numerous camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals in the former Soviet Union in pursuit of investigative leads.

Based on a thorough and ongoing comparison of U.S. and Soviet records, the KWWG has developed specific information on the circumstances surrounding the loss of 23 American servicemen. In these 23 cases the American servicemen are listed as missing in action. Based on the work of the KWWG, a significant amount of information now exists that indicates that these men perished. The KWWG has also developed information on the fates of another 54 missing-in-action servicemen. The working group believes that continued and coordinated inquiries into the holdings of the Russian Ministry of Defense archives will yield further clarification regarding the fate of individual American POW/MIAs.

The primary focus of the work of the KWWG has been its efforts to determine the facts concerning Soviet involvement with and the transfer of U.S. POWs from the Korean Theater of Operations to the Soviet Union. In the Interim Report of May 1995, the KWWG stated,

"The Commission has received information concerning statements of former Soviet officers asserting that there were cases of transferring American POWs to places of confinement on the territory of the former Soviet Union as well as cases of interrogation of American POWs who were transferred to Soviet territory for this purpose."

In the last year the Commission has heard additional statements from former Soviet servicemen and others who assert that American servicemen were transferred to the Soviet Union. The KWWG attaches great importance to continued efforts to research the issue of the transfer of American POWs to the Soviet Union. It will continue to interview Russian, formerly Soviet, and American veterans and other citizens in pursuit of the facts surrounding this issue.

Central to the continued efforts of the KWWG is further access to Russian archives, particularly those of the Russian Ministry of Defense. At technical talks held in February 1996 in Moscow, the Russian side pledged to provide a large number of potentially relevant documents to the U.S. side. The U.S. side continues to wait for these documents.

COLD WAR WORKING GROUP

The work of the Cold War Working Group (CWWG) has focused on ten specific incidents of U.S. aircraft lost from 1950-1965. These incidents were selected in light of the fact that they occurred on or near the territory of the former Soviet Union and resulted in missing American servicemen. The working group has developed an extensive body of knowledge on certain of these incidents. In its work the CWWG has also addressed the Russian side's requests for information on its servicemen missing from the conflict in Afghanistan and from incidents which occurred during the Cold War era.

As a result of the work conducted to date the CWWG has acquired more than 80 primary Soviet source documents which contain some 200 pages of information of the highest authority relating to the U.S. aircraft loss incidents. Scores of interviews with Soviet pilots who participated in the shootdowns as well as with other participants, witnesses and knowledgeable individuals, have been conducted. The combination of primary-source documentation and witness testimony related to the loss of a USAF RB-29 on 7 October 1952 led to the location, recovery and repatriation of the remains of Captain John Robertson Dunham, USAF.

The Commission has undertaken field trips across the former Soviet Union. The Commission conducted a field investigation of the 2 September 1958 loss of a C-130 near Yerevan in the then-Soviet Republic of Armenia. Commission representatives visited the crash site in August 1993, interviewed witnesses and coordinated a detailed investigation by forensic anthropologists from the U.S. Army. Field investigations continue.

Based on the synthesis of information obtained from U.S. and Russian archives and from interviews conducted with American and Russian veterans and others, the

CWWG has developed a detailed account of the circumstances of loss in several cases. In other cases, the details are less clear. The CWWG cites, in this regard, three examples where further clarification is sought. In the 29 July 1953 loss of a U.S. RB-50, shot down by Soviet fighters near Vladivostok in the Soviet Far East, the co-pilot of the plane survived the crash and was subsequently rescued by the U.S. Navy. Circumstantial evidence has been obtained that additional crew members may have survived. In another case, information has been received that surviving crew members from a plane shot down on 4 July 1952 were interrogated in detail about a crew member missing from an RB-29 shot down by the Soviets near Vladivostok on 13 June 1952. In a third case, the CWWG has information that the remains of a U.S. crew member from a plane shot down in the Barents Sea on 1 July 1960, were recovered by the Soviets. To date, the location of these remains has not been ascertained. Work continues to clarify the details of these and other questions related to each of the Cold War loss incidents.

At this time the CWWG considers increased access to Russian archives of primary importance to furthering the goals of the Commission. The U.S. side has repeatedly pressed for access to Russian Border Guards archives in the belief that the Border Guards units would have played a role or, at least, been fully aware of the circumstances surrounding each of the incidents. The U.S. side has identified relevant documents in the Russian Central Naval archives and has asked the Russian side to provide them for review by the Commission. The request remains open. Work on each of the Cold War incidents continues.

VIETNAM WAR WORKING GROUP

The Vietnam War Working Group (VWWG) of the Commission has examined issues regarding the loss of U.S. servicemen in Southeast Asia. The Russian side has provided the U.S. side 270 pages of material in 76 documents, including 64 pages of

previously classified information from Soviet military intelligence holdings on the air war in Vietnam. Interviews on events in Vietnam during the war years have been conducted with more than 100 witnesses. Many of these interviews have been with intelligence officers, senior military technicians, present and former high-ranking government officials. Efforts to discover additional documentation and to locate and interview additional witnesses continue.

As in other areas of the Commission's work, the Vietnam War Working Group believes it is essential to seek further information from Russian archives regarding the issue of American POW/MIAs from the Vietnam War. In its continuing examination of the issue, the VWWG believes that additional interviews with officers of the former Committee for State Security (KGB), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff are a high priority.

The issues before the VWWG have included the transfer of U.S. POWs to the Soviet Union; Soviet involvement with U.S. POWs in Southeast Asia, either through direct or indirect contact; information from Soviet archives concerning Vietnamese policy toward U.S. POWs, and information known to Soviet veterans and other personnel concerning loss incidents involving U.S. personnel during the Vietnam War. In this context, one of the primary lines of inquiry guiding the work of the VWWG has been the question of whether American POWs were transported from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. At this stage in its investigation, the working group has found no first-hand, substantiated evidence that American prisoners of war were taken from Southeast Asia to the former Soviet Union. However, the working group continues to investigate other information which suggests that such transfers may have taken place. The issue continues to be one of highest priority in the Commission's research and investigation.

The VWWG has reviewed two important documents from the Russian GRU (military intelligence). While not vouching for the accuracy of the documents' contents,

the Russian Co-chairman of the Commission has stated that they are valid transcripts of wartime reports by North Vietnamese officials on the number of American POWs captured and held in North Vietnam during the war. In the first document, dated 1971, a North Vietnamese official stated that 735 American POWs were being held. In the second document, dated 1972, another North Vietnamese official state that 1205 American POWs were being held by the North Vietnamese. Both documents have been dismissed as fabrications by the Government of Vietnam.

The numbers 1205 and 735 are higher than the 591 U.S. servicemen who were returned in early 1973 during Operation Homecoming. There is debate within the U.S. side of the Commission as to whether the numbers cited in these reports are plausible.¹ The U.S. Government has concluded that there is probably more information in Vietnamese party and military archives that could shed light on these documents, and both the U.S. and Russian sides agree that ultimate clarification of these documents should come from the Government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. However, in the interim, the VWWG is continuing to seek additional information from Russian sources to assist with its investigation into these documents, to include access to the Soviet-Vietnamese translators who initially acquired and evaluated these reports, as well as access to relevant archival reports.

The Vietnam War Working Group has also received important leads which may clarify the degree of Soviet involvement with interrogations of American POWs. The VWWG is continuing to seek archival access to determine whether interrogation records might exist in the archives of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the KGB and the GRU. The Commission is also continuing to seek interviews with Russian Vietnam War veterans and Russian personnel who may have relevant recollections. The U.S. side of the Commission has underscored to the Russian side the importance of

¹ A coordinated, interagency intelligence analysis released by the Department of Defense on 24 January 1994 casts doubt on the accuracy of the numbers in the Russian documents. Another analysis, by U.S. Senator Bob Smith released on 21 July 1993, lends credibility to the documents.


determining whether any Vietnamese or Russian interrogation records might contain information on unaccounted for U.S. personnel. The efforts of the VWWG continue.


RECOMMENDATIONS


In its work to date the Commission has made steady progress towards its objectives. In May 1995, an interim report on the work of the Commission was presented to the Presidents of the United States and Russia. This comprehensive report is designed to present to the President of the United States the Commission's findings to date and to inform the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State of the need for follow-up action by each of the Armed Services and other appropriate agencies of the federal government. We have managed to resolve certain of the issues which have been before us. However, we believe that a considerable amount of work remains to be done. We recommend that the United States Government reaffirm its commitment to building and sustaining a vigorous interview and archival search program in Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union to pursue additional information on the fates of American POW/MIAs. This, coupled with a well-targeted use of the media for publicizing the Commission's program and objectives, has proven to be the only effective means for achieving progress. For by keeping the issue of American POW/MIAs in the public eye, both in the U.S. and in Russia, we assure that those with information that might help resolve our unanswered questions are aware of the U.S. Government's efforts on behalf of our unaccounted-for servicemen.


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Prisoners of War/Missing in Action


U.S. Side



Malcolm Toon, Chairman



A. Denis Clift



John E. Herbst



Sam Johnson



John F. Kerry



R. Michael McReynolds


Pete Peterson


Robert C. Smith


Kent M. Wiedemann


James W. Wold


Norman Kass, Executive Secretary

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Ambassador.

Mr. TOON. To date, the U.S. membership of the Commission has visited every one of the 15 states formerly comprising the U.S.S.R., with the single exception of Tajikistan. I have met with the top government officials in each of these countries and have made numerous media appeals asking anyone with information about our missing servicemen to contact us as a gesture of humanitarian concern. Thanks to similar appeals in the past, we have been able to assure that at least one American pilot whose fate was once unknown now rests in peace at Arlington Cemetery.

We have looked hard at the question of transfers of United States servicemen into the former Soviet Union. As a result of my intimate knowledge of the Soviet Union's modus operandi, I have long believed that particularly during the Korean war, the former U.S.S.R. would not have missed a chance to get its hands on our POW's and to exploit them for its own political and military objectives. This view is shared by prominent officials on the Russian side and is supported by a number of leads that the Commission has uncovered, including testimony by a former Soviet sergeant claiming to have seen four United States servicemen being treated in a military hospital north of Vladivostok in 1951.

In each instance where we have obtained such information, we have sought to examine it thoroughly so that we could report the facts to the American people. Unfortunately, despite extensive efforts, we are not yet at a point where we can provide a definitive statement about specific United States servicemen who were caught up in a Soviet program to transfer United States POW's onto Soviet territory. Continuing our investigation into the transfer issue has been and will continue to be a top priority for the Commission in the weeks and months ahead.

In this context, I would like to point out that as my personal view, but it is shared by most of my fellow Commissioners, I would like to point out that our Joint Commission with the Russians must expand its scope to include direct discussions with the governments of the People's Republic of China and North Korea. This is essential if we are to get out all the facts about Americans missing from the Korean war.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Ambassador.

I always envied those whose birthday was the Fourth of July, you, Senator George Murphy, George M. Cohan, and my mother is long in heaven so she cannot get angry when I say this, but she never should have copped out that I was conceived on the Fourth of July, hence, 269 days later, an April 3 birthday. So it is a good day for a person who has served his country as long as you have. Thank you for your statement.

Mr. Liotta, excuse me for trying to attach you to that handsome movie star, Ray Liotta.

Mr. LIOTTA. We do come from the same part of New Jersey.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you really? Is he your cousin?

Mr. LIOTTA. No, no relation.

Mr. DORNAN. You are luckier. You got the red hair.

Mr. LIOTTA. That is right.

Mr. DORNAN. Please go ahead, Mr. Liotta.

**STATEMENT OF ALAN LIOTTA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DEFENSE
POW/MIA OFFICE**

Mr. LIOTTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Unlike Ambassador Toon, this is my first ever Congressional testimony. I am proud that my baptism centers on such an important and critical issue as our efforts to account for our missing men from the Korean war.

In about 20 days, a team of 10 American Department of Defense remains recovery experts will deploy into North Korea on the first ever joint United States-North Korean recovery operation. This unprecedented event is the result of long years of frustrating but ultimately successful negotiations with North Korea on the POW-MIA issue.

The issue of accounting for our missing servicemen in the Korean war is one that we take seriously. It is an issue for which progress has long been overdue. Since the signing of the armistice in 1953, the United States Government has sought to bring home thousands of American servicemen who remain unaccounted for from the Korean conflict. Despite continuous frustrations in dealing with the North Korean and the Chinese governments, we never gave up hope that we would one day make serious progress on this important humanitarian issue. Over the last 6 months, a series of direct talks with the North Koreans finally achieved a breakthrough that the United States Government, veterans of the Korean war, and the families of our missing have long been waiting for.

Prior to these direct contacts, we had conducted talks on the POW/MIA issue through the United Nations Command to its counterpart, the North Korean People's Army at Panmunjom. These talks achieved some progress, including the signing of an agreement in 1993 to regularize the remains repatriation process. This agreement facilitated the subsequent return of over 200 remains between 1990 and 1994. However, as a result of the North Koreans' recovery techniques, we have successfully identified only six of these remains. It was for this reason that we were convinced that joint recovery operations were the only way to proceed if we were to have any hope of recovering significant numbers of identifiable remains.

Despite former North Korean leader Kim Il-song's statement to former President Jimmy Carter in 1994 that joint recovery operations were possible, the Korean People's Army refused over the next 18 months to discuss the issue with the United States. During this time, the United Nations Command continued to negotiate with the North Koreans, pressing them to agree to joint recovery operations, but to no avail. At the end of last year after careful interagency deliberation, we decided to try direct contacts with the Korean People's Army to see if this new venue would achieve the desired results.

Our first direct talks took place in Hawaii in January of this year at the U.S. Army Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii. During these talks, we had three principal objectives: resolve the outstanding issues involving previous repatriations, get the DPRK to commit to joint recovery operations, and demonstrate to them the capabilities of the laboratory to further their understanding of

why we were unable to identify more than six of the 208 remains they had returned to us.

Although the talks at CILHI failed to achieve any agreements, we did succeed in broadening the North Koreans' understanding of the need for joint recovery operations. In late March, the North Koreans signaled that they wished to meet again and we subsequently agreed to hold another round of talks in New York in May of this year. At that time, we resolved the past issues associated with the repatriated remains and agreed to a subsequent working-level meeting in the first half of June 1996 to begin planning joint recovery operations aimed at implementing these operations.

I have just returned from 8 days of these working-level talks in North Korea and am pleased to report that our first joint recovery operation will begin on July 10 at a crash site in Unsan County in the northwestern part of North Korea. This first operation is scheduled to last no more than 20 days. During our working-level talks, we also had the opportunity to briefly visit this site. A second joint recovery operation is set for September of this year. This site is in Nampo City, just southwest of Pyongyang.

I would like to note that although these working-level talks were arduous, we did agree on a myriad of technical details necessary to achieve this long-awaited breakthrough.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Liotta, just one point. I am following your comments and you skipped over that Congressman Richardson was with you. He had hoped to visit with us either on the panel or as a witness today. He may yet come over.

Mr. LIOTTA. It was during his Congressional delegation visit to North Korea over Memorial Day weekend in which I was asked to accompany him because of the remains-related issue talks which he would be having.

Mr. DORNAN. I asked him on the House floor yesterday, was there any discussion of live American prisoners. He said no, and we will get to this later in questioning. I asked Mr. Richardson, were you briefed at all on this? Were you briefed on any of these memos that are coming forward, and he said no. He is very experienced, had a great successful mission in the Middle East to get out those two McDonnell Douglas people.

We all have top secret clearances. I am on the Intelligence Committee. You have to team this thing. We have to work the way Ambassador Toon works with Mr. Peterson and Sam Johnson, the 7-year prisoner, Pete Peterson, almost a 6-year prisoner. It is not your fault. I do not even know if you got the briefing. We will find out in a minute. Please proceed.

Mr. LIOTTA. Thank you. Despite our significant progress on the remains aspect of this issue, we are not content to accept progress on this aspect of the issue alone. A key concern remains unresolved reports of live Americans living in North Korea. Over the years, the United States Government has received reports, mostly hearsay, of live Americans in North Korea. Some of these reports allege the Americans are Korean POW's. Other reports describe them as defectors. Most of the reports have been linked to the appearance of these Americans in a North Korean propaganda film, "Nameless Heroes", or their role as language instructors in a military training facility.

We do know that there are currently four American servicemen who deserted their units in the 1960's, subsequently defected to North Korea, and are still living there. Two later defectors were reported to have died. Because of their close similarities with individuals in the propaganda film and because some of the reports indicate the alleged POW's appeared in the films and served as language instructors, we suspect these individuals are the basis for at least some of these reports. However, because we cannot absolutely rule out the possibility that these Americans account for all of the reports, we continue to investigate these reports to the utmost of our ability.

With specific mention to the four defectors, the State Department has undertaken requests to seek consular access to these individuals in an attempt to talk to them and to see if there is interest in their returning home or at least meeting with their families.

In addition, the Defense POW/MIA Office has begun the daunting task of producing a more accurate listing of the Korean war unaccounted for. This involves reviewing and reconciling the official Korean war casualty list with the American Battle Monuments Commission's list of unaccounted for remains and the Central Identification Laboratory's Korean war forensic data base. Already, we have uncovered thousands of errors and inconsistencies, but there remains much more to accomplish before we have the desired goal of the most accurate listing ever. We hope to complete our first draft of this project in August of this year.

In addition to this, we are continuing our efforts to locate, review, declassify, and centralize Korean war documents from both Department of Defense and National Archives sources. This effort is intended to provide more accurate information to the families as well as make the information more accessible to the public, in compliance with recent congressional legislation.

We are also looking into expanding our contacts with the Chinese government on the Korean war POW/MIA issue. Already, the Chinese are accepting specific case inquiries and we are currently preparing five additional such cases, which we hope to expand this effort into some joint archival research efforts with the Chinese.

Finally, with the approval of the use of DNA as a forensic tool in the identification of remains, families can now provide reference samples through their service casualty office. Mitochondrial DNA testing requires a reference sample from the individual's maternal line, such as the mother, brother, sister, mother's sister or brother, et cetera. The service casualty office will determine who the most eligible next of kin is and arrange for a kit with detailed instructions to be sent to that person for a blood sample to be taken.

The Korean war is often referred to as the forgotten war. As I have demonstrated to you today, hopefully, that is not the case. Our current commitment to account for our servicemen from this conflict is stronger and more robust than at any time since the signing of the armistice. President Clinton reaffirmed this commitment in his dedication of the Korean War Veterans Memorial in Washington in 1994. Secretary of Defense Perry recently signed a DOD policy statement establishing the Korean war accounting effort as a DOD priority, with directions to the individual services to devote the commensurate resources to the effort.

For my part, I can assure you that the Defense POW/MIA Office intends to carry on its mission of accounting for our Korean war missing. We are determined not to let the daunting challenges facing us deter our efforts to succeed, and as American military experts deploy into North Korea next month to begin the first joint recovery operations, they do so in a concerted effort to remember and respect the brave servicemen for whom they are searching and working to bring home after so many years. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Mr. Liotta.

How many in the room are family members of Korean missing in action? Quite a few. Do you know if any are waiting in the hall? Do we still have a line of about seven or eight people out there? I tried to get the bigger room because I knew so many of you do not have military assist travel and paid your own way here. There is nobody? Good, because what I was going to suggest was any staffers who were interested, and I appreciate them being here, they can come up and line the wall up here and make sure we have every family member inside the room.

Thank you for joining us, Ms. Harman. I was going to make an observation, so you got in under the wire before we hear from our third panelist.

My wife, who thought she was going to lose me in Vietnam as a correspondent, because she knew as a reserve fighter pilot, I was stealing and begging every combat mission I could get on, and I did get 14, and I would have had a lot of explaining to do if I had been shot down in what I called a Saigon Sam-suit with civilian identification. I do not think they would have bought, "Just a reporter. I will walk back." They would have said, "CIA. You dead."

My wife sat there in the hearing room for the whole hearing yesterday on Vietnam and then talked for hours afterward, saw our best friend in the Air Force, the wife of a known POW in Laos for at least 5 or 6 years, the famous, sad, infamous David Herdlijska case. She and Carol renewed friendships. Carol started to cry and Sally said, Mr. Pickett was wonderful in his questioning when you left the room. Where was everybody else? Why is there no congressional interest in this?

J.C. Watts came for a while. Ben Gilman read a tough but heartfelt statement. He is the full chairman of International Relations, so he had to get back to other committee hearings and he apologized to me three times today already for not coming back. Ike Skelton, who is always sensitive to these issues, came. Steve Buyer was there for a couple of minutes.

There is something about this issue where good people, thoughtful people, compassionate people say, well, that is it. Let us move on. I have had combat officers who watched the wing man go down say, "Hey, I took my chances. It could have happened to me." I say, where is your empathy? If it happened to you, you have brothers and sisters and mother and aunt and your dad and they all die, and then your kids are 40 and 50 years of age and they start to go through that search in midlife and want to know what happened to my dad. Why would you not be out in the front here? I do not understand the lack of interest.

Then when I find these stories of bureaucrats coming clean now, or Russian combat pilots coming clean. When I try to blend these together, which has been your job, Ambassador, I do not understand why we are letting something slip through our fingers here.

Ms. Harman, at the beginning, I mentioned that one of my heroes, Ike Eisenhower, said something that gave me a chill that I got hold of last night. This came out in the newspapers, November 9, 1992, shortly after Clinton's victory. All eyes were on Arkansas, and it just disappeared. I never even saw it. Nobody even sent it to me. Family members assumed that we are riding this and I would be ahead of them.

Listen to this article. It is very short. The United States Government wrote off American POW's during the Korean war and knew that many United States servicemen were shipped to the Soviet Union, a national security aide to President Eisenhower said yesterday. In fact, retired Army Col. Philip Corso—have any of you seen the BBC documentary where he is right on camera? Ambassador, you have seen it, and many of the family members. They showed it at the Alliance yesterday across the river to the families.

He said he recommended to President Eisenhower the policy in which the administration falsely declared soldiers dead when they were known to have been captured alive. "The fate of our prisoners fell through the cracks. It was not an accident. It was policy, confessing that live Americans in enemy hands after the war," Colonel Corso, 77, said in a news conference. I never heard of a news conference. The retired intelligence officer previewed testimony he expected to give today, November 9, 1992, to the Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs. I asked Senator Bob Smith last night. He said Kerry walked out. McCain walked out. Everybody walked out. One Senator took the testimony from Philip Corso.

He said, "With its end-of-the-year deadline looming, the Senate panel having concentrated its efforts on POW's from the Vietnam war has turned its attention to more than 8,000 servicemen unaccounted for"—that is four times Vietnam—"from the Korean war." As chief of special projects during that war, Colonel Corso was ordered to keep track of American prisoners in North Korea and report his findings to Eisenhower. "I kept getting reports that some of our men were being shipped to Manchuria and then into the Soviet Union." I am told that all of this is still in the NSA archives. It is there. Somebody has to go through the laborious search.

But during the truce talks at Panmunjom, North Korea—we argued about the table shape for 2 years, or the height of the stools—"The American delegation asked North Korea and the Chinese officials about the men only once, and unofficially at that," said Colonel Corso.

Fighting ended in July 1953. After the postwar exchange of prisoners, Pentagon officials were flabbergasted to discover that hundreds of U.S. soldiers known to have been taken prisoner were not returned. "I definitely know of two trainloads of American prisoners, about 1,000 men"—Ambassador, you know what this does to the family members, I am sure you do—"taken to China and then switched to Russian trains and shipped into Siberia. None of those boys ever came back." Colonel Corso said the prisoners were dead

men because they were unlikely to survive and the Soviets would always deny holding them.

He added that the communists used personal data from the POWs to create false identities for their spies, and I remember that year, as an airman basic, reading a story in 1953—I looked it up recently—on a camp in the Soviet Union patterned after a middle-American village with a soda shop, 1950's music, and they would learn to speak in the American idiom to move and act and think and talk like Americans before they were infiltrated into the cold war, and that is where they would have used this.

The last paragraph, to conceal the fate of the prisoners from the public—this is the confession of a 77-year-old officer—Colonel Corso said that he suggested in 1955 that Eisenhower declare the men dead. President Eisenhower said to me, "I think you are right. I accept your recommendation," the retired colonel said. The American people were not made aware of this matter until this month. Eisenhower, class of 1915—I always wanted to go to West Point; that is why I am wearing my West Point tie—duty, honor, country. There is nothing honorable about that blight in an otherwise excellent tenure.

Ms. HARMAN. Mr. Chairman?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes?

Ms. HARMAN. Would you yield to me just for a moment?

Mr. DORNAN. Please.

Ms. HARMAN. I appreciate your moving words. I would just like to say how important I think it is that you are holding these hearings and to say for myself, and I am sure it is true for so many others on this subcommittee, that there are conflicting hearing schedules.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Ms. HARMAN. I just left one on proliferation of nuclear weapons, which I know you are intensely interested in, too, and it is very hard to be everywhere. I hope many of the families know that we were in session until 11:30 last night—

Mr. DORNAN. Midnight, actually.

Ms. HARMAN. Midnight, and this place seems to be working all the time. It is not an excuse, but so many of us have conflicting schedules.

I would just like to add this. As you know, Mr. Chairman, you represented parts of my congressional district in California, and on Pacific Street in Venice, CA, there is a haunting mural that says, "Do not forget our POW/MIA's."

Mr. DORNAN. I have seen it.

Ms. HARMAN. And there is a list of names. I just want to tell the families that I do not forget and that I take these issues very seriously and that I join with you and our other subcommittee members in trying to find answers everywhere in the world where we have been at war and where there are people unaccounted for. As a mother of two sons and two daughters, I think one of my worst nightmares would be having my children serve our country and never knowing what became of them.

Mr. DORNAN. Mrs. Harman, thank you for bringing that up because you sound like me last night, around 1 in the morning, explaining to my wife again, and she has been a 20-year congress-

sional wife, the divided duties around here, and I am glad you brought that up because I want to tell all the family members in the room that Ms. Harman speaks for most members.

I should have added that I have had people coming up to me for the last several months thanking me for these hearings, apologizing for not coming, asking me how they are going. There is an intense interest in this. It is not like it is completely forgotten. I think what I meant to convey was the frustration of, what can you do about it? I mean, half the House is younger—almost, not quite—they were all toddlers or not born, half the House, when the Chinese came across and entered this conflict in Korea in November, and then the boys obviously were not going to be home for Christmas. Some of them maybe are still there through 45 Christmases.

So I appreciate you bringing that up, because I do not want the families to think there is not great concern about this. The truth is, I told Curt Weldon at the hearing that you just came from that what he was doing, what you have just been working on, is the most important thing we can do in Congress today, because one American city or one European city or Haifa disappearing to a nuclear device is more people than every tragedy and every war in the history of the United States, every killed in action, wounded, or missing all put together, just one city. I was trying to get the big room. I said, no, you keep the big room. I am trying to clean up the past. You are trying to save a horrible tragedy in the future.

I did not mean to set you up, Mr. Brown, for any more pressure than you feel, but to Jane and anybody who has just joined us, this is the Director of Korean Affairs at the Department of State with an extensive background. I have not had a chance to go over your biography but I have had a briefing on how extensive your knowledge is. Please proceed, Mr. Brown.

STATEMENT OF DAVID G. BROWN, DIRECTOR, KOREAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman, it is my pleasure to have this opportunity presented by the initiative you have taken to hold these hearings, which I do think are extremely important. I must say I have a certain sympathy for the comments you have made about the apparent lack of interest or the difficulty of generating interest in this subject because even some members of my own family have asked, why in the world is a State Department official getting involved in questions of remains and MIA issues left over from the Korean war? I have to, I am sure, explain it in the same way that you do, that we have a complete commitment to all of those people who have been sent overseas to serve their country.

Mr. DORNAN. You have been to the Korean Memorial.

Mr. BROWN. I have, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. That answers everything.

Mr. BROWN. It is a beautiful—

Mr. DORNAN. Haunting.

Mr. BROWN. Yes. The return of remains of United States servicemen and an accounting for those still missing have been important issues for the United States since the end of the Korean war. We have been in active contact with the Democratic People's Republic

of Korea [DPRK] on the remains issue since 1985 through a variety of channels.

I would like very much to acknowledge that a number of Congressmen have played important roles over the last decade, including Congressman Sonny Montgomery, Senator Bob Smith—

Mr. DORNAN. Who thanked me this morning for having these hearings, deeply, told me to press on, and that he will join me later. He has a conflict.

Mr. BROWN. If you look at the record, you will see his early involvement in this issue. I would also mention Senator Frank Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, your own comments in hearings last November helped underline through the DPRK the importance of this issue, and as has been mentioned, most recently, Congressman Bill Richardson visited Pyongyang and his principal purpose was to convey his sense of the importance of this issue of the return of remains.

Over the last several months, the State Department has worked very closely with DOD on the remains issue. We have served as a channel of communication with the DPRK. We have dispatched personnel to assist DPMO negotiators in the negotiations you have heard about, and we have tried to provide the political advice we can provide on the overall context in which their work is being conducted with North Korea.

What is that political context? The United States-Democratic People's Republic of Korea agreed framework of October 1994 made clear to North Korea that the implementation of the nuclear agreement and progress on other issues of concern to the United States would be needed in order for North Korea's relations with the United States to improve. In addition to the nuclear issue, we have made clear to the North Koreans repeatedly our concerns about a number of issues, including missile proliferation that you just mentioned, the DPRK's support for terrorism, the importance of North-South dialog, the reduction of the conventional military threat in the Korean peninsula, and, prominently, the return of the remains of American servicemen who died in North Korea. We have stressed repeatedly the importance of resolving the important humanitarian issue that this committee is addressing.

Our South Korean allies have fully understood our efforts to deal with North Korea on the remains issue, recognizing the importance of this humanitarian issue to us. I would like to express our appreciation for the understanding and support which the Republic of Korea has shown for this work.

Under DPMO's skillful and patient leadership, our consistent approaches to the North Koreans have produced some significant and welcome progress. As Mr. Liotta has indicated in his testimony, detailed negotiations with North Korea over the past 5 months produced agreement last week in Pyongyang to conduct the first joint recovery operations in North Korea next month.

These negotiations have taken place against the backdrop of 40 years of post-Korean war hostility between the United States and North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the world. The Korean People's Army, that is the organization with which DPMO reached agreement last week and with which DPMO will be working together to conduct these joint recovery operations,

has been one of the most impenetrable elements of this North Korean society. In this context, I think our agreement to conduct joint recovery operations involving United States military personnel in North Korea, working cooperatively with the North Korean Army, is truly a major accomplishment.

Apart from the return of remains, there is the related and important question of whether there are American POW's or MIA's still alive in North Korea. We in the State Department fully support DOD's efforts to check every and all reports alleging that there may still be Americans held against their will in North Korea. While there have been reports of live American POW's, thus far, the United States Government has been unable to substantiate that any Americans are being held in North Korea against their will.

The agreement to conduct joint recovery operations bodes well for our ability to make progress on the repatriation of remains and to resolve the fate of American soldiers still listed as missing in the Korean war. That is the end of my testimony, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]

House Committee on National Security
Sub-committee on Military Personnel

June 20, 1996

THE RETURN OF REMAINS AND POW/MIA ISSUES WITH NORTH KOREA

Testimony of David G. Brown
Director, Office of Korean Affairs
Department of State

Mr. Chairman,

It is my pleasure to represent the State Department before this committee.

The return of the remains of US servicemen and an accounting for those missing have been important issues for the US since the end of the Korean War. We have been in active contact with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) on the remains issue since 1985. A number of channels have been used to achieve progress on this issue, including the Military Armistice Commission, meetings between US and DPRK Embassies in Beijing, our New York channel via the DPRK UN Mission, and direct negotiations, most recently between US delegations led by the Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and North Korean delegations led by the Foreign Ministry and including representatives of the Korean People's Army (KPA).

A number of Congressmen have also played important roles over the last decade, including Congressman Sonny Montgomery

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and Senators Bob Smith and Frank Murkowski. Mr. Chairman, your own comments in hearings last November helped underline the importance of this issue. Most recently, Congressman Bill Richardson visited Pyongyang to convey the importance of North Korean cooperation on the return of remains.

State and DOD have cooperated in various ways to accomplish the US goal of bringing fallen Americans home through the institution of joint recovery operations. Over the last several months, the State Department has assisted DOD by serving as a channel of communications with the North, by despatching personnel to assist DPMO's negotiators and by providing advice on the political context within which the remains negotiations have taken place.

What is the political context for these activities? The US-DPRK Agreed Framework of October, 1994 made clear to North Korea that the implementation of the nuclear agreement and progress on other issues of concern to the United States would be needed in order for North Korea's relations with the US to improve. In addition to the nuclear issue, we have made clear to the North Koreans our concerns about a number of other issues. These include: missile proliferation, DPRK support for terrorism, North-South dialogue, the reduction of conventional military threats, and -- prominently -- the return of the remains of American servicemen who died in North Korea during the Korean War.

We have made clear to the North Koreans that more normal relations will only be possible if we are able to make progress on these issues of concern to the US. We have stressed the importance of resolving the important humanitarian issue of repatriating remains.

Our South Korean allies have fully understood our efforts to deal with North Korea on the remains issue, recognizing the importance of this humanitarian issue to the US. We appreciate the understanding and support they have shown.

Under DPMO's skillful leadership, our consistent approaches to the North Koreans have produced some significant and welcome progress. As Mr. Liotta has indicated in his testimony, detailed negotiations with North Korea over the past five months produced agreement last week in Pyongyang to conduct the first joint recovery operations in North Korea beginning next month. DPRK agreement to joint recovery operations is a major step forward.

These negotiations have taken place against the backdrop of forty years of post-Korean War hostility between the US and North Korea. North Korea is perhaps the most closed society in the world. The Korean Peoples Army, the organization with which DPMO reached agreement last week and with which DPMO will be working to conduct the joint recovery

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operations, has been one of the most impenetrable elements in North Korea. In this context, our agreement to conduct joint recovery operations with the KPA in North Korea is truly a major accomplishment. And one on which we must build with continued firmness and patience.

Apart from the return of remains there is the related and important question of whether there are Americans POWs or MIAs still alive in North Korea. The State Department fully supports DOD's efforts to check all reports alleging that there may be Americans held against their will in North Korea. While there have been reports of live American POWs, thus far, the USG has been unable to substantiate that any Americans are being held in North Korea against their will.

The agreement to conduct joint recovery operations reflects the success we have had in persuading North Korea of the importance of these humanitarian issues and in building a basis for constructive work with North Korea. This bodes well for our ability to make progress on the repatriation of remains and to resolve the fate of the American soldiers still listed as missing in action from the Korean War. We will continue to encourage North Korean cooperation, making clear that concrete accomplishments are needed in this and other areas in order for our bilateral relations to improve.

Thank you.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown.

I will ask my colleagues to indulge me, because I have set a pattern in this committee of letting all members go first and go last, but if you would not mind, Mr. Pickett, I have been doing so much midnight reading on this that I would like to ask a few questions first.

Mr. PICKETT. Please go ahead.

Mr. DORNAN. Ambassador, what is your assessment, and I know this is tough, Mr. Ambassador, because it is a personal question and it is the kind of thing that the press feeds off and tends to want to, by isolation, exaggerate it, embellish it, or make it some sort of definitive statement based on hard-core knowledge, but I think the families are entitled to ask you this, since you put 4 hard years into this. And Ms. Harman, Ambassador Toon just proudly stated that over the Fourth of July holiday, on that very date, he turns 80, and he thought this was a 6-month assignment. He called off what he was beginning to think was a good, well-earned retirement.

Here is the question. What is your assessment personally about the transfer of American POW's during the Korean war? Let me use your own words back at you, because yesterday I used it several times and used the word obsession, that Soviets who had their pilots running the air war, their best fighter pilots over there, you saw the photographs in the documentary of them in Chinese neutral clothing with no insignia in Beijing on the way to Mukhden and Manchuria and then down to Korean bases when they had enough real estate to operate out of there. You have seen these officers, with the general officer rank eventually and a chest full of medals.

They would lust, I said yesterday, they would be obsessed at getting an F-86 Saber and as many pilots as they could, and in the BBC documentary, you see extensive—I saw this in the archives a month ago. I said I thought they gave phony germ warfare confessions and used bad grammar as they did in Vietnam, "I are an aerial war pirate of the blackest most evil kind," et cetera. Instead, here are complicated drawings of all the K-series air bases, K-13, K-16 where the ammunition depot was, if they had ever had the wherewithal to bomb us, the kind of thing the Germans would have lusted for, for RAF bases during conflict.

And then formations of how to tactically form up and fight and engage and break up into elements and dog fight. I could not believe they got this out of our pilots. Now, what was released to us by the Russians was always by returned pilots, much to their embarrassment, never anybody that was not accounted for—very clever.

Back to the question. What is your gut feeling, Mr. Ambassador, about whether or not they acted upon where we agreed they had this lust to get at our pilots, whipping them so badly in air combat?

Mr. TOON. I think, Mr. Chairman, as you know, I knew the Soviet Government pretty well, having worked with it for almost 8 years, 2 years as Ambassador, and I am convinced, knowing the Soviet Government, that they would have used every effort to get their hands on qualified American POW's.

Beyond that, I think we ought to recognize that the Soviet Union was really running that war in Korea. The Koreans were doing exactly what the Soviets wanted them to do, unlike the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi. One of the interesting things that we discovered over the past 4 years is the relationship between Moscow and Hanoi was probably worse than the relationship between Washington and Hanoi, despite the fact that we were at war. But that was not the case between Pyongyang and Moscow. Moscow was running the whole show.

Mr. DORNAN. Is it correct that Stalin had a Chinese pseudonym, Sung See [ph.] that he would sign documents with? That was in that documentary, and they showed the documents.

Mr. TOON. I have seen that allegation.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, that he would have this Chinese name that he would sign documents with and that he was reluctant to unleash Kim and Kim Il-song made the case and he said, when they said, look, the Koreans are collapsing. MacArthur will have the whole peninsula by Christmas. They are on the Yalu and a couple of points. We have to go in. It was a date I have never known, October 19 that he signed using this Chinese name, go ahead. Go at them. Then he was embarrassed when the whole United Nation stayed in and the war went up to a higher level.

Mr. TOON. Mr. Chairman, throughout my private conversations with General Volkogonov, my former opposite number, now deceased, and in my many meetings with Russian officials, I have expressed my deep suspicion that this happened. We have not found any archival evidence that this is the case.

I did try to meet with a former member of the Politburo when I was Ambassador there by the name of Mr. Punamajov. He is the only living member of the former Politburo when I was Ambassador. I asked to meet with him in order to find out the answer to this question, because I am convinced that if any American POW's came to the Soviet Union, the first person to know about it would be the top man, who was Brezhnev at the time—who was Stalin at the time.

But the answer came back, yes, he would meet with me, and two weeks later, the answer came back that he was ill and he could not meet with me. So I submitted my questions to him in writing and the answer came back was that he had no knowledge at all that would be useful to me.

So we have run into an absolute blank brick wall on this whole issue. That is why I think it is important for us to talk to the North Koreans as members of the Commission and to the Chinese and find out just what the story is about this. I have read the Corso testimony before and we have quoted this time and time again to our Russian opposite numbers, but they cannot find any archival information that would back this up.

Mr. DORNAN. Can we find archival information on our side on Philip Corso? I cannot believe—he admitted to me he was partially unprepared. I cannot believe that one Senator, Bob Smith of New Hampshire, who is the junior member and felt much abused on that committee—whether it is true or not, he felt abused by some other Republicans joining forces with a predetermined agenda, battering him around, that is the way he felt, and exhausting him, he

told me. He was just at his wit's end. And he sits there alone with Corso.

If Corso is trying to get something off his conscience, I am all for truth serum if he will do it. He is a free man. I am all for polygraphing and I am all for getting his assistance to find archival evidence on what he bases it on, because you are a Russian expert, but I sat at a table with Henry Hyde at one side opposite Yeugeny Primakov in Lubyonka, or a satellite of Lubyonka, and I said, trying to break the ice a little bit, I said, look, why do you not tell me if you have any agents in the CIA right now and we will get rid of them this will really establish a friendship.

Aldrich Ames was highly active at that moment and for the next year. And he gets this knowing look on his face and he says, like a little kid, "You tell me where yours are and I will tell you where mine are." We walked out and Henry Hyde said to me, "This guy is a tough customer." He is now the foreign minister. This is a man who would pick up a phone and say, "You are sick," or "You are not going to get your check in retirement, my ex-Politburo friend. You are sick."

And he calls the Archives and says—they never destroy anything, thank God. It is like Nixon not following Buckley's advice to destroy the tapes that he owned until they became public knowledge and it was too late. He calls the Archives and says, "Seal that section off. Do not show Ambassador Toon anything," and you shut your mouth. That is the stone wall we are running into.

That is why I asked for your own gut feeling and I guess I will have to just go with your analysis that they would literally die or get people killed or die themselves to get this information because they are preparing for World War III and they do not want our planes to shoot them down at the rate of 7, 8, or 13 to 1. So that is where we are stuck, and it is a stone wall and that is why in my opening remarks I said, windows opening, windows closing and why, and probably Mr. Liotta will feel the brunt of my questioning on this, why we cannot make definitive statements about conclusive and credible and not credible and this in an analytical paper, but we will get to that later.

Another question, Mr. Ambassador. You already answered this one. It is on the Russian Archives. But how about in the Russian Archives did we find anything on Chinese knowledge? Congressman Sam Johnson, who has enjoyed serving on this with you, told me, "The key is China. The key is China, China on everything, China on Vietnam, China on Korea, China on the Soviet cooperation. They went by train through China. Everything is China." What do you think about the Russians? Did they ever say to you, "Go to China. It is in their archives."

Mr. TOON. Many times.

Mr. DORNAN. Many times. That is——

Mr. TOON. These are the Chinese, the North Vietnamese, and the North Koreans have the answer to these questions that you put to us.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. TOON. Frankly, I think at some point, as I said in my remarks, we should sit down with the Chinese and the North Koreans and discuss this problem very frankly with them. But, as you

know, I am no longer a member of the government. I am a private citizen trying to enjoy life down in North Carolina and I simply await the time when my colleagues in the State Department say, it is appropriate for you now to approach the Chinese. And when they do that, then I will be glad, together with Congressman Sam Johnson, who is head of the working group on Korea, to talk with the Chinese about this and try to find out what they know.

Mr. DORNAN. Fortunately, in that culture, your fourscore of wisdom in years has some credibility, unlike some other countries that say, well, his time is gone. But the Chinese do respect that.

You have answered question four, your assessment of Chinese knowledge based on what you uncovered in Russia. You say you are entering your fifth year. This is a key question and it is one, if it is carried in the press or if the Russian Embassy has a person in the audience, is the Russian cooperation increasing or decreasing at present?

Mr. TOON. Let me be perfectly frank with you in answering that question. The cooperation we have had from the Russian side is much better than I ever thought we would get, but it falls short of what we need in order to answer the basic questions that we have on our POW's and MIA's. I am convinced on the Korean POW problem that there are files in the Presidential Archives that would prove this point, but we have not been able to get our hands on any files.

Now I can understand this. If, for example, Washington, the executive branch, should order the CIA and the FBI to open up all their files to the former enemy, do you think there would be wild enthusiasm about doing this?

Mr. DORNAN. Good point.

Mr. TOON. There is not wide enthusiasm among certain circles, the circles represented by Mr. Primakov, whom I know very well. I must say, I am not wildly enthusiastic about him being foreign minister, but that is a personal view.

Mr. DORNAN. I have been over to the Soviet Union 10 times, never to Russia, since the union collapsed, just circumstance and other things to do. But when you were there, and I went through there many times, there was an electricity in the air. You know how you had a morale problem with some of your troops. They would get there, the excitement of the Soviet Union, and then that grayness would close in, particularly in 1986, 1987, 1988, and 1989. They would say, "This is the most depressing place," after 2 or 3 months. All my skills, you begin to weigh, and one of them was married so he had his wife there who was an active duty foreign service officer and they said, "Anything, any place in the world would be better than this," because it was that tension right before the collapse.

After that mood change, I am sure you have seen some of these documentaries, and here is an example I want to give you and the family members about people's desire to talk at some point in their life, like the Soviet generals in uniform before camera and Colonel Corso.

I saw a film on the—what is the Russian word for memory?

Mr. TOON. Pamyat.

Mr. DORNAN. I think that was the name of the film, and they showed where apartment complexes had been built on mass graves. Now, I consider myself more than a student on the Holocaust, having visited 19 concentration camps, several more than once, from Babyar to Salasviels to the Yusanovach in Yugoslavia, and many trips to Auschwitz. I am looking at this like a Holocaust of hundreds of thousands of people, mass graves, and they are showing how they deliberately under Stalin and later built apartment buildings right on the grave.

And then here comes a man who wants to talk, a plain-looking Russian, looked for all the world sort of like Solzhenitsyn without the beard and he says, "I remember my worst day, I killed 300 people in the woods." He said, "My arm was so tired at the end of the day, I could hardly hold it up, shooting them in the back of the head over and over," describing how the people could be brow-beaten into being submissive. It reminded me of Yusanovach, of a corrupt, hate-filled ex-Catholic priest who started a bet with 2 other guards, who could kill the most people in one night, and the other 2 guards quit at 200 and he killed 300 using a sledgehammer, and there was the sledgehammer in the museum case and it has been destroyed by Franco Tujman, who does not want any part of that bad memory of Croatia.

So I look at these, that one is an archival thing in Yusanovach in what is now Croatia, and the other is a man I am looking at on film talking about he killed 300 human beings in one night until his arm would not come up anymore, and you could tell it was painful for him to say it, how he kept it secret for a while, but now he wants to get it off his conscience.

There are people who will talk, who are willing to talk, but the leadership says, shut up, this pride thing. The current foreign service or the KGB, do not talk, do not talk, do not talk, and that is why it is so delicate to get through these openings and try and go with—that is why I said earlier private independent resources, skilled researchers, not an eager young bureaucrat who says, "Well, it is not a mindset to debunk. I am tough. I want conclusive evidence and that is it."

I have no more questions to you other than do you think, on a hopeful note, that the Yeltsin government, if it gets through the runoff, might be more forthcoming, the window might open up a little bit more?

Mr. TOON. The problem, basically, is this, Mr. Chairman. The people that I dealt with are still around in important places and it those people who block access to the information that we need. I am talking about the Primakovs, people like that.

Mr. DORNAN. Right, and the people who would talk are on a pension and it is a lousy pension and it is diminishing in value. They want some peace, but they also want to get it off their conscience.

What we will do is we will continue with the Ambassador and then we will go down to the other two.

Thank you for joining us, Mr. Gejdenson of Connecticut.

Mr. PICKETT. Mr. Ambassador, you have indicated that timing might be the key to real success in being able to answer a lot of questions about the missing as a result of the Korean war, that you just cannot walk in and take action and conclude what you have

undertaken. The timing and being able to talk with the right people and having the right environment in which to pursue this is very important to success. I think you have indicated that.

My question relates to the organization of the Commission that has been set up to investigate this issue and goes to the question of whether you feel that there are adequate resources behind what you are undertaking to do, whether there is an adequate long-range plan to stay the course, to get to the point where the environment will be "right" to get to the bottom of this issue. How do you feel about that?

Mr. TOON. I think you never are satisfied with the degree of cooperation you get from the Government, but I think, in fairness, I should point out that we have managed to get the sort of transportation that I think we need to carry out the job. I made it very clear when I took on this job almost 5 years ago that under no conditions was I was going to fly Aeroflot and I had to have a reliable aircraft. So what I——

Mr. DORNAN. You have experienced the vodka breath that I have? They pass it up and down the cabin for free. I thought it was water.

Mr. TOON. I flew Aeroflot a lot in the old days.

Mr. DORNAN. I bet you did. So did I.

Mr. TOON. I had had my fill of that sort of thing. But in any case, I made clear that under no conditions will I fly Aeroflot. I had to have my own aircraft, and we have had that all the way through.

Under the Bush administration, we flew directly from Andrews Air Force Base and the plane stayed with us throughout our, usually a week or 10-day, visit. Under the Clinton administration—I probably should not say this—but apparently, in order to save money, we fly commercially now to Frankfurt. Then we pick up the plane that was carrying Ron Brown. Now we have another plane that usually takes us. But in any case, I do have that sort of cooperation.

As far as finances are concerned, I think now in the Pentagon we have the sort of support that we should have had many years ago. So that, I think, has been adequately taken care of.

Personnel problems from time to time are a little bit difficult, but I think that we have reached the point now where there is a general recognition across the whole Government that this is an important issue.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you. That was the main thing I wanted to get on the record.

Mr. DORNAN. Ms. Harman, and then Mr. Gejdenson.

Ms. HARMAN. I only have this question. I have listened carefully and it is a very frustrating and sad circumstance in which we find ourselves. As the chairman pointed out, many families who are sitting in this room, I wonder what any of these witnesses has to say to these families about the future for them. Should they remain hopeful? Do you think that in some finite period of time there will be more information? I realize it is unknown what will happen with the Russian election and then if the Yeltsin administration will be cooperative, but do you have anything to address to these families?

Mr. TOON. Let me just say a word about this. I have made clear from the very beginning of this exercise that there was to be nothing classified. Now, there was a practical reason for this. I am sitting down in North Carolina and I have no way of maintaining classified files, and that has been followed all the way through. That means that any information that we have gotten from the Russian side or from the other republics—I visited 14 of them, as I told you—has been made available to the families because it is unclassified. So as far as I am concerned, everything that I know, they know.

Ms. HARMAN. Anyone else? Mr. Brown? Mr. Liotta?

Mr. LIOTTA. In terms of—

Ms. HARMAN. Anything at all. You have been addressing your comments to this panel, as you should. I am asking you as a panel member to address any comments you might have to the families that are sitting behind you.

Mr. LIOTTA. I would hope that the family members do maintain the hopes and expectations and the demands that they put upon their Government and which we are trying to move forward with. One of the things which my office has done is we have begun an outreach program, where we are going out across the country, sending teams of people from our office to meet with family members in their home districts as opposed to having them have to travel to Washington, DC, answer their questions about their individual cases, update them and give them briefings on what is currently happening within our office, within the State Department, with the United States-Russia Joint Commission, and other avenues to give them the sense of where our progress lies, where our frustrations lie, and what we are trying to do to overcome that in an effort to keep them fully apprised of where we are going, where we hope to be, and what is left to be done.

Ms. HARMAN. Thank you. Mr. Brown, any comment?

Mr. BROWN. Just to add to that the hope that they would have and understand that their Government is working on their behalf, that we take their concerns seriously, that we are trying to do everything we can to track down the information to support DOD's efforts. This is a difficult problem and we will do our best.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

Mr. Gejdenson is here for the second panel. Bob Dumas is the brother of a Korean war POW Army private and will be on that second panel. He is from your district.

STATEMENT OF HON. SAM GEJDENSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CONNECTICUT

Mr. GEJDENSON. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I would just like to commend you for holding these hearings and just say for one moment that I know how difficult a situation this is. My parents survived Hitler and Stalin in Europe, and as a young child, there were constantly stories of brothers and sisters and cousins who may or may not have survived the Holocaust or survived Stalin.

I think for those of us in Government, we have two responsibilities here. One is to make sure that any American military personnel who risk their lives for the security of this country and the en-

tire planet, that they deserve an unending effort to determine their situation, whatever that might be.

We also owe to the families a responsibility to make sure that those who would profit from exploiting their feelings are not given any advantage, and I know from working with Bob how determined he is, and I know that all of us here understand that in some ways, these family members have paid a greater price than those who have certainty about the loss of relatives.

As a child, I remember people used to come around and tell you, for \$10,000, we could find a cousin or an uncle hidden away in Siberia somewhere. In virtually every instance, the money disappeared and no information was gathered.

So that is why I think it is particularly critical that the Government of this country, elected by its citizens, lead this effort to make sure that every honest effort is made and that people's emotions are not simply toyed with.

I will not be able to stay because I have a 3 o'clock meeting that I must tend to, but I want to commend Bob for all he has done and commend you and the committee for its efforts today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Before you go, a quick story because it is \$10,000. The worst story I ever heard in Vietnam—I know the Ambassador may not have heard this because it is a Vietnamese true story. Mrs. McDonald, I met her at the league family meetings. Her young son, a Navy pilot, was one of the tougher cases, a good shoot or radio contact on the ground. She ran into a stone wall trying to get at some briefings. It was during this "seal everything up" period and things were leaking out slowly.

She gets a call, "Come to Mexico City." This is a mom now in her 70's. She goes to Mexico City and some evil creep says, here is a picture of your son, half of it. Give me \$10,000 and I will go get you the other half. She comes up with \$10,000 and never hears from him again and now she is dead.

If that does not tell you the horror of this case and the scavengerous people that will hang around the fringes, and the \$10,000 triggered that. I will give you a report on the Dumas family. Thank you.

Mr. GEJDENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Ambassador, where was the one pilot? You said it was satisfying to at least get one case solved. Did you find his remains somewhere in Russia?

Mr. TOON. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. One of those 14 trips?

Mr. TOON. No. What happened was that—see, on every visit that I have made, in every city that I have visited, I have gone on Russian television or the television stations of the 14 republics and made an appeal.

Mr. DORNAN. And you speak in Russian.

Mr. TOON. If the local people do not mind that.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. TOON. There is a feeling of reluctance to use the Russian language in some of the new republics. But if they do not mind it, then I speak in Russian. I usually start off with a few words of Russian in any case.

But in any case, I appeal to the people to come forward with any information they may have about any American POW/MIA's and point out to them that, unlike in the past when they would have been punished for doing this sort of thing, they would be commended by the local government. And I can assure my audience, on the basis of my conversations that day with the President, the foreign ministers, and so forth, that this was the case.

In response to one of these appeals, a former member of a crew of a trawler off the Vladivostok coast came forward with a ring and offered to sell it to me. I pointed out to my opposite number, you just remind this young man—young man, he was about 75—that he is holding stolen property. It was Dunham's ring, Dunham's Naval Academy ring. So he came forward with the ring and gave it to me finally and we sent it to the family.

Then we quizzed him very thoroughly about what happened and he told us that the body of Dunham was pulled out of the water—

Mr. DORNAN. Spell that Dunham.

Mr. TOON. D-u-n-h-a-m, Captain Dunham. He was pulled out of the water off the Pacific Coast and he knows exactly where it was buried. So we made a joint team of American experts and Russian experts and went out there and dug up a lot of territory before we finally found Dunham's body.

Mr. DORNAN. Was Captain Dunham an air pilot or off a ship?

Mr. TOON. He was an air pilot.

Mr. DORNAN. I get the full story. That alone is a dramatic story, a ring. A Medal of Honor winner, Lance Sigent—the chow hall is named after him at the Air Force Academy—his ring turned up in Thailand years after he had disappeared and then died in captivity. Other members saw his sad shape from a beating for 30 days. But his ring turned up. That kind of an old story, of course, to the family members, it chokes them up and they think, I would be satisfied for a ring.

One final thing. Had you ever heard of this Clapper report, that is General Clapper when he was head of the DIA, on this experimentation and execution, probably?

Mr. TOON. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. There are things I guess we still have to keep classified so as not to have more people pick up the phone and tell retired people, shut your mouth or you will lose your dough, or sealing off archives, but that is why you have to work with us—and this is more to the other two gentlemen—so that Mr. Gejdenson, properly representing his family in Connecticut—we all have top secret clearances. I do not want this friction back and forth.

I want the bureaucrats, and I say that with the best sense, the investigators, let us say, to understand that we are the first line of contact. It is like the Willy and Joe cartoons in World War II. Write your Congressman if you do not like it here, and people do, and sometimes we can help.

Let me change the order here, Mr. Liotta. Because this is your baptismal appearance before Congress, I will let you be the anchor man.

Mr. BROWN. I will mess up your plans, Mr. Chairman, by saying it is my first time.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Ambassador, did you read the RAND report? I have met Paul Cole, who is going to be on the next panel, and he has my confidence. I saw him also in this BBC documentary. I am not a bad investigator, after doing 6 years of interrogating people in front of a camera and winning emmys for it. I am pretty good at getting information out of people, getting them to say things they did not plan on when they came on my TV show.

But I like Paul Cole's report. I know what a great archivist he is.

Mr. TOON. I know Cole very well. I have had a number of sessions with him. I think he is pretty well informed.

Mr. DORNAN. Good. All right, Mr. Brown. Has the State Department, in fact, contacted the North Korean Government to gain access—we will take the easy one first—to the four defectors who you agree are alive and there and we have their names and hometowns?

Mr. BROWN. We are in the process of doing that. We have indicated to them that this is an issue we want to raise and we plan to do so.

Mr. DORNAN. And one intends to come home or would like to come home?

Mr. BROWN. We have indications that one of them may want to, but until, of course, we have some way of arranging access to that person, we are not in a position to confirm that.

Mr. DORNAN. If they were civilian defectors, under the Vietnam period, Jimmy Carter gave them amnesty. These are military deserters and that is on the books, so they would have to go through a court martial if they come home.

Mr. BROWN. I am not an expert in that aspect of it, Congressman.

Mr. DORNAN. All right.

Mr. TOON. May I make a personal observation here?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, please.

Mr. TOON. I do not quite understand why we seek an appointment with these defectors in order to find out whether they wanted to come home or not. My own feeling is that we ought to ask them for any information they may have and just leave them there.

Mr. DORNAN. That is the only reason. I agree. I agree. Of course, if a guy was willing to take his medicine, go through a court martial, just to get to come home, that he would prefer an American jail for a while to the depressive and near starvation status that you are the expert on, Mr. Brown, I would say, OK, that is fair if you give us information. But then they enter the category of this whole ugly industry that victimized the aforementioned mom, Mrs. McDonald, where they would say, "I will make up stuff and get to come home."

This is why I went to Ronald Reagan in November 1984 and said, truth serum Bobby Garwood. Get his permission. I said, I am inclined—there is a James Bond streak in my generation—kidnap him and stick the truth serum in him, for God's sake, if we find out about live American prisoners. They are going to court martial him.

If these defectors would be willing to say, "Yes, I will take truth serum"—and I have seen it work on test pilots who could not re-

member a bailout and when they give them the truth serum, on video. I have seen Fish Salmon, the famous Lockheed pilot, read off the instruments that a human would not even remember, that it heightened his memory under truth serum as he is spinning in an F-104 into the ground, about to eject, a violent ejection.

Give them the truth serum and if it pans out, then they come home and face the court martial. But they owe it to their country if they have ever seen another American or if one of the language translators is there under POW status. That is where I may have some disagreement with Mr. Liotta, that some of these reports are more than hearsay, it is firsthand, and it indicates 60- to 70-year-old, or depending on the sighting date, of late 50's or early 60's, 2 or 3 years older than I am, in a guarded status.

Was a request made, Mr. Brown, to the North Korean Government? You say you have made that formal request?

Mr. BROWN. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. You are negotiating. Do you think that they, if they do give us access to these people, do you think they would be inclined to threaten or brief these people, you must not talk about any other Caucasian you have ever come in contact with?

Mr. BROWN. I think we would have to assume the worst—

Mr. DORNAN. Assume the worst.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. In that sort of circumstance, and would have to be seeking access, if we can get it, to them in the normal kind of circumstances where people would be able to speak freely.

Mr. DORNAN. How long ago was the request made?

Mr. BROWN. We indicated this week—

Mr. DORNAN. This week?

Mr. BROWN. You have to understand, Mr. Congressman, that—

Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask a cynical question. Not in preparation for this testimony?

Mr. BROWN. No.

Mr. DORNAN. No.

Mr. BROWN. You have to understand that this is a difficult—

Mr. DORNAN. You heard the groans.

Mr. BROWN [continuing]. Country to deal with, in which you have to make progress in a step-by-step fashion and you have to be careful about the implications of what you do in one area for what happens in another area. So we try and exercise good judgment in the way we go about—

Mr. DORNAN. You want to see a Congressman between a rock and a hard place? I understand that. You do not want what Ambassador Toon called doors slammed in your face and then you are down the dark hole again for 5 years. But convincing family members not to groan when nobody does anything for 15 years and then you have something fruitful and you say, "All right, let us try and keep this door open. I will put my foot in the door." Then they say this week—it has to be a steady constant pressure and a trust reestablished.

Look, these family members may not be able to forgive President Eisenhower the way I have indicated I am willing to take his whole life into context here when their sons were written off and a hero President who drove Hitler to suicide, from lieutenant colonel status to a five-star general, and we wrapped it up in Europe in 3

years and less than 5 months, if you take April 30 instead of a week later when the war ended in Europe.

This is a tough thing. They have to feel constant pressure and then they will be able to trust you that, wait, let us wait a month, even 2 months, 3 months, because we do not want these people to bring that damn door down in front of our face.

Had you read the Clapper memo?

Mr. BROWN. I have not.

Mr. DORNAN. Please read this. Have you seen the documentary on BBC, as the Ambassador has?

Mr. BROWN. I have not.

Mr. DORNAN. We will get you a copy. I am going to make it available to all the Congressmen. It may not be perfect, I mean, it may be 90 percent on target, but I will bet it is not much off 90, and right now I am looking at it as kind of 100 percent.

[The following information was submitted for the record:]

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20340

27 APR 1992

S/NF-0466/POW-MIA

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
→ THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND,
CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)

SUBJECT: Defense Intelligence Agency Report S/NF-0418 (U)
Information Memorandum

1. [REDACTED] The enclosed intelligence report summarizes the results of a DIA investigation into possible drug experimentation on U.S. Prisoners of War during the Korean War carried out by Soviet and Czechoslovakian personnel. The purpose of this program was to develop comprehensive interrogation techniques involving medical, psychological and drug-induced behavior modification. Information uncovered by DIA indicates that up to "several dozen" unwilling participants in this program may have been executed upon its conclusion in North Korea.

2. [REDACTED] The source was well placed in that he personally saw progress reports on the work in North Korea that were forwarded to top leadership in the Czech Central Committee and Ministry of Defense. He remains a very sensitive source who has provided reliable information to the U.S. intelligence community for many years. The source is most reluctant to have his identity become known or to be tied to the information he provided. It should be noted that the source did submit to polygraph examination during which no deception was indicated. This report is classified both to protect the source's identity and to ensure proper security is maintained during possible demarche and follow-up investigative activity.

3. [REDACTED] I have furnished the attached report to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense for their information. Normally, intelligence reports concerning American prisoners of war are distributed within the Government to the Military departments, the intelligence agencies, the Department of State, the temporary Senate Select Committee on POW/MIA Affairs, the House POW/MIA

CLASSIFIED BY: DIRECTOR, DIA
DECLASSIFY: OADR

DELIVER BY HAND TO
ADDRESSES

Task Force, etc. However, as the attached intelligence report could seriously impact ongoing foreign policy activities of the United States Government, I await instructions on any further dissemination of the subject report.

1 enclosure
DIA memorandum #
0468/POW-MIA (S/NF)

cc:
PDASD, Mr. Ford
DASD POW/MIA, Mr. Ptak
DIA: DR, DD, COS, Chf POW-MIA
GC: Mr. Allard

James R. Clapper, Jr.
JAMES R. CLAPPER, JR.
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

S/NF-0418/POW-MIA

1. **PURPOSE:** (U) To provide information for a proposed diplomatic demarche to the [Czechoslovakian] Government.

2. **POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:**

a. [REDACTED] During an Escape and Evasion research project in September 1990, Air Force Intelligence (AF/INU) debriefed a United States Government (USG) source on Soviet Prisoner of War (POW) interrogation techniques. He alleged that some of the POW handling techniques were based on research conducted during the Korean war. This research comprised medical, psychological, and drug-induced behavior modification experiments performed on American POWs. Source also stated that a number of American POWs were executed at the conclusion of the tests. Subsequent to the completion of Operation Desert Storm, DIA's Special Office for Prisoners of War and Missing in Action (DIA/POW-MIA) was informed of the investigative lead and conducted an initial interview with the source.

b. [REDACTED] DIA/POW-MIA conducted an intensive and extensive review of open source literature and archived intelligence materials. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was tasked to search archived intelligence reports as well as current sources and defectors. Department of Defense (DoD) elements were similarly tasked. The investigative and analytical effort culminated with a report of investigation received from the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service in March 1992. While the information developed does not corroborate the specific operation, it does confirm corollary elements of the source's report such as the existence and location of field elements and of Czechoslovakian and Soviet institutions in North Korea. In addition, developed information confirmed the correct names, placement, and access of several individuals identified by the source. Also, it should be noted as background that the source has provided reliable information to the USG for over 20 years. Upon completion of the investigative effort the source was polygraphed on the essential elements of the reported information with "no deception indicated."

c. [REDACTED] Source's Report: During the Korean war a Soviet and Czech drug testing program utilized American and other United Nations POWs as laboratory specimens. The program was initiated by the then Soviet Union's Main Medical Administration of the Ministry of Defense and conducted jointly with medical personnel from the Czechoslovakian Military Health Administration and

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Korean doctors. Testing was done in a Czech built hospital in North Korea. Analysis was conducted in Prague by the Central Military Hospital and the Air Force Research Institute.

(1) The drug experimentation program's primary objective was to develop methods of modifying human behavior and destroying psychological resistance. The program studied the effects of various drugs and environmental conditions on American soldiers and pilots. A secondary objective of the program was to train Czechoslovakian and Soviet doctors under wartime conditions.

(2) At the conclusion of the testing program a number of American POWs were executed. The individuals were executed to preclude public exposure of the information. This action was discussed by Department Eight (Administrative Organs Department of the Czech Government) and the Soviet Main Health Administration and Administrative Organs Department. The source has indicated that these and other Soviet organizations were participants in the testing program.

d. () POW-MIA investigation and analysis has confirmed that the Czechoslovakian Government did have a large hospital facility, staffed by Czech medical personnel, operating in North Korea during the war. In addition, special POW interrogation facilities were maintained in North Korea and Mukden, China (Mukden was the location for Japan's biological warfare testing program during WW II). Caucasians believed to have been Soviets or East Europeans were described by returned U.S. POWs as directing interrogation operations at both facilities. Intense interrogations and environmental control techniques were also practiced at both facilities. The activities at these two known special interrogation facilities cannot be directly linked to research at the Czech hospital based on currently available information.

e. () At the request of DIA, the CIA has queried the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Services (CIS) on this matter. The CIS has confirmed the existence of the Air Force Health Research Institute, the Central Military Hospital in Prague, and the identities of physicians identified by the USG's source. The physicians served in the Central Military Hospital and in the Czech hospital in North Korea. Czech sources deny that their personnel conducted any activities other than medically treating North Korean civilians.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS:

a. () All available intelligence and open sources have been exploited to collect information on the Soviet-Czech drug experimentation program. More detailed information on the

program-related activities, personalities, and organizations of the former Czechoslovakian Government is listed in the enclosure below. To resolve the question of American unaccounted for from the Korean War, additional information must be obtained from the current Czechoslovakian Government and the Commonwealth of Independent States. At a minimum, this would include archival records access to validate known information and develop additional leads for follow-up. The ultimate goal would be the development of information concerning unaccounted-for Americans possibly involved in the program sufficient to determine and document their fate.

Mr. DORNAN. Here is a tough question that the families asked my staffer to be sure I asked today. You knew about these defectors in 1988. I am putting all the weight of the State Department on you, Republican Presidents, Democrat Presidents. If we knew about it in 1988, what happened in over 8 years here?

Mr. BROWN. In fact, I think we have known about the defectors since they defected. They defected—the four that we believe are still alive, and I say we believe—in the 1960's, so we have known about it for a long time. We have not had an ability, really, to do serious work on this kind of thing until much more recently.

Mr. DORNAN. My friend, Steve Solarz, my liberal Democrat friend, and he is a friend, he went over there, cost a Southern Democrat his seat, Billy Ray Evans of Georgia. They got all the way up to the border area. They went into Pyongyang. It seems like we lost an opening there.

President Carter's opening that I read in my statement, was that not 1994?

Mr. BROWN. That was 1994.

Mr. DORNAN. President Carter has this charm factor because he has been into so many dangerous stops, saved hundreds of lives in Haiti, in my estimation, personally saved hundreds of civilians from dying and a handful of handsome young men and women in the 82d Airborne. So he has a mystique about him. They will open up to him. He is like a good priest. He will get that confession going. We have to get on a different track.

Mr. BROWN. As Mr. Liotta said, when President Carter went there, he did raise this issue and it was part of the process that has led to the success that we have had.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. Mr. Liotta, you get the toughest questions because you are a redhead, so I show you no mercy.

Mr. LIOTTA. That sounds fair.

Mr. DORNAN. OK. At your Pentagon briefing Monday—remember, you have a second panel following you—you said, nobody is able to confirm these reports, that it was nothing more than an analytical exercise representing the views of one person. You said that the 19 intelligence reports, and I have seen most of them now, were little more than third-hand accounts.

In other words, the press was trying to create a fight between you and me by calling me right after your press conference and saying, boy, all of this information seems to have been trashed over there, and they gave me some of your direct quotes and I think you will notice that I said I will wait, please, until the hearing and I get to meet Mr. Liotta for the first time.

You said that your office has not been able to confirm anything. Could you give us some steps that you actually took to confirm these reports after they had been acquired, and to bring my colleagues up to speed, a Romanian comes in this country as an immigrant and he says, "I will give you some information on Americans in Korea because you caught me here illegally, if you will let me stay." That sounds like all of the vicious reporting—false reporting—in Bangkok, in Cambodia, and Indochina. So they said no and he is kicked out.

So a good researcher says, "Hey, look at this I have found. Let us see if we can find this guy in Romania." He goes to the Immi-

gration and Naturalization Service. [INS]. We have everything computerized now. Within hours, they find out he is back in the United States legally and it has been so many years, he is an American citizen. So they call the guy again, debrief him, polygraphs, and they say, "Can you give us the bus driver's name where you saw 10 Caucasians in a field, locking onto a pair of blue eyes as they track one another?" I have read the debriefing.

And he says, "I do not know the bus driver's name. She was North Korean. I know some other Romanians on the bus." Darn good. Hearsay so far, or one person's word. They track down another Romanian and he is in the United States. He is an American and lives in the same neighborhood and the guy did not know it and he confirms the 1979 report.

I call that a smoking gun. I call that corroboration. I call that one hell of a 1979 story. So give us some specifics on how you came to the conclusion that it is an analytical exercise and just the view of one person.

Mr. LIOTTA. I would be glad to, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your comments and your willingness to wait to hear from me before we could make any final determination. I would hope that you would be able to read my entire transcript of my press conference and not the 30-second sound bites which get often played out in the press.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Mr. LIOTTA. Because if you do, you will see that in my press conference, I did not disown that report that my analyst wrote and I did not debunk or refute the report that that analyst wrote. What I tried to do in that press conference in response to questions was put the report in its proper context, to give an understanding to some people in the room of why the report was drafted and what the report was attempting to convey, and the information that an analyst, doing his job as an analyst, is trying to put forward. There is some information, there is some reporting that we need to follow up on, that we need to pursue that reporting and get to the bottom of it.

The fact is, Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, the reason that report, that we had some reporting recently, is because of the initiative of this office, of my office. We had had, up until about 1985, only a handful of reporting involving live sightings of Americans in North Korea, far fewer than the many hundreds of reporting we have had in Southeast Asia, as you are well aware.

Mr. DORNAN. True.

Mr. LIOTTA. Last year, we established, as we geared our office up to begin to tackle the question of the Korean war accounting, we established an analytic team, and one of the things that that analytic team did was begin to look into the question of the possibility of live Americans in North Korea. As they should do, they sent out requirements and taskings of the various intelligence community resources who could possibly provide information. They began to hunt, to look for information and reporting that could provide us leads and to work with information that we did have to try and corroborate that information.

I will talk in detail, if you would like, to the Oprica sighting, which is the one that you are referring to.

But in the course of that, the recent reporting that we have seen is all the result of the work of my office. The reporting which is coming out now is because we are asking the question. We are going forward and saying, where is the information? Provide us the information so that we can come forward and begin our search. We can look and we have specific and detailed places to go to look, targeted questions to ask so that we can get answers, not speculation, not hyperbole, but truth. That is what we are after.

Case in point, Mr. Oprica's reporting. We did have the report from Mr. Oprica of the bus ride that he took while he was working in North Korea as a Romanian engineer, and in his report, he gave us several facts that included the fact that they were on a bus and that they were driving on a countryside road and that they saw some laborers out in the field, that the laborers looked—

Mr. DORNAN. Driving to a museum of all the gifts from world leaders to Kim Il-song, and the museum is strangely 3 hours north of Pyongyang, and one of the lines in the report, Mr. Oprica's own feeling about locking eyes, as other people on the bus did, with these Caucasians who were a whole foot taller than everybody else and stood there expressionless and their eyes tracked them as the bus went by until the bus went around a corner, was he said it occurred to him later that these were other trophies, living trophies of Kim Il-song from the great war of liberation.

Now that is just a man saying that was my own thoughts, and that they all talked about it. When they asked the bus driver, she refused to talk about it. From then on, they had the same guides for other weekend tours—it could be boring in North Korea—but never again did they ever see that bus driver again.

So in other words, if you have a Sherlock Holmes bent, a Hercule Poirot feeling about anything, you can tell when somebody is lying and when they are giving you the whole full feeling of what they felt about that event. So it was not just that thing.

Then he said that he thought they were lost, but then again, it was a pretty direct route, that they just went straight from that spot, about 2 hours and 15 minutes out of Pyongyang, 45 minutes more to the museum, and he began to think, they deliberately took us by there. That is when they talked to one another and said, what were these, living trophies of Kim Il-song? Is this a farm extension of the museum, where they have captured Americans as slave laborers? That is why I put credibility in Oprica's report.

Mr. LIOTTA. Interestingly enough, during my trip to North Korea last week, they also took me to that museum and traveled the same road that they went along in that very regard. Let me explain to you one of the difficulties that we have.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you read the second Romanian's report? I have not.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir, and that is what I am going to highlight for you right now. One of the things that Mr. Oprica did for us was give us the names of other Romanians who were on that bus, and so we went and talked—and he said, talk to them. They can tell you what we saw. That is exactly what we need to do. That is the kind of corroboration that we are after, not just one report, not just one eyewitness report.

Mr. DORNAN. Are you going after the other Romanians?

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent.

Mr. LIOTTA. We have interviewed two of the Romanians who were on that bus and they have given us two additional names, and we are in the process of tracking down those two additional people that were on the bus.

Mr. DORNAN. Are they all saying substantially the same thing 17 years after the fact?

Mr. LIOTTA. No, they are not, and that is what I would like to demonstrate for you. Mr. Oprica said that he saw about 50 farm laborers. One of the other persons, Mr. Tomescu, that he gave us the name of and the person we interviewed, said he saw between 20 and 30 farm laborers.

Mr. Oprica said there were no guards on these farm laborers. Mr. Tomescu said there were, at least present in the fields.

Mr. Oprica said they were Caucasians, appeared to be Caucasians. Mr. Tomescu said the people appeared white.

Mr. Oprica said they were 3 hours north of—I am not saying it is a difference. I am just telling you—

Mr. DORNAN. No, no, that is good. I am tracking you so far.

Mr. LIOTTA. Mr. Oprica said they were 3 hours north of Pyongyang when they came across this site. Mr. Tomescu says that they were in Nampo, which is southwest of Pyongyang, about an hour and a half southwest of Pyongyang, not on the way to the museum.

Mr. Oprica said that he locked eyes and that the eyes were light or possibly blue-gray. Mr. Tomescu said the bus was driving at about 40 kilometers an hour and that the laborers were 400 to 500 yards away, not a distance that you could see the color of their eyes.

Mr. Oprica said they were all dressed in the same type of uniform. Mr. Tomescu said they were all dressed differently.

These are the kinds of questions which we are faced with. These are the kinds of questions which we have to resolve in order to determine. We have two eyewitnesses on the same bus on the same event giving radically different accounts. It is not surprising—

Mr. DORNAN. One second.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Now I am pitting my 63 years against yours and I will weigh in Mr. Brown and I will bet he will be on my side. Those are not radically different accounts.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. I do not mean to put you on the spot, Alan, but white and Caucasian is the same. You know we could run an experiment, and I have somebody senior to me, that you could put a bunch of people on a bus, and I have fighter pilot's eyes. One guy locks on a far target. Thirty to 50 is identical. You could have people on that bus say 10, 20, 100, 50, 60, they are all in the ballpark. One guy locks on the far people in the field while Mr. Oprica locks on this guy's eyes who stands up closer to the road. The other guy might not have even seen him. Forty miles an hour, I can pick up some things not only at 85 in a car.

I flew an F-16 last weekend at 63 years of age and my pilot, David Dornan, 20 years my junior, did not get a single bogey all

afternoon before I did. I felt pretty cocky at the end of that flight. He said, "You have still got it, Congressman," and I will bet you Duke Cunningham, his eyes go 25 miles further than mine.

This is not radical. It is different—different. I am just arguing with your adjective. It is not radically different. It is all in the ballpark. The main thing is, they are all corroborating bus, white Caucasians. For example, the trip. They took a bus trip every weekend. Seventeen years later, two people both could pass a polygraph test. Are you sure it was on the museum trip? I thought it was on the trip southwest to Nampo. That is all in the ballpark, do you not think, Mr. Brown? I am trying to recruit you here.

Mr. BROWN. I think I will—

Mr. DORNAN. I will not put the Ambassador on the spot.

Mr. BROWN. I think what you have to do here is what Alan Liotta's office is doing. He is trying to get in touch with—

Mr. DORNAN. But I will tell you what is going to happen. If you find 10 Romanians, you are going to get 10 slightly different stories, or in some aspects, badly different, different weekend, different trip, but the overall story is going to keep getting confirmed. Those Romanians on that bus saw Caucasians.

For example, if Mr. Oprica said he saw no armed guards, the guy who says he saw armed guards adds credence to this story. He may have been locked on the people close to him going—he even says in his report, "What are Caucasians doing out here in the middle of—why would they volunteer to do creepy labor in a boring little town like this," while somebody is looking afar and seeing guards. The guards make the first story even more important, not less important. And the different clothing? You can get 10 different descriptions on—because that is not the clothing Romanians wear.

This is just—tomorrow, I was supposed to go see a marine dying of AIDS who got a bad blood transfusion after he was shot in El Salvador. He died at 11 a.m. this morning. I have tomorrow morning, all morning long, free. I am going to call you at your shed. I would like to get the transcript of your press conference. I am glad I did not get baited by the news media to create bad blood between us, but I want to talk to you about this further investigation, and unfortunately, it is a 1979 story.

I was a Congressman in 1979. I was chairman of the POW Task Force. I would have been all over this story if we had had it in 1979, and here it is, 17 years later. When we get the other panel, I will get you the transcript, so I hope you can hang around for the other panel.

Let me ask my colleagues if they have any questions, and I just have a couple more for you.

Mr. PICKETT. I do not have anything further, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Ms. Harman?

Ms. HARMAN. I am sad to excuse myself, but I am glad this inquiry is continuing.

Mr. DORNAN. I will give you a follow-up on the House floor.

Can I come back to this thing, conclusive proof or conclusive evidence. We had a problem yesterday with the panel on Vietnam on what is circumstantial evidence, and this is causing friction between the DPMO office and Mr. Smith's office and my office. It has even gotten into Al Hunt's column today, one of Mr. Smith's staff-

ers and my staffers, in the Wall Street Journal column today. He is called ubiquitous, that he is everywhere. I will tell you, he had three Purple Hearts before his 19th birthday. That is not too bad. He has written some great oral histories on Vietnam, including "Leading the Way," where he interviewed Schwartzkopf and Colin Powell and the just-deceased General Warner, the black officer, four-star who just died.

So Al knows what he is doing. And he also, just to give you a little personal knowledge on my side—Mr. Chapla knows this; I do not know if Mr. Pickett did—he had a unit overrun and squads left behind. He goes to his officers—officers, but I did both—he says, "We have to go back for those men." The lieutenant says, "Do what you want. I am not going back in there." So this young 18-year-old sergeant organized, or maybe he was a corporal then, and went back in and rescued his platoon. That is not forgetting. That is not leaving wounded on the battlefield. And he brought them out.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. And so he gets the Bronze Star and his lieutenant probably got a Bronze Star for being in the area, right? Or it was a captain. Maybe the captain got a Bronze Star, because by the time you left, they were passing them out like popcorn. Lately, people are dying over the honor of just little tiny dollar devices on medals.

Let me ask you about this museum. My staffer has the name of the museum written down. Here is where my intelligence background comes in. I was an intelligence officer and a fighter pilot. I do not want to say the name of the museum or the country for fear if there is a foreign service officer of a foreign embassy in here, they will say, "Do not ever let anybody go to that museum in our country, because guys have gone to the museum in Hanoi, which they are cocky about, and we have found hard evidence and resolved some cases in the museum."

When I went to the museum with David Hrdlicka in 1979—excuse me, I have Dave on the mind—with David Drier, there is an American flag all battle damaged and burned in a case and I said, this bugs me. Cover me. Cover me. And I reached around through the back of the museum case and furled Old Glory until you could not even tell it was an American flag. I just did not want to see an American flag in a case in a Communist museum in Hanoi. And we found names and I.D. cards of persons and brought them back.

But I know a lawyer, a liberal lawyer of principle, who was helping guys defect in Saigon on conscientious defector status, and when he went to Hanoi, his Americanism came up because they thought he was on their side. Oh, you are from New York. And he saw all these American names in the museum and he took down all these names and brought them back to Saigon and they had new respect for this conscientious objector lawyer working on spec in Saigon because he gave our guys about 50 names of pilots shot down that they never knew happened. I had dinner with him in Saigon during the war and heard that story.

So there are lots of ways you can get stuff at a museum. So I am going to ask you in private later about a museum in another country, so let me ask you generically, are we using these assets,

like museums, to go in there on a trip like yours with Congressman Richardson and say, "Take us to your war museum."

Mr. LIOTTA. We did not during Congressman Richardson's visit, but during the delegation which I led last week, I insisted that they take me and my delegation to this war museum. They were reluctant. They did not want to take us to it. They were afraid that we would be offended in the very way that you have described so eloquently. By midweek, I said that I would not carry on with the negotiations unless they took us to the war museum.

Mr. DORNAN. Good.

Mr. LIOTTA. They agreed. They took us to the war museum and we spent half a day going through the war museum. We went through more rooms than any other American that has been to that war museum has been to, and Senator Smith was the first to get into that war museum and visited a great many rooms and gave us a report on and some pictures from his trip to that museum. So we have known about it and we were able to get some information from it.

While we were in that museum and making the tour, we took numerous photographs of things which they had on display there, which included U.S. military I.D. cards, blood chits from the war. One point that I made sure to raise to them was at one point we were in an anti-aircraft command post to show us what their brigades looked like and they had a book in Korean. I asked what the book was and was told that it was a shoot-down record.

So I pointed to the shoot-down record and I said, this is the kind of archival information that we must have access to because it is taking this kind of archival information. It has the unit and where they shot it down and was anyone captured, what happened to the plane, did they get to the crash site, did they investigate it, find any bodies there, find any live soldiers or airmen?

This is the kind of archival information that we have to have access to, and that when we combine this archival information with the archival information that we have in our holdings right now, then we can come to a true understanding and we would get direct evidence that allows us to understand the fate of many of our unaccounted for.

They understood that and they said that they thought that we would be able to, indeed, move toward archival progress and that we would be able to work together, and that is on our agenda to pursue it. They know it is an objective of ours. They know it is very important to us and they know that we are going to continue to push and prod and demand access to that information so that we can work with it.

Mr. DORNAN. The museum I was thinking of was a different museum, but I would have asked you about that one because Senator Smith told me to. But there is another museum that I will talk with you in private about tomorrow and it may even be more fruitful because it is much bigger, a bigger museum.

Mr. LIOTTA. I would like to talk to you about that.

Mr. DORNAN. Are you aware that the Senate Select Committee, before it went out of business, said that a Task Force China should be formed similar to Ambassador Toon's Commission with Russia?

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you started to implement anything like that?

Mr. LIOTTA. We have not.

Mr. DORNAN. We had better move on it. Again, we may run into a wall, given what happens with the most favored nation vote with China, and that will be taken as a much bigger insult, if they do not get it or it is taken away, than we even can conceive of here.

Mr. LIOTTA. Irrespective, Mr. Chairman, of bilateral issues between us, I would be very interested in working with you and also discussing, would a commission be the best way to get Chinese cooperation.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. LIOTTA. I think some China scholars would tell us that it would not be the best way to get cooperation.

Mr. DORNAN. What has your office, the Defense Missing Persons Office, done to question Vietnam on their relationship with North Koreans during the Vietnam war? I just found out during the week that North Korea came down to Vietnam—this never occurred to me. I do not know, because I visited in the field around Cam Rahn Bay with the White Horse and the Tiger Korean divisions, ROK divisions, Republic of Korea, so the Communists went to their allies, their axis, and they said, we need your help on how to deal with these two Korean divisions, upping the tension there.

But has anybody asked, has anybody queried them on their relationship with North Koreans in interrogating prisoners in Vietnam or sending prisoners to Korea? Remember, Cubans came to Hanoi into our prison system and savagely tortured to death Major Earl Cobiell in front of other prisoners, and we found out who one of those people was and he ends up in New York as a brigadier general with the Cuban Embassy at the United Nations. When I was a freshman Congressman, I said, arrest this killer, and nobody had the stomach to do it in the Carter administration. So he went back to Cuba and he is probably a three-star general now.

Read the book "P.O.W." He beat an American to death, smashing his head against the concrete, screaming, "You g-d-m liar. You faker," he called them. That was his name, the faker, because he would hit him across the face with a whip and he would not even blink because his mind had been destroyed. Actually, he was taken off and died alone. We got his remains back. He has been buried in American soil.

Has anybody thought of following this line of questioning? Did American prisoners come up here from Vietnam? Could we have access to your intelligence officers that went down to Vietnam from Korea? Has anybody started to put together a profile on that?

Mr. LIOTTA. I do not know the answer to the question but I will get you an answer to that question.

Mr. DORNAN. OK, because if the Cubans were there, believe me, fellow Asians were there, especially since the Chinese were running the anti-aircraft program, had 300,000 people involved. Ambassador Toon is correct. Soviets ran the Korean war but they funded 95 percent of the Vietnam war but without the same control, but the funding made them an important player.

I have a final question for you and I will turn to my colleagues. In negotiations with the North Vietnamese in the Clinton adminis-

tration, when did you first raise the need to discuss any of these specific live sighting reports from 1968 up to the present with the North Koreans? Have you done that on a trip over there or just in writing or what?

Mr. LIOTTA. Three times, Congressman.

Mr. DORNAN. Over there?

Mr. LIOTTA. No, first raised in an off-line conversation in New York City during the New York talks. We asked two questions. We asked about the defectors and what the status of these defectors were and whether we could get access to the defectors.

Mr. DORNAN. That was before Mr. Brown.

Mr. LIOTTA. That is right. And that is why I said this was off-line. It was not an official representation and was not part of the official talks.

During the trip with Congressman Richardson, I asked in a car ride with a foreign ministry official, I reminded them that General Wold had raised the question in New York about the defectors and also about the possibility of Americans being detained still, American servicemen still being detained against their will. We had asked for an answer from them. Did they have an answer that I could bring back to General Wold?

I was told they did not have an answer ready yet. I reminded them that I would be hopefully coming to have the next round of talks, the technical talks with them, in about 10 days, and that I would hope they would have an answer ready at that time.

During my delegation, we had a dinner with Ambassador Kim Jung Hong, who was the head of their delegation. They met with General Wold. At that time, he delivered an answer to General Wold's questions which basically said, the so-called Americans in the propaganda film "Nameless Heroes" were not Americans, they were not the defectors, and that everything that—they have no Americans being detained against their will and that they have no other information about it, and then they proceeded to harangue us about their POW's which we have not given back, allegedly.

The bottom line here is—

Mr. DORNAN. This is a repeat of Vietnam. It is tragic.

Mr. LIOTTA. Yes, sir, and the bottom line was, this was the same response that Senator Smith and Congressman Montgomery and other distinguished officials who have been able to travel and have asked these questions directly to the North Koreans have received. They received the same answer.

Mr. DORNAN. Make me this promise, because I may try to go over there in August, depending on how my own political race is going, because there is not much reward in tracking old issues like this in a hot election year, but I may put duty ahead of survival anyway and go over there.

If other Congressmen get over there or Senators ahead of me or I do not get over, please promise me, and you also, Mr. Brown, that you will make it part of the briefing of any elected official from this country, which they pay great attention to, that they understand that the ongoing investigations are the hottest ones and then give them the top secret part of it. Do not blow this track we are on, but we want you to have this knowledge in case you get a little mosaic piece that we can put into the puzzle.

Mr. Pickett.

Mr. PICKETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe I have gotten the information from this panel with your questions and mine that I believe we can get today. I thank you very much, and I want to thank you gentleman and wish you well in your undertaking.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

One final cleanup here. On March 9, 1988, you can see it is redacted in the body of the testimony, and there is the full list and it is the full intelligence distribution list. In response to your request, about four lines redacted, three separate reports of such sightings, which are attached. The first report dated April 80 indicates that, redacted, sighted two Americans in August 1986, redacted, on the outskirts of Pyongyang. Ten military pilots captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea—captured in North Vietnam were brought to North Korea. This is 1988.

The second report, also dated April 80—that was the very month I was chairman, the only Republican chairman of anything on Capitol Hill. Steve Solarz paid me the decency of making me, because of my corporate institutional knowledge, he made me chairman of the POW Task Force. In the third report dated March 1988—this is 8 years later now—indicated sighting as many as 11 Caucasians, probably American prisoners from the Korean war in the fall of 1979 at a collective farm north of Pyongyang. That may have been a repeat in March 1988 of the Romanian report. It sounds like that.

When I get hold of any of these documents, I like to send them back to you and say, we got it, we are working it, we are doing this or that. You can see, Ambassador Toon, if they do let you go, this is going to go on and on because of this situation of some of these countries, like Korea, coming out of the dark ages furtively. Are they out? Are they not out? It is anybody's guess what is going to happen in China, given the fact that, unlike the Russians, these people have a capitalistic ability to create things.

In my district, in Disneyland, everything from a \$1 refrigerator magnet to a \$3,500 bisque scene from Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs is all made in China. All Russia seemed to be good at was space and military and the overlap was almost total. So we are going to see a hell of a century here with the Chinese.

I thank the panel very much. It was not as bad as you thought. I do want to keep this relationship going, but I am a Sherlock Holmes type and I am also an optimist and that is a bad combination. Thank you very much.

Mr. TOON. Thank you.

Mr. LIOTTA. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Thank you.

Mr. DORNAN. If the analysts would please come forward. Would family members hold off for just a second? I wanted the analysts to come up first: Norm Kass, InSung O. Lee, and John McCreary. I am going to start to pick up the pace here, mainly my pace. I just want the families to hear the panelists before we hear from you. We owe you that.

Mr. McCreary is on board. Mr. Kass is on board. Mr. Lee, if you would take your seat, we are off and running here. If you gentlemen would rise, please. Raise your right hand, please.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated.

So as not to delay the suspense anymore, I am going to start with the DPMO analyst, Mr. InSung O. Lee. Since, Mr. Lee, your report moved across the wire services, I would like to ask you if you have any statement or anything that you would like to make, and then I have four questions for you.

STATEMENT OF A PANEL CONSISTING OF INSUNG O. LEE, DPMO ANALYST; JOHN McCREARY, CHIEF KOREAN ANALYST, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY; AND NORM KASS, RUSSIAN DIVISION, DPMO

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman and subcommittee members, my name is InSung O. Lee, an analyst assigned to the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, Defense Prisoner of War and Missing in Action Office. By Mr. Chairman's invitation, I appear before this committee.

I am somewhat confused as to whether to thank Congressman Dornan or not for this invitation, for I would rather spend more time conducting research and investigation. Nevertheless, I appreciate the opportunity to share my analytical views of the prisoners of war and missing in action from the Korean war, and Mr. Chairman, thank you for your invitation.

Mr. Chairman, before I begin with my contribution to this hearing, I would like to convey to the public, especially the Korean war veterans and those KOA's, MIA's, and unaccounted-for personnel from the Korean war. Of course, if they have ability to hear me, I would like to express my appreciation for their sacrifices, allowing me to live in this democratic society. I consider all Korean war veterans, and especially those who have died or are missing from the tragic war, my heroes, as I was a little child when the war broke out.

Mr. DORNAN. Like my colleague, Jay Kim, a little child looking at these soldiers from all these countries there to fight and die for your freedom. He tells me about that quite often.

Mr. LEE. Mr. Chairman, I am not a policy officer for DPMO and my answers will be directed to the analytical areas. As a research analyst and a team chief in the Korea Division, I am responsible for directing and analyzing all sources, both classified and unclassified information, and make recommendations and advise the policy officers and my DPMO leadership.

With that comment, I am ready to answer any of the questions which you may have.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me just ask a few questions first of Mr. Lee, before the others testify. Well, no, let me get it all on the record here.

Mr. Norm Kass is the Russian Division at the same office, Defense Missing Persons Office. Do you have a statement of any kind, Mr. Kass?

Mr. KASS. No, sir; I am here to respond to your questions.

Mr. DORNAN. Good. I have a few questions for you, and I am sure Mr. Pickett might have, as well.

Mr. McCreary, you are the Korean analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency and you have been an expert in this field for many years, I understand. How long?

Mr. MCCREARY. Twenty-two years, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Twenty-two years. Would you prefer also just to respond to questions?

Mr. MCCREARY. I am delighted to be here. I compliment you on your hearings and I am at your service.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you very much.

Mr. MCCREARY. To the extent of my considering that this is an open session.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right, and if there is anything that we cannot discuss in open, remember that I have the standard Congressman's top secret clearance. I can call the CIA to my office at any time personally, or with other members, and get a briefing on anywhere in the world. It is almost 95 percent there. But having served 8 years on the Intelligence Committee—which means appointed by my minority leader, Bob Michel, and then reappointed by the Speaker, Newt Gingrich—I have a little bit more access. I read the NID as much as I can, the National Intelligence Daily, to see if it is keeping up with CNN and the New York Times.

Could you please, Mr. Lee, describe the circumstances that led you to prepare this document? For example, how long did you work on it?

Mr. LEE. As far as working on the document, I had to collect all the information that I have heard from all sources and I have been working on it for about 1½ years now. The document itself was drafted in about 3, 4, or 5 days of intense analyzation, something that needs to be brought before the leadership of the DPMO as well as I look that the public had a need to know about, the recent findings.

Mr. DORNAN. I agree. What did you do with it once it was finally prepared? To whom did you provide it?

Mr. LEE. Since I am not the Division Chief, it normally goes through a Division Chief. And so therefore, when I drafted it I showed that to my Division Chief, and he agreed that we are to send this out to our leadership.

Mr. DORNAN. I want to ask you a personal question. I think I know the answer, but I just want to hear it. As someone of Korean heritage who knows that 33,651 Americans died, another 10,000 in flying safety accidents in a combat theater and lost at sea and so forth, auto or jeep accidents, and whose own country suffered multiple times that KIA rate and as the aforesaid, 50,000 mission, do you agree with Lieutenant Cho Chang-ho that possibly 50,000 prisoners were held back and that there might be 10,000 alive of Korean, South Korean, ROK forces?

Mr. LEE. I am not sure about the figure itself. By this testimony, by the interrogation of—

Mr. DORNAN. Were you in on his interrogation or did you read it?

Mr. LEE. I was not there physically, but one of our colleagues from another agency was there who is also Korean American. So,

therefore, he may have thought this gentleman was a Korean individual, but that was not the case. He was American. And he was there when the interrogation took place.

As far as figures are concerned, it is very strongly believable that the South Koreans who were captured are still in North Korea. On one of my trips to Russia, I had talked to one of the former North Korean general officers and he also stated that South Korean prisoners of war were taken to other places in the Soviet Union and used as labor camp laborers.

Mr. DORNAN. A human coin of the realm to pay back debt, pay back war debt. This happened with many Vietnamese as more bonded servants going to East European countries and working for peanuts to try and send money home, and that happened in the period from the Saigon collapse in 1975 to the wall coming out. For 14 years, there were a lot of sad stories of Vietnamese trying to work off a debt—North Vietnamese trying to work off a war debt.

But that is a fascinating story in itself, because Korea is an allied country and here the same pattern that may have happened to a small number of American pilots or other American technicians is compounded by a factor of 10, 20, 100, 1,000, with our allied persons. It shows you what happens when you do not win a war and you sign a cease fire and then a 2-year phony negotiation and then a sort of armistice with Pyongyang.

Here is the big question. You stand by, of course, all the conclusions that you made in that memo dated March 26, 1996? You do?

Mr. LEE. That is affirmative.

Mr. DORNAN. I want to ask the family members coming up about that, and I want to tell you that we are pretty proud of you in my office because we think your analysis was straightforward and based on more than circumstantial evidence. You had corroborative reports in there. So I hope that there is an attention, but rather a team feeling at the office. Do you believe, based on your analysis, that I choose to call expert analysis—this is the gut feeling thing I sort of asked Ambassador Toon—do you believe that not only is your statement accurate, but you now are convinced personally that there is a small number of live Americans in North Korea who are not in the defector category, or do you feel comfortable separating them from the defector category?

Mr. LEE. Definitely, there is more than one group of Americans there, from—

Mr. DORNAN. See, that alone is a powerful statement. Definitely more than one group.

Mr. LEE. From my analysis. The reason being that this reporting was about the Oprica case, the first sighting that—pretty confident that they have seen Caucasians there. It was revealed to our Government in 1988. There is no question about what they saw, in my mind. We are not discounting that Romanians who have seen those Caucasians out in the field.

It is difficult to prove that the Caucasians are, in fact, POW's, from my analysis. And from what I understand, Mr. Oprica and Mr. Tomescu made conclusions based on a certain degree on some rumors that were prevalent in North Korea during that period. Koreans were saying that there were POW's held back from the Korean war.

Now, for the first time, and the recent reports, a North Korean defector was able to distinguish United States defectors from other groups of foreigners for the first time. In all the previous reports, there was really no differentiation there. There was another defector who had personally seen and spoken to an American. That person may have been a defector—a U.S. defector—but at the same time, that may have been a POW.

In the Oprica sighting it can be argued that the group of Caucasians may have been part of a friendship harvest outing. There is someone who contends that might happen. So we were looking at all different avenues of either, discount or confirm this sighting. Again, this idea cannot be discarded, but there is very little merit for the following.

Now, this incident took place on Sunday. Like many countries, even North Koreans allow their workforce to take a break 1 day out of the week. If in fact they were planning to have any diplomatic corps or foreigners for public relations purposes, they want to take them out to the fields; certainly I do not think it would be a Sunday. And also that the Koreans have set aside Friday afternoons, where office workers are drafted to go out to the fields and do some labor.

Mr. DORNAN. Office workers are drafted? The word "drafted" can be replaced with "dragooned," "shanghaied," "ordered" to go out and work in the field.

Mr. LEE. I would say they were ordered to.

Mr. DORNAN. Ordered?

Mr. LEE. It is like standard operating procedures for military, the training schedule. Every Friday afternoon, their place of duty is out in the field.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Lee, did you hear my exchange with Mr. Liotta? By the way, I took note at the end that there was pride of supervisor status and pride of authorship, that he was taking pride in your work. You see, that was not what I had picked up from the press conference, and I do want to look at the full transcript of it. But he quite plainly said, "Hey, this is my office developing all this stuff. This is good work." So I was happy to hear him say that.

But did you notice that as mean as I got with anybody—and I thought it was pretty tame, myself—was when I said, hold on, those are not radically different accounts. He is not a trained analyst, at least not to my knowledge: is he? He is not a trained analyst; you are. You are. You are: the three of you are trained investigators. Would you call those different sightings that he was relating—I do not want to start an interoffice conflict, but does anything strike you as radically different?

Mr. LEE. One thing I could say for sure is that the people they have observed were Caucasians.

Mr. DORNAN. That is a common denominator. So when you get into a numbers game, is not 10 or 20 or 80 all in the same ballpark in a field? It is like guessing beans in a jar. The range of guesses are phenomenal, what people think when they see a large group in the field, particularly if your view is fixated, as I said, on just a few people. And if you have eye contact and you do not break that eye contact, everything else is peripheral vision. And a lot of people are not trained to use their peripheral vision at all; they just have

tunnel vision. So I hope that we see more pride of supervisor status about what you are doing.

Let me ask Mr. McCreary a question. Mr. McCreary, I assume I read a lot of your work product in the National Intelligence Digest Daily, the daily.

Mr. MCCREARY. That would be an assumption.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes; that is not a fair question.

Mr. MCCREARY. I do not write for that and I prefer not to get into that.

Mr. DORNAN. Right, but you have been a Korean area analyst for how long?

Mr. MCCREARY. For a number of—several decades.

Mr. DORNAN. I am sorry. I asked you that before. Do you feel, as an analyst, that at the end of the Korean war—July 27, 1953: I am waiting to go to pilot training, Eisenhower kept his promise; as a President-elect, he kept a campaign promise and was off to Korea in 1952 so the war has come to an end—do you believe that there was the regular Communist pattern at the end of that war of holding back prisoners? In every conflict—White Russian conflict, 1919, in every conflict—the Communists hold back prisoners. Do you believe they held back prisoners? South Vietnam and Americans and maybe some of the other nations involved: Turks, Greeks, British, Canadians, whatever?

Mr. MCCREARY. What I believe is less important than what the evidence shows and—

Mr. DORNAN. That is what I meant, is what the evidence shows.

Mr. MCCREARY [continuing]. And there is evidence that shows that that is true, that is right, including the work that Mr. Lee did.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you read his report?

Mr. MCCREARY. I have read his background paper, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. March 26, and you accept that as a pretty good piece of work?

Mr. MCCREARY. I took Mr. Oprica's deposition for the Senate Select Committee. I went to North Korea and verified personally the physical plant and the things that he described. I was with Senator Smith on his trip.

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent.

Mr. MCCREARY. So I have no question. He is the only American I have ever met who has a badge, a medal given by Kim Il-song, as a matter of fact. So I personally have verified, at least to the extent that I can, the extent that a trip to Pyongyang can, his personal—the observations he made. He said there was a thing here; I saw it. He said there was a thing there; I saw it. He said there was a museum in Yohongsong; there is one.

Mr. DORNAN. Mr. Oprica has a medal personally pinned on by Kim Il-song?

Mr. MCCREARY. That is correct.

Mr. DORNAN. There is a piece of evidence we had not come across.

Mr. MCCREARY. It is just a testimony to his bona fide. He was not lying about being in North Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. So a person like that, you would not feel you had to give him sodium pentothal. He is a good witness.

Mr. MCCREARY. Tomescu was with him. We knew about Tomescu in 1992. We tried to get there. We ran out of time and money and we could not find him. We knew about the other witness.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. MCCREARY. The Senate Select Committee did. We just simply did—it was a bridge too far.

Mr. DORNAN. So you went through the museum with Senator Smith?

Mr. MCCREARY. Yes. I went farther than Senator Smith. I broke away from the group.

Mr. DORNAN. And you would probably concur with my analysis of my friend, that this man's heart and soul is wrapped up in seeking the truth on this issue, Senator Smith?

Mr. MCCREARY. No question about that.

Mr. DORNAN. No question about that, I agree with you, Mr. McCreary. And you stand ready to go back on another trip if this window begins to creak open a little bit more?

Mr. MCCREARY. I would go with you if you go.

Mr. DORNAN. That is what I was leading up to.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. What about—I resisted asking this question before. Mr. Santoli, now that he is in the Wall Street Journal, his cover is blown. He wants me to ask about the museum in China. I always like to assume there is a Chinese foreign service officer who is very aggressive and very loyal in the room, but there are war museums in China. I went to the Anthropological Museum where our North China Marines took away the actual skull of Peking man—we said it differently in those days—but they had the plaster of paris that we left them. I went to look at all the anthropological exhibits, and like Mexico in their anthropological museums, knowing these translations—their museums are not like ours with triple translations—but their museum is a little dusty but in pretty good shape. They must have one hell of a war museum somewhere around Beijing. Have you ever heard of one around Beijing, Mr. Lee?

Mr. LEE. Not in Beijing, but the Ondong has a museum and in it we have found that there were dog tags of U.S. pilots who were shot down.

Mr. DORNAN. You have heard it? Now that would be hearsay. That is hearsay.

Mr. LEE. No, sir; it is not hearsay. We have copies of dog tags that were sent. There were rubbings sent. We have been able to analyze and determine in one case, an MIA case that we have been—

Mr. DORNAN. Have you seen the BBC documentary?

Mr. LEE. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you seen it, Mr. McCreary?

Mr. MCCREARY. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You know more than this documentary, so I would really like your opinion on this. In the documentary is my good friend, Bud Meheron, 21 victories in Europe, our first double ace, our first triple ace, our first quadruple ace, shot down in May with the other person who had 20 kills, Ken Johnson, and they both escaped and evaded. They sent him to the Japanese theater and he

shot down one, and then he went to Korea and shot down five. You will not find him on the ace list because he let his wing man take credit for number five. He figured he would have more chances. The wing man got back and they looked at his gunnery film and his guns jammed. That was Bud Meheron's victory. So he is an ace in Korea.

They captured him. He is in the film. There have been hints in my office that he might have been the F-86 pilot taken to Moscow to brief at a science and technology museum. I cannot believe that. I mean, he is such a close friend. I took him to the 50th anniversary of the Battle of Britain with his wife, Joan, and we became very close, and I see him several times a year and he always has lunch with me when he comes here. I will talk to him again. I will ask him if he would take sodium pentothal, and I bet he would, assuming that he is not recalling something.

But I guess we are setting up a screening at the DPMO office. Have you seen it, Mr. Kass?

Mr. KASS. No, sir.

Mr. DORNAN. You have to see this film, because these are live interviews with general officers spilling all about getting their arms compound fractured from Saber jet 50-caliber machine guns. But I will show that film to you and we will talk about visiting some of these other war museums and hopefully they will not clean up the rooms and hide the material from us and we can get some progress here.

Mr. Kass, what initiatives are being taken to find sources of information independently? Mr. Toon is on the record under oath saying he thinks the world of one of my panelists, Paul Cole, who is also interviewed live and in color in this BBC documentary. I was very happy to hear that, because Mr. Cole has my confidence and I think there is great value in an independent analysis.

My first experience with this was under George Bush, the B team at the CIA. Remember setting up a blue ribbon team to say, wait a minute, our analysis here is breaking down and we are all honorable, patriotic Americans. Let us split into teams here, and the B team came in with a totally different analysis of what turned into a book, "A Clear and Present Danger," the Soviet lurch toward just crushing their economy so that everything would go into war production.

What is your opinion of independent analysis helping something like the Missing Persons Office?

Mr. KASS. I would say it is not only desirable, it is essential.

Mr. DORNAN. Essential?

Mr. KASS. Yes, indeed, and I would also say that if you examine the 4-plus years that this Commission has been in operation, what you would find over in DOD and DPMO is that we have had through the life of the program parallel efforts to those of the Commission, because I think one of the enduring premises we make is the fact that you can learn only up to a certain amount through the Commission for a number of reasons.

There are many difficulties that we encounter, both in terms of reaching people and in terms of getting access to archives, and the only way to address the effort, if it is going to be a serious research effort, is to explore alternative methods and alternative support re-

search that would allow us to develop leads which then could be used to go back to the Commission and pursue them.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you follow what I meant when I said a Sherlock Holmes attitude?

Mr. KASS. I think I understand the idea, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. But there are people who are born cynics—impossible, could not happen, too many years, baloney, he is lying, it is a dead lead, going nowhere, do not do it, do not do it. You remember when IBM was famous for one little arrogant thing on your desk that says “Think”? I would like to put up a sign in the DPMO office that says, “No mindset to debunk.” That is a little too much in your face——

[Applause.]

It is too much in your face, but the opposite of that would be, in a positive way, “A mindset to uncover the impossible,” the Gordian knot, whether it is mythological allegorical, or what. Alexander the Great says, pretty big knot. He pulls out his sword and cuts it in half. There goes your Gordian knot. Onward to Persia.

There has to be a positive mindset, and that is why I like investigators who say, you know what, this looked impossible but it led me to follow this lead, and then I went to that lead and then I went to that lead. We go to court all the time with circumstantial evidence and get convictions. Buliose has a book out that I just sent for, Vincent Buliose, who said he has sent people to the death chamber, or had them rot for life, on circumstantial evidence one-fiftieth of what O.J. Simpson beat the rap on. And then I hear people say, oh, it is circumstantial evidence, it is hearsay, it is this or that.

We had an indictment yesterday—no, an unindicted co-conspirator yesterday—his picture is on the front page, Bruce Lindsay—to get at hearsay evidence.

I just have one more question for you and Mr. Pickett and then we will go vote and we will come back to the final panel. I want to follow up on what I asked Malcolm Toon. What is your opinion of the status of Russian cooperation, increasing or decreasing?

Mr. KASS. Decreasing.

Mr. DORNAN. Pardon?

Mr. KASS. Decreasing.

Mr. DORNAN. Decreasing, window closing. Thank you.

Do you believe that the GRU military intelligence and the KGB under the eye of the foreign minister who ran it, Yeugeny Primakov, has been fully cooperative with the Commission's efforts?

Mr. KASS. No, I do not.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you believe there is still pertinent archival information being withheld on Korea or Vietnam in Russian archives?

Mr. KASS. Not that I think, I know.

Mr. DORNAN. You know——

Mr. KASS. Yes, sir.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. And yet they say to a distinguished diplomat with four decades of living, go to China, go to Korea, go

to Vietnam and find out there. All of that is diversionary and disingenuous?

Mr. KASS. I think it is an effort to deflect attention from what they know and what they are ready to share.

Mr. DORNAN. And just stall and buy time.

Do you believe that American prisoners, and I guess you can pick up on Mr. McCreary's answer, so I will put it in the way he answered it. Is there hard evidence to you that American prisoners were taken to Russia during Korea?

Mr. KASS. There is certainly evidence. I would consider it significant evidence.

Mr. DORNAN. Not hard, OK. Significant.

Mr. KASS. Really, it is a quibbling over the adjective, but I think there is compelling—I would consider it strong evidence to suggest that, yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And Vietnam, any evidence that people from Vietnam went to Russia?

Mr. KASS. There is evidence of that, as well.

Mr. DORNAN. As compelling, or about the same?

Mr. KASS. I cannot discuss the details of that with you.

Mr. DORNAN. Excellent. You can with me off camera.

How about Russia after World War II?

Mr. KASS. With regard to the transfer of Americans onto Soviet soil or the presence of Americans on Soviet soil, we already know existed following World War II. We found that out through the Commission and other sources, as well.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. This is hard to reflect in a written record, but could I ask the family members, do you have confidence in these three men? Is there anybody who does not have confidence in these three men?

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. Are we building confidence? We have a long way to go. Right, separate them.

Here is the problem. Mr. Pickett and I have five votes, rollcall votes. They will be 5-minute votes. Mr. Pickett, do you have any questions of our analysts?

Mr. PICKETT. No, Mr. Chairman. I think probably we are going to have to leave very shortly to go over and vote.

Mr. DORNAN. There is no sense going over right now when we have 15 minutes. We will set up the panel, swear them in, and start it. I hope you can come back with me. Then we will go over and catch the tail end of the 15-minute vote. Then we are going to have four 5-minute votes with about 2 or 3 minutes in between.

I am not apologizing to the families because I think it was good for you to hear the top level as long as we questioned them, then the analysts, and I have access to these people all the time and I have confidence in all three of these people. That is why it is much shorter than the other one, because I am not so sure at the top. I felt a little better after today, but still, I have more questions. Their answers created more questions, but I do not have anything else for you three gentleman. Thank you, Mr. Kass, thank you, Mr. Lee, thank you, Mr. McCreary.

If very quickly you could change places with Pat Dunton, with Bob Dumas, with researcher Paul Cole, and with Irene Mandra. As fast as you can get up to the table, I will swear you people in.

Captain McDaniel, you honor us with your presence.

Ms. Mandra, hello again. Is Mr. Dumas here? Please take the second seat. I flew with a Robert K. Dumas in F-100's. Hello again, Mr. Cole, and Pat Dunton. If you would all please stand and raise your right hand.

[Witnesses sworn.]

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you. Please be seated.

I am going to ask you, since your entire written statement, if you have one, will go in the record, so that we can kind of getting this going, because second bells will go off in a minute and then we will stay about 4 minutes and then we will be gone probably the better part of a half-hour, and then it should be open-ended. I, for one, like this clustering of votes because we are not running over burning up all this electric train time from this building, and that way, we should have another long hour of testimony.

Again, I want to publicly state that Mr. Owen Pickett of Virginia has been an absolute champion to sit at my side because this, he knows, is a keen area of interest of mine and he has gone way beyond just being a good vice chairman. He has picked up a tremendous interest himself, because he is the Congressman for one of the biggest military conglomerates, mostly Navy, in the country, and much respected in the whole Newport/News/Hampton/southeastern Virginia area.

So we will just go left to right here. Ms. Dunton, I have met you in my office for the first time recently. We have 9 minutes on the vote. We will take about 4 of it right now. Please proceed with any opening statement.

STATEMENT OF PAT DUNTON, PRESIDENT, KOREAN/COLD WAR FAMILY ASSOCIATION

Ms. DUNTON. I would like to tell the committee that I have been working on this since I was 21 years old in 1969.

Mr. DORNAN. You were how old when your dad was shot down?

Ms. DUNTON. Three years old.

Mr. DORNAN. Three years old.

Ms. DUNTON. He was shot down April 12, 1951. When I was 21, I decided it was time that I found out what happened to my father since the Government had not seen fit to try to discover what had happened to him or informed my family of what had happened to him. I am saying that to dispel the myth that this is new, that we are Johnny-come-lately's. The families have always been doing this. There are many of us out there that have been trying to contact the Government or people in the Government who would get the answers for us. We were consistently put off.

I went to the National Personnel Records Center in 1969 and asked them for information. Their excuse now is that, well, we had a fire in 1974 so we do not have anything to give you. In 1969, they said they had no record of my father ever serving in Korea, much less having any information on him. That is a little bit of my background.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask you one question. In 1965—may I ask you to do the arithmetic? In 1965, how old were you? In 1964, when Alvarez was shot down in the Tonkin Gulf incident, how old were you on August 5, 1974?

Ms. DUNTON. Seventeen, sixteen.

Mr. DORNAN. During the entire next decade, from 16 to 26, did you have this feeling of here we go again?

Ms. DUNTON. Absolutely.

Mr. DORNAN. With missing—

Ms. DUNTON. I tried to contact the National League of Families in 1974 when I first found out about it, and I wanted to get in touch with those families and say, "Please do not do what we did in Korea. Do not do what our parents did and what the wives did from Korea, because they listened to the Government who told us, 'We will get you the information.' They were promising you, 'We will get the information to you.'"

Mr. DORNAN. All right. We will come back and finish your statement. And Mr. Cole, please let me rearrange the order: I am going to go to the relatives first—to Mr. Dumas, and then to Ms. Mandra, and then we will come back to you.

Let me just tell Mr. Pickett here that Mr. Cole did this long, extensive report for the RAND Corp. He is in this documentary that I am going to send to you. He has been—I hate this word "trashed," it is overused—but he has been critiqued severely, sort of discredited. And that is the nonsense that has to stop. Everybody should accept everybody else in good conscience, and the cynics ought to occasionally back off and let the optimists have their day to see if there is anything to be, to use the word from some of your families, anything to be ferreted out in the area of intelligence.

We will take a recess for voting and be right back.

[Recess.]

Mr. DORNAN. The subcommittee comes back into order. Thank you for your forbearance. I am supposed to do a speech on the House floor. I am going to cancel it for you folks so this will be open-ended. I can always do what we call a special order. That is what general officers put out: general orders and special orders. I never knew if the House adopted that military term or not, maybe when George Washington was presiding over the Continental Congress, he started issuing general orders and special orders. But we will proceed here.

I will tell you something that is peculiar that just hit me. I come back and whatever minor level attention there is when I have bureaucrats in front of me—and you will notice that, for all my tough image around this place, I do not conduct a hearing like some Hollywood movie. "I think the witness is lying." "I think the witness is stonewalling me." "I will wait here until hell freezes over until I get an answer." The toughest I ever get is I repeat what I said to Mr. Liotta. Wait a minute. I question your adjective, radically different testimony on the bus sightings of the Romanians.

But I suddenly realized as I sat down, there is no tension here. I have a panel before me that is going to answer every question to the best of their ability: no equivocating, no shaving, no double entendres, no nuances, just straightforward search for the truth.

We go back to you, Ms. Dunton, to pick up where you left off, if you wanted to say anything else in an opening statement.

Ms. DUNTON. I have quite a long opening statement. Would you mind if I go ahead and read it, because I think it does have some pertinence.

Mr. DORNAN. Look, you have worked hard on it. The family members learn so much from sharing other people's experiences. You kicked into this in your maturity just as Vietnam is taking off. You concurred with my feeling that you said, here we go again and you watched the agony of all these missing in actions shoot down with one horrible extension. Because I lived through them both, one, as a young enlisted man who joined in October 1952.

You may not have been at the hearing yesterday when I said the lead Army psychiatrist of the team that debriefed every single returning prisoner from North Korean camps came by to talk to us, to give us something to do as young precadets. I had just turned 20. I picked up a fascination with this. I picked up a fascination with escape and evasion stories. I read about the first F-80 pilot to evade from North Korea to South Korea with both his ankles severely broken on handmade crutches and his ankles fused with his feet at an angle like this so he walked the whole distance on his toes. I read that. He then had to have his ankles rebroken and reset and then went back to flying. I read that in 1952, before I joined.

I have always had a keen interest in escape and evasion, and then I end up being a pilot myself, eject twice—once in the mountains rescued by a helicopter in Arizona, once in the ocean in the Guard, rescued again by a Navy helicopter. I am always thinking, the stress I was under, nobody was shooting at me. Many trips to Vietnam, thinking there when my imagination would leave the moment of trying to film something with a Bolax camera, that if I get shot down, I am in deep trouble because I am a civilian. How do I explain my presence in Indochina?

Then as a Congressman, in my 20-year span, 18 years in office, a 2-year gap. I want to learn from you folks but I want you to share one another's story. So read your statement and we will all track your experience, and then you two folks can do the same.

And one question, because you were not there yesterday. I suggested to Delores Apaca and to Joann Shirley—that is her last name—that we form in the families a coalition. Keep your individual identities—there is strength in the numbers of different groups—on letter signing, making statements of different groups. But we have to have a coalition of the League, the Alliance, and the Korean war family groups. Is there more than one Korean war family group?

Ms. DUNTON. Not that I know of.

Mr. DORNAN. Little local groups maybe came together years ago. You three people have to have a coalition working group to get to Mr. Santoli and his counterpart. Stand up and identify yourself, Dino, and pronounce your last name with all of its Italian flourish.

Mr. CARLUCCIO. Dino Carluccio.

Mr. DORNAN. Dino Carluccio and Al Santoli; these are my soldiers. He just reported to Senator Bob Smith, the only man who conducted a short 2-hour hearing on Korea in almost half a cen-

tury, 45 years or so. And then you will have a coalition so we can stay on track and this will not be broken.

If we lose the leadership in the House—the Republicans—I have utmost confidence in this gentleman from Virginia that he will have a series of hearings on this and keep it going. Mr. Clinton cannot break any more promises on this; I did not learn until yesterday that he has never come to a League meeting, an Alliance meeting, or sent a high-ranking representative—just analysts and briefers. I guess General Wold is the top of that food chain.

So we will try and keep this continuity going so we do not get another dry spell of 5 or 10 years where nothing happens. And we will ride Korea and pray to God that they just keep opening up. Who knows, we can get another miracle like the Berlin Wall coming down.

So take as long as you want, Ms. Dunton.

Ms. DUNTON. Thank you. I think we got to the part where I was 21 years old in 1969 when I started trying to find the information on my father. I contacted Senators, Congressmen, the Air Force Specialty Office, VA offices, governmental and private agencies, all with the same “no information” response.

When the Air Force Casualty Office told me they had burned the records of the Korean war missing because they did not have the space to keep them, I realized I would have to do the research myself. Part of my research involved on-line computer communication. This is where I met my first other Korean war MIA daughter. A close bond developed rapidly between us, and as we learned how similar our experiences were in attempting to gain information about the loss of our fathers, soon we were sharing experiences with other families.

We were all in the same situation. Either we got no information at all or the text trail led to still-classified documents, and those documents are mostly still classified to this day. Unable to get declassifications or results individually, we realized a collective approach would have more strength. The Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing was formed and incorporated in Texas in 1993. This is how long it has taken the families to get together again.

In the 1950's, there was a family association called the Fighting Homefront and they wrote letters, they went to Congress. I know my grandmother was physically removed from the Senate building because she said she was going to sit there until she talked to her Senator.

Mr. DORNAN. What year was that?

Ms. DUNTON. 1954.

As the president of the association, I am before you today to state clearly and for the record what our association believes can be done to account for the Korean war missing. Presently, the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office [DPMO], under the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs, is tasked to serve as the Department of Defense focal point for all POW/MIA matters.

We are aware that a few family members have received assistance from this office. We are also aware that there are committed individuals who have worked in this office in the past and that a

few are there now. However, those few personnel who are assigned to work on the issue of more than 8,000 Korean war unaccounted for must attempt to function within a bureaucratic and political office which, according to the Inspector General's report, still has not clearly defined its goals and objectives on this issue.

One officer at DPMO recently defined his job as paper shuffling. Because a lot of times we do not know what these people do, we asked him, what is your job? What do you do? He says, "I shuffle paper."

Mr. DORNAN. At what location were you when you were told that?

Ms. DUNTON. I was at DPMO, talking to DPMO personnel.

Mr. DORNAN. In Crystal City?

Ms. DUNTON. Where were we?

Mr. DORNAN. Through that door with all the keyed locks on it?

Ms. DUNTON. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And he said, my job is a paper shuffler?

Ms. DUNTON. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. What level? He was not an analyst like the three men we had here.

Ms. DUNTON. You did not have him testify today.

Mr. DORNAN. But his title is analyst?

Ms. DUNTON. No. It was—no. He was not an analyst.

Mr. DORNAN. A field officer? The kind they are going to send out in briefings across the country?

Ms. DUNTON. Exactly.

Mr. DORNAN. Building up toward—

Ms. DUNTON. One of the ones that talk to the families.

Mr. DORNAN. How many of you in the room today were at part of the hearings yesterday? Some of you were. You heard the analysis of Bill Bell, who has given years of his life to this including two-plus in Hanoi, that he feels this is their way to finally shut down or discourage annual meetings. So that is the level that will be handled.

And this is what I have meant for years as a Congressman, for two decades: Do not put bureaucrats there who are in a dead end career. That is why I could never understand an otherwise nice man, Paul Mather, having a job for 15 years, stalled out at Lieutenant Colonel in Bangkok. Or Chuck Trowbridge, who I thought I could trust over the years, who spent about 20 years in a slot accomplishing nothing and debunking. No mindset to debunk, constant debunking.

Go ahead.

Ms. DUNTON. Another high-ranking official within the United States-Russian Task Force for years has called for the family members to beg for more personnel and more money. At the same time his office spends thousands of dollars paying for limousines, expensive hotels, picnics, and tours for Russian members of the Joint Commission.

When the families have asked for research on the Korean war, they have consistently told us, we do not have the analysts to do it, we do not have the money to get the analysts to do it, you all need to go back to the Hill and get us some more money. It is constant, what we hear from them as far as—

Mr. DORNAN. Somebody has told you, go to the Hill—to the Congress of the United States—and get us more money?

Ms. DUNTON. Yes. We did it once already.

Mr. DORNAN. That was the million that—

Ms. DUNTON. Jeannie and I—

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. That my friend, Murtha.

Ms. DUNTON. We went on the Hill, just like we did 5 weeks ago and said, DPMO does not have the funds to do this. They do not have the funds to do the Korean war research. We want the research done. We need to get funds to do this specifically. It was done in the 1995 authorization act and it was \$1 million.

Mr. DORNAN. Be advised, if you want to get tough, that they had the money to send a male and a female analyst. And I am not making any assumptions that it was party time because I understand they are a mismatched set, but we all get surprises. But a male and a female who are supposed to be qualified senior administrators went out to Monterey, CA, not a stick in the eye, to an administrative school for a month last year and the year before and a week refresher last week. So remember that. If you need their names, I will get you their names.

Go ahead.

Ms. DUNTON. At great taxpayer expense, DPMO has produced few tangible results for Korean war missing. You heard them today: they claim one, and that was actually a cold war shoot-down, I believe.

Now, at a critical time in our history when it appears joint recovery teams might be allowed into North Korea, we must have our house in order before we move forward with the North Koreans. DPMO has had the time, the personnel, and plenty of money to be prepared, yet they are not. They are not prepared to do this. They do not have the list ready. They do not know who is missing where, much less who is missing.

It is time to try a more productive and efficient approach. Our association believes the Congress of the United States can do a service to Korean war missing, their families, and the American taxpaying public by defunding DPMO for Korean war accounting. We propose that Congress use only half what DPMO states they spend on Korean war accounting—approximately \$4.5 million annually—and fund an independent private entity capable of producing results for Korean war missing and their families.

At this time, I submit a copy—I have one here—of our proposal. I think, Congressman Dornan, you already have one, and I will get copies for everyone. We ask that this be included in the record.

[The information of the Korean/Cold War Family Association follows:]

KOREAN/COLD WAR FAMILY ASSOCIATION OF THE MISSING



TO
RESOLVE

TO
REMEMBER

TO
CHANGE

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*A. Proposal**B. Appendix A, Inspector General White Paper Report**C. Appendix B, Federal Research Division Final Report**D. Appendix C, K/C FAM Policy Dimensions**E. Appendix D, Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIA
Korean War*

April, 1996

Summary: Private Sector Research Entity (PSRE) Proposal

The United States Congress has enacted into law through the 1991, 1992, 1995, and 1996 Defense Authorization Acts a clear mandate that the United States government shall continue to investigate and strive to resolve the more than 8,500 cases of Americans listed as MIA from the Korean and Cold Wars. Annually the Department of Defense spends millions of tax payer dollars attempting to account for these missing men. Year after year, administration after administration there is little or no tangible result.

The end of the Cold War and the proposed multi-faceted Peace Treaty negotiations with North and South Korea, China, Russia, and the United States should provide a unique and long overdue opportunity to resolve the fates of missing Americans. The Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing strongly requests the United States Congress to support the creation of a private sector POW/MIA initiative research entity (PSRE) to ensure resolution of the fates of missing American servicemen at this historic and opportune time.

Index

Introduction

- 1) End of the Cold War creates opportunities to account for the missing
- 2) Governmental entities have failed to exploit this potential

Objectives

- 1) Fullest possible accounting for POW/MIAs from the Korean War and the Cold War
- 2) Serve the interests of the POW/MIAs and their families

Privatize Research

- 1) Specifically tasked and well funded government entities have made ineffectual attempts at progress
- 2) The private sector offers professional expertise and objectivity from political considerations

Mission Statement

Research in order to resolve

Sources and Products

- 1) Research United States archives utilizing experts with security clearances
- 2) Research foreign archives without political restraint
- 3) Provide information to the families and government

Methodology

- 1) Meet or exceed accepted professional standards
- 2) Investigation on case by case basis

Funding Requirements

- 1) Combination of private and public source financing, foundation grants, private gifts and matching funds
- 2) Budget request less than one tenth that of DOD expenditures

Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA RESEARCH AGENDA

Introduction

The end of the Cold War brought a great deal of opportunity to answer the question of what fate befell servicemen who did not return from the Korean War or from the Cold War. Many believed, with a great deal of justification, that archival records held by communist nations would be the most important sources of new information.

In the early 1990's, two governmental bodies were created to take advantage of this unprecedented and historic opportunity. There is a consensus that at least DPMO/USRJC and probably the entire Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTFFA) process has inadequately explored the potential now available. The cost to taxpayers for this failure is measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars.

The time has come to create and adequately fund a Private Sector POW/MIA initiative Research Entity (PSRE). In order to do so, the first step must be a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of the governmental effort to resolve Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases. The purpose of this evaluation is not to become bogged down in a rehash of what went wrong; rather, in order to establish the need for a new approach one needs to show that those who had the chance, the money and the responsibility have not performed satisfactorily. (Appendix A) Thus, the failed governmental approach should end, or at least step aside. It is time for others to be given a chance which cannot happen without adequate funding.

Objectives

The objective of the private sector POW/MIA research entity (PSRE) would be to provide a fullest possible accounting for the POW/MIA's and answers to the family members. This will be achieved by the creation of a research entity that will meet rigorous professional and academic standards found in military history and archive sciences. Unlike existing governmental structures, PSRE does not believe families need counseling or advocates; rather, families deserve answers.

Rather than conducting research that serves the political purposes of governmental bodies, PSRE will put the accounting for the POW/MIA's first. PSRE will define in clear terms what services and information family members can expect and will also create an open organization whose activities are held accountable by the consumers it is designed to serve. Thus, PSRE's mission statement and accountability will be centered on the interests of the POW/MIA's and their families.

This research agenda is intended to be used as a planning document that will both justify the creation of a private sector research entity and lay the foundation for a campaign to raise funds from public and private sector sources.

Privatize Research

In a formal finding in 1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of Defense was not capable and would not have the capability to do the type of research required to resolve Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA issues. *Evidence accumulated since 1992 demonstrates that the two governmental structures - The Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO) and the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC) - responsible for resolving Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases have had little success.* Many have concluded that their efforts on Korean War cases have been a failure.

The USRJC, which has existed longer than the Korean War lasted, has not resolved a single Korean War POW/MIA case using information derived by DPMO or the Commission. The meager progress that has been made was the result of the efforts of others, including work by family members and independent researchers.

Over the past two years, family members have forwarded to Congress an ever increasing volume of complaints and expressions of frustrations concerning DPMO's conduct and lack of results. Neither JTFFA nor DPMO has suffered from a lack of funds. Using DPMO's own figures, its operation costs the taxpayer \$60 million per year. *Thus, since 1992 this failed effort has cost the taxpayer over \$300 million.* DPMO states its financial resources are 40% directly allocable to the Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases; \$120 million, with no resolved cases to show for it. The time has come to move on.

The Defense Department has had its well-funded chance. The time for a private sector research alternative has come. The government can keep DPMO and the USRJC if it must, but the PSRE must be given the opportunity to serve the needs of the Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs and their families. Up to now, family members have had to fund private sector research efforts out of their own pocket. Thus, in an example of double taxation, *a citizens group has to pay taxes to support an ineffectual government program while simultaneously financing a private effort designed to achieve the same end and with better results.*

The DoD's observation that DoD has neither the talent nor the resources to do adequate research on Korean War or Cold War POW/MIA cases has been proven to be true. The private sector should take over and provide low cost, efficient service.

By creating PSRE, the families will form an organization that can better serve them and conduct research in a more systematic fashion. In order to make the case for a private sector entity, however, PSRE must demonstrate that it knows what to do and how to do it.

Mission Statement: Resolve Cases

The Department of Defense treats the POW/MIA resolution effort as a Graves Registration Service problem. The DoD defines "to resolve" as the recovery and identification of remains. In contrast, PSRE will provide the most comprehensive and detailed description of the circumstances of loss and ultimate fate that can be obtained.

The definition of "to resolve" forms the very core of the PSRE. PSRE's definition of "to resolve" has two levels:

- 1) Use archival research to locate the individual POW/MIA whether alive or as positively identified repatriated remains.
- 2) Obtain information concerning the circumstances of loss from US records, interviews and debriefings of US servicemen and from foreign sources. This information will be provided on a timely basis to family members and also placed in casualty records according to Section 1506 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996.

PSRE recognizes that it will not be possible to account for every Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA case. With that goal in mind, however, PSRE will work to determine to the greatest degree of detail possible the fate of individual Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA cases and forward this information to the families. PSRE will perform these tasks with compassion, discretion and dignity.

Sources and Products

PSRE will search for information that derives from records and from direct testimony of eyewitnesses. The result of this effort will be an important addition to the record of American Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs.

PSRE has no ambition to duplicate the functions of the individual casualty affairs branches of the independent Services. In addition, PSRE will not seek custody of individual casualty records or otherwise attempt to become a record repository. PSRE will be a research organization whose products will be distributed first to families, then to governmental organizations whose mission is to store and retain documentation.

PSRE, like other existing government contractors, will utilize qualified professionals who hold security clearances in order to access classified materials in the United States. Relevant record repositories are scattered from Hawaii to Washington, DC. Using established business practices, PSRE will obtain access to these repositories in order to conduct research that falls within both US law and any subsequent statement of work contained in PSRE's contracts. The Department of Defense is on record with the determination that DoD has neither the expertise nor the resources to carry out archival research.

PSRE will also organize archive research efforts in foreign holdings. *There are many precedents whereby private contractors conduct proprietary research abroad with the approval and endorsement of the US government.* There are also many examples that show how independent researchers, by disengaging their work from politics to the greatest degree possible, are able to achieve results that governmental bodies cannot.

PSRE will use the efficiency and expertise of the private sector and leverage its relationship with governmental sponsors to devise the most effective and professional archive research effort possible. PSRE will adapt its methodology and approach to the local circumstances where foreign archive holdings are

located.

PSRE will conduct interviews with US and foreign veterans whose testimony can complement known facts concerning a particular case. As shown repeatedly over the past four years, direct testimony of eyewitnesses contributes considerably to the effort to derive a more complete picture of the circumstances of loss and ultimate fate of Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs.

Of particular interest will be to locate, analyze, and disseminate the debriefings of repatriated Korean War POWs. The records for repatriated US Army, Navy and Marine POWs have been located in the National Archives and Records Administration. A priority will be to locate the debriefings of repatriated US Air Force POWs. These records, which have been missing for twenty years, have been located by private sector researchers. PSRE will seek, within the context of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, to incorporate the relevant contents of the US Air Force POW debriefings into the casualty files of Korean War MIA cases.

In sum, PSRE will focus on untapped sources of information and will provide this information first to the families and then to appropriate offices in the US government that are custodians of casualty data.

Methodology

The methodology for services provided by PSRE will meet or exceed accepted professional standards and will conform to established practices in the event PSRE becomes a government contractor.

PSRE will prepare its investigation on a case by case basis giving priority to those cases that either have not been adequately documented or can be completed or even resolved through meticulous research.

PSRE will not submit lists to foreign researchers first. PSRE will focus research efforts as evidence accumulates.

Funding Requirements

PSRE will seek a combination of private and public source financing, foundation grants, private gifts and matching funds. Contracts from the US government, particularly OSD, will be necessary for two reasons. First, private sources will not be able to provide adequate funding. Second, in order to work with certain types of casualty records and in order to have full access to all archives, PSRE researchers must have an official relationship with an OSD sponsor.

Total amount of funding required depends on the level of ambition. PSRE would seek a fraction of the contract money previously spent by the Defense POW/MIA Office. In 1994, for example, DPMO paid \$840,000 to photocopy for and ship to DPMO records that were already in the public domain. (Appendix B) This type of public sector excess will not be a part of PSRE's operations.


The job will be expensive, but if one takes DPMO's expenditure of \$30,000 per Korean War POW/MIA case as a guideline, then PSRE should be expected, by DPMO standards, to spend in excess of \$200 million. *PSRE will budget for each Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA case less than one tenth of what the DPMO has spent.* A \$11.25 million operating budget over five years should be adequate to address the Korean War cases and the Cold War cases as well. Additional funds will be sought if needs are identified.

In light of the fact that OSD funding is an Executive Branch function, contract support from an OSD sponsor will reflect the policy of the current Administration. Likewise, if the current administration does not support private sector research, it will be difficult in the extreme to obtain contract support from OSD or any other branch of the government.

The extent to which the Legislative Branch can compel the Executive Branch to support PSRE's work depends, in large measure, on the composition of PSRE's Congressional support.

Appendix A

A WHITE PAPER
THE DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR MISSING
IN ACTION OFFICE



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

AUGUST 1995



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884



AUG 18 1995


MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN
ACTION OFFICE

SUBJECT: PROGRAM EVALUATION DIRECTORATE WHITE PAPER

Program Evaluation Directorate (PED) White Papers are intended to provide a more informal vehicle for communicating advice and constructive suggestions to our clients. Enclosed is a White Paper we prepared to help your office define its missions and tasks, establish a planning process, and structure the organization. As briefed to you previously, our initial work found that improvements in these areas were needed.

The White Paper provides suggestions for improving practices in your office based on legislative requirements, information from other studies we have conducted, or our review and interpretation of the appropriate management literature. We also provide some illustrative examples of goals and structures for your office drawn from our on site work. However, we firmly believe that only the members of the organization can properly decide their own goals and structures. We can only provide the appropriate information and tools.

As is the usual practice with the Program Evaluation Directorate projects, our findings and recommendations are advisory in nature and do not require any specific management response. However, we hope this report will be of value to you and we would appreciate your feedback on the report. Please direct your comments to me or to Mr. David House, at (703) 604-8783.


John C. Speedy III
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
Program Evaluation

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Secretary of Defense established the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO) in July 1993 to provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) affairs within the Department of Defense. Creation of the office brought together four disparate DoD offices that had been working in the POW/MIA arena for varying amounts of time.

In August 1994, the Director, DPMO, on his own initiative, requested an evaluation of his office by the Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Program Evaluation (PED). We focused our initial work on assessing the processes that provide definition, direction, and structure for the organization. We found that well developed processes in these areas were not yet in place. Specifically, we found that:

- basic missions and tasks were not well defined or communicated within the organization;
- no strategic planning process was in place; and
- the organizational structure was turbulent, poorly defined, and not consistent with current policy guidance regarding organizational layering.

After documenting these observations and providing a briefing to the Director in December 1994, we redirected our work to provide constructive suggestions on defining mission and tasks, establishing a planning process, and structuring the organization at the DPMO. The results of that work are presented in this White Paper and summarized in the paragraphs that follow.

Defining Missions and Tasks

In defining its missions and tasks, the DPMO faces challenges posed by the broad nature of its charter, the different institutional backgrounds of the office's components, and the divergent nature of its internal and external clients. Overcoming these obstacles first requires recognition of the conflicting perspectives that clients and components bring to bear on the operations of the agency. We suggest putting together a specific statement of the organization's purpose and translating it into some general goals as a way to produce awareness of where groups differ on attacking a common problem. This process can also contribute to communication and help foster commitment to the goals that are ultimately established. Only the members of an organization can validly formulate its goals, and the process should incorporate a wide range of input and discussion. However, we do provide some illustrative general goals for DPMO to facilitate our discussion. We recommend finalizing the draft instructions on Missions and Functions as a good vehicle for documenting the results of this effort.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Strategic Planning

Carrying out the missions and tasks established by the DPMO means setting up a good planning process. This involves translating the established purposes into more specific objectives or initiatives. Formulating these specific objectives should take into account the internal and external environment and attempt to identify strengths and weaknesses of the organization. The process should also account for the resources needed to reach the objectives and determine ways to measure progress towards achieving objectives. We point out the strategic planning guidelines set forth in the Government Performance and Results Act and urge the DPMO to adopt this model. We suggest that planning efforts should start small and need not wait until full developed strategic plans are in place. We also recommend that the organization adopt performance measures that are simple to apply and linked to the budget process.

Organizational Structures

In our discussion of organization structure, we recommend that the DPMO refrain from any ad hoc structural changes until it makes a more systematic assessment of its organizational needs. We analyzed three general alternative ways to divide the work and the assignment of responsibilities and authority in the DPMO:

- Alternative 1: The Current Structure With Well Defined Mission and Tasks.
- Alternative 2: A matrix-type structure using task forces for specified activities.
- Alternative 3: A structure that allocates a significant portion of the work load and responsibility structure by geographic region.

Criteria we present for analyzing structures include clear lines of authority and responsibility, decentralization where possible, and congruence with the strategy of the organization. In formulating the alternatives, we assume that all current functions will remain within the DPMO. The description of each alternative includes any assumptions made concerning the work processes at the DPMO. We believe the alternatives presented are viable alternatives for consideration, in whole or in part, but only those more familiar with the organization can validate our assumptions. Accordingly, we make no specific recommendations on the structure most appropriate for the DPMO.

Concluding Remarks

In concluding, we recognize the difficulty in setting aside time for such process building. However, in our experience, without the strong leadership that such actions require, the organization will continue to experience difficulty in justifying its resource requirements and completing the assigned mission.

INTRODUCTION

THE DPMO OFFICE IS BORN

In July 1993, officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense moved to finalize the internal directive and supporting documents that set up a new Department of Defense (DoD) field activity—the DPMO. One phrase in the new office's charter sets forth its mission: "...provide centralized management of prisoner of war/missing in action (POW/MIA) affairs within the Department of Defense."¹

BELIEF THAT CENTRALIZED MANAGEMENT NEEDED

According to one participant in the establishment of the DPMO, the timing for its creation was driven by an invitation issued to families of POWs and MIAs to meet with officials in Washington to discuss their concerns.² While this explanation would not be inconsistent with the role played by outside forces in the history of the POW/MIA issue, the DoD documents setting up the agency do not address the political considerations involved in the decision. The rationale for the new field agency, as set forth in the decision memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, was that providing centralized management of POW/MIA affairs within the DoD would enhance the "efficiency, effectiveness, and responsiveness of the Department's efforts in these matters."³

ACTION CONSOLIDATED FOUR OFFICES

The Deputy Secretary's approval of the proposed directive brought together four disparate DoD offices that had been working in the POW/MIA arena for varying amounts of time.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA)

The first of the four offices, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (POW/MIA), was established in 1991 within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Its job was to develop U.S. and DoD policies on POW/MIA issues. With the creation of the DPMO, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense who headed the office was now also in charge of the new DoD field activity. He continued to report to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.

Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for POW/MIAs

The second office, the Defense Intelligence Agency Special Office for POW/MIAs, was set up during the Vietnam Conflict to collect information on American servicemen classified as either POWs or MIAs. The office, which was intended to support operational commanders, continued functioning at varying levels of activity after the fall of South Vietnam.

Central Documentation Office

The third office, the Central Documentation Office, was set up by the Secretary of Defense in late 1991 to review and declassify materials pertaining to American POWs and MIAs lost

INTRODUCTION

in Southeast Asia. Before the consolidation, the office reported to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence).

Task Force Russia

The fourth office, Task Force Russia, was set up in early 1992 under the control of the Department of the Army. The Task Force was given the mission of supporting the United States-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (hereafter referred to as the Joint Commission). The Joint Commission was primarily intended to resolve the fate of U.S. Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs. In addition, it reports on any information concerning Vietnam War and World War II POWs and MIAs. The Joint Commission includes Members of Congress, senior Department of State and DoD personnel, and a representative from the U.S. Archives. Much of the Task Force's work consists of research in Russian archives and interviews of Russian citizens that provide the data used by the Joint Commission in determining the fate of U.S. service members.

**ONE OFFICE'S
RESERVATIONS
ABOUT
CONSOLIDATION**

With the creation of the DPMO, Task Force Russia no longer fell under the authority of the Department of the Army. When asked to comment on this prospect, Task Force Russia staff cautioned their superiors that the placement under DPMO "carries with it a very real probability that [the task force's] successful operating procedures will not survive subordination to the new organization."⁴ While the Army leadership eventually concurred with the consolidation proposal, they did inform officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense of specific concerns about the impact of the action on the successful operation of the Task Force. Dealing with these concerns was not the only challenge faced by the leadership of the new organization.

THE CHALLENGE OF "CENTRALLY MANAGING" POW/MIA AFFAIRS

**ENTITIES OUTSIDE
THE DPMO DEAL IN
POW/MIA ARENA**

One challenge for the DPMO was carrying out its stated responsibility to "[S]erve as the DoD focal point for POW/MIA matters." This responsibility had to be carried out even though other DoD offices that deal with POW/MIA matters answer to different administrative chains of command than the DPMO office. Key organizations, outside the Office of the Secretary of Defense, that deal with POW/MIA issues include:

- The Military Service Casualty and Mortuary Affairs Office;
- The U.S. Army's Central Identification Laboratory in Hawaii;

- The U.S. Pacific Command's Joint Task Force Full Accounting which conducts POW/MIA research and field investigations in Southeast Asia; and
- The Joint Services Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape Agency, which develops policy and procedures that may influence the actions of future POWs.

Other outside entities with whom the DPMO must work to carry out the responsibilities in its charter include the Defense Intelligence Agency, Congress, POW/MIA families, and veterans organizations.

PERSONNEL FOR NEW ORGANIZATION NOT INITIALLY AVAILABLE

Another challenge was that the DPMO began operations without the full staffing level envisioned for the new organization. The administrative documents accompanying the DPMO Charter authorized 51 personnel spaces for the DPMO in addition to the 71 spaces transferred from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Defense Intelligence Agency offices that combined to form the new organization. However, establishment of the office preceded without filling these spaces. In addition, while 27 military personnel occupied temporary positions in the Task Force Russia when the DPMO started-up in July 1993, the authorization for these spaces terminated in December 1993. In sum, as of August 1994, the DPMO had personnel filling only 66 of 122 authorized positions.⁶

Because the increased personnel authorized for the DPMO were not initially available, the detailing of DoD personnel to the office was permitted, according to the administrative documents supporting the charter. However, the office was expected to take action in order to recruit and hire the needed personnel. Administrative support for these personnel actions, under the terms of the charter, is provided by the Director, Washington Headquarters Services.

INCREASED CONGRESSIONAL AND PUBLIC SCRUTINY

As the DPMO moved to establish itself as the focus for POW/MIA affairs while simultaneously obtaining the personnel authorized for the office, it did so in the context of increased attention on POW/MIA affairs. President Bush's efforts to normalize relations with Vietnam in 1991 coincided with increased attention by Congress on POW/MIA matters. By 1994, two separate Congressional investigations had examined POW/MIA matters. Also, the end of the Cold War opened up the possibility of obtaining information on Korean and World War II POW/MIAs from the former Soviet Union. This event led to the creation of family groups for Korean POW/MIAs to join the already active family groups related to the Vietnam War.⁸

INTRODUCTION

OUR ASSESSMENT OF PROCESSES IN PLACE

This was the context, then, for our examination of the processes in place at the DPMO. Overall, we saw the need to build the basic elements necessary for providing clearer definition, direction, and structure in the organization. Our specific observations are detailed in the following paragraphs.

MISSIONS AND TASKS NOT WELL DEFINED

We found that the DPMO's basic missions and tasks are not well defined or communicated within the organization. While this deficit is recognized by senior leadership at the DPMO,⁹ the procedures for generating the needed definitions, internal directives and guidelines are not in place. To some, the lack of procedures may be perceived as bureaucratic oversights that have occurred in the face of urgent operational requirements. However, in our experience, action to correct this situation is required so that the DPMO can focus its limited resources on what is essential and reduce any duplication of effort.

Defining missions and tasks is also a prerequisite for identifying the skills and personnel the organization must obtain for the job it needs to do. This clear definition of personnel requirements is essential as the agency attempts to justify its current personnel levels during projected downsizing in the DoD.

STRATEGIC PLANNING LACKING

Faced with the short-term requirements of establishing a new organization, the DPMO leadership had not established a strategic planning process. As a result, the DPMO is not availing itself of a useful tool for providing overall direction to personnel and for adjusting to changing requirements and resource levels.

AN UNSTABLE AND ILL-DEFINED ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.

In examining the organizational structure, we found a great degree of turbulence. Within a six month period, we were provided with six different organizational charts reflecting a different organizational structure and personnel manning levels. We did not find evidence that these changes were based on a systematic assessment of how best to organize the DPMO to meet its mission. In addition, the current structure at the DPMO does not reflect National and Defense Performance Review guidance regarding streamlining organizational layers. As a result of these conditions, organizational efficiency is reduced and the matching of personnel with authorized positions is not assured. Establishing a process that will let the organization stabilize its structure is essential for focusing the efforts of the directorates to meet the DPMO's mission.¹⁰

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NOTES

- ¹DoD Directive 5110.10, *Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing In Action Office (DPMO)*, July 16, 1995.
- ²Interview with DoD Official conducted by PED Staff, November 3, 1994.
- ³While we do not necessarily endorse the author's views, a historical review of the public role in the POW/MIA issue can be found in H. Bruce Franklin, *MIA or Mythmaking in America*, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1993. The stated rationale for establishing the DPMO is from Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from...Director, Administration and Management, Subject: Proposed DoD Directive, "Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office(DPMO)," July 15, 1993.
- ⁴Memorandum For Director, Task Force Russia, From Deputy Director And Special Assistant to the Director, Subject: Reorganization Of POW/MIA Affairs, April 29, 1993.
- ⁵Stated Responsibility from DoD Directive 5110.10, *Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing In Action Office (DPMO)*, July 16, 1995, Section E., paragraph d. Outside entities noted in paragraph i, same reference.
- ⁶Information on personnel authorizations, transfers, and detaching personnel from Executive Summary/Cover Brief, Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense from...Director, Administration and Management, Subject: Proposed DoD Directive, "Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office(DPMO)," July 15, 1993, page 2. For certain administrative functions, the personnel transferred from the nine OSD positions are a separate group.
- ⁷Administrative support for DPMO addressed in DoD Directive 5110.10, *Defense Prisoner Of War/Missing In Action Office (DPMO)*, July 16, 1995, Section H, paragraph 3.
- ⁸On congressional investigations see *The Report on the Select Committee on POW/MIA's*, Senator John Kerry, Chairman, January 1993, and *An Examination of U.S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs*, Prepared by the Minority Staff of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Jesse Helms, Ranking Member, May 1991.
- ⁹For example, the Deputy Director, DPMO, expressed need for a clearer mission statement and better idea where the organization is heading. Interview with the Deputy Director, DPMO, conducted by PED Staff, November 1, 1994.
- ¹⁰On delaytoring and span of control see Vice President Al Gore's, *Report of the National Performance Review*, September 7, 1993, pp. 70-72. The Defense Performance Review was established by Secretary of Defense Memorandum, June 1, 1993.

For the sake of brevity, the models proposed by the Inspector General's office have been omitted.

The following are excerpted from the text:

STEP 1: DEFINING MISSION AND TASKS**LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK
ESTABLISHED IN
1993**

Further impetus for defining missions and tasks is contained in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. In this Act, Congress established a legislative framework for defining missions. The law requires that each agency establish comprehensive mission statements. The Act also calls for strategic plans from all Executive Departments by 1997. These must contain general goals and objectives for major functions, a description of how these goals and objectives will be accomplished, and identification of factors outside the agency's control that could affect its ability to achieve the goals and objectives.

The mission statements, as called for in the Act, should explain why the organization exists and give a clear picture where it is going. While the DPMO is not specifically directed to do so, developing a mission statement and other elements consistent with the Government Performance and Results Act requirements is a prudent way to be consistent with Department-wide planning requirements.

OBSTACLES TO DEFINING MISSIONS

Our experience with conducting other organizational reviews, causes us to conclude that problems with clarifying focus and purpose are not unusual. What accounts for this condition?

**PUBLIC SECTOR
CHARACTERISTICS
COMPLICATE**

Some management literature suggests that special characteristics of the public sector complicate things. In this view, objectives of public agencies tend to be multiple, conflicting, and vague. People want different things with varying degrees of intensity and vague objectives can accommodate disagreement. Clients of public sector agencies also tend to be multiple and heterogeneous in their interests. A special point has been made that policy offices with their hard to define outputs are a particularly difficult area to establish specific purposes and measures.

**SPECIFIC
OBSTACLES AT THE
DPMO**

These general factors help explain the specific obstacles faced by the DPMO as it tries to establish a well-defined purpose. The mission in the charter is overly broad, the components of the office have different institutional backgrounds, and the internal and external clients of the office are widely divergent. These points are detailed below.

**IMPLEMENTING A
BROAD MISSION
STATEMENT**

The mission statement of the office in its entirety is as follows: "The DPMO provides centralized management of [POW/MIA] affairs within the Department of Defense." The charter does not further elaborate on what "central management" consists of. It does not, for example, note a role for the office in the review of resources for other activities that perform in the POW/MIA arena. It does not differentiate between the role the office has in present day operational matters versus past issues.

The charter does not provide detailed descriptions of what "centrally managing POW-MIA affairs" means in such areas as intelligence collection. These are "details" that the office needs to work out as it operationalizes its mission statement.

This situation is not unique. Other Defense Department offices are faced with implementing broad mission statements that are subject to differing interpretation. For example, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) was set up in 1986 and given the task of "overall supervision (including oversight of policy and resources) of special operations activities...." In implementing this broad mission, interpretation problems have arisen and in 1993, the office still saw a need to "ask the Secretary of Defense to issue implementing instructions to clarify the relationship and respective responsibilities between [the office] and the [Special Operations Command]."⁵ In other PED work, we have pointed out how ambiguities in the DoD directives have resulted in differing interpretations between the office in charge of the Defense Information Program, the Military Departments, and the Defense Agencies.⁶

DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND OF COMPONENT PARTS

Another obstacle is the differing institutional backgrounds of the organizational elements within the DPMO. The creation of DPMO brought together individuals with recent backgrounds in policy offices, intelligence organizations, public affairs, and special task forces. Even those with similar organizational backgrounds had experiences with different regions of the world (e.g., Russia and Southeast Asia) and different wars (e.g., Vietnam and Korea).

MULTIPLE "CLIENTS" WITH DIFFERING INTERESTS

Another obstacle to organizing around a common purpose is the different clients served by the office. We use this term to indicate those who avail themselves of the information, services, or programs generated by the DPMO.

External Clients

First, significant outside clients exist in the form of various family groups. In the 1970's Southeast Asia families formed into the National League of Families of American Prisoners and Missing in Southeast Asia, generally abbreviated as the National League of Families. This group has initiated visits to Hanoi and the leadership has been granted security clearances so as to participate in high-level meetings on POW-MIA matters.⁷ With the opening up of the former Soviet Union, family groups have also been established for Korean War and Cold War POW/MIAs.

Internal Clients

The DPMO also has significant internal clients. First, they are to be the advisor to the Secretary of Defense on POW/MIA matters acting through the appropriate policy offices. Second, they must generate internal DoD policy in the area for the Military Departments and the Combatant Commands. Third, they must generate intelligence requirements for agencies across the Government.

ILLUSTRATIVE GENERAL GOALS FOR THE DEFENSE PRISONER OF WAR/MISSING IN ACTION OFFICE

GOAL: Provide objective and timely advice to DoD leadership on policy matters and intelligence requirements.

GOAL: Ensure the fullest possible coordination across all elements in DoD involved in POW/MIA affairs.

GOAL: Be fully responsive to those outside DoD with an interest in the area.

GOAL: Expertly manage and maintain information resources on POW/MIA matters.

Figure 1

OBTAIN WIDE- RANGE OF INPUT

As important as the substance of the goals is the process for formulating them. Ideally, the process should obtain input from a wide range of sources, both inside and outside the organization. In this way, the process itself can contribute to communication and help foster commitment to the objectives that are ultimately established. We note that the involvement of others, particularly those outside the DoD, has to be appropriate to the circumstances and may not mean direct participation.

USE ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTION AS CATALYST

During our research at the DPMO, we were shown a draft administrative instruction that attempted to define the responsibilities of the different components of the office. This document was incomplete and had remained incomplete for over a year. While some might view this as a bureaucratic formality, the development and finalization of an instruction on missions and functions is a good vehicle for defining missions and tasks at the agency. Once these are defined, the next step is detailing the specific things that need to be done and the methods that need to be employed for accomplishing the stated mission and general goals. This involves institutionalizing a planning process. The next section deals with this area.

STEP 2: ESTABLISHING A PLANNING PROCESS

CHALLENGES AND REWARDS OF PLANNING

Advice on planning is easy to give but sometimes hard to take. We all know that we need to "consider the big picture," "describe how our goals will be achieved," and "put first things first." However, it's hard to stop worrying about day-to-day brush fires when it's your yard that's burning. Even political appointees, who would appear to have the authority needed for taking time out to do strategic planning, report that time pressures beyond their control make this difficult.¹

However, overcoming these difficulties is worth the effort. Mapping out how to achieve the purposes set for the organization helps focus attention on the right things. The process often includes longer-term needs that may be neglected in the face of pressing emergencies.

IMPROVING THE SITUATION AT THE DPMO

As noted previously, we found that the DPMO had not instituted a strategic planning process, either in line with the Government Performance and Results Act or some other model. In addition, the task had not been assigned within the organization. The Plans and Policy Directorate, where one might expect to find this function, was not involved in internal organizational planning. The Deputy Director acknowledged that the DPMO "never really looks forward more than about three months," and he recognized the need to formulate a "clear view" of where the organization is heading.²

The following paragraphs, while not intended as a treatise on standard approaches to planning, provide some suggestions on correcting this situation.

START WHERE YOU ARE

In general, a good planning process translates the established mission and goals into more specific objectives or initiatives. Formulating these specific objectives should take into account the internal and external environment and attempt to identify strengths and weaknesses of the organization. The process should also account for the resources needed to reach the objectives and determine ways to measure progress towards achieving objectives. This is a big order when the organization has several missions, a complicated and fast-moving environment, and few existing performance measures, as is the case with the DPMO.

STEP 3: STRUCTURING THE ORGANIZATION

IMPORTANCE OF STRUCTURE

Having discussed suggestions on how to define mission and tasks at the DPMO and how to establish planning systems, we now turn to ways to develop and analyze alternative structures for the organization. By structuring, we mean the division of work and the assignment of responsibilities and authority in the organization.¹

**STRUCTURAL
CHANGE NO
PANACEA BUT
IMPORTANT**

Of course, structural changes alone are no panacea for solving an organization's problems. We agree with those who assert that cultural factors, values, and, last but not least, leadership, are also important.² However, we assume that structural issues provide a foundation for addressing these areas.

**NEED TO ASSESS
STRUCTURE AT THE
DPMO**

Because of this assumption, we are concerned about the unstable and ill-defined structure we found at DPMO. To correct this situation, we recommend that the DPMO refrain from any ad hoc changes until it makes a more systematic assessment of its organizational needs. This section provides some suggestions and illustrations on how to carry out this recommendation.

We begin with general principles on structuring and then apply them to three alternative structures for the DPMO. In formulating the alternatives, we assume that all current functions will remain within the DPMO. The description of each alternative includes any assumptions made concerning the work processes at the DPMO. We believe the alternatives presented are viable alternatives for consideration, in whole or in part, but only those more familiar with the organization can validate our assumptions.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES ABOUT STRUCTURING

While there is no clear consensus on the issue, our review of the management literature and the principles stated in the Vice President's National Performance Review lead us to formulate the following criteria for assessing alternative organizational structures.

**CLEARLY DEFINED
LINES OF
AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY**

Criteria 1-- Clear Lines

Structures should support the clearest possible definition of authority and responsibility consistent with achieving the mission of the organization.

STEP 3: STRUCTURING THE ORGANIZATION

ALTERNATIVE 1: CURRENT ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE




Figure 3

STRUCTURE
FOLLOWS PRIOR
ORGANIZATIONS

The directorates shown in Figure 3 are composed of between one and three divisions. The largest directorate, Research and Analysis, generally contains the staff who formerly composed the Defense Intelligence Agency's Special Office. Task Force Russia staff make up the bulk of the Joint Commission Support Directorate. The Reference and Documents Directorate is staffed by those who formerly manned the Central Documentation Office. Members of the staff who are dual hatted in Office of the Secretary of Defense positions are concentrated in the Plans and Policy Directorate. Staff elements at the DPMO include a Chief of Staff, General Counsel, a Special Assistant, a Family Advocate, an Executive Secretariat, and an Executive Secretary for the Joint Commission.

EVALUATION OF
ALTERNATIVE 1
AMBIGUITY WITH
JOINT COMMISSION
SUPPORT

EVALUATION OF ALTERNATIVE 1

Clear Lines. The greatest possibility for ambiguous lines of authority are with elements in the organizational structure with similar functions, namely, a staff office for Family Advocate and a separate one for External Affairs; and in the other case, a Directorate for Joint Commission Support and a separate Executive Secretary for U.S./Russia Joint Commission. An internal study done in the Summer of 1994 and memorandum prepared by staff rotating out of the DPMO pointed towards the coordination difficulties posed by the ambiguous structure for

Appendix B

Federal Research Division of the Library of Congress

Summary: Final Report on Korea/Cold War Archives Research, Library of Congress Federal Research Division under the direction of Department of Defense POW/MIA Office (DPMO)

Archives accessed readily available to the general public: 36,523 pages

Archives accessed not readily available to general public: 2,000 pages
(still classified)

Case specific information forwarded to permanent casualty file: None

Information forwarded to family members: Unknown

TOTAL COST	\$840,212.84
TOTAL PAGES	<u>38,523</u>

COST PER PAGE	\$21.81
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(for photo-copying/delivery)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS

TO : Dr. Angelo Collura, Chief
 Research and Analysis Division
 Defense POW/MIA Office

FROM : Louis R. Mortimer, Chief *LRM*
 Federal Research Division

RE : Final Report on Korea/Cold War Archives Research

DATE: April 11, 1996

Pursuant to our Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for FY 1995, I am reporting the results of work performed by staff members of the Library of Congress Federal Research Division (FRD) in searching for and recovering documents pertaining to unaccounted for military personnel from the Korean Conflict and the Cold War. All archival research was performed in the Washington, D.C. area, and both unclassified and classified records repositories were researched. FRD submitted quarterly reports on the progress of the research and these reports summarized the activities performed during that quarter. I will not reiterate the detailed discussion of each of those reports here.

According to the terms of our MOA, FRD archive researchers were not tasked to declassify or redact documents. Staff members identified those documents that pertained only to the condition, location, and treatment of unaccounted-for personnel from the Korean Conflict and Cold War era. FRD staff members photocopied those documents and transferred them to DPMO custody. At no time did FRD take possession of any classified documents. FRD transferred all retrieved and photocopied documents to DPMO.

FRD archival researchers used official Department of Defense personnel lists (including the Battlefield Monuments Commission list of Korean War missing and Summary of Cold War Losses) and identified a total of 38,523 pages of documents related to the location, condition, and treatment of unaccounted for personnel from the two conflicts. These documents consist of casualty reports, debriefings, and official records from archives of the US Armed Forces, Department of State, US National Archives, and other federal agencies. Personnel from the Defense POW/MIA Office took possession of the recovered documents either from FRD staff members who made deliveries of unclassified materials or, if classified material, directly from the records repository officials. A summary of archival research activities at the repositories visited follows.

US National Archives Washington, D.C. and Suitland and College Park, MD

Staff members began their work at the downtown facility in unclassified military records. Using the guides created by archives documents analysts, staff thoroughly examined 16 different record groups. Mr. Wilbert Mahoney, Military Reference Branch, Textual Reference Division, served as point of contact. In addition to the military records, staff members visited the National Archives II in College Park, MD to investigate record groups that had been moved to that location. Records in the Sam Klaus files were not available to FRD researchers because they were in transit and not open during the period of the MOA. Time did not permit FRD staff to return to the College Park archive in September 1995 to view these files.

Archives researchers visited both the National Archives Records Administration and Federal Records Center in Suitland, MD where they examined military records and documents, classified and unclassified. Researchers relied on the expert knowledge of Mr. Richard Boylan and Mr. Michael Waesche, curators of the pertinent collections. Messrs. Boylan and Waesche were very helpful to FRD staff members. Both gentlemen guided researchers through the collections, identifying record groups of potential value to this project, including messages and documents produced and received by the US embassies in Seoul and Tokyo during the Korean War that contained some references to prisoners-of-war and casualties.

A total of 13,039 pages of documents were reproduced at the US National Archives facilities located in downtown Washington, D.C., College Park, MD, and Suitland, MD. In September 1995, FRD researchers located some 33 documents requested by DPMO's analysis branch. This figure represents approximately 75 percent of the requests for clarification. FRD staff were denied access to one record group that had been recently moved to College Park/Archives II, but FRD supplied DPMO with the appropriate point-of-contact at the facility for future follow-up.

US Navy Operation Archives Washington Navy Yard

The documents housed in the US Navy Operation Archives are extremely fragile and FRD researchers were not permitted to handle and photocopy them. FRD, in conjunction with the Photoduplication Service of the Library of Congress (which installed the microfilm camera and supplied the technician) made arrangements with Mr. Bernard Cavalcante and Ms. Kathy Lloyd at the Operation Archives to microfilm the documents. An FRD staff member was granted permission to disassemble the document bindings and assist the microfilm technician to speed the filming process. All Naval Aviation and Marine Aviation files were screened (including unit histories and ship logs; war diaries and activity reports) and filmed. DPMO has no microfilm reader and, therefore, paper copies of the filmed documents were produced. The original microfilm was given to the Navy Archives in return for the use of their facility and in the interest of long-term preservation of the material. A

total of 4,299 pages of documents were transmitted to DPMO.

**Marine Corps Historical Center
Washington Navy Yard**

War diaries and operations logs for Marine Aviation units, operational diaries on aviation and ground units, and document folders on peacetime casualties were screened. Histories for all Marine Corps units active in the Fleet Marine Force Command down to battalions and service support companies were examined on the advice of Mr. Fred Graboske, archivist. In all, 490 pages of documents were produced for DPMO. FRD researchers were unable to locate USMC witness statements on the deaths of combat soldiers and prisoners-of-war.

**US Army Center for Military History
Washington, D.C.**

Researchers examined the contents of two file cabinets containing Korean War, World War II, and Vietnam reports, including Korean War documents on American personnel listed as "missing-in-action." Many of the reports found in the cabinets had been reproduced for DPMO from copies at the National Archives. However, some 1,968 pages of documents were unique and useful. Ms. Hannah Zeidlik, Chief of the Archives Branch, served as expert consultant.

**US Department of State
Washington, D.C. and Newington, VA**

Archive researchers met with Ms. Jeanne Hassan and Mr. Craig McKeeg, representatives of the External Research and Intelligence and Research Divisions, respectively to learn how the State Department files are organized, the nature of the information reported in messages, telegrams, and special investigations. These specialists explained the State Department's concerns about politically sensitive documents and their right to deny the release of all, or parts of these documents to DPMO. Once the documents, all categorized as classified, were screened and tagged for the attention of State Department officials, the documents themselves had to be listed for request-for-release procedures and then reviewed by the Declassification Branch.

The Sam Klaus files were never available to FRD researchers and have not been reviewed for documents that may contain information on the condition, location, and treatment of unaccounted-for personnel. The files were closed in preparation for transfer to Archives II (College Park, MD) shortly after work began at the downtown National Archives location and time did not permit researchers to examine the files before termination of the MOA.

Researchers examined the so-called Central, Log, and Post Files, containing materials

on casualties, negotiations with the North Koreans regarding unaccounted-for military personnel, reports on Cold War shootdowns, and State Department diplomatic activity worldwide; those documents produced by the Korean Desk Officer (including the embassy files and publications on the country) and all available files on the Korean War and Cold War at the downtown Washington facility. The National Archives is the custodian for most Central File documents produced in the 1950s and 1960s. All of these documents are included in Record Group 59 which was moved to Archives II in College Park. These records were examined by FRD researchers in September 1995.

FRD staff then travelled to Nowington, VA to a secondary storage facility to examine the Field Office Files. These files contain memoranda, and other documents that were produced in-country. FRD staff members identified 3,056 pages of documents and these materials were transferred from External Request Research Division to the Declassification Division. The FRD point-of-contact was Rosa Pace; the case officer for declassification (account number 9500784) was Christine Penace (202) 647-7125. The Department of State has instructions to notify DPMO when the documents are ready for transfer.

US Army Investigative Records Center Ft. Meade, MD

The primary focus of research from late in the third and during all of the fourth quarters of FY 1995 was the Army Investigative Records Center. Eight FRD researchers worked two shifts at the Center in order to complete the review of files. The Center houses the 3,000 files of Army personnel who were held as prisoners during the Korean War. These files contain debriefing reports from returnees, witness statements regarding eyewitness accounts of American personnel "last seen," and questionnaires concerning the capture, treatment, and escape attempts that were answered as follow-up to these witness statements. The reports provide valuable eyewitness statements that include names, cause of death, place of burial, and other relevant observations. The investigation of the documents was rather slow because of the poor condition of the material: papers literally broke apart in the hands of researchers.

Over a period of four months, researchers identified and photocopied 10,325 pages of documents, 8,325 unclassified and 2,000 classified reports. Archive researchers worked under the guidance of Mr. Henry Persons, custodian of the files. FRD staff members were instructed by DPMO officials *not* to photocopy the questionnaires (the so-called Phase 1-4 surveys of returnees) because the material contains personal data that would be virtually impossible to redact for privacy information. An estimated 10,000 pages of casualty information could not be reproduced. The presence of privacy information in these survey-questionnaires was the determining factor in the decision not to photocopy. FRD staff found classified documents other than survey material in only 427 returnee folders. The Army Investigative Records Center was the last documents repository visited by FRD staff members.

Personnel

David Osborne served as project manager, overseeing the coordination of staff assignments, research sites, liaison with archivists regarding permission to access files, and with DPMO officials. The following FRD staff performed full-time archival research during the course of the MOA:

David Osborne, Project manager
 Rodney P. Katz, team leader
 Jennifer B. Whatley
 Thomas D. Hall
 Michelle D. Wright
 Laura McLennan
 Carol A. Corrigan
 Samuel Stueland
 Olena Z. Thorne

Other staff members worked on the project on an as-needed basis.¹

Two microfilming technicians were loaned to FRD by the Library of Congress Photoduplication Service. Ms. Patricia Byam assisted with the photocopy efforts at the National Archives and Ms. Cheryl Nutter operated the microfilm camera to produce microfilm at the US Navy Operation Archives, Washington Navy Yard.

¹The large volume of archive material at the Army Investigative Records Center, Ft. Meade, MD required additional staff members to work in two shifts in order to complete the task by the end of the fiscal year.

Budget

FY 1995 expenditures are as follows:

Direct Labor Cost	\$361,800.00
Overhead Costs	347,328.00
Benefits	72,360.00
Administrative Costs ²	43,416.00
Photodup equipment	2,500.00
Copy account	7,705.00
Microfilm/Copy Flow (attached)	<u>5,103.84</u>
TOTAL:	\$840,212.84

Research Findings

The greatest disappointment to the researchers was the inability to locate all pertinent US Air Force documents. After numerous telephone communications with personnel (at Bolling AFB; Ft. Belvoir; SAF/AAIQ, the Pentagon; St. Louis, MO; Maxwell AFB; Kelly AFB; Randolph AFB) researchers could not locate the Air Force returnee debriefings. A similar condition seems to exist with regard to the US Navy debriefings. Several archivists suggested that the documents no longer exist.

Staff researchers were given some research information from members of the Korean/Cold War Families of the American Missing. This information consisted of letters from the archivist at the Eisenhower Library indicating that some pertinent material might be found there. Time and funding did not permit FRD staff to travel to remote locations and it would be useful for analysts at DPMO to contact those presidential library archivists to determine whether related documents exist in those archives if they have not already done so.

Archive researchers at FRD were enthusiastic and committed to finding every piece of documentation relating to the conditions of the MOA. They were dedicated to the task and determined to help DPMO and family members find evidence of unaccounted-for military personnel.

²Administrative costs include FRD administrative, marketing, and accounting support costs.

Appendix C

Policy Dimensions of Korean War MIAs**BY: Pat Wilson Dunton, President****Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing**

Day: 214-428-2855

Evening: 214-471-0246

For Immediate Release

Friday, March 29, 1996

Summary:

This article addresses several critical issues that were not covered in "The Other MIAs: Americans Seek Relatives Lost in Korea," (WP, March 26, 1996). In this article, the author reviews the five research tasks required to resolve Korean War MIA cases, calls for the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action (DPMO) office to be disbanded, and offers some suggestions on how the Clinton Administration's policy toward North Korea could be coordinated in a way that would more effectively achieve an accounting for Korean War MIAs and address the needs of their families.

Policy Dimensions of Korean War MIAs

“The Other MIAs: Americans Seek Relatives Lost in Korea,” (WP, March 26, 1996), focuses on important personal and humanitarian dimensions of the Korean War MIA problem. Analytical and policy issues that are not discussed in that article deserve equal attention because at the end of the day, Korean War MIA cases will be resolved through methodical research.

The Korean War MIA is not just a Cold War curiosity for historians to contemplate. The policy implications for the Clinton Administration are profound. The Post correctly notes that the MIA issue “complicates relations with North Korea.” The same can be said for US-Russia relations. This explains why the State Department would like to see the Korean War missing in action (MIA) issue disappear and why the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO) is content to make no progress on finding out what happened to American servicemen who were taken to the USSR during the Korean War.

The overall DoD MIA resolution effort, Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTFFA), has an annual budget of \$65 million. Of this, DPMO receives \$12 million per year. Thus, since 1992 DoD has spent at least \$260 million, over *one quarter of a billion dollars*, on MIA resolution efforts. By DPMO’s estimate, \$4.8 million of its annual budget (\$12 million total since 1992) has been devoted to Korean War cases. It is fair to ask, “What has been achieved with all this money?”

One way to begin to answer this question is to look at the analytical issues.

Resolution of Korean War MIA cases falls into the following five broad categories that must be addressed with distinctly different sources and methods:

- Establish an accurate list of Korean War MIAs and complete circumstances of loss from US records;
- Conduct an Outreach program for family members of Korean War MIAs for the purpose of DNA collection;
- Identify remains of the unidentified buried on US territory and those obtained from the North Koreans using DNA technology;
- Recover remains in North Korea by joint US/NK recovery efforts; and
- Determine the fate of men who were last known alive in North Korean, Chinese, or Soviet custody.

These five analytical tasks, if properly done, can provide families what they need to know about individual servicemen lost during the Korean War. A review of DoD's performance in general, and of DPMO in particular, reveals that since 1992 a massive amount of money has produced few tangible results for the families of Korean War MIAs.

First, the formulation of an accurate list of Korean War MIAs (Persons Missing - Korea, PMKOR) was not begun by DPMO until October 1995, and to date, has not been completed. The November 1995 DPMO newsletter stated, *"It is important to understand that the product will not and cannot meet the same standards of information as PMSEA*

(Persons Missing - Southeast Asia) and its related files.” After only one month’s work , DPMO determined not to include critical Korean War MIA case information in its “definitive” Korean War data base of MIAs. Contrary to DPMO’s position, many research professionals agree that much important case information is most assuredly available, but requires a methodical research plan for its recovery. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of DPMO, James Wold states in the Post article that he agrees with Korean War MIA families that accounting efforts for their loved ones should be equalized with government efforts at recovering the missing from Southeast Asia, yet DPMO, by their own admission, continues to use different standards for Korean War MIA accounting efforts.

Second, in 1954 each family of a missing serviceman received notification from DoD that any additional information concerning the recoverability of their family member would be sent to them immediately. Not only was this not done, individual MIA case files, including names and addresses of next of kin were inadvertently destroyed or “retired” to places unknown necessitating a costly process of relocating the families. The “Outreach” program for Southeast Asia MIA family members provides excellent information about the DNA identification process and enables families to submit DNA samples. No such program exists for Korean War MIA family members, yet DPMO continues to accept remains from North Korea, many of which very likely cannot be positively identified by any other method.

Third, in 1953 approximately 850 American remains that could not be identified were buried in the Punchbowl Cemetery in Honolulu, Hawaii. With contemporary DNA

techniques, there is a good chance that many of these men could be identified. The nationality of these men has never been in doubt, and since they represent over 10 percent of the servicemen whose cases have not been resolved, this is an excellent place to start. DPMO has not, however, taken any steps to identify the bodies buried at the Punchbowl.

The North Korean government turned over to US authorities dozens of remains long before DPMO existed. CILHI, the DoD laboratory responsible for analyzing these remains, concluded in 1993 that the individuals represented by the bones were too old, too short, and had not been buried long enough to be those of Americans. In spite of this finding, DPMO asserts the remains "may be those of Americans." If that is true, then the only option is DNA testing. Yet DPMO has done nothing to prepare for DNA tests. Neither the delivery of remains nor the identification of them is a DPMO function.

Fourth, the remains of thousands of servicemen who died in combat, in POW camps, or were murdered after capture, were left on the Korean peninsula. For the families of these men, the issues are what were the actual circumstances of death and whether remains still exist. The only way to be sure is to have access to North Korea for this humanitarian purpose. DPMO has failed to negotiate access to known North Korean archival records which would reveal the fate of missing servicemen. DPMO has even failed to negotiate access to known grave sites while at the same time US tax dollars are going to be used to build a light water reactor at Shin-po in North Korea. DPMO does not even have a liaison with KEDO, the international organization in charge of building the reactors!

The construction of the Shin-po reactors should be linked to North Korea's willingness to permit American forensic anthropologists to search the site for the remains of American servicemen lost during the Korean War. Before the site where the lightwater reactor will be built is bulldozed, Congress should require a search for American remains that might be buried at the site. The alternative would be to permit bulldozers operated by an American civil engineering firm, paid for by American tax dollars to obliterate the remains of American servicemen that DPMO is "searching for" at great expense.

Fifth, US records do not have enough data to inform families what happened to men who were last seen alive in enemy custody. DPMO has not initiated any effort to establish archival research efforts with North Korea or China concerning these men. However, those men who were transported to the USSR or died in Soviet custody can be accounted for with Soviet records now in the custody of the Russian government. Yet the DoD/DPMO body responsible for this research, the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC) (which has existed for longer than the Korean War lasted), has *failed to resolve a single case* of an American serviceman last known to be alive in Soviet custody. DPMO and the USRJC have no results to show but will not state that the POW transfer did not occur. This sophistry is simply a recipe for continued funding for DPMO.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of DPMO, James Wold, said he "agrees" that Korean War families deserve the "same thing" as the families of those lost in Southeast Asia. Since the annual budget for Southeast Asian work is about \$60 million compared to \$4.8 million for Korean War cases, Wold's position would require the budget for Korean War cases to be increased by *over two thousand percent per year for four*

years. He has never made such a request and it would be unwise to trust DPMO with any more money if he did.

For the many millions spent, DoD in general and DPMO specifically have not produced any results for the Korean War MIAs or their families. The Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing opposes continued funding for DPMO. How much more money and how many more opportunities need to be wasted before Congress shares the Family Association's conclusion that DPMO is not capable of the type of analysis required to deal with Korean War cases? The evidence is overwhelming--DPMO has failed utterly and should be zeroed out as soon as possible.

The effort to account for the more than 8,000 missing servicemen and to provide answers to their families must continue, but it must be pursued methodically by research professionals. In the view of the Korean/Cold War Family Association, DPMO should no longer have the responsibility for Korean War MIA accounting efforts. Privatize this effort in the same way DoD pays private industry to develop technology for the services.

To date, the Clinton administration has chosen not to include accounting for Korean War MIAs in any substantive manner in their negotiations with the North Koreans. Perhaps availability of accurate Korean War MIA case development would empower the Clinton administration to make accounting for Korean War MIAs a meaningful part of any future negotiations with the North Koreans.

End

Appendix E



An Examination of U. S. Policy Toward POW/MIAs

**By the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations Republican Staff**

Thursday, May 23, 1991

THE KOREAN WAR

Unlike the result in World War II, Allied forces did not achieve a military victory in Korea. The Korean War ended at the negotiating table between Communist North Korean representatives and United Nations representatives.

With regard to POW repatriation, the North Koreans initially demanded an "all-for-all" prisoner exchange. The United States was reluctant to agree to this formula based on its World War II experience with the Yalta agreement and mandatory repatriation, knowing that thousands of those forced to return to the Soviet Union were either shot or interned in slave labor camps, where most of them died. After two long years of negotiations, the North Koreans agreed to the principle of voluntary or "non-forcible repatriation." This agreement stated that each side would release only those prisoners who wished to return to their respective countries.

Operation BIG SWITCH was the name given to the largest and final exchange of prisoners between the North Koreans and the U.N. forces, which occurred over a one-month period from August 5, 1953 to September 6, 1953.¹ Chinese and North Korean POWs were returned to North Korea, and U.S. and other U.N. troops were returned to South Korea. Approximately 14,200 Communist Chinese POWs elected not to return to the Peoples Republic of China; while 21 American POWs elected to stay with the Communist forces, and likely went to China. These 21 Americans are defectors and obviously are not considered as unrepatriated U.S. POWs.

However, U.S. government documents state that the U.S. government knew that nearly one thousand U.S. POWs--and an undetermined number of some 8,000 U.S. MIAs--were still held captive after operation BIG SWITCH and were not repatriated at the end of the Korean War. These U.S. POWs were never repatriated.

Three days after the start of operation BIG SWITCH, the *New York Times* reported that

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, retired commander of the United States Eighth Army in Korea, estimated tonight that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.²

¹ Korean War Almanac, Harry G. Summers, Jr., Colonel of Infantry, Facts on File, pp. 33,62.

² "8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1953.

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"LEAVES A BALANCE OF 8,000 UNACCOUNTED FOR"

A report by the U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity, Korea, five days into operation BIG SWITCH, stated:

"Figures show that the total number of MIAs, *plus known captives, less those to be US repatriated, leaves a balance of 8,000 unaccounted for.*" [emphasis added]³

The report mentions numerous reports of U.N. POWs who were transferred to Manchuria, China, and the USSR since the beginning of hostilities in Korea.⁴ Specifically, the report stated

many POWs transferred have been technicians and factory workers. Other POWs transferred had a knowledge of Cantonese and are reportedly used for propaganda purposes.⁵

The number of known U.S. POWS not repatriated from the Korean War was cited by Hugh M. Milton II, Assistant Secretary of the Army in January, 1954, in a memorandum he wrote four months after the conclusion of operation BIG SWITCH. Section 3, Part B reads:

B. THE UNACCOUNTED-FOR AMERICANS BELIEVED TO BE STILL HELD ILLEGALLY BY THE COMMUNISTS (SECRET)

1. There are approximately 954 United States personnel falling in this group. What the Department of the Army and other interested agencies is doing about their recovery falls into two parts. First, the direct efforts of the UNC Military Armistice Commission to obtain an accurate accounting, and second, efforts by G2 of the Army, both overt and covert, to locate, identify, and recover these individuals. G2 is making an intensive effort through its information collection system world-wide, to obtain information on these people and has a plan for clandestine action to obtain the recovery of one or more to establish the case positively that prisoners are still being held by the Communists. No results have been obtained yet in this effort. The direct efforts of the UNC [United Nations Command] are being held in abeyance pending further study of the problem by the State Department...

2. A further complicating factor in the situation is that to continue to carry this personnel in a missing status is costing over one million dollars annually. It may become necessary at some future date to drop them from our records as 'missing and presumed dead.'⁶[emphasis added]

³ Report, U.N. Combined Command for Reconnaissance Activity Korea, (CCRAK). CCRAK SPECIFIC REQUEST Number 66-53.

⁴ The United States had not recognized the People's Republic of China and, as a result, the U.S. did not deal directly with the Chinese throughout the negotiations.

⁵ (CCRAK) Report, REQUEST Number 66-53.

⁶ Memorandum, SECRET, "TO: Secretary of the Army, Subject: The Twenty-One Non-Repatriates and the Unaccounted-For Americans Believed to be Still Held Illegally by the Communists, From: Assistant Secretary Milton," January 16, 1954.

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In fact, the Defense Department did in fact "drop them" from DOD records as "missing and presumed dead," as were the non-repatriated U.S. POWs from the American Expeditionary Force in World War I and World War II. In a memorandum to Milton from Major General Robert Young, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 of the U.S. Army, Young updates Assistant Secretary Milton on the progress on dropping the U.S. POWs from DOD records:

2. Under the provisions of Public Law 490 (77th Congress), the Department of the Army, after careful review of each case and interrogation of returning prisoners of war, has placed 618 soldiers, known to have been in enemy hands and unaccounted for by the Communist Forces in the following categories:

313 - Finding of Death - Administratively determined, under the provisions of Public Law 490, by Department of the Army.

275 - Report of Death - reported on good authority by returning prisoners.

21 - Dishonorable Discharge.

4 - Under investigation, prognosis undecided. Missing in Action for over one year.

2 - Returned to Military Control.⁷

The number had already been dropped from 954 to 618 through a series of presumed findings of death for the "unaccounted-for Americans believed to be still held illegally by the Communists." Presumed findings of death were also used to whittle down the number of U.S. soldiers listed as MIA.

According to the "Interim Report of U.S. Casualties," prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, as of December 31, 1953 (Operation BIG SWITCH ended September 6, 1953), the total number of U.S. soldiers who had been listed as Missing in Action from the Korean War was 13,325. Still listed as MIA in January 1, 1954 were 2,953, and the figure for died, or presumed dead, was 5,140. 5,131 MIAs had been repatriated and 101 were listed as "Current captured."⁸

"THESE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE TO BE 'NEGOTIATED FOR'"

On June 17, 1955, almost two years after the end of operation BIG SWITCH, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, issued an internal report titled, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War." The report admitted that,

⁷ Memorandum, SECRET, "To: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1," April 29, 1954.

⁸ See "Interim Report of U.S. Battle Casualties," as of December 31, 1953 (Source: Progress Reports and Statistics, OSD, as of January 25, 1954).

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After the official repatriation efforts were completed, the U.N. Command found that it still had slightly less than 1000 U.S. PWs [not MLAs] "unaccounted for" by the Communists.⁹

Although frank and forthright, this report--written by staff of the Office of Special Operations --provides a glimpse into the thinking of those involved in the Korean POW issue. Sections of the report follow:

At the time of the official repatriation, some of our repatriates stated that they had been informed by the Communists that they (the Communists) were holding 'some' U.S. flyers as 'political prisoners' rather than as prisoners of war and that *these people would have to be 'negotiated for' through political or diplomatic channels*. Due to the fact that we did not recognize the red regime in China, no political negotiations were instituted, although [the] State [Department] did have some exploratory discussions with the British in an attempt to get at the problem. The situation was relatively dormant when, in late November 1954, the Peking radio announced that 13 of these 'political prisoners' had been sentenced for 'spying.' This announcement caused a public uproar and a demand from U.S. citizens, Congressional leaders and organizations for action to effect their release.¹⁰ [emphasis added]

The eleven U.S. "political prisoners," were not the only U.S. servicemen the Chinese held after the Korean War. The *New York Times*, reported

Communist China is holding prisoner other United States Air Force personnel besides the eleven who were recently sentenced on spying charges following their capture during the Korean War. This information was brought out of China by Squadron Leader Andrew R. MacKenzie, a Canadian flier who was released today by the Chinese at the Hong Kong border. He reached freedom here two years to the day after he was shot down and fell into Chinese hands in North Korea....Held back from the Korean war prisoner exchange, he was released by the Peiping [sic] regime following a period of negotiations through diplomatic channels....Wing Comdr. Donald Skene, his brother-in-law who was sent here from Canada to meet him, said guardedly at a press conference later that an undisclosed number of United States airmen had been in the same camp with Squadron Leader MacKenzie....Wing Commander Skene said none of the Americans in the camp was on the list of eleven whose sentencing was announced by the Chinese November 23[, 1954].¹¹

"AMERICAN POWs REPORTED IN ROUTE TO SIBERIA"

Despite some political inconvenience to the Department of Defense, the government felt that the issue and controversy had been controlled. The conclusion of the report, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," stated:

⁹ Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, titled "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

¹⁰ *ibid.*

¹¹ "Freed Flier Says Peiping Is Holding More U.S. Airmen, Canadian Now in Hong Kong Brings News of Americans Other Than 11 Jailed," *The New York Times*, December 6, 1954.

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Such as they are, our current efforts in the political field, plus the 'stand-by' alternatives developed by the military, represent the full range of possible additional efforts to recover personnel now in custody of foreign powers. On one hand, we are bound at present by the President's 'peaceful means' decree. The military courses of action apparently cannot be taken unilaterally, and we are possessed of some rather 'reluctant' allies in this respect. The problem becomes a philosophical one. If we are 'at war,' cold, hot or otherwise, casualties and losses must be expected and perhaps we must learn to live with this type of thing. If we are in for fifty years of peripheral 'fire fights' we may be forced to adopt a rather cynical attitude on this for political course of action something like General Erskine outlined which would (1) instill in the soldier a much more effective 'don't get captured' attitude, and (2) we should also push to get the military commander more discretionary authority to retaliate, fast and hard against these Communist tactics.¹²

Reports of the fate of these Americans continued to come to the attention of the United States government. One such report, a Foreign Service Dispatch (cable) by Air Pouch dated March 23, 1954, sent from the U.S. diplomatic post in Hong Kong to the State Department in Washington, sheds some light on the fate of hundreds of U.S. POWs captured during the Korean War. The report reads:

American POWs reported en route to Siberia

A recently arrived Greek refugee from Manchuria has reported seeing several hundred American prisoners of war being transferred from Chinese trains to Russian trains at Manchouli near the border of Manchuria and Siberia. The POWs were seen late in 1951 and in the spring of 1952 by the informant and a Russian friend of his. The informant was interrogated on two occasions by the Assistant Air Liaison Officer and the Consulate General agrees with his evaluation of the information as probably true and the evaluation of the source as unknown reliability. The full text of the initial Air Liaison Office report follows:

First report dated March 16, 1954, from Air Liaison Office, Hong Kong, to USAF, Washington, G2.

"This office has interviewed refugee source who states that he observed hundreds of prisoners of war in American uniforms being sent into Siberia in late 1951 and 1952. Observations were made at Manchouli (Lupin), 49 degrees 50'-117 degrees 30' Manchuria Road Map, AMSL 201 First Edition, on USSR-Manchurian border. Source observed POWs on railway station platform loading into trains for movement into Siberia. In railway restaurant source closely observed three POWs who were under guard and were conversing in English. POWs wore sleeve insignia which indicated POWs were Air Force noncommissioned officers. Source states that there were a great number of Negroes among POW shipments and also states that at no time later were any POWs observed returning from Siberia. Source does not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals against friends in Manchuria, however is willing to cooperate in answering further questions and will be available Hong Kong for questioning for the next four days."

Upon receipt of this information, USAF, Washington, requested elaboration of the following points:

¹² Report, CONFIDENTIAL, prepared by the Defense Advisory Committee on Prisoners of War, Study Group III, "Recovery of Unrepatriated Prisoners of War," a document presented by the Office of Special Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense, written by James J. Kelleher, Report No. CPOW/3 D-1, June 8, 1955.

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1. Description of uniforms or clothing worn by POWs including ornaments.
2. Physical condition of POWs.
3. Nationality of guards.
4. Specific dates of observations.
5. Destination in Siberia.
6. Presence of Russians in uniform or civilian clothing accompanying movement of POWs.
7. Complete description of three POWs specifically mentioned.

The Air Liaison Office complied by submitting the telegram quoted below.

FROM USAIRLO SGN LACKEY. CITE C4. REUR 53737 following answers submitted to seven questions.

(1) POWs wore OD outer clothing described as not heavy inasmuch as weather considered early spring. Source identified from pictures service jacket, field, M1943. No belongings except canteen. No ornaments observed.

(2) Condition appeared good, no wounded all ambulatory.

(3) Station divided into two sections with tracks on each side of loading platform. On Chinese side POWs accompanied by Chinese guards. POWs passed through gate bisecting platform to Russian train manned and operated by Russians. Russian trainmen wore dark blue or black tunic with silver colored shoulder boards. Source says this regular train uniform but he knows the trainmen are military wearing regular train uniforms.

(4) Interrogation with aid of more fluent interpreter reveals source first observed POWs in railroad station in spring 1951. Second observation was outside city of Manchouli about three months later with POW train headed towards station where he observed POW transfer. Source was impressed with second observation because of large number of Negroes among POWs. Source states job was numbering railroad cars at Manchouli every time subsequent POW shipments passed through Manchouli. Source says these shipments were reported often and occurred when United Nation forces in Korea were on the offensive.

(5) Unknown.

(6) Only Russian accompanying POWs were those who manned train.

(7) Three POWs observed in station restaurant appeared to be 30 or 35. Source identified Air Force non-commissioned officer sleeve insignia of Staff Sergeant rank, stated that several inches above insignia there was a propeller but says that all three did not have propeller. Three POWs accompanied by Chinese guard. POWs appeared thin but in good health and spirits, were being given what source described as good food. POWs were talking in English but did not converse with guard. Further information as to number of POWs observed source states that first observation filled a seven passenger car train and second observation about the same. Source continues to emphasize the number of Negro troops, which evidently impressed him because he had seen so few Negroes before.

...Comment Reporting Officer: Source is very careful not to exaggerate information and is positive of identification of American POWs. In view of information contained in Charity Interrogation Report No. 619 dated 5 February 54, Reporting Officer gives above information rating of F-2. Source departing Hong Kong today by ship. Future address on file this office.'

In this connection the Department's attention is called to Charity Interrogation Report No.

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619, forwarded to the Department under cover of a letter dated March 1, 1954, to Mr. A. Sabin Chase, DRF. Section 6 of this report states, "On another occasion source saw several coaches full of Europeans who were taken to USSR. They were not Russians. Source passed the coaches several times and heard them talk in a language unknown to him."¹³

"PRISONERS IN PEACE AND REFORM CAMPS WILL NOT BE EXCHANGED"

The report from Hong Kong was specifically discussed in Major General Young's April 29, 1954 memorandum to Assistant Secretary of the Army, Hugh Milton, II. Young, responding to Milton's request to "consolidate information on prisoners of war which may remain in Communist hands," states in his memorandum written six months after the last U.S. POW returned from North Korea, that the above quoted intelligence report

corroborates previous indications UNC POWs might have been shipped to Siberia during Korean hostilities....reports have now come [to the] attention [of the] U.S. Government which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war from Korea had been transported into Soviet Union and are now in Soviet custody. Request fullest possible information these POWs and their repatriation earliest possible time.¹⁴

One CIA intelligence report, which had an information date as of October 1950 - February 1951, confirmed that hundreds of Negro troops were held by the North Koreans. The CIA report stated:

1. One Republic of Korea soldier who was captured by the Communists on 29 October 1950 was sent to a war prison camp at Pyoktong (125-26, 40-36) in North Pyonman. This camp in early November had about 1,000 American war prisoners, of whom about 700 were negroes, approximately 1,500 ROK prisoners, and about 300 civilian employees of the United Nations forces.¹⁵

A different three page CIA intelligence report, on Prisoner of War Camps in North Korea and China, with information dated January-May, 1952, described the Chinese Communist system of camps for U.N. POWs.

War Prisoner Administrative Office and Camp Classification

1. In May 1952 the War Prisoner Administrative Office (Chan Fu Kuan Li Ch'u) (2069/0199/4619/3810/5710) in Pyongyang, under Colonel No-man-ch'i-fu (6179/7024/1148/1133), an intelligence

¹³ Cable, Foreign Service Dispatch "From: AMCONGEN, Hong Kong, To: The Department of State, Washington, by Air Pouch, signed Julian F. Harrington, American Consul General, cc: Taipei, Moscow, London, Paris, No. 1716," March 23, 1954.

¹⁴ Memorandum, SECRET, "To: Hugh Milton, the Assistant Secretary of the Army, (M&RF) Subject: United States Personnel Unaccounted for by Communist Forces, From: Major General Robert N. Young, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1," April 29, 1954.

¹⁵ Report, CIA, No. S0 6582, Country: Korea/China; Date of Info: October 1950 - February 1951.

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officer attached to the general headquarters of the Soviet Far Eastern Military District, controlled prisoner of war camps in Manchuria and North Korea. The office, formerly in Mukden, employed 30 persons, several of whom were English-speaking Soviets. LIN Mai (2651/6701) and NAM IL (0589/2480) were deputy chairmen of the office.

2. The office had developed three types of prisoner-of-war camps. Camps termed 'peace camps,' detaining persons who exhibited pro-Communist leanings, were characterized by considerate treatment of the prisoners and the staging within the camps of Communist rallies and meetings. The largest peace camp, which held two thousand prisoners, was at Chungchun. Peace camps were also at K'aiyuan Ksien (124-05, 42-36) and Penchi (123-43, 41-20).

3. Reform camps, all of which were in Manchuria, detained anti-Communist prisoners possessing certain technical skills. Emphasis at these camps was on re-indoctrination of the prisoners.

4. Normal prisoner-of-war camps, all of which were in North Korea, detained prisoners whom the Communists will exchange. *Prisoners in peace and reform camps will not be exchanged.* [emphasis added]

5. Officials of North Korean prisoner of war camps sent reports on individual prisoners to the War Prisoner Administrative Office. Cooperative prisoners were being transferred to peace camps. ROK [Republic of Korea] officers were being shot; ROK army soldiers were being reindoctrinated and assimilated into the North Korean army.

...13. On 6 January four hundred United States prisoners, including three hundred negroes, were being detained in two buildings at Nsiao Nan Kuan Chaiih, at the southeast corner of the intersection, in Mukden. One building, used as the police headquarters in Nsiao Nan Kuan during the Japanese occupation, was a two-story concrete structure, 30 meters long and 20 meters wide. The other building, one story high and constructed of gray brick, was behind the two-story building. Both buildings had tile roofs. All prisoners held here, with the exception of three second lieutenants, were enlisted personnel. The prisoners, dressed in Chinese Communist army uniforms, with a red arm band on the left arm, were not required to work. Two hours of indoctrination were conducted daily by staff members of the Northeast Army Command. Prisoners were permitted to play basketball in the courtyard. The attempt of three white prisoners to escape caused the withdrawal of permission for white prisoners to walk alone through streets in the vicinity of the camp. Two Chinese Communist soldiers guarded groups of white prisoners when such groups left the buildings. Negroes, however, could move outside the compound area freely and individually. Rice, noodles, and one vegetable were served daily to the prisoners in groups of 10 to 15 men. One platoon of Chinese Communist soldiers guarded the compound.¹⁶

"...DEVOID OF ANY FOUNDATION WHATSOEVER..."

In an attempt to resolve the unrepatriated U.S. POW problem from the Korean war by diplomacy, the United States officially communicated with the Soviet government on May 5, 1954. The official U.S. diplomatic note to the Soviet Union stated:

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to request the Ministry's assistance in the following matter.

¹⁶ Report, CIA, "Subject: Prisoners-of-War Camps in North Korea and China," No. SO 91634, July 17, 1952.

 T H E K O R E A N W A R

The United States government has recently received reports which support earlier indications that American prisoners of war who had seen action in Korea have been transported to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and that they are now in Soviet custody. The United States Government desires to receive urgently all information available to the Soviet Government concerning these American personnel and to arrange their repatriation at the earliest possible time.¹⁷

On May 12, 1954, the Soviet Union replied:

In connection with the note of the Embassy of the United States of America, received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on May 5, 1954, the Ministry has the honor to state the following:

The United States assertion contained in the indicated note that American prisoners of war who participated in military actions in Korea have allegedly been transferred to the Soviet Union and at the present time are being kept under Soviet guard is devoid of any foundation whatsoever and is clearly far-fetched, since there are not and have not been any such persons in the Soviet Union.¹⁸

The Soviet response predicates denial of access to the men on its refusal to characterize the U.S. personnel as "prisoners of war." In fact, the Soviets made it a practice to refuse to acknowledge the U.S. citizenship of the U.S. soldiers; as a result—from the Soviet's standpoint—the Soviet denial is accurate.

Nor was this lesson -- that the Soviets do not acknowledge the citizenship of U.S. POWs -- ever learned. According to a April 15, 1991 press advisory issued by the United States Department of State, the United States once again requested that the Soviets "provide us with any additional information on any other U.S. citizens who may have been detained as a result of World War II, the Korean conflict or the Vietnam War,"¹⁹ a request that repeated the mistake of asking for information only about U.S. citizens that the State Department made 37 years earlier.

The State Department also made a point of including in its recent press advisory the government's usual statement that "in the interest of following every credible lead in providing families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones."²⁰ Furthermore, according to the press advisory, the State Department specifically asked the Soviets only about "two U.S. planes shot down in the early 1950s,"²¹ and did not ask the Soviets any specific questions about any non-repatriated POWs from World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War. It seems apparent that if the Department of State had expected to get solid information from the Soviet government, then the State Department would have sent a much more comprehensive and appropriately phrased request.

¹⁷ See diplomatic note.

¹⁸ U.S. State Department press release 249, May 13, 1954.

¹⁹ See United States Department of State press advisory, Office of the Assistant Secretary/Spokesman, "USSR: Allegations of U.S. POWs in the USSR," April 15, 1991.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

 T H E K O R E A N W A R

The sincerity of the State Department's declared intention to follow "every credible lead in providing families of U.S. service members with information about their loved ones" is, therefore, suspect. One U.S. government document dated January 21, 1980, a memorandum from Michael Oksenberg to Zbigniew Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor under President Carter, reveals the cynical view and attitude of at least one U.S. government official with regard to the non-repatriation issue,

a letter from you is important to indicate that you take recent refugee reports of sighting of live Americans 'seriously.' This is simply good politics; DIA and State are playing this game, and you should not be the whistle blower. The idea is to say that the President [Carter] is determined to pursue any lead concerning possible live MIAs.²²

"...POWs WHO MIGHT STILL BE IN COMMUNIST CUSTODY..."

The executive branch's disinformation tactics against concerned mothers and fathers extended to Congressmen and Senators. One case is found in a December 21, 1953 letter sent to the Secretary of State from Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson with regard to a constituent letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas, who wrote Senator Johnson about a *U.S. News and World Report* article titled "Where are 944 Missing GIs?"

The first reaction of the Secretary of State's office was to call Johnson and dispose of the matter by phone. However, as a written reply was requested, Thruston B. Morton, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, was tasked to reply. The evolution of the text of Morton's letter to Johnson—which took four rewrites to complete—definitively illustrates the ambivalence with which the United States government has approached the non-repatriation issue. The four drafts still exist today, and they illustrate how the State Department artfully sought to mislead the future U.S. President, and the most powerful leader in Congress at the time.

The first draft of the State Department's response contained the following text:

On September 9, the United Nations Command presented to the Communist representatives on the Military Armistice Commission a list of approximately 3,404 Allied personnel, including 944 Americans, about whom there was evidence that they had at one time or another been in Communist custody. The kinds of evidence from which this list was drawn included letters written home by prisoners, prisoners of war interrogations, interrogations of returnees, and Communist radio broadcasts. The United Nations Command asked the Communist side for a complete accounting of these personnel.

On September 21, the Communists made a reply relative to the list of names presented to them by the United Nations Command on September 9, in which they stated that many of the men on the list had never been captured at all, while others had already been repatriated.²³

²² Memorandum, National Security Council, "To: Zbigniew Brzezinski, From: Michael Oksenberg," January 21, 1980.

²³ Letter, first draft "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thruston B. Morton," file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153.

 T H E K O R E A N W A R

This entire section was crossed out by Morton, but a persistent foreign service officer sent Morton back the second draft, with the section quoted above unchanged, as well as a new sentence at the end of the introductory paragraph which read:

He [Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas] can be assured that efforts are being made to obtain the release of all our men in Communist custody and may be interested in having the following information about this matter.²⁴

The second draft also contained a new page which followed the paragraphs used in the first draft. The second page of the second draft read:

General Clark, in a letter of September 24 [1954], two and a half weeks after Operation BIG SWITCH ended] to the Communist side, stated that he considered their reply wholly unacceptable, and pointed out that by signing the armistice agreement the Communists had undertaken a solemn obligation to repatriate directly or to hand over to the custody of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission all of the captured persons held by them at the time the armistice was signed. He pointed out that this obligation was binding upon them and applied to all United Nations Command persons regardless of where captured or held in custody. I am enclosing a copy of General Clark's letter of September 24 which you may wish to send to your constituent.

On November 21, the United Nations Command provided the Communist side with a revision of its original list of unaccounted for Allied personnel which it had presented to the Communists on September 9. The revised list contained a total of 3,400 names, and the figure for United States prisoners of war unaccounted for was increased by eight to a total of 952.

On November 21, the United Nations Command protested in the Military Armistice Commission to the Communists that they had still failed to give a satisfactory reply concerning the list of unaccounted for United Nations Command personnel, and pointed out that additional evidence provided by three Korean prisoners of war who recently defected to the United Nations side corroborated the United Nations Command statements that the Communists were withholding prisoners of war. The United Nations Command demanded that the Communists "hand over to the custody of the Custodian Forces of India all those prisoners that your side still retains."

Ambassador Arthur Dean has also referred to this problem in the course of his negotiations with the Communists at Panmunjom.

Your constituent may be assured that it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and the United Nations Command will make every effort to accomplish the objective.²⁵

Assistant Secretary Morton rejected all the proposed changes in the second draft by crossing them out. The third draft of the letter to Johnson was so disagreeable to Morton that he typed out two sentences and attached it to the draft and crossed out all other sentences that related to the State Departments reply. As a result, the final letter read:

²⁴ Letter, second draft "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thurston B. Morton," file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153.

²⁵ *ibid.*

T H E K O R E A N W A R

My dear Senator Johnson:

I refer to your letter of December 21, acknowledged by telephone on December 30, with which you enclose a letter from Mr. Paul Bath of Marshall, Texas concerning an article in the December 18 issue of *U.S. News and World Report*. It is believed that Mr. Bath refers to the article "Where are 944 Missing GIs?" on page 27 of this publication.

I am enclosing copies of a statement recounting the efforts being made to secure the return of American prisoners of war who *might* still be in Communist custody which I believe will be of assistance to you in replying to your constituent. As the statement points out, it continues to be our determined purpose to obtain the return of all personnel in Communist custody and we will do everything possible to accomplish this objective. [emphasis added]

With regard to questions as to whether there are military personnel or other United States citizens in the custody of the Soviet Government, a few of the prisoners-of-war of other nationalities recently released by the Soviet Government have made reports alleging that American citizens are imprisoned in the Soviet Union. All of these reports are being investigated by this Department with the cooperation of other agencies of the Government.

You are probably aware that representations which the United States Government recently made to the Soviet Government resulted in the release in Berlin on December 29 of Homer H. Cox and Leland Towers, two Americans reported by returning [German] prisoner-of-war as being in Soviet custody. The Department will investigate, as it has done in the past, every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments.

Sincerely Yours,

For the Secretary of State,

Thruston B. Morton²⁶

It is noteworthy that Morton's letter contained no specific or accurate information, as contrasted with the three rejected drafts which had such information. The rhetoric of the State Department could not go beyond the word "might" to describe the possibility of U.S. soldiers being held by Communist forces. On the one hand, the State Department was taking credit for having released two Americans from the Soviet gulag and for investigating "every report indicating that American citizens are held in the custody of foreign governments," but on the other it was dismissing any real possibility that there could be more POWs in Communist prisons. Meanwhile, the State Department knew that the North Koreans had not returned nearly 1,000 U.S. POWs, as well as an undetermined number of the 8,000 MIAs who were actually captured alive and imprisoned by the North Koreans.

²⁶ Letter, final "To: Senator Johnson, From: Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, Thruston B. Morton", file number SEV 611.61241/12-2153, January 20, 1954.

"THEY...WOULD HOLD ME LIKE THEY HAD DONE THESE OTHER GUYS"

The People's Republic of China, as noted earlier, released a Canadian Squadron Leader thirteen months after the last U.N. POW was repatriated by the Communist forces three months after Operation BIG SWITCH. In 1973, Chinese Communists repatriated two American POWs who had been *captured* during the Korean War, along with a pilot, Philip Smith, who was shot down over the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnam war. During interrogation sessions in Smith's seven years of solitary confinement in a PRC jail, these two U.S. POWs from the Korean War were paraded before him. Smith said the Chinese told him:

they wouldn't release me, and would hold me like they'd done to these other guys until I recanted.²⁷

Most Americans would find it incomprehensible that the Chinese would hold U.S. POWs from the Korean War, and release them two decades later; yet, to the Chinese Communists, this policy had some rationale.

At the conclusion of Operation BIG SWITCH, the United States Government left U.S. POWs, held against their will, in custody of the North Koreans, the mainland Chinese, and the USSR. Whether any of these men are still alive is --tragically--unclear.

The fate of the more than 8,000 men listed as MIA who were administratively found to be "presumed dead" is a mystery. No rebuttal was ever made to General Van Fleet, who stated in the fall of 1953 his belief that a large percentage of the 8,000 American soldiers listed as missing in Korea were alive.²⁸ "A large percentage" translates into thousands of U.S. soldiers who were never repatriated by the Communist forces after the Korean war.

Seven years after operation BIG SWITCH, one Foreign Service Dispatch to the State Department in Washington contained the names of two U.S. Korean POWs working in a Soviet phosphorus mine.²⁹ The cable, "sanitized" by the United States government, originally contained the names of the two U.S. POWs. However, but the names were blacked out in the sanitized version. According to the United States government, the names were blacked out to protect the abandoned POWs' "privacy." It is absurd that the U.S. government, having abandoned soldiers to a life of slave labor and forced captivity, is attempting to protect the same abandoned soldiers' "privacy."³⁰ Perhaps this example best illustrates the U.S. approach to repatriating our abandoned POWs.

²⁷ "ExPOWs Recall Psychological Terror, Coercion," *The Free Press Enterprise*, January 22, 1991.

²⁸ "8,000 Missing, Van Fleet Says," *The New York Times*, August 8, 1953.

²⁹ Cable, "From: the American Embassy in Brussels, To: the State Department in Washington," September 8, 1960.

³⁰ "Men Who Never Returned," Editorial, *The Washington Times*, March 13, 1991.

Ms. DUNTON. Briefly, I will address parts of the proposal. The objective of a private sector research entity is to provide the fullest possible accounting for the POW/MIAs and the answers to the family members. That is it, two goals.

The families define an accounting for the missing in four parts: The discovery of live American missing service personnel. That is the main part, our biggest goal, of course. Two, the recovery of remains. Three, the identification of remains. And four, provide the information to the families. Let us know what happened.

The key to achieving these goals is well planned, methodical research in the United States and in foreign archives. As the Air Force Casualty Office so aptly phrased it, the data base on the missing from the Korean war is grossly incomplete. That is what they said.

In order to discover if any American missing service personnel are still alive, case files need to be built. Leads need to be followed. The files have to be analyzed to develop new leads. Waiting for information to fall out of the blue is not research. Research is aggressively planned, it is methodical, it is pro-active research, work, constantly in the record.

Mr. DORNAN. Please, a footnote for your morale. I have had recently, in the last week or so, analysts in my office who have almost used those very words. They have been volunteering their concept of what an analyst is—looking for opportunities to go in the field, picking up a phone book, and tracing one lead to the next instead of creating dead ends by debunking something and saying, “Well, this is worthless. It is probably just hearsay or lying.”

They go after it. And it has been done so little and it has borne so much fruit already—and I am talking about Korea, not only Vietnam—that now we see what could have been done with a proper attitude at the top over the years. It does not mean there were not people there with that attitude, like Lt. Gen. Eugene Tye, who coined the phrase “a mindset to debunk.”

The reason I do not mind jumping on Trowbridge’s case is he leaves in a few—he is already on termination leave. He leaves with a gigantic Federal pension very soon, and I look back with horror at how I treated him in a friendly way for 25 years. You know how to play a Congressman, I guess, or when I was just a concerned citizen: Act like you are as aggressive as he is, and you are as optimistic as he is, and you are out there looking for leads, boy, and you are going to nail this thing down.

This is the way communists in Korea and Vietnam and Russia—which we will hear from Mr. Cole—treat us when we walk out of the room, American negotiators. We leave the room—this is the arms control talks, and I do not know what their cultural body language is, but it would be like this: “Are these Americans easy to roll or what, comrade?”

I heard this from our best negotiator, and I have to get this three-star general’s name who spoke fluent French and Spanish and was our lead negotiator or the head of the administrative team in Geneva. They just have this attitude that we are stupid and easily pushed around and easily lied to,

So they have contempt for us, overlaid in China’s case by a certain cultural contempt that Henry Kissinger sums up in one story.

He said to Cho En-Lai, "You really think that we are not as intelligent." Cho says, "Well, you are not bad for a Westerner." That was his attitude to Dr. Henry Kissinger. So it really is true that they just think we are pitiful, and we get it from our own people that make us think that, that they are pitiful, and then we get the feeling they are laughing at us behind our backs when we leave the room—our American people are—and then they go back to shuffling paper.

Go ahead, please.

Ms. DUNTON. It may sound extraordinarily simple to build case files. It would seem only common sense to have our facts in hand before pursuing information from North Korea, Russia, or China. But true case files for the Korean war missing have never been accumulated by any department of the Federal Government, and DPMO seems to be overwhelmed by the task. It is an archival challenge, but not an impossible one for professionals in the field.

We ran into this when the Task Force Russia was first tasked to go over and look for the missing that Yeltsin had pronounced that they should have some information on. Task Force Russia could not find information to ask the Russians about; they did not know enough about the Korean war missing. The families supplied them the information about who was lost, where they went down, what kind of plane, the background of the missing people, because there were no case files for them to work with. And those were the families that knew about Task Force Russia at the time; that was not, by any stretch of the imagination, all of them.

Existing records are scattered across the United States in various facilities, the majority of which have never been declassified. Intelligence collected at the time and over the next decade by the CIA, NSA, DIA, DOD, and others was never analyzed and matched with the appropriate missing service person. This indicates to me that the Department of Defense never had a true intent to recover those left behind.

Still, many of the families have built case files themselves in spite of the Government's obfuscation. We have followed leads and analyzed what information we could gather in order to develop new leads, but we are limited by access to documents which are still classified and the funds it takes to do it. The assistance we have gotten did not come from DOD; they have impeded our process. We have received valuable assistance and been provided concrete results from private researchers, scholars, and archivists.

The recovery of remains not only requires research efforts but obviously access to the territory of loss. Since the end of the cold war, everyone knows we have been working on negotiations with North Korea to get access there. It is undeniably critical to use qualified personnel in the recovery operations and to minimize acceptance of curated remains in order to maximize identification probabilities.

But we cannot move ahead with politically motivated recovery plans based on flawed methodology. If we use politically motivated methodologies to do something that should be a scientific or an archival method of approaching—I am not making sense here, but you just cannot politically do a scientific project. And recovery of remains should be a scientific-type project, not, "Okay, we will let you go here or we will let you go there." It needs to be set up with

a long-range plan and we determine—the scientists determine, the archaeologists determine—what the best possibilities are for recovery of remains.

The identification of remains for the majority of the cases will require the use of the most modern technology available, mitochondrial DNA. In order to use this technology, reference samples must be collected from the family. Some of the families that know about this process have already sent in some reference samples to AFDIL, but the majority of the families do not know about this. The majority of the families have never been contacted about these possibilities. There are also 866 unidentified remains that were interred in the Punch Bowl in Hawaii and the families need these identified. It is already on our territory. Why cannot we get these remains identified for those families and for those parents?

The families want the live men located and all the information that can be had as to what happened to the missing. It has become painfully apparent that the Department of Defense is not the entity that is going to accomplish this task. We are denied access to documents, access to eyewitness testimony, access to live sighting reports.

I was told just last summer that DPMO had no live sighting reports on Korean war missing, absolutely none. They were taking me on a tour of the Vietnam section of the files and they said, "And these are our live sighting reports section." I said, "Where is it for Korea?" "We do not have any for Korea. This is no live sighting reports for Korea." I have documents that say there are. I knew that was not true, but this is their department saying this to me.

DOD is serving political purposes of governmental bodies and lacks the proactive intent and motivation to put the accounting for the POW/MIA first. It has to come first. In a formal finding in 1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of Defense was not capable and would not have the capability to do the type of research required to resolve Korean war and cold war cases on POW/MIA issues, and we agree completely. We need an open organization whose activities are held accountable by the consumers it is designed to serve.

In closing, I wish to refute a statement that has been used by the Department of Defense and many of its agencies since I can remember, and that is, "We do not want to give the families false hope" by giving them interim information or giving them just a little bit and letting them go off on their own. For over 40 years, the real false hope the families have had is that the Government and the Department of Defense will keep the promises made to these missing men and their families.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dunton follows:]

Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing
128 Beaver Run
Coppell, Texas 75019-4849

Statement to Congress
June 20, 1996

Pat Wilson Dunton
President/Founding Director

On April 12, 1951, near the northwestern border of North Korea, the B-29 bomber my father, Capt. James S. Wilson, Jr., was navigating, was shot down by Russian MiGs. There were eleven American service personnel on board. Reports vary as to the number of parachutes seen coming from the crippled plane. One report sites 5 parachutes while another reports only one. All of the men were subsequently listed as "unofficial PWs". In August of 1953, during Operation Big Switch, two of these crew members were repatriated. By December of 1953, the other nine were declared dead. My family, as were the other families, was told by the Department of Defense that we would be contacted immediately should any information be forthcoming.

I was 3 years old when my father's plane was shot down. In 1969, I was 21 and my family still knew nothing as to when he died, where he died, how he died, or even if he died at all. I decided it was time I found out. Over the next 20 years, I contacted my Senators, Congressmen, casualty office, VA offices, government and private agencies: all with the same "No Information" response. Early on, before the fire at the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis, they said they had no record of my father ever serving in Korea. When the Air Force casualty office told me they had burned the records of the Korean War missing because they did not have space to keep them, I realized I would have to do the research myself.

Part of my research involved on-line computer communication. This is where I met my first other Korean War MIA daughter. A close bond developed rapidly between us as we learned how similar our experiences were in attempting to gain information about the loss of our fathers. Soon we were sharing experiences with other families. We were all in the same situation; either we got no information at all or the text trail led to still classified documents. Unable to get declassification or results individually, we realized a collective approach might have more strength. The Korean/Cold War Family Association of the Missing was then formed and incorporated in Texas.

As president of the Association, I am before you today to state clearly and for the record, what our Association believes can be done to account for Korean War missing. Presently the Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office (DPMO), under the authority, direction, and control of the Assistant Secretary of

Defense (International Security Affairs), is tasked to serve as the Department of Defense "focal point" for all POW/MIA matters. We are aware that a few family members have received assistance from this office. We are also aware that there are committed individuals who have worked in this office in the past, and some who are there today. However, those few personnel who are assigned to work on the issue of the more than 8,000 Korean War unaccounted for must attempt to function within a bureaucratic and political office which according to an inspector general's report still has not clearly defined its goals and objectives on this issue. One officer at DPMO recently defined his job as "shuffling papers." Another high ranking official with the US/Russian Task Force for years has called family members to beg for more personnel and more money, at the same time his office spends thousands of dollars paying for limos, expensive hotels, picnics and tours for Russian members of the Joint Commission.

At great tax payer expense DPMO has produced few tangible results for Korean War missing. Now at a critical time in our history, when it appears joint recovery teams might be allowed into North Korea, we must have our "house in order" before we move forward with the North Koreans. DPMO has had time, personnel, and plenty of money to be prepared, all to no avail. It is time to try a more productive and efficient approach. Our Association believes the Congress of the United States can do a service to Korean War missing, their families, and the American tax paying public by defunding DPMO for Korean War accounting. We propose that Congress use only half what DPMO states they spend on Korean War accounting, approximately \$4.5 million annually and fund an independent, private entity capable of producing results for Korean War missing and their families. At this time I submit a copy of our privatization proposal to the committee and ask that it be included in the public record of these hearings. Briefly, I will address parts of the proposal.

The objective of a private sector Korean War POW/MIA research entity (PSRE) is to provide a fullest possible accounting for the POW/MIAs and answers to the family members.

The family members define Accounting for the Missing in four parts:

1. Discovery of live American Missing Service Personnel
2. Recovery of remains
3. Identification of remains
4. Provide the families with all the information
"Let us know what happened"

The key to achieving these goals well planned, methodical RESEARCH, in the United States and in foreign archives. As the Air Force Casualty Office so aptly phrased it "the data base....on the missing from the Korean War...is grossly incomplete."

In order to Discover if any American Missing Service Personnel are still alive, case files would have to be built, leads would have to be followed, and the files would have to be analyzed to develop new leads. Waiting for information to "fall out of the

blue" is not research. Research is aggressively planned, methodical, proactive WORK.

It may sound extraordinarily simple to build case files. It would seem only common sense to have our facts in hand before pursuing information from North Korea, Russia or China, but true case files for the Korean War missing have never been accumulated by any department of the federal government. DPMO seems to be overwhelmed by the task. It is an archival challenge but not an impossible one for professionals in the field. Existing records are scattered across the U.S. in various facilities, the majority of which have never been declassified. Intelligence collected at the time and over the next decades by the CIA, NSA, DIA, DoD and others was never analyzed and matched with the appropriate missing service person. This indicates to the families the Department of Defense never had a true intent to recover those left behind. Still, many of the families have built case files themselves in spite of our government's obfuscation. We have followed leads and analyzed what information we could gather in order to develop new leads, but we are limited by access to documents which are still classified and the funds required to find them. The assistance we have gotten came not from DoD, they impeded our progress. We have received invaluable assistance and been provided concrete results from private researchers, scholars and archivists.

The recovery of remains not only requires research efforts but obviously access to the territory of loss. Under the heading of Search and Rescue Attempts, too many of the case status cards of the '50's say "none, territory held by hostile forces". Since the end of the cold war, we are beginning to get access to these territories. With this access, it is undeniably critical to use qualified personnel in recovery operations and minimize acceptance of curated remains in order to maximize identification probabilities. It is imperative to use our own archival records and repatriated POW eyewitness accounts to prioritize our recovery efforts.

The identification of remains requires, for the majority of cases, the use of the most modern technology available; mitochondrial DNA. In order to use this technology, a reference sample must be collected from the maternal relatives of the missing person. Families knowledgeable of the process have already deposited reference samples with AFDIL but the majority of families would have to be located and informed in order to build a true data base. Approximately 866 unidentified remains are interred at the Punch Bowl in Hawaii, half of which were recovered by our own Graves Registration Service during and shortly after the war. The families want these remains identified first.

The families want the live men located and all the information as to what happened to the missing. It has become painfully apparent that the Department of Defense is not the entity that will accomplish this task. We are denied access to documents, access to eye witness testimony, access to live sighting reports, and access to foreign intelligence and witness reports. DoD serves political

purposes of governmental bodies and lacks the proactive intent and motivation to put the accounting for the POW/MIA first. In a formal finding in 1991, the DIA concluded that the Department of Defense was not capable and would not have the capability to do the type of research required to resolve Korean War and Cold War POW/MIA issues. WE AGREE WHOLE HEARTEDLY. We need an open organization whose activities are held accountable by the consumers it is designed to serve.

In closing I wish to refute a statement used by the Department of Defense and its many agencies in reference to giving information to the families: "We don't want to give the families 'false hope'." For over 40 years, the real 'false hope' the families have had is that the government and the Department of Defense would keep the promises made to these missing men and their families.

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you.

One of several questions, then we will go to Mr. Dumas. Carol Hrdlicka is in the room. They have got to appreciate this. When I think about Vietnam and Korea, I just reflected on 1954. Is your grandmother in heaven? Still alive. She has not gone to heaven. Here is your grandmother demonstrating in the Senate in 1954. David Hrdlicka and I are in pilot training. He is shot down in 1965. So you are 11 years apart there, your grandmother's demonstration.

But Hrdlicka is 1975, 1985, 1995—it is 31 years ago. So Herdlijka and Wilson are closer than you would think, talking about two wars that we just so quickly started going through this pathetic dance again.

So when you say to me, and Carol Hrdlicka, who has gone through so much redacted material and false material in her husband's file, trying to get rid of another case using his—not even his general area of his shoot-down—to have somebody tell you, "Well, we cannot release these documents to you," it is infuriating to a Vietnamese-era family who say, "Good God, we are talking about something 30 years ago. Who are you keeping this secret from except me, and you have already given them all the top secret information, asking them to divulge information." So you are only keeping it from those who have a loved one's interest here.

To add another 11 years to it, or excuse me. Your dad's shoot-down was 1952, right?

Ms. DUNTON. Fifty-one.

Mr. DORNAN. Fifty-one, so you add another 14 years to it. Who told you that they cannot release something classified to you? Where did they say, "No, this is classified. We cannot give it to you."

Ms. DUNTON. They have classified—which time? I am stunned. Which area? Every place we have been. The National Archives has classified documents. The Air Force—what is the name of that place—Montgomery, AL, the Air Force Historical Society, rooms full of classified documents.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you remember when we talked about the Air Force material?

Let me ask Dino Carluccio a question. Did you guys ever get access to any of the Air Force classified material?

Mr. CARLUCCIO. The law that we wrote requires all this stuff to be declassified by this past January, so they are in violation of the law.

Mr. DORNAN. Everybody is already in violation of the law.

Ms. DUNTON. Yes. Yes.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask Mr. Cole a question out of sequence. Have you done some archival research in Great Britain?

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Do they not have a statute of limitation on all of their secret information? For example, I remember in Time magazine a few years ago it was divulged, British war plans for a war with the United States. It was not 1820, following up the War of 1812 to 1814. It was the 1920's. They were anticipating a possibility, if we got in a war with the United States, here is what we

would do and how many battleships did we have to their emerging naval strength again, the naval treaty signed here in Washington in 1922. So we all had a good laugh, because we had fought World War II together and they had been at our side in Korea and then in Vietnam, their ships are going in and trading with the enemy.

Do they not have something like 25 or 30 years where they say, OK, time limitation. No sensitivity is involved. Take it.

Mr. COLE. No.

Mr. DORNAN. They do not?

Mr. COLE. No.

Mr. DORNAN. They will lock things up forever, too?

Mr. COLE. The British have the Official Secrets Act. I find that in my experience—I was just jotting down here how many foreign countries I have either done archive research or organized research projects and it is about seven or eight. The British are the most restrictive.

Mr. DORNAN. The most restrictive?

Mr. COLE. Yes, the most secretive.

Mr. DORNAN. Who is the least? Are we the least secretive?

Mr. COLE. By far and away, the most open, and it is in large measure through the Freedom of Information Act, which is unique, and it is also to the kind of legislation you are just discussing because it gives private researchers the tools to pry information out of the archives.

For example, and I do not want to get into too much detail here, but there was a change in the Freedom of Information Act, and I cannot put a date on it right now. It was like 2 or 3 years ago, something like that. Prior to that, if I went to the archives and said, I would like to have this document declassified, the presumption was against me. I had to prove that I needed this document for some legitimate purpose.

It has now been turned around. This is because of legislation. The presumption is, it should be declassified and it is up to the originating agency to state why it should not be. So this has made things much easier for researchers.

So no matter how bad things are here, believe me, it is far worse everywhere else, in my experience.

Mr. DORNAN. But when all the Presidents from this period are dead, Nixon, Truman, Roosevelt, Ike, I do not understand what possible rationale, except that we still have a hostile relationship with North Korea and we still have U-2's flying in the area, which has been in the open press. We still have serious intelligence gathering because of their lurch toward nuclear capability. We are putting money in there for light reactors to try and get them to be a decent nation.

I still do not understand why with particular combat intelligence there is any—can you think, Mr. Cole, of a rationale for holding back any combat stories or afteraction reports from 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953?

Mr. COLE. I do not have to think of them. They exist. I have an opinion on these things.

Mr. DORNAN. Please.

Mr. COLE. By and large, you will find two methodological problems. I can think of two concrete examples. One is looking for the

debriefs of Air Force POW's from Korea. No one has found those. There are like 16 fragments of the several hundred floating around. One of the potential problems that I would have if I went to the archives is that this would be considered information of a personal nature and I would be denied access. Whether or not this information was actually personal is another matter. I would have to appeal it. It would take years to dig it out.

Actually, I can think of three things. The second thing is it is rather routine to be denied access to material on the grounds of sources and methods, and you cannot look at the material to make a determination. So even if you have this blanket declassification decree signed by the President, then there are still exemptions to it, sources and methods.

The third thing is that, as you know from your own experience, it is not a simple thing to get a document declassified unless it has already been reviewed. They call it available for research, is what the National Archives call it.

Mr. DORNAN. What do they call it?

Mr. COLE. They call it available for research.

Mr. DORNAN. Available for research.

Mr. COLE. Documents are still classified, but you just put a declassification strip on the photocopy machine and that is how you declassify it.

Now, documents that are not available for research but are stored at the archives, if I want to get access to them, then it is the originating agency that has to review these. So if it is—take the example of the Air Force POW debriefs. Assume, for the moment, that we actually do find them and that the office that prepared them no longer exists. Then you have to find somebody in the Air Force structure who has now taken over a role of a defunct office and get them to review those documents to see if they are available for research. Usually, the answer you get back when you file such a request is, take a number, particularly with the CIA.

The CIA is my favorite example, and I have a zillion stories about them. If you filed a FOIA request with the CIA, they are very efficient in sending you the answers and so forth to your letters, but it usually says that you are number 437, or 1,200, in your case.

Ms. DUNTON. Twelve-hundred-and-sixty-five. I have 1,265.

Mr. COLE. The record for me—I keep track of these things just out of, I guess, morbid curiosity—is nearly 4 years and 6 months I waited for a document to be declassified. It was an NSC document. So there is no sense of urgency. And also, I have no recourse to the methodology that would allow these documents to be reviewed more quickly.

But I have to note, full stop, these procedures exist in the United States. We can do these things here. But they do not exist elsewhere.

Mr. DORNAN. But in the butcher shop, if you take a number, or Starbucks coffee, somebody is going down the numbers. How do we know that somebody is assiduously going down a list of 1,266 people and saying, well, he does not exist anymore. He graduated and changed, went into medicine. He is not writing this thesis paper. She does not need this. She passed away. Who is going down the

list that you suddenly get a call 5 years later that says, "By the way, you are 1,266. Your number just came up."

Mr. COLE. Two things. Well, you do not get a call, you just get the documents in the mail, for example.

Ms. DUNTON. Or a denial.

Mr. COLE. Or a denial. You wait 5 years and you get a denial.

But there are two things that I should point out here. One is, if you look at the structure of the State Department where they do the declassification reviews, within the State Department, that office is called the elephant's graveyard. It is really understaffed. If you look at the computers they use, just to put the logo of the State Department on a document when they are reviewing it, their computers are so slow that they press the function and go get a cup of coffee.

The second thing is, I received one time in my experience with the FOIA system a letter from the CIA—this is after a couple of years—saying, "Do you still want these documents? If we do not hear from you in 30 days, we are going to flush your request from the system."

But once again, full stop. In my experience with the FOIA, it is a very effective system but it is very, very slow, just because of the magnitude of requests, I suppose. But there are ways you could address that, in my personal opinion, but they would require some fundamental—

Mr. DORNAN. But occasionally you see books written and stories written, so somebody does get through the FOIA process and gets a story written.

Mr. COLE. A lot of times, historical material is, as it is called, available for research, boxes and boxes of material that you have seen.

Mr. DORNAN. This is a learning process for me, so let me press on in kindness to everybody. Mr. Dumas?

STATEMENT OF BOB DUMAS, BROTHER OF KOREAN WAR POW ARMY PRIVATE ROGER DUMAS

Mr. DUMAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. DORNAN. Is this your younger or older brother, Bob?

Mr. DUMAS. This is my younger brother. I had five brothers on the front line at one time.

Mr. DORNAN. In Korea?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, in Korea, myself and four other brothers. You are only supposed to have two.

Mr. DORNAN. Any sisters who were nurses?

Mr. DUMAS. No. I have one sister, but she was not in the service. This is my 46th year. I started in 1950. I served two tours of duty in Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. Two tours?

Mr. DUMAS. Two tours.

Mr. DORNAN. What number brother are you of the five in age?

Mr. DUMAS. Number two.

Mr. DORNAN. Number two. What was your older brother doing?

Mr. DUMAS. My older brother was in Korea in the 3rd Division.

Mr. DORNAN. And which is the brother who is missing?

Mr. DUMAS. That is Roger. He was in the 24th Division, Company C.

Mr. DORNAN. Overrun in——

Mr. DUMAS. Overrun by the Chinese.

Mr. DORNAN. In November?

Mr. DUMAS. November 4, 1950.

Mr. DORNAN. Go ahead with your statement.

Mr. DUMAS. I think the statement I gave to the committee is in front of you.

Mr. DORNAN. I have it right in front of me here.

Mr. DUMAS. I will try to condense 46 years in a few minutes, which is hard for me to do. Anyway, in 1953, when the conflict ended, he was still living. He was ready to be released and he was getting on a truck to go home and a guard took him off with a bayonet and marched him up a hill.

Mr. DORNAN. Other soldiers witnessed this?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. There is one in California right now, Bobby Caruth in Redding, CA.

Mr. DORNAN. This is why Al Santoli wanted me to have you on the panel.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. He lives in Redding, CA, Bobby Caruth. He just had a stroke about 3 months ago. He is doing well.

Mr. DORNAN. How old are you, Mr. Dumas?

Mr. DUMAS. I am 66.

Mr. DORNAN. Are any of your other three brothers alive? Let us assume——

Mr. DUMAS. No, they are all dead but one, one more.

So anyway, he did not get released in 1953, and Colonel Foster was right when he said there were many, many American POW's that were not released on that day in August 1953 and again in September 1953. But he was seen alive again in 1956 and 1957 by an ex-POW from Seattle, WA, by the name of Walter Enbom, who the Government said was never a prisoner of war at all, but he was in camp number five with my brother from 1950 to 1953.

He was released in 1953 and reentered the Air Force in 1956 and got another tour of duty in Korea. They sent him back to Korea instead of sending him to Europe. They sent him to Korea. On a patrol one night on the DMZ line, the 38th Parallel, he was captured with six other men in a patrol. Unbeknownst to the North Koreans, they forgot about him 3 years earlier and took him back to Pyongyang and he was put in a cellblock which was made out of stone. The whole building was made out of stone. While he was there, he saw my brother and 25 other American POW's.

Mr. DORNAN. Pause right there. Camp five. Al Santoli has shown me some pictures of these huge camps along the—was camp five up near the Yalu?

Mr. DUMAS. That is on the Yalu river.

Mr. DORNAN. And it is rolling hills——

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. You have a hill on the right-hand side that comes down into an inlet.

Mr. DORNAN. So now his experience is totally different. He is in a block-type prison in Pyongyang.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. He is taken right to Pyongyang, the capital.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me just jump ahead. He has always been discredited. The Government has always said—

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, they have always discredited him. I was in Federal Court in 1982 to change my brother's status from missing presumed dead to prisoner of war and at that time this was brought into Federal Court. But the U.S. attorney for the Government said that this man was not a POW.

Mr. DORNAN. In 1956?

Mr. DUMAS. No, in 1982, 1982.

Mr. DORNAN. No, no. I mean, did they say he was a prisoner in 1950 to 1953 but he was never recaptured?

Mr. DUMAS. He was in the Air Force from 1956 to 1957 but they said he was never recaptured.

Mr. DORNAN. Right. Right. But they acknowledged he was a prisoner with your brother the first go-around?

Mr. DUMAS. No, they will not acknowledge he was a prisoner even in 1950, 1951, 1952, and 1953, but I have his release list from the State of Washington, in alphabetical order. He is on a release list from 1953 as a prisoner of war from the State of Washington. I have all the States.

Mr. DORNAN. Did he ever polygraph?

Mr. DUMAS. No, no. He gave me a sworn statement, notarized, though, from the State of Washington. I also have him testifying at the VA in Seattle, WA, for a friend of his that was also in the camp with my brother and he gave a statement to the Government. He testified that he was bayoneted by a Chinese guy in the buttocks and the VA in Washington took his testimony as a POW, a prisoner of war, so I have a DD-214 form that does not say he was a prisoner. It just says he was in from 1956 to 1957 and he was released on a general discharge. That is the way they did things back in those days, give them a general discharge.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. But anyway, he is still in Seattle, WA. He called me about 7 years ago and told me he could not talk to me anymore, that he works for the Commerce Department, which is a Federal job, and that they were putting pressure on him and he could not talk to me no more. That was the last time I spoke with him. That was in 1956 and 1957.

Mr. DORNAN. When he said he was captured on this patrol—you see, this story is so compelling. The cynical side of this optimist says, it cannot be true. This is a Walter Mitty story, that this prisoner is now fantasizing and trying to get back into the swim of things and he is picking out a prisoner from the prior imprisonment, your brother, and he is spinning an outrageous tale.

I had a friend during that period who, we teased him at a drive-in. He lifted up his shirt—he was a few years older than I—and says, here is where I was wounded in Korea, and it was a recent appendix operation and he had never left basic training. He was kicked out. So some people will, tragically, fantasize about things.

If he was captured in a patrol and he was Air Force, Air Force bases are usually back from the DMZ or the armistice line. Other people were captured with him and then they were all released at some point?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, just like 1968. Eleven months after your capture, after the war, you are released by the North Koreans. Do not forget, Chairman Dornan, since 1953 to 1996, we have had 1,100 men captured on the 38th Parallel.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right, and all released——

Mr. DUMAS. And all released except a few, one or two back and forth.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. A lot of people do not know this in this country, but at that time, from——

Mr. DORNAN. Like the recent helicopter pilot, the Kiowa pilot.

Mr. DUMAS. Right. From 1953 into the 1960s, there was no fence along the 38th Parallel, and if you happened to walk into North Korean territory, you were captured, and if they walked into South Korean territory, they were captured. This went back and forth for many years until they put that demarcation line fence up later on in years.

Mr. DORNAN. How many people were captured with him the second time when he was Air Force?

Mr. DUMAS. Six, besides him.

Mr. DORNAN. And all six were released?

Mr. DUMAS. All seven, with him.

Mr. DORNAN. Seven.

Mr. DUMAS. It was seven with him.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you contacted any of the others?

Mr. DUMAS. The only one I got was him. Major Kelly, the Pentagon said they were looking for a Major Kelly for years and they never could find him. There was a Sergeant Hill that was also in that patrol from Massachusetts. The Government would not give me their address, would not give me nothing on these people. We could not get nothing from them. Everything was classified.

Mr. DORNAN. C-SPAN cameras grind at certain hearings around here and people will look at them. There are junkies that look at everything. It is their taxpayer money being spent in most cases. But a lot of things can go on and be boring and people will just tune out. I do not think that this type of a story is anything short of fascinating to most Americans, and if there were a C-SPAN camera grinding away and it was on C-SPAN I or II, somebody would look and say, my God, I was one of those six guys.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, that is what I mean.

Mr. DORNAN. Seven guys.

Mr. DUMAS. They showed up.

Mr. DORNAN. And I am going to corroborate this. It is hard to get these stories out. It is not grist for the mills of People magazine and things like that, because that is all the glitterati and the young set. It is too bad you had to fight this struggle alone.

Continue with the story. So up to the point of 1982, you tried to sue the Government.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. Before I get to that, he had given a statement, a sworn statement. He had it notarized in Seattle, WA. On the statement, he names 15 ex-POW's that were in the camp with him the first time he was a prisoner of war, when the Government said he was not a POW. He names 15 prisoners that were with him in the camp.

Mr. DORNAN. See, if we had a proper list of the 8,000, we could take those names, computer check him, and in today's state of the art——

Mr. DUMAS. I got the list.

Mr. DORNAN [continuing]. It spits out the answer in seconds.

Mr. DUMAS. I got the list.

Mr. DORNAN. You did?

Mr. DUMAS. I got the list of 8,000, 8,200.

Mr. DORNAN. So do they——

Mr. DUMAS. And they are all on the list.

Mr. DORNAN. And they are all on the list?

Mr. DUMAS. Every one of them is on the list. All the guys he named in that statement is on that list. Sonny Preston—Sonny Preston knew my brother. He is on that list.

Mr. DORNAN. These are all people I saw alive.

Mr. DUMAS. All the people that he was in the camp with, the prison camp. All these people.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. Now if you want to jump ahead a little bit to 1982——

Mr. DORNAN. No, let me go back one second. Did anybody speculate why your brother was taken off at bayonet point?

Mr. DUMAS. The only one who speculated was Bobby Caruth from Redding, CA, that was with him.

Mr. DORNAN. What would he say he thought they did it for?

Mr. DUMAS. What was that again?

Mr. DORNAN. Why did he think they singled out your brother?

Mr. DUMAS. All he said to him, "Where are you going?" and he put his hands in the air and says, "I do not know." That was the last time he talked to him. That was in August of 1953.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me tell the family members what Mr. Cole suggested I do. Al Santoli and I a few weeks ago went up to the National Archives branch one and only, the National Archives where our Constitution and Declaration of Independence is, right over here across from the National Museum of Art, and we went up to Maryland, and it is a fantastic facility. Mr. Cole gave us a sample of films to ask for to get—I could not spend the hours of laborious hard work that he did researching. He wanted us to get a flavor. The researchers up there, partly because of your introduction, were most friendly and accommodating, as a matter of fact, into helping all of you family members.

We go up at Hollywood state-of-the-art moviolas—I used to do this for a while. I lasted all of 3 days, it was so horrible with white gloves, taking down the edge numbers on editing film. I flashed on that. We started looking through stuff and we are looking at film exactly in the period your brother was captured and you are in combat with your other brothers. We see this film, that I can see it vividly. There was even a slight older tint to the film, but very clear, very good film, and they have three copies of each, one stashed away, one kept here. I mean, we are a rich country. By God, we could solve this because we do do things right in an archival sense. It is getting access to it.

They are in Pyongyang. There is no bomb damage. The people are not even hostile. They are more curious. We are both making

the same observations without even telling one another. And as I have suffered with Vietnam photographs like the Hrdlicka picture, it is so obviously Hrdlicka it is ridiculous, but it is grainy, it is in the rain. The guy has a poncho on. He has a bayonet at his back. But here are moving pictures, so I hit the pause button and I say, "Al, here is what we suffer with in Vietnam. Eight families will identify this person's face that is blocked by the guy's head in front of him."

But we are not dealing with stills. I hit the button. We are dealing with motion pictures. He is coming at me and he is turning and I could identify this guy 100 times over, particularly if you gave me a list of my unit, jogged my memory on the names. That is Bill, that is Fred, that is Mike, that is Skip, and bingo, you go through everybody.

So I am looking at this and then we start to hear prisoner testimony before the war is over, and I am starting to flash back on prisoner exchanges, because, after all, the war came to a screeching halt. MacArthur is fired in April. I just turned 18 that month. I am anxious to go in, an adventuresome-type young man. My dad got three wound chevrons and gassed in World War I. My brothers, older, younger, the same way. I love brother stories. "Beau Geste" was our favorite movie, three brothers.

So I look at this film and I say, this guy is in 1951, a felt thing on a table. He is in Japan somewhere, a typical young high school dropout or a not well-educated guy, but very forthcoming, and he tells the story of a lieutenant singled out, like your brother, taken to the top of a hill, and they told him, "America is that way. Run. Run for it," and they start laughing. He has his hands up and he says, "No." They said, "Run." "No." So they shoot him eight times on the spot and kill him and dump him in a grave that they just had him dig.

He said, "We went up on the hill the next day and they had not even covered his body. We buried other guys who died in the camp." And he gave this lieutenant's name. This is all in the archives that Mr. Cole has been through, extensive, and I said, Al, this is one depressing operation. I have the flavor here. I know what is available here. And then Al says, and what about the Air Force records? What about this? What about that?

So you do not need a reason why they would single out somebody like your brother with a bayonet. This is the tragedy of POWs. It brings out sadism in the guards. It brings out this god-like power of arbitrariness. You see it in the movie "Schindler's List". He looks at the little boy, puts his fingers on the window and says, "You want merciful? You can do anything you want." He picks up his rifle and goes right down and shoots the top of the little boy's head off out in the yard when the little boy thought he was home free.

Mr. DUMAS. For no reason at all.

Mr. DORNAN. No reason at all, just because he is in that god-like role. So you tell a story like this and while you are telling it, I am flashing on these young guys being debriefed in Japan and where all of these debriefings are. So I said to Al, and I am going to ask Mr. Cole this in a minute, I said, I wonder if after the war was over, using a modicum of imagination, we said, let us assemble all the sergeants and senior corporals of the 24th Infantry Division,

coin assist, pay their way to come to wherever their home base is, and go into an auditorium and run all these films.

I remember having gang officer calls in the auditorium with a World War II building at George Air Force Base and seeing the first film available on the F-105 Thunderchief and everybody flying F-100's is going, "Whoa, it keeps getting better. I want to fly this monster." We had Israeli officers come and tell us of their air battles and everything. This would have been the same period, 1955, 1956. I am flashing on something I actually did. Call in the whole unit. We are going to have a mass gang showing of all of these films. Here are all the rosters of the order of battle 6 years ago and we want to identify every person here, who is home and who is not. Done.

I said, Al, do you think they did that? No, probably not. Life marches on. This is the failure of this country to bring its wounded, and a prisoner is always psychologically wounded, back from the battlefield, and that is why Vietnam sticks in my craw because I tracked it all during the war as a journalist and a reserve officer with friends in captivity and half did not come back. Saying in Hawaii, you are going to do it right this time, right? We have computers. We have a data base and everything, and they did everything just as screwed up as in Korea.

Mr. DUMAS. Exactly what you are talking about are these photographs, exactly what you are saying.

Mr. DORNAN. Are these the ones I already saw, Al?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, I saw them. Yes.

Mr. DUMAS. These men never came out, and we have four identifications right now on this picture. It is my brother in the right-hand corner, Mr. Weldon East, who the Government said was never a prisoner of war, that he did not send a letter to Senator Kerrey, but the FBI in Arkansas had his handwriting analyzed. It is the same handwriting that they received in 1992 from him—

Mr. DORNAN. So now he gets the POW medal.

Mr. DUMAS. No, he gets nothing. They will not recognize it.

Mr. DORNAN. They are still denying it?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes. They are not going to tell him he is a POW. Weldon East is the fellow that sent a letter from North Korea that says, I am sick. I was born in Spadra, AR. I am still a prisoner in North Korea and I want to come home. This is 1992. John Kerrey had that letter in his possession for a month and a half before he turned it over to the family in Arkansas. When he turned it over to the family in Arkansas, the FBI in Washington said it was a hoax.

Mr. DORNAN. Did you track this case, Dino?

Mr. CARLUCCIO. I have some recollection on it.

Mr. DUMAS. I am only saying what the family told me what they did with the FBI in Arkansas. His sister, who lives in Arkansas with her husband, received a letter from him in 1950 before he went overseas. They analyzed his handwriting, the FBI in Arkansas, with the letter that he sent and it is the same handwriting. But the Government said he was never a prisoner—or he was a prisoner of war. He was captured in 1951. But this was not from him, this was a hoax.

Mr. DORNAN. In the Defense Missing Persons Office, is anybody going back over the Korean photographs, imagery, Mr. Cole, anybody trying to do what we never did in the first place, a thorough photographic scan of every face? At NPIC down here in the old Navy Yard, they have technologies and skills they did not have after Korea.

Mr. COLE. First off, I do not know what DPMO does. I am not employed by them and they do not share their methodology or insights with me.

I do know what happened to the materials that I have uncovered, and I can give you two examples. In one of the archive research projects that I undertook for the Office of the Secretary of Defense in Ukraine, we found a whole bunch of Korea war photographs. It turns out that the Tass photographers that were running around North Korea were actually working for the KGB, which is no surprise. These photographs were found in the KGB archives in Kiev.

I also found a bunch of photographs from Vietnam, as well, and these photographs were of American POW's, and also some rather graphic and gruesome photographs of dead Americans that were photographed by the Tass photographers.

I turned those over to DPMO, and then a fellow by the name of Larry Gioladan wanted to get some photographs of POW's to use for his book, "Last Seen Alive," and one of the photographs that I uncovered in Kiev is on the cover of his book. Larry, who is now a foreign correspondent somewhere, so he told me this directly—he is in Sarajevo.

Mr. DORNAN. Sarajevo?

Mr. COLE. He told me when he asked for these photographs from DPMO, he got them and he said to them, "Where did you get these?" He knew they were from me because I showed him the photocopies that I kept. And their answer was, "We do not know. We do not know where we got these."

So I think, in my personal opinion, I do not think anything was done with those photographs. I think one photograph from Vietnam, they said some cryptic comment to me, like, "This was useful in the resolution of a Vietnam case."

Mr. DORNAN. Pat?

Ms. DUNTON. I know what happened to those photographs. I was at a camp two reunion in San Antonio, TX. DPMO was there. They had the photographs. They presented it to these ex-POW's and one photograph was identified. I was standing right there when the man identified it. As it turns out, that is the photograph that is on the cover of the book you just said. The man is still alive. He lives in South Texas. I told Larry Gioladan that and Gioladan said, "No, they told me none of these people were identified," and I was standing right there when DPMO had this particular picture identified, long before they gave it to Larry Gioladan.

Mr. COLE. The second part of my answer involves—now, this is still photographs we discussed—the motion pictures. For a reason—I do a lot of different projects and I do historical research for a number of organizations. It is kind of my business. I had reason to revisit the Korea war collection, and in the process of going through some documents from the Korea war crimes section of a judge advocate general in Korea, they are preparing war crimes

trial files in case we ever got our hands on these people who murdered our servicemen once they were captured—this is in textual records now, documents—I found two reels of film.

That is not supposed to happen. There is a whole section at the Archives, the Motion Picture Branch. This set the archivist into sort of a dither because the textual people did not know what to do with the reel of film, and it was the original. You had not gone there. There has to be a so-called reference copy. You are not supposed to look at the original.

Before we figured out that this was the so-called archive copy, we looked at one, and it was a film of an atrocity site, just a slow combat camera footage of panning down this terrible scene. Well, there are two reels of this. That told me two things.

DPMO has said, they have told your office in writing and they have told me that they looked through those textual records and have analyzed them. They say they have photocopied every piece of paper that is in that archive group, RG-153. Whoever did it overlooked two reels of film, and this is very unusual.

Mr. DORNAN. It seems highly unlikely.

Mr. COLE. So whoever did it—now, they cannot turn around and say, oh, yes, we saw that, because it is archive copies. They could not have seen it. So whoever does this research for them—I used to be a university professor, so I feel comfortable grading people—I would write at the top of this, “Come see me in my office.”

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. COLE. Then in the Motion Picture Archives at College Park, I have found some of the films that you saw, and what you are referring to, where it shows these POW's, is actually captured enemy film.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right.

Mr. COLE. We do not know who made the film, if it was Russians or Chinese or Koreans. We just know we captured it. We do not know the providence of those films. It is just impossible to determine right now, in other words, where they came from, if they were just kept by the Air Force or if they were kept by the Army or whatever. They have been sitting somewhere for a very long time. In my estimation, since they were captured enemy films, they were treated as an intelligence product and they probably just sat in a vault somewhere.

The second thing about the Motion Picture Archives in this context is the so-called 293 files, which are the basic documents for unrepatriated servicemen, all MIA's and POW's. It has an IBM card—many of the family members have seen this—stapled in the back of the casualty jacket. There are 17 reels of film that show the Kukura facility in Japan in 1952 in operation that shows the bodies coming in the doors—

Mr. DORNAN. We saw that.

Mr. COLE. It shows every step of the process, showing the files, showing the guys doing the skeletal charts, showing—and also with the identities of the individuals that they are working on.

There are two reels of film that are only in the archive version. I requested to have reference copies made. That tells me, as a researcher—you know, all researchers are very curious at what other

researchers are doing, but you have to be sort of clever in finding out.

Mr. DORNAN. Including the DPMO calling down there and saying, what did Congressman Dornan look at? What did he want to see? What is Al Santoli looking at? I do not want to play these games. Call me and ask me what I looked at.

Mr. COLE. Exactly. That is, excuse me, sleazy.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. COLE. You do not go snooping around another researcher's stuff unless you come up and ask them directly. You do not go ask the Archivist, what is that guy doing?

My point here is that there are actually 19 reels of film, 2 that exist in the pristine archive version. I had requested those to be made into reference copies. That tells me that nobody has looked at them. Either they had not looked at it before, or if they had, they were so incompetent that they did not ask for the last two reels of film.

Once again, full stop, what does this tell you about the people who are looking into the Korean war evidence that exists in the archives? They go through boxes of documents and ignore films. They do not even look at films. And I have my own views on this, and I am sorry to monopolize it, but it raises profound questions about the competence of the people who are allegedly doing research.

Mr. DORNAN. Pat's term comes back to mind. "I shove papers around."

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. That is not someone driven toward an objective the way you would be as a researcher.

Let me come back to you. It was very valuable to have you come into the flow at that point.

Mr. COLE. I am sorry I was so long.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you have anything else to say, Bob, and then I will go to Ms. Mandra.

Mr. DUMAS. No, the only thing before Irene's speech is this. These photographs were given to the Defense Department over a year ago and they blew these up to the size that we have here, and the Defense Department told me that these were very important because they never saw anything like this. These are men that never were released. Now, we are not talking about 150 men here. We are talking maybe 3,000 or 4,000.

Mr. DORNAN. Now wait a minute. They told you nobody in that picture has ever been released?

Mr. DUMAS. According to what I was told by the guy that brought it out, the fellow that brought it out in 1953. He gave it to the AP in 1978. The Associated Press in Washington gave it to me, and he said he snuck it out in the shoe, in the bottom of a shoe, the film, because the AP photographer had died in the camp and he took the film, put it in his shoe, and when he was released in 1953 took it with him. But he did not have it developed until 1978, when he read about me in an AP story. Then he developed the film, and he did it through photographs, and he gave them to AP in Washington. He told them that these men were never released. None of these men came out.

Mr. DORNAN. Circa 1978, he said that?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, and then I gave these to the Defense Department.

Mr. DORNAN. Last year?

Mr. DUMAS. A little over a year ago.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. And I said to Marty Wisda, I believe he is Colonel Wisda, I said, "Colonel Wisda, it looks like these men have never been released." He said, "Well, I will have them analyzed at the Pentagon. We will blow them up and I will give them back to you." I did not give him the originals but just a copy.

Mr. DORNAN. And he blew them up and gave them back to you.

Mr. DUMAS. He gave them back to me.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you know this colonel's name, Al?

Mr. SANTOLI. Colonel Wisda.

Mr. DUMAS. Colonel Wisda, and he said that he was going to send this picture to every VFW, American Legion, and DAV post in the United States so they could identify some of these men.

Mr. DORNAN. Has that been done?

Mr. DUMAS. Never been done, no. They never did that.

Mr. DORNAN. Can we get a letter with Senator Smith and me and ask why this was not done?

Mr. DUMAS. They never did it.

Mr. DORNAN. Of course, that is an excellent idea. That is imaginative.

Mr. DUMAS. Senator, all the veterans' posts or the ex-POW's that belong to these posts could identify some of the men in this photograph.

Mr. DORNAN. My American Legion post in Pacific Palisades, the Ronald Reagan post, would put that—it ought to be bigger than that, to tell you the truth, it is that clear—would put it up on a bulletin board that would sit there for 2 or 3 years. They would never take it down. They might frame it and make it part of the hall.

Mr. DUMAS. I will leave it with Al tonight, both of these photographs.

Mr. DORNAN. We will track that. Sometimes you do not get anything done around here because people say, oh, it will die in the House. It will die in the Senate. They thought they had tamped down Senator Bob Smith until I pop up over here, and we find out that when we send letters together, neither has to threaten to subpoena. It comes. There is something about, oh, God, if they are coordinated on this, we might as well give it to them. So we will follow that up.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dumas follows:]

**STATEMENT OF ROBERT DUMAS
TO THE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMITTEE
SUB COMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL
JUNE 20, 1996**

PAGE 1

My brother CPI Roger Armand Dumas COC, 19th Infantry Regiment 24th Division was captured by Chinese Forces Northeast of Anju North Korea on November 4, 1950.

At the end of the conflict in September 1953, he was not repatriated with the sick and wounded.

He was seen alive in August waiting to board a truck to be released to Freedom Village. Mr. Bobby Caruth of Redding California was with him when a Chinese guard took CPI Dumas away without any explanation.

Mr. Caruth had given a statement after his release. He has given me a statement on a cassette tape which is available to the Committee.

PAGE 2

In 1956 he was seen alive in a Pyongyang Prison by a former Korean Prisoner of War, Mr. Walter Enbom of Seattle Washington, was in camp number 5 with CPI Dumas in 1951.

He was released in 1953, he re-entered the Service in 1955 and was sent back to South Korea for a Tour of Duty. He was recaptured by a North Korea Border Patrol along with six other men. They were taken to Pyongyang where he met CPI Dumas and twenty-five other Americans who were not released in 1953.

Eleven months later they were released and reported what they knew. They were told they were captured after the armistice and that is why they were released.

PAGE 3

The same thing happened to the Pueblo crew in 1968. They were also held for eleven months then released. Many crew members said they had heard of Americans still in North Korea from 1953.

Mr. Enboms statement is attached. Several other POW's knew CPI Dumas in Camp Number 5. Mr. Lloyd Pate of Grovetown, Georgia, Mr. George W. Rogers. of Terlton, Oklahoma. Mr. Rogers also drew maps for our Intelligence of Camp Number 5, which are available, their statements are on file in Hartford Federal Court.

In 1979, the Associated Press in Washington D.C. sent me Two original photos of Camp Number 5 and Prisoners waiting to be released, but these men were not repatriated, CPI Dumas and several other Prisoners have been identified in this photo.

PAGE 4

An Ex-POW smuggled the film in the bottom of his Chinese slipper. The film was given to him in Camp Number 5 by an Associated Press Journalist, who gave it to him before he passed away. The Ex-POW is a Mr. Achee of Florida (no Address).

These photos have never been Published. Two years ago I gave them to Col. Marty Wisda of the POW/MIA Office, he said at the time he was going to send a copy to all Veteran Organizations to see if the rest of the POW's could be identified. I have heard nothing since. These two large photo are available to the Committee also.

PAGE 5

In 1982, I was the Prevailing Party in a Federal Law Suit for the change of CPI Dumas from Missing to Prisoner of War. In 1980 the Military Board of Review had refused to let me present evidence in CPI Dumas' case. Previously, in 1981, I had met with Senator Thurmond the Judiciary Chairman. He arranged a meeting at the White House for me with Admiral Bud Nance on December 23rd, we met for over two hours, where we discussed my brother and all the other men who were not repatriated in 1953.

Admiral Nance National Security Advisor to President Reagan agreed we left men behind, but did not know any more than that. I advised him that I was going to institute a Federal Law Suit to change CPI Dumas' status to Prisoner of War from MIA to POW.

The meeting ended with no promises but that he would continue to keep me informed through Sen. Thurmond Office, which Sen. Thurmond did. We had a very good relationship, the Senator and I. He was always available to any one who wanted to look at his records on the Prisoner issue in Korea.

In February of 1982, I instituted my suit in Federal District Court in Hartford, Connecticut. My case went to trial in July of 1982. The presiding Judge was Judge Emmett T. Claire.

I presented witnesses who knew CPI Dumas in Camp Number 5, North Korea, Mr. Lloyd Pate of Grovetown, Georgia gave a full description of how he met CPI Dumas.

Mr. George W. Rogers of Terilton, Oklahoma, also testified he knew CPI Dumas in Camp Number 5, Mr. Rogers also knew Walter Enbom in Camp Number 5 along with Mr. Cecil Preston of Seattle, Washington who also knew Mr. Enbom. They had a reunion in Seattle, Washington at the Ex-POW Club in 1979.

PAGE 6

In 1985, I won my case and was the Prevailing Party. The Army Secretary, John Marsh changed CPI Dumas' status to POW presumed dead. Previously in July of 1982 Judge Claire ordered the Government Attorney to bring into Court 389 data sheets that were available, of POW's not returned in 1953 including CPI Dumas' name and data sheet.

The Attorney argued that the Defense Department knew nothing about 389 Data Sheets on POW's. The Judge then said if they were not in his Court Room in two (2) weeks he would hold him in contempt.

Two weeks later the Attorney arrived with the Data Sheets. He gave me 189 Army Data Sheets including CPI Dumas and others, and he kept 200 Air Force Data Sheets which are in his office in New Haven, Connecticut.

Judge Claire gave me only the Army Data Sheets. Several years after the Court Case, I received a phone call from the Government Attorney telling me the change of status of CPI Dumas was not put in his military record.

I then proceeded to institute another suit in the District Court of Connecticut in 1992. But because the present Attorney General was involved in the first case, I decided to put the case in the Federal District Court in the District of Columbia.

Last year Judge Harold Green dismissed the case because the Government Attorneys told him that they were the Prevailing Party in the first case. This was not true.

I was the Prevailing Party. I am the only person in history to get a status change in Federal Court, no one has ever done this. My brother CPI Dumas is still POW, Presumed Dead.

How can one be a Prisoner of War and no one saw him die. How can this government then still presume him dead? My Court Case is available in the US District Court of Connecticut, and also in the Congressional Archives.

PAGE 7

In 1986, I Robert Dumas, had a conversation with Col. Henry Land, the head of the POW/MIA Office at the Pentagon. Our conversation was recorded on cassette. In our conversation I said that the State Department told me that when we bring our troops home from South Korea then we will get our Prisoners back, Col. Land said that is correct, that is a public statement by the North Korean Government.

Also, he said when the North Koreans get to a position and they want to release the Prisoners and the remains that are up there, they will do so when it is to their advantage. I said isn't it to their advantage to release them. He said you don't have to convince me, you have to convince the North Koreans. This tape is available for the committee.

PAGE 8

In 1987, I was approached by the Rev. Jesse Jackson and asked if I could set up a meeting with Ambassador Pak Gil Yon, The North Korean observer to the United Nations. I called the Ambassador who I have known for several years, he agreed to meet Rev. Jackson at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in New York. The meeting took place at 1:00 p.m. I introduced Rev. Jackson to the Ambassador, several other persons were in the room with us, Mr. Chong, 1st Sect. to Ambassador Pak, Rev. Arhne of Chicago, a Rainbow Coalition Member, Peter Jango Ha a South Korean businessman from New York and Jesse Jr, Secret Servicemen and myself.

Rev. Jackson opened the meeting with the most important question ever asked of the North Korean Government. Mr. Ambassador, if your country still have Americans alive from the Korean War it would be good for both of our nations to release them. I will come to Pyongyang with a Delegation around Christmas time to discuss this.

Ambassador said yes Rev. it would be good for both of our Countries. Rev. Arhne will put the Delegation together. Rev. Jackson called the State Department and told them of his plans, I don't know who he spoke with but I was afraid someone would stop our trip.

Rev. Jackson said to me, I can go anywhere in the world I want, I said yes anywhere but North Korea. Jackson wrote a letter that I hand delivered to Ambassador Pak the following morning.

At 10:30 a.m. that morning I received a call from Rev. Arhne of Chicago informing me that the State Department put travel restrictions on North Korean Delegates to New York. North Korea got mad and put restrictions on our trip.

Rev. Jackson has not spoken to me since 1987. I have tried to contact him without success. Rev. Arhne called me last year and said he was sorry about the trip but he still knows of live Americans in North Korea. Rev. Jackson's letter is attached.

PAGE 9

On December 10, 1987, The Hartford Courant Newspaper had a story about the meeting. The following day there was another story of a Romanian Engineer who lived in Bloomfield, Connecticut. His name is Serban Oprica. He defected from the Communist in the middle eighties. He saw the story and called the person who wrote it. He said when he lived in Romania, he and twenty other Romanian Engineers were sent to North Korea in 1979 to build a TV Station.

One Sunday a bus took them sight seeing. The driver was new and he took a wrong road four hours North of Pyongyang. This was October 1979 on a Sunday afternoon.

The bus came upon a Collective Farm by mistake, Mr. Oprica and the other men saw 50 Caucasians working in a Cabbage Field. The closest to the bus looked to be in his early fifties with blue eyes. Mr. Oprica asked who these people were, are they Europeans, he was told by an Engineer who had been in Korea for several years that these are American Prisoners from the Korean War. There are no European workers on Collective Farms here.

When Mr. Oprica got to his apartment he informed his lovely wife, Tina, "Guess who I saw today, I saw American Prisoners from the Korean War working on Collective Farms."

Mr. Oprica informed Congressman John Rowland of Connecticut, about this, he wrote to the Defense Department shortly after Jackson's meeting. The Defense said he was mistaken, they came to see him at his home. He stands by his story of what he saw and what he told his wife. He was not even an American Citizen at the time he wrote to the Defense Department. He is very disappointed with Washington. He is a top Engineer with the State of Connecticut and now resides in West Hartford.

In 1992 Mr. Oprica testified with me before Senator Kerrys Committee on what he saw. Nothing was ever, ever said again about our testimony. An official from Washington came to see him last year and he told him again what he saw and the exact location where he saw them. He has not heard from them since. His statement is attached.

Nothing was ever done by Senator Kerry, Chairman of the POW Committee to keep hearings open, especially after so many individuals testified about live Prisoners in North Korea. I feel very sorry for Mr. Oprica and his family.

PAGE 11

In July of 1993, I met with Ambassador Pak Gil Yon in New York. He said he was sorry the Delegation was not able to come to Pyongyang. He asked about Rev. Jackson, I said I have not talked to him since December 9, 1987. No more was said about our trip. Ambassador Pak Gil Yon asked if I had a picture of my brother, I always carry one wherever I go. He took the picture of CPI Dumas in uniform two months before his capture and sent it back to Pyongyang. I have not seen that photo since. Recently, I was told the photo is safe and will be returned to me someday. Picture attached.

PAGE 12

In 1994, I had a conversation with another Ambassador I have known for several years, Ambassador Ho Jong. In this conversation, which is on tape, he said we will tell whereabouts of all persons in my country. The Ambassador never used the word POW only persons. This will be done if the United States will sign a Peace Treaty with his Country. This tape is available for the Committee.

PAGE 13

In 1992, I received a CIA Document that was sent by an unknown individual from Washington D.C. It said, to change Roger Dumas' status to Prisoner would cause a precedent for other cases, also, a letter I received while in Federal District Court in Connecticut said not to tell the public about this, as it would cause a precedent for other cases. Last year I received the same letter as I did when I was in Court. Both Documents are attached.

PAGE 14

Congressman Dornan, you and your Committee, after almost 43 years, now have the opportunity to settle this long overdue issue. Please hold more hearings, and discussions with the North Korean Government, to turn these poor devils after all these years. I am very disturbed that we are giving North Korea Humanitarian Aide, Food and Oil and have not asked about our men still being held somewhere in North Korea and not allowed to leave.

If it is going to take a Peace Treaty between our two Nations, so be it. That is the only way to bring them home, Do It. Regardless of what South Korea says. 89 thousand Americans missing from World War Two, Vietnam, and Korea and none are accounted for.

We are the only nation in the World who does not negotiate for their prisoners of War. This is a disgrace to our Nation. Thank you for accepting my testimony and statement.

Robert R. Dumas, Sr.
Brother of CPI Roger A Dumas
Korean (POW) Not Returned

Mr. DORNAN. Irene, your statement, please.

**STATEMENT OF IRENE MANDRA, SISTER OF KOREAN WAR
POW USMC SGT. PHILIP MANDRA**

Ms. MANDRA. Congressman Dornan, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak on behalf of my brother, Sergeant Philip V. Mandra, and for all of the POW's and MIA's from Korea and the cold war.

In 1953, at the end of the Korean war, my family and I were told that my brother was dead. We were told that no American soldiers were left behind in Korea. I believed our Government. We mourned and went on with our lives. Congressman Dornan, we were lied to. Our boys were left behind alive. They were shipped to China, the Soviet Union, and North Korea.

I am from a generation that believed our government to be of the people, for the people. I was wrong. What I have learned has shocked and surprised me. I found out on my own that marine search teams reached my brother's location within 15 to 20 minutes of the explosion. Search teams found nothing. There were no bodies. Where did five marines go within 15 to 20 minutes? Our boys were dragged off by the Chinese. I learned that Phil was hit with a concussion grenade, not gunfire. His wounds were survivable.

Inquiries of my Government yielded little to no information. Information on Korea was still classified in 1988, some 35 years after the Korean war. There was nothing being done to account for the 389 known prisoners left behind.

What I had to contend with and what has upset me the most is the apathy I have seen within my own Government. In 1992, all this was changed and I had hope and faith again when the Government started Task Force Russia. This organization was short-lived before the Department of Defense took over under Ross and a cloak of secrecy prevailed.

Information surfaced about my brother in 1993 when a Russian colonel identified Phil's picture from an album of the missing. This colonel unequivocally—

Mr. DORNAN. Pardon me just one second. This is the general that I saw on film in the BBC documentary.

Ms. MANDRA. Yes, Colonel Molinin.

Mr. DORNAN. Totally believable.

Ms. MANDRA. Yes. He stated that he saw an American soldier in a Magadan prison in the 1960's. The Russian side of the commission did not believe this colonel, but Ambassador Toon and the task force said the colonel was very credible.

The information I received on that interview with the Russian colonel was redacted. When I protested, I was told by my Government that all of the names were blackened to protect the Russians' privacy. How dare the United States Government—my Government—protect the rights of privacy of Russian citizens. What about my rights? What about my brother Phil's rights?

This is only one of the problems I have had with the handling of the MIA affairs and DPMO. My problem is not with the people at DPMO, it is the agency itself. The unwritten policies of the organization are dictated by lifetime bureaucrats. Most people working

n DPMO are decent, honorable people. They are hindered by antiquated laws and by people in authority who are protecting wrong decisions that were made years before DPMO's control, afraid that our Government may be embarrassed by its previous actions.

After the privacy incident, I flew at my own expense to Moscow and met with the Russian side of the commission. I immediately received all of the documentation that I could not get from my own country.

Mr. DORNAN. By the way, where did they film you for that documentary, here in the United States?

Ms. MANDRA. Yes. That was done during the Korean dedication in July, this past July.

Mr. DORNAN. I was at that, but I left when someone else arrived, a little higher office than I.

Ms. MANDRA. I was promised that a team would go to Magadan and would investigate the prison and would speak to the surrounding communities. I had to wait 18 months before a team was sent. This was 18 months added to my brother's death sentence, 18 months he did not have to give.

If I may just stop for a minute, Congressman Dornan, the only reason they went was because I approached Ambassador Toon at a cocktail party and I said to him, "Ambassador, you promised me——"

Mr. DORNAN. Here or in Moscow?

Ms. MANDRA. No, here in Washington. "You promised me that you would send a team to Magadan, and," I said, "you have never researched what has happened with my brother." At that moment, he called men over and said, "We have not been to Magadan yet?" And they said, "No, Ambassador." He said, "Get a team going," 18 months after Colonel Molinin came forward and said, "I saw Philip Mandra in that prison."

I would like the members of the State Department, the Department——

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me one second, Irene. I do not want to forget this. Yesterday, some of the Korean families told me about these briefings, instructions you got before you met with the Russians at the party here. Now I am told they had tours, limousines, and I would not resent all that if we were stroking them with courtesy, politeness, and a taste of America to get some productive conversation out of them later. But when we hit a wall, then all of that is wasted money. While the relatives are flying around on their own money, their tax dollars are paying for these guys.

I do not know if Carol Hrdlicka was in the room. It reminded me of the briefings the military gave Carol Hansen or gave Mrs. Holland when I was out of the room. My wife was telling me what Mr. Owen Pickett had gotten out of her, that, oh, do not do this or you will get your guy killed. This is top secret. You will get your man killed. And check with us in 30 years. Maybe he will still be alive because you did not get him killed.

Did you get one of those briefings about, do not be rude to the Russians. Treat them nice, now. We want to get something.

Ms. MANDRA. The first time we were meeting with the Russians, they did meet with the family members and did say that we should

speak to them politely and we should not be angry with them. In this way, we could have some kind of dialogue and communication.

Mr. DORNAN. And then 18 months goes by.

Ms. MANDRA. But the funny thing is that you brought that up. I was the one that protested because I asked, I think his name is Colonel Olinka, is it, the man from Korea?

Mr. COLE. Orlov.

Ms. MANDRA. Orlov, and——

Mr. DORNAN. Could you spell it?

Ms. MANDRA. I do not know.

Mr. COLE. Colonel Alexander Orlov, O-r-l-o-v.

Ms. MANDRA. And I brought up my brother's case at the plenary and he said, "Go see the Chinese." That is all I needed, after I spent money for a ticket and food and a hotel, and I had it. I went home and I picked up the phone and I did not stop calling everyone I could call and I wrote a whole column and I sent it to every veterans' paper that I can, that we pay for these Russians to come here, we entertain them, and then they turn around and they tell us to go see the Chinese. This is just an outrage.

Right after that, I understand that the Russians were not invited back here, and I was very happy about it. But they are not going to give us information. Why should we ask them to come here? I do not have to waste——

Mr. DORNAN. Irene, just take a second. John Chapla is my chief of staff and he is an Army lieutenant colonel. This is a getaway Thursday. You can pretty much set your own pace. You can come in early tomorrow. If any family member thinks the pace is too slow here, just raise your hand and we will pick up the pace. But I am absorbing this. It is open-ended here. My chief of staff just said, do you want to do a special order tonight? I said, no. He did not know I had already told you that this is more important to me. I can do a special order on this later.

I do not know if some of you heard, but I said Dino Carluccio and Al Santoli are in today's Wall Street Journal, a column by Al Hunt saying that the ubiquitous but—it is a negative column, but——

Mr. SANTOLI. Basically, we said that we are involved in some kind of a circus, some kind of a sideshow, milking the families, profiteering.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, yes.

Mr. SANTOLI. That is a John McCain, John Kerrey. That article was a hunt.

Mr. DORNAN. Now here is why I wanted kind of a second time-out here, is this is going to be an awfully good record, the hearings yesterday and today, toward what end? Printed in one of these Government brown books that I used to look at in the Korean war that had the same cover as the field manual for a Springfield 1903 rifle or a Colt 45? All the recommendations at the tail end of your Senate written report, and I mentioned the minority report, and then I realized, I did not carefully read the minority report because I had access to Senator Bob Smith and would talk to him.

What is frustrating me now as I listen to this story is it is sort of what I expected, the way we treated the Russians. I asked to get on that task force and our minority leader said, no, I am putting Sam Johnson on. I said, well, I certainly step aside for a 7-year

POW. Sam is frustrated to the point of saying, what is the purpose here. Obviously, Malcolm Toon at age 80 on the Fourth of July would like to step aside for somebody.

I am open for suggestions later on what you would like us to do on some course of action. If I go on the House floor and say that I have confidence in the analysts—somebody mentioned they want to talk to me off the record about one of the analysts that I at this point have confidence in, but I am not going to play a game with Mr. Toon's replacement. It will be interesting to see, as people are getting indicted more and more over the next few months, who is going to be left to be appointed to anything.

But I want to work with these people and I want the games to start playing. Mr. Cole used a tough word, sleazy. It is annoying to me to have people call over there and say, "What did Mr. Dornan want to see? Do not let him know something more than we do. If he gets ahead of us, he will embarrass us." It is not going to be paper pushing anymore.

I do not know if you heard my opening to the Vietnam section yesterday, but I said if anybody does not believe that we left prisoners alive in Korea, save Vietnam for later, quit. Have the decency to walk away from this thing because you are an obstructionist. It is now an incontrovertible fact, way beyond circumstantial evidence.

Then let me ask this from the whole audience. Did anybody here learn today about President Eisenhower's words?

Ms. MANDRA. Oh, no. We have known that.

Mr. DORNAN. See, you have all known that.

Ms. MANDRA. We all know this. We have been in this for—

Mr. DORNAN. Some of the articles Al was bringing me from a magazine I used to subscribe to, Argassi, I read all of these things religiously and then I did not totally forget them. I just filed them away. And when he brings me Argassi the other day, I said, I remember reading this article right before I joined the Air Force, thinking, well, this is why I am joining the Air Force. This is not going to happen again. We will get these guys out. We will shoot our way in and get them out.

And now, all these things you have had in drawers and bureaus and filed in red, here we are reliving all of this again with this difference. We have money. We have an office. We have some people pushing papers around, other people who are dedicated. We can get an emergency million, Murtha's million, you call it, out of an ex-marine, a good guy.

Mr. SANTOLI. They said that pejoratively, like laughing about it.

Mr. DORNAN. Who said it pejoratively?

Mr. SANTOLI. Ask Paul.

Mr. DORNAN. Make a note of Murtha's million and we will come to that.

Mr. SANTOLI. And what happened to it.

Mr. DORNAN. Finish your story, Ms. Mandra. I just want you to know that I am sitting here figuring, what do we do with this testimony, because when you say, "I am the one who took exception to that," that is great, but where are we now and when did you take exception to it, month and year.

Ms. MANDRA. I am just trying to think. At that plenary, because the Russians did not come back in January. Volkogonov passed away, I believe it was December of 1995. I have been flying back and forth so often, Congressman Dornan, it is a little hard to remember.

Mr. DORNAN. When did you go to Moscow?

Ms. MANDRA. I went to Moscow in December of 1993.

Mr. DORNAN. Who went with you?

Ms. MANDRA. Just me and my older brother.

Mr. DORNAN. How old is your older brother?

Ms. MANDRA. My older brother is 71, a World War II veteran, Navy.

Mr. DORNAN. This may not seem important, but it is to me. Who met you at the airport?

Ms. MANDRA. Colonel Parr met me at the airport.

Mr. DORNAN. Air Force attaché, Moscow?

Ms. MANDRA. He was the head of the task force on the commission side in Moscow, only because I requested it. I wrote a letter to the Department of Defense and I said, I am not familiar with the language. I do not know my way around.

I was partially disabled because I was suffering from knee surgery, so I was walking with a cane. I said, please have someone come and pick us up so this way we can get to the hotel safely, and Colonel Parr picked us up.

Mr. DORNAN. And then what hotel did they put you up at?

Ms. MANDRA. We put ourselves up. It cost us \$10,000 in 2 weeks, my brother and I.

Mr. DORNAN. You know, of course, you just triggered the \$10,000 figure again in my mind that Mrs. McDonald gave to some sleazeball in Mexico City. The House is going out. Ten thousand dollars the total trip cost you.

Ms. MANDRA. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. What hotel did you stay at?

Ms. MANDRA. Hotel Aerostar, I think it was called.

Mr. DORNAN. Who are the highest embassy people that tried to help you there and that you saw?

Ms. MANDRA. On the Russian side?

Mr. DORNAN. No, on our side.

Ms. MANDRA. On our side, I saw the Ambassador.

Mr. DORNAN. Who was the Ambassador then?

Ms. MANDRA. I am just trying to think. It is going back to 1993.

Mr. DORNAN. Who is after Jack Matlock?

Ms. MANDRA. Pickering.

Mr. DORNAN. Pickering is still there.

Ms. MANDRA. Pickering, I saw.

Mr. DORNAN. He is a good man. I saw him in El Salvador many times.

Ms. MANDRA. I ran ads in newspapers. I tried to get a plane to go to Ekaterinburg, which is where the gulags are.

Mr. DORNAN. Where the Czar was killed, where Francis Gary Powers was shot down, when it was called Sverdlosk.

Ms. MANDRA. Colonel Parr talked me out of it, because——

Mr. DORNAN. Who talked you out of it?

Ms. MANDRA. Colonel Parr.

Mr. DORNAN. Why?

Ms. MANDRA. Because he said that we would have to have an interpreter and a car waiting for us. He did not guarantee that I could get a car or an interpreter. He said, "What are you going to do if you land there and you do not have the means to travel around? You would need someone who knows the location." He actually, you know, put a little fear into us. We were afraid at that point. We had so much to do in the 2 weeks——

Mr. DORNAN. Why would he not volunteer to go with you, if that is why he is there?

Ms. MANDRA. They did not. They did not.

Mr. DORNAN. That is Yeltsin's hometown, as a matter of fact.

Ms. MANDRA. Congressman, it was so—we had to hire an interpreter. We had to hire a car in order to go anyplace.

Mr. DORNAN. Stop right there. Has any other family member in the room had this type of an experience?

Ms. MANDRA. No. The only other person I know that went to Moscow was Jane Reynolds Howard, but she had a Russian friend there that traveled with her so they knew the location and they knew the language, so it was much easier for her. We had to hire people in order to move around and get anyplace.

Mr. DORNAN. What hotel here was this Russian plenary session at, the Ritz Carlton?

Ms. MANDRA. We went to the Pentagon, did we not? When we met the Russians and they held the plenary, I thought it was at the—because we met them twice.

Mr. DORNAN. You see, the shift of dollars from one of those plenary sessions to a fund in Moscow to be used for relatives who are coming with the hard evidence that you had, we are talking pennies here in comparison to sending two people for a month to Monterey to learn how to be a good administrator. What are we hiring people for that are not trained to be administrators when there are people volunteering to come back on active duty with their heart and brain totally into this issue? It is just astounding.

Please finish your statement, Irene.

Ms. MANDRA. I spoke to General Volkogonov, not only Volkogonov, but Colonel Malinin——

Mr. DORNAN. In Moscow.

Ms. MANDRA [continuing]. Took a train from his town all the way—he lived outside of St. Petersburg—down to Moscow to meet me, and I showed him other pictures of Phil. I wanted to make sure. He picked out two pictures of my brother——

Mr. DORNAN. Did you say your hotel is called the Red Arrow?

Ms. MANDRA. Aerostar, I believe we stayed at.

Mr. DORNAN. The midnight train from Leningrad is called the Arrow.

Ms. MANDRA. He picked out this picture and this picture.

Mr. DORNAN. At your hotel in Moscow?

Ms. MANDRA. And he said to me that he made no mistake because he recognized—he saw him twice, once in 1963 and once in 1966. He said when he saw him the second time, he thought that he—the first time, he said, he did not look that bad but he said you could see how he aged being years in prison. And he said he made no mistake. He saw the Roman nose, the thin face, because,

he said, this man looked up at him and knew that he was looking down at him.

This man, he said, was all by himself, circling a courtyard. He was allowed to come out of his cell just a few minutes——

Mr. DORNAN. What was the general's job and rank when he saw your brother?

Ms. MANDRA. The colonel?

Mr. DORNAN. The colonel, I mean.

Ms. MANDRA. He was supposed to be with the, I thought the MVD, and he was a colonel

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Ms. MANDRA. Yes, and he said that he and his wife, his first wife, started to find out about all the atrocities that were going on at that time and he said he never forgot this boy all these years because it bothered him. He asked the commandant of the prison, "Who is he?" And the commandant said, "Oh, he was just sent to me from the camps. He is an American spy." In Moscow, in Russia, you are an American spy no matter what you do.

My brother was a sergeant, the head of a fire team. He was no spy. Why they called him a spy, I do not know. But you have to remember, knowing my brother, he was a 21-year-old kid, a strict Catholic. He was an altar boy as a child. He would never accept communism ideology, and if they tried to push that down his throat, or you could have your freedom if you either spied for us or joined the Russian Army, my brother would not go for any of this, so I think——

Mr. DORNAN. Your brother does not have the technical background as somebody they would have lusted to keep.

Ms. MANDRA. No.

Mr. DORNAN. However, suppose he was taken for the medical experiments and he was somebody they never got around to. They shut down the thing. Somebody had normal human guilt kick in and then they said, well, what do we do with this last survivor? Well, send him over to that camp, and he shows up, a nondistinguished prisoner, as far as any technical background is concerned. And let us say the general was forcing his memory and he was being kind to you and he was seeing things that his subconscious wanted him to see. He still saw somebody.

Ms. MANDRA. That is what I kept telling them.

Mr. DORNAN. Even if it was not your brother.

Ms. MANDRA. Even if the Department of Defense says to me, "This is not Philip Mandra," but it was an American boy in that courtyard who was segregated and who was being called an American spy and it behooves my Government to find out not only who that boy was, but there were three other boys that were hanging out a window yelling, "I am an American. I am an American."

Mr. DORNAN. To the colonel?

Ms. MANDRA. To the colonel. Now, he could not get close enough, because they were way up, to identify the boys that were yelling at him, but all this testimony came out in 1993 when we spoke to Colonel Malinin. This is why I had to make the trip. I wanted to speak with this man, and at that time, they said he was—in fact, that is part of my speech.

Mr. DORNAN. This is December 1993 when you were there?

Ms. MANDRA. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Please read that.

Ms. MANDRA. I have here, I would like the members of the State Department, the Department of Defense, and this committee and the White House to put themselves into the shoes of our boys, our prisoners of the Korean war. Please, let us get motivated to change present protocol before our POW's are starved or tortured or suffer even one more moment in prison or captured.

Communication with DPMO is better than previously, but it must improve. DPMO's office organizational skills are lacking. Faxes are still being misplaced. Mail is not being answered in a timely fashion. Information given by family members is not reviewed unless requested several times. Trust has been lost. How can the old task force have a turnaround period of less than a day but under DPMO there is no turnaround, there is no responsiveness?

Congressman, how do we as Americans continue to give China most favored nation status for trade purposes, yet accept and, in essence, reward China for her refusal to answer questions on the Korean war? The Chinese were in charge of the POW camps. How do we justify billions of dollars to Russia when the Russian side of the commission actually goes out to intimidate and harass any Russian individual who attempts to bear witness to the capture and captivity of our boys? The Russians' cooperation is minimal.

We spend billions of dollars in aid for illegal aliens, foreign aid, humanitarian efforts, yet all the while we are denying our task force essential personnel. We currently have two investigators in the field in Russia. We originally had six. Visualize the mass we call Russia. Now, how do we expect two men to canvas one of the largest countries with no other support group?

The White House gave \$2,500 per Russian soldier to aid and assist them to build their own housing under the Russian Officer Re-settlement Program. Why not restructure those moneys to give back the life of our U.S. soldiers? Let us follow leads promptly, return phone calls in a timely fashion, respond to legitimate faxes, help us to obtain documents, hire more analysts, and hire responsive personnel, not bureaucrats. Think about hiring an outside corporation like the RAND Corp., if need be, to do analytical work. We have done it before.

Stop the denial process. Begin the responsive process. Colonel Stuart Harrington and Ralph Peters from the original task force made a video containing various proofs, testimonials, and other data. Included in this video was the testimony by a Chinese colonel that he himself turned Americans over to the Russians. At a later date, Peter Tsouras, an analysts from the original task force, wrote a 77-page booklet on the investigation, findings, and proof which led to the same conclusions, that American servicemen indeed were sent to the gulags. Ed Ross tried to classify—

Mr. DORNAN. Excuse me 1 second, Irene. Do you have that 77-page booklet?

Ms. MANDRA. Yes. In fact—

Mr. DORNAN. Do the other family members?

Ms. MANDRA. We sent it over to Al Santoli.

Mr. DORNAN. OK. He has it.

Ms. DUNTON. I do not have it with me today, but I have it.

Ms. MANDRA. I have it, too.

Mr. DORNAN. At this point, to tell you the truth, I am being overwhelmed by this, because I have so many duties here, but Mr. Santoli is coming in weekends with his Vietnamese-American wife. He has interns volunteering to help him. He is burning the midnight oil here. We are getting so much material that—you know, all Westerners use this expression, the tip of an iceberg, and even the story that Ambassador Toon told about Dunham, how his body washed up on the shore from the plane shot down, from a ring. It is the tip of an iceberg.

Ambassador Toon indicated that he was making all these statements as he traveled around on a Government taxpayer airplane, which I perfectly understand his asking for, given the poor state of Aeroflot in that country, but I just find out from Dino, going over to vote, that Senator Smith was the one who said, put an ad in Red Star newspaper, and it was the Russian responding to the Red Star newspaper ad. Now, if Ambassador Toon knew that, he forgot it, and that is what caused the man to come forward, and maybe the rest of the story is accurate, asked for some money or something, and then he says, "That is stolen property," and got the story out and brought this one set of remains home.

Since it is only one, it is very easy to do the arithmetic. How much have we spent on all of this? That is the price to get that one funeral somewhere in the United States on this officer Dunham.

Ms. MANDRA. The testimony by the Chinese colonel that he, himself, turned Americans over to the Russians. At a later date, Peter Tsouras, an analyst from the original task force, wrote a 77-page booklet on the investigation, findings, and proof, which led to the same conclusions, that American servicemen, indeed, were sent to the gulags. Ed Ross tried to classify this 77-page report but family members already had copies, so they could not.

Let us stop the madness. Let us stop the coverup. Let us fix the problem. We currently have another Russian citizen who claims that he personally was in a hospital—he was hospitalized with my brother. Because of his statement, we must interview seven Russian individuals. At present, we are still waiting for the Russians to cooperate. Let us not forget the patriotism of the Korean war veterans who were called upon to fight one of the bloodiest wars this Nation had to face, as well as the pilots and their crew from the cold war, who were the epitome of courage and bravery.

I know the Department of Defense has a difficult job, a tough job. I do not expect miracles, but it was done before by the original task force, so it could be done again. My brother and every POW has rights. Let this committee enforce their rights. I know that we cannot give the prisoners of war back their lives, but they have a right to live in a world without bars and shackles and chains, to come home and see their country once more and to be with their families. They have a God-given right to freedom. Let us find them. Congressman, let us honor our dead but let us bring back the living. Thank you.

[Applause.]

Mr. DORNAN. Thank you, Irene.

Mr. Paul Cole, your statement and then we will go to questions.

**STATEMENT OF PAUL COLE, RESEARCHER AND FORMER DOD
ARCHIVIST IN RUSSIA AND EAST EUROPE**

Mr. COLE. I will keep this brief. I am here to talk about how one does Korean war POW/MIA research. In my view, the type of research that would establish the criteria established by the Korea/Cold War Family Association of the Missing is a relatively straightforward task. My purpose is to describe how these cases can be researched in United States and foreign archives.

Since the BBC program has been mentioned a number of times, I feel compelled to say two things. I brought a copy of it, which I would be happy to submit for the record. I do not know if—

Mr. DORNAN. No, no, I will take a look at it.

Mr. SANTOLI. We can show it to the DPMO analysts, if they have not seen it.

Mr. COLE. Which they have had, by the way. When they said today they had not seen it, I was flabbergasted.

Mr. DORNAN. Wait. Most people said they had not seen this documentary yesterday. Refresh my memory, Mr. Santoli or Mr. Chapla. Going left to right, did not—yes, none of them, starting with Mr. Gray all the way down the line, nobody had seen it. Colonel Curt Young in the back had not seen it. We said we would get him a copy. And today, Ambassador Toon said he saw it, which surprised me.

Mr. COLE. Yes. I did not produce this film. I participated in it, and that is one of the things I want to say for the record, is I am now working for the BBC on another program as a result of this, so I am still working with them. But copies of this were provided to DPMO and I know that people there have seen it, because a lot of the material DPMO traded information with the—

Mr. DORNAN. Have you ever read the book—I have not—called, "Kiss the Boys Goodbye"?

Ms. MANDRA. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Was a documentary made out of that video?

Mr. SANTOLI. No. "We Can Keep You Forever" was the documentary.

Mr. DORNAN. "We Can Keep You Forever", which is an actual line that many POW's who have survived told me they used on them. "We can keep you forever, so you had better do what we"—that is what they basically said to Colonel Bud McHuron. "The war is ending. They do not even know we have you. They do not know you are alive. We can keep you forever," and that is part of the way they broke him.

Mr. COLE. I am also submitting materials for the record that I have to stress were in the public domain prior to my appearance today. I obtained a lot of archive material from the Soviet Union that, in contrast to what Ambassador Toon said today, that there is no classified material, DPMO has received materials from the Russian side of the joint commission and classified them in this country. I obtained the same, in some cases, more complete copies of the same archive materials from Russia and I have them in my bag right here and I provided those to DPMO to show them the

contrast between what the Russians were giving them and what—

Mr. DORNAN. Who do you think looked at it?

Mr. COLE. I was told by—I will not use his name here—a source I trust at DPMO, since I used to be a consultant to them. He said that nobody looked at them.

Mr. DORNAN. Wow.

Mr. COLE. Congressman, there is something that is missing here. The ground rules that Ambassador Toon agreed to when the United States-Russian Joint Commission was established, and I was a so-called technical consultant. I was in Moscow in March 1992 when this commission began. Remember, I had a research team that had been at work for 3 months in the archives when this commission was created, so I knew the scene.

Ambassador Toon agreed to two ground rules. The first one was that there would be no independent research used by the commission. The second ground rule was, the United States could not take the initiative to interview anyone in Russia without first informing the Russian side of the joint commission.

So this meant, as I found out, and I will give you an example in my statement here, of archive material that was obtained by independent sources in Moscow that pertained directly to American POW's in Korea submitted to DOD, to DPMO, and in many cases, was never used because it violated so-called, as Mr. Norm Kass put it to me once upon a time, it violated the spirit of the commission.

Let me just blow through this statement.

Mr. DORNAN. He has been over to Moscow.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. It violated the spirit of the commission.

Mr. COLE. Yes. I can give you so many examples like this from my own first-hand experience. I can give you an example—let me go through this and then—

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. Go ahead.

Mr. COLE. I sort of gave some thought to this and it sort of works if I read it.

Mr. DORNAN. All right.

Mr. COLE. Since 1991, I have organized and have been the principal investigator for three separate research projects lasting 2½ years relating to Korean war POW/MIA issues. The Office of the Secretary of Defense retained me for these projects, in part, because of a DOD finding in 1991 that the Office of the Secretary of Defense did not have adequate expertise or resources to conduct archive research in United States or foreign archives. A short summary of my work for DOD is attached to my formal statement.

These projects began in 1991.

Mr. DORNAN. Was Dick Cheney aware of this, or below, maybe?

Mr. COLE. You are getting ahead of me again. I went to Russia with an introduction from Secretary Cheney in his own handwriting.

Mr. DORNAN. All right. Go ahead.

Mr. COLE. The motivation for the first project was the anticipation that the United States and North Korea would engage in bilateral negotiations. Thus, POW/MIA issues had to be addressed. I was also asked to prepare a remains joint recovery strategy, which

is why I have some opinions about the one that they have planned now.

The general purpose of these OSD-sponsored projects was to determine the fates of World War II, cold war, and Korean war POW/MIA's through archive research. Included in these projects was the task to determine if any POW's or MIA's from any conflict had been transported to but not repatriated from the Sino-Soviet bloc.

Following the award of the first OSD contract in 1991, I initiated an archive research project in the United States, in the Soviet Union, and a smaller effort in Sweden. The joint archive project, which preceded by 3 months the creation of the United States-Russian Joint Commission, was approved by the Soviet Minister of Defense, Marshal Shaposhnikov, and by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. In 1992, the first project, which focused on Soviet military archives, was so successful it was extended by OSD for an entire year. My three-volume report, "POW/MIA Issues," deriving from these projects was published by RAND in 1994.

I have also organized and managed archive research related to Korean war issues in the Federal Republic of Germany, including archives of the former German Democratic Republic, their military archives, and their secret police or Stasi files, and also KGB archives in four former republics of the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. My seven-volume report deriving from research in the KGB and Stasi archives was submitted to DPMO in 1994. I brought some examples of it.

The content of all these studies was studied, reviewed, edited, and approved for release by the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DPMO.

Results are possible, but from time to time, we need to remind ourselves what we are doing. It is easy to lose track of what is important when servicemen are reduced to objects, such as BNR's, and the families become so-called PNKO's. We are not looking for things; we are looking for people. The purpose of Korean war POW/MIA research is to help people find information about other people. If that is the task, then results are possible.

But in order to be effective, research should be organized only after a family expresses what they want to know about a POW/MIA case. Prior to that, one can only guess what a family wants to know. Since families are entitled to answers that match their level of interest, I think that is a logical place to start. Family interest ranges from none at all to the belief that a missing man is still alive and everything in between.

The circumstances of loss framed by these two polarities are not evenly distributed. More men remain unrecovered from POW camp cemeteries, that is about 2,100, than were transported to the USSR. In my view, that is about 35. More men murdered after capture remain unrecovered, that is about 950, than were unrecovered from marked, isolated burial sites, about 575. And more men remain unrecovered from temporary military cemeteries, about 500, than might have died in aircraft crashes, about 400. So the circumstances of individual loss vary greatly.

Thus, the utility of different archive holdings varies according to the circumstances of loss. The type of information the family requires varies, as well. Each case is a custom job, you could say, but

similar cases can be addressed with similar methodological techniques and similar sources.

At the end of the day, Korean war POW/MIA cases will be resolved by research, not by politics, but access to the archives is a political act in any country.

A brief word about the utility of U.S. records. The historical record of Korean war POW/MIA information is extensive and the level of detail is precise. Parenthetically, I strongly disagree with DPMO when they allege that the record is flawed.

Mr. DORNAN. That the record is what?

Mr. COLE. Flawed.

Mr. DORNAN. Absolutely.

Mr. COLE. The quantity and quality of existing information in U.S. archives alone is adequate to answer questions relating to perhaps 95 percent of the remaining POW/MIA cases.

In my experience, most families want to know what happened. Recovery of remains or expectations that anyone is alive are found less frequently. For the families who would be satisfied to know the circumstances of loss, information and details contained in U.S. archives are usually more than sufficient to satisfy their inquiries.

For example, of the approximately 5,000 POW/MIA's who died but were not recovered from marked graves, crash sites, and battlefields above the 38th Parallel, U.S. archives can provide detailed information on the circumstances of death for over 4,500. The circumstances of death for over 4,100 men lost above the 38th Parallel were witnessed by repatriated American POW's and over 400 more were thought to have perished in air crashes. The other 550 cases either have no geographic coordinates—loss at sea, that sort of thing—or no repatriated eyewitnesses could provide information.

In addition, using modern techniques derived since 1954, there is a good chance that a majority of the 866 Americans buried as unidentified in the Punch Bowl Cemetery in Honolulu could be identified. We could, in other words, recover the remains of up to 866 American servicemen without any assistance from China, North Korea, or the Soviet Union. We could do this using U.S. archives, U.S. scientific methods, and we do not even have to leave the United States.

Mr. DORNAN. Wow.

Mr. COLE. In my view, information derived from U.S. archives would satisfy many, perhaps the majority, of families. Since the circumstances of loss for over 4,500 can be derived from U.S. sources, I think it is a good place to start.

A brief word about the utility of Soviet records. Soviet military records in Russian custody have been proven to contain information concerning unrepatriated and unrecovered American POW's and MIA's. I attached something that I call my "Moscow Report" to my formal statement, where you can see how this archive information can be related to specific individual cases.

Records of the Soviet KGB, on the other hand, have turned up a great deal of information on imprisoned Americans who held dual citizenship, but thus far have not revealed any information on Korean war POW/MIA's. I should stress, however, that KGB records in Russian custody have yet to be examined. The only KGB records I have seen, I have obtained from Ukraine, Latvia, Lithuania, and

Estonia. I have been in the KGB archives looking through the boxes myself, but not in Russia.

In 1991, the late General Dimitri Volkogonov promised that up to three American researchers would be given access to Soviet military archives. No governmental research group has ever placed American researchers in Soviet military archives. When Volkogonov made this promise, which was never kept, my research team was already at work on Soviet military records under the terms of the Shaposhnikov-Cheney agreement. Our group successfully located a number of valuable records, but eventually, access was denied to these archives by Russian authorities.

I should add, in contrast to what Ambassador Toon said today, he referred to my archive research team as "disruptive and out of control".

Mr. DORNAN. You must have been surprised to hear today how highly he thought of you.

Mr. COLE. Yes, that is a good way to put it.

Mr. DORNAN. Disruptive and out of control.

Mr. COLE. Yes, and this also was part of the problem, that it was an independent research effort that had to be shut down, as he put it. On the April 9, 1992, meeting of the U.S. side, the commissioners, the minutes of that meeting are very clear. Toon complained to RAND, where I was working at the time, that this effort was ruining their commission.

Mr. DORNAN. And this is Bataan Death March Day 1992 and George Bush is President.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And Toon is complaining. Toon was appointed by George Bush to this.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And he is complaining that very day, in what words again, about RAND? He complained to RAND?

Mr. COLE. That the independent archive research that was under my supervision in Moscow was "disruptive and out of control." This came from a complaint that he received from Volkogonov, because what I did, if I can be immodest for a second, I went to Moscow and tried to find the best archivist in Russia and I put him to work. When the commission was put to work, they had the B team.

Mr. DORNAN. You had the A team.

Mr. COLE. Yes. Guess who did not like it.

Mr. DORNAN. The B team. But Volkogonov is the one who complained to Toon?

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. So he was not all this splendid person that he pretended to be until he died.

Mr. COLE. No.

Mr. DORNAN. Well, he is Communist, but I thought he was a guilt-ridden communist.

Mr. COLE. No. But the point is that Soviet military archives—

Mr. DORNAN. Then the loss of him meeting his maker in December of last year is not as terrible as I thought, then.

Mr. COLE. Since we are on the subject, just let me tell you a sidebar story to Volkogonov. There were a few things that I was forced to cut out of my RAND report. Some, you disagree with, it is edi-

torial stuff and some people just do not get it and you think you are such a great writer and they just do not understand, but you go along with it.

But one to this day that sticks in my craw is I had the documents on how Volkogonov was selling archive material to Korean journalists under the name of the newspaper. I knew the record groups. To my satisfaction, this was a clear thing and the position of Task Force Russia was, the only issue is what hand does he take the money with. That is what I was told. Well, I had to cut this out of my report.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. COLE. You will see that I sort of hint at it in this very dark and vague way, which you can sort of figure it out. But that is the kind of environment.

Then they had a deal with a British publisher to sell microfilm copies of these archives. Why should they give them to the Americans for free, for goodness sake?

I am almost finished here. The point is, the utility of Soviet military archives in Russian custody, they contain information that tells the story of how American servicemen died in Soviet custody, how Soviet officers witnessed the deaths of Americans or located and in some cases photographed the remains of Americans. The daily operational reports of the Soviet 64th Air Corps, which they had a combat regiment at Endol, are particularly valuable. The American side of the United States-Russian Joint Commission has requested these documents repeatedly but my team was the only source of them.

Full stop, my team obtained—I have not brought them today—another folder full of these daily operational summaries, which I offered to Norm Kass and he would not take them because he said the commission did not accept documents from independent researchers. So they have been sitting for 2 years.

Mr. DORNAN. But then you heard Mr. Kass say today that he thinks outside sources are essential. Was that not the word he used?

Mr. COLE. We will have to revisit that, obviously. But Soviet military records contain information about Americans found dead in crash sites, photographs of Americans found dead by Soviet search teams, and unrepatriated Americans who were interrogated by Soviet intelligence. Also, the identify of unrepatriated Americans shot down by Soviet aircraft and the identity of crashed United States Air Force aircraft located by Soviet service teams can be derived from these materials. I attached my "Moscow report," as I call it, as an illustration. I also include a couple of these daily operational summaries.

This report demonstrates the utility of Soviet military records and how this information can be related to individual American POW/MIA cases. Soviet veterans are also a valuable source of information concerning American POW/MIA's.

Finally, the utility of other archives. In my view, in contrast to what we heard early today, and I know there are a number of people in this room who would disagree with me, and I am aware of this, I think there is little to be gained from other archives. At the

very least, we should concentrate our efforts on archives whose utility has been proven.

The archives of the People's Republic of China have not been proven to have information related to POW/MIA's. I did an investigation a few years ago, trying to find out through academic circles how we could crack the code on Chinese military archives that might have some utility for this and the answer was, not in a million years.

No one has yet to prove that the North Koreans made——

Mr. DORNAN. One second, Dr. Cole. Meaning there might be something there, but we are never going to get to it.

Mr. COLE. It would be an enormous effort. This is a recipe for making a lot of trips to Beijing and having banquets and toasts and all this kind of stuff, and your archives and our archives and that sort of thing. I have never liked that approach. At the end of the day, you sit down with a box of documents, you have some serious butt time, and you turn the pages. That is how you make progress in archive research, and you have to negotiate it on the worker bee level.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. COLE. It is only the worker bees who are going to be able to do it.

And the North Koreans, to describe them as vassals during the Korean war is probably to give them a bit of credit. They lifted things and they built roads and they carried stuff. I do not think they ever put pen to paper about the Americans that they were murdering after they captured. Why would they——

Mr. DORNAN. This is the Chinese you are talking about?

Mr. COLE. The North Koreans.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, the North Koreans, right.

Mr. COLE. So until we see that this North Korean museum that we are talking about——

Mr. DORNAN. What about the camera crews that took the excellent film footage that you directed me to in the archives?

Mr. COLE. I bet you it was Russians. That is just an intuitive feeling. North Koreans are not making films of people they capture. This is Tass stuff. This is KGB. This is GRU. And a lot of this material was probably captured when we overran the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. DORNAN. Right, because it is not identified precisely where it came from.

Mr. COLE. No, and we will never know, probably. But the North Koreans, in addition to everything else, they were dirt poor. Are they going to spend money on a movie camera? Even the propaganda films of Kim Il-song had a Russian, and all that sort of thing that I have found in the archives thus far have a clear Russian providence.

Mr. DORNAN. Actually, I looked up the other night, we took Pyongyang around October 20–21, 1950.

Mr. COLE. Yes, 1950.

Mr. DORNAN. So that was pretty quick turnaround from Inchon on September 15. A month and a few days later, bing, we had Pyongyang and we are on our way north. So yes, that could have come out of the Soviet——

Mr. COLE. The military intelligence had organized—I have the documents at home, I did not bring those with me today—there was an organized effort to collect all of the Soviet material that we could lay our hands on in Pyongyang, the assumption being that soldiers would not pay much attention to it, so they had to organize special units to recognize the material and that sort of thing.

Mr. DORNAN. One thought on other archives. The infamous march down the street in Hanoi of pilots they had captured up to that point, which were not that many, although dozens, July 6, 1966. In the still photographs that were released by Hanoi of the pilots walking down the street in twos, handcuffed together, you see in the background many Caucasian faces, including one that I thought I could identify as an Indian, Delhi, cameraman, Bulgarians, who knows what, East Germans. There are many cameramen with 16-mm cameras filming this march until the crowd got out of control and started to seriously hurt some of them and then they all ran for the soccer stadium and slammed the doors and did not have their rally. They had overinflamed the crowd.

Where is all that film from all these East European countries rallying to the cause of Hanoi early in the Vietnam air war? It is somewhere to turn up, and certainly there must be some Russian film of that.

Mr. COLE. Yes. I can give one brief insight to that. I did not work on Vietnam. It was not defined as an archive project by the Department of Defense when I got into the picture. We did do a search of the motion picture archives, of the Soviet military archives just outside of Moscow, and our researchers reported to us that most of it had been gone through and there were entire boxes missing. So someone sanitized it.

Mr. DORNAN. And that is one thing they would want to sanitize, is Vietnam footage.

Mr. COLE. Yes, and Korea stuff, too. This was, once again, part of the Commission's methodology. They told the Russians they wanted to look at the motion picture archives, gave them time to go there, sanitize it, and then they came.

Mr. DORNAN. This is something I meant to ask Ambassador Toon. He would have considered it hostile. That is why he said he hoped it did not go too badly today. But he is leaving. He kind of captured me when he said he would be 80 July 4. But this is what has to stop, not only saying that independent work is anything other than the way Norm Kass characterized it, essential, but to stop this telegraphing our punches, spooking them is the right word, and causing them to pick up a phone, as our CIA would do here if somebody was coming over and saying, "You know something, they are going to get into this Howard Hunt stuff of the CIA, the rogue elephant crap. Do not let them see that stuff. Seal it off. Get that out of there," and there goes a lost opportunity.

Mr. COLE. I can give you a concrete example of how this works, in addition to the fact that it is not just my observation. The Senate Select Committee had testimony about how the Russian side of the joint commission would get the witnesses and intimidate them and all this sort of stuff. One of my consultants had a very shadowy figure come up to him and he said, "You are working too close-

ly with the Americans. It would be easy to push you in front of a car." And he looked at him and he said, "Try it."

Mr. DORNAN. You mean one of your Russian associates, your A team of archivists?

Mr. COLE. Yes. He knew who it was. He was a local figure.

A fellow who was in Moscow with Task Force Russia—I am going to have to be careful here, because he told me—this was one of these things where he was not really supposed to be doing what he was doing—he did not like this rule about tipping the Russians off to what we wanted to do. He was a Russian speaker. He said, every time they went to a prison camp, he said he could tell that the card files, the prisoner files had been gone through. Now, you know that from going into the archives. If someone—even with your in-box, if someone jumbles the papers, you can tell it. But this happened time-and-time again.

The first time I met Ambassador Toon was before we went to Moscow in March of 1992 when I said, "Do not tell them the names of who you are looking for. It is a bad idea. Just tell them you want to find Americans and see what you get." Well, that showed my naivete and he understood the Russian mind. So they gave him a list of names. This is who we are looking for. And the Russians asked, please, give us all the names.

Well, the person responsible for going to the prison camps told me that he was ordered to tell them in advance that he was going, he said, but what they did not say, what his orders did not forbid was he had a list of people that we knew had been in the gulag but came out, repatriated gulag prisoners.

He says, on the list of the people that he was ordered to look for, he never found one. But on his private list of people he knew had been there, he found 85 percent.

Mr. DORNAN. Sanitized.

Mr. COLE. Oh, of course. You know that old Russian phrase that goes, "It never happened, and besides, it was a long time ago"?

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. COLE. That is at work here. But my point is that even under the conditions we are talking about, we know where the records are. We know what they contain. It is a question of how well we want to, I do not want to say exploit the archives, how well we use them.

Let me finish with one example.

Mr. DORNAN. Then I am going to ask you the question I interrupted Irene with. Where do we go from here? Where do you think, in your opinion, we should go?

Mr. COLE. Just let me give you one example about this independent research stuff. In 1993, and I will not use names here, but it is documented well if you want to know the details, my research team in Moscow uncovered documents relating to an American pilot who was being interrogated and transported by Soviets in Korea. In this report from the Soviets, it gives the date of the man's death. It just says, "Died during transport. We could not complete the interrogation."

I sent these documents to DPMO in 1993. The next of kin got the documents in 1993, as well. The United States-Russian Joint Commission never accepted those documents as evidence. What

they did accept from the Russians and is in the record is two partial documents that were cut, pasted together so clumsily you could almost see the paper crossing, and presented as a single document. But because it came from the Russians, that was OK. They could accept that. The full text of the documents that my group had uncovered were never accepted by the DPMO or the Commission as evidence.

Mr. DORNAN. Explain to me, they do not accept it. What does that mean?

Mr. COLE. The answer I got was, I said, well, how do you make this determination, and the answer I got back was, "Some things we take and some things we do not." Only at the insistence of a family member were these complete documents ever put in the casualty file, and to this day, they have never been officially put into the casualty file. When a family member asked DPMO, why is it taking over 2 years, the answer was, "It was a bureaucratic oversight." That is a direct quote.

We can all sit around and tell horror stories about DPMO and all that kind of stuff. You can travel the world over and never find a monument built to a commission. In my view, just as a private citizen and so forth, I do not think the Government has any business being in the research business. Doing this sort of analysis, yes, but research, no. The Department of Defense realized that in 1991. They said, we do not do archive work, and over the past 5 years, they have proven that they do not do archive work. They knew that very well.

[Laughter.]

Mr. COLE. So the long and the short of this is, look, this is not—take this in the right way—this is not brain surgery. Archive research is a matter of finding boxes and going through the documents, finding the evidence. But if we focus all the efforts on we are going to go to an F-80 crash site in North Korea and dig it up, why? I have in my documents here, I can tell you who died there. I can tell you down to a space about as big as this area here where that plane crashed. But on the other hand, I can tell you the names of almost 3,000 U.S. servicemen who are left in marked graves by the Graves Registration Service.

So the approach just does not make any sense to me. This is not a research strategy.

Mr. DORNAN. Let me ask you this. I meant to ask this of Ambassador Toon. I will submit it to him in writing, but then again, it is speculative. Is it possible, given that they are allied at one time formerly, allied Asian Communist nations, that North Koreans would walk across the street—I asked something similar to this—to the Ambassador from the People's Republic of Vietnam to North Korea and say, "Tell us how you deal with the Americans in crash sites. How do you get the money out of them? What is the potential for money and how do you do this?"

Mr. COLE. I do not have to even make a hypothetical answer to that, or I would never try to guess what Ambassador Toon would say. I was hired to answer that question in 1991. Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Carl Ford said—

Mr. DORNAN. A good man.

Mr. COLE. Oh, I had a great time working with him. I really enjoyed it. But that is a parenthetical.

He said, make a comparison between the way that the Vietnamese are exploiting the remains issue and the North Koreans. He says, take a look at it and come back and tell me if there are any similarities. So I looked into it and I got into an area that I do not claim any expertise on whatsoever, forensic anthropology. But I looked and held, physically held in my hands, quite a few of the remains that we obtained and identified from Vietnam and I saw the records that the Vietnamese turned over with them.

They show classic signs of French education, forensic anthropology. The notes are in French. The notation system is right out of the textbooks. These are educated people who are dealing with these remains. In one case, they are numbered. In one case, I saw a set of remains that had been hanging in some guy's doctors office for a while.

Mr. DORNAN. No, it was in a medical museum——

Mr. COLE. A medical museum.

Mr. DORNAN. A medical school in Vinh.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. They could see the little holes drilled in all the pilot's bones.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Do you know the sidebar story to that?

Mr. COLE. No.

Mr. DORNAN. They told the family this. They bit the bullet and said, "Your son's bones hung in a medical school for x-number of years, all wired together, and was used in this class as American remains," and the family grieves over that. The father gnashes his teeth. He passes on and then they come back to the family and say, "Excuse me, we were wrong. It was not your son," and then they have to go tell the other family that it was your son. I mean, that is the kind of screw-up that went on in the early years.

Mr. COLE. There is one example after the other of that sort of thing.

The point that I am trying to make here is that the Vietnamese who dealt with these remains showed a certain level of anthropological sophistication derivative from France. It was not their own. You could say that they learned how to deal with remains from the French.

Then we go to Korea. Five years ago, you look at the condition of the remains, and I document this in my RAND report. It is the first place, by the way, that any photographs have ever been published. It is an oddball thing, that——

Mr. DORNAN. From Korea.

Mr. COLE. Korea. The Department of Defense will not allow these bones to be photographed, they say for privacy reasons, but I can go out to the National Archives and see film by name of Korean war KIA's being embalmed.

Mr. DORNAN. That are identifiable. I saw those.

Mr. COLE. Yes. I can do that, but I cannot publicize these remains that the North Koreans appear to be obtaining from ancestor worship yards.

The point here is, the North Koreans showed absolutely no training, no sophistication, no nothing. I spent a lot of time with the last East German Ambassador to Pyongyang trying to understand his experience in Pyongyang and what was going on here. He just looked at me and with this—kind of laughed and said, “Dr. Cole, if you want bones, they will give you bones.” He says, “That is the way they look at it.”

So I cannot stress strongly enough that there was absolutely no similarity between the Vietnamese exploitation of these remains and the North Korean 5 years ago.

I do know, and no one ever told me this was classified—maybe it is—but I was told the North Vietnamese charged a site visit, to go visit a crash site, the price tag was \$450,000.

Mr. DORNAN. North Vietnam or North Korea?

Mr. COLE. North Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. North Vietnam?

Mr. COLE. North Vietnam. Well, Vietnam.

Mr. DORNAN. They charged \$450,000?

Mr. COLE. Yes, just to go visit the site. Up until a couple years ago, remains obtained from Korea, there was never any question of compensation or anything. In my own view, the fact that the DPMO announced that they are going to go visit a crash site, we have taught the North Koreans how to exploit us.

Mr. DORNAN. That is the answer to my question.

Mr. COLE. Five years ago, they were clueless. We have told them how to do it. We paid them almost \$1 million for remains that have no scientific relationship to Americans. Their own scientists at CILHI, and I commissioned a study from the two heads, the two forensic anthropologists—

Mr. DORNAN. But as I was corrected by one of the colonels in uniform yesterday, “Oh, no, we do all this in Hanoi now. It does not happen in Hawaii. They do not get the free trip to Hawaii any longer.”

Mr. COLE. It may be.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. COLE. But the point I am trying to get across here is, once again, facts are stubborn things and research is research.

Mr. DORNAN. Then we do not get skulls.

Mr. COLE. From North Korea?

Mr. DORNAN. From Vietnam. There are no more skulls from Vietnam. It is all chips now.

Mr. COLE. No. North Korea, the only thing we get are big bones. There is never any screening. It is so consistent. I had an anthropologist look at these North Korean bones and he said, “You know what this looks like? This looks like stuff that was collected from Indian reservations in the 1930s by WPA.” He says, “It is the same thing.” If you just send people out to look for bones, they see a skull and go, hey, look, pick it up. It breaks the mandible off.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. COLE. Eighty-five percent of the remains we get back from North Korea have the face smashed out. That is where you can tell race. The remains are older—and I tried to explain this to somebody at DPMO once. Statistics can be useful, particularly if you do a distribution of one population, you look at the standard devi-

ations, and if you go back and take another sample, random sample from that population, it should have the same distribution.

I took where the North Koreans said they found these remains and looked up who was lost there, which Americans died in that area. We can document that. I put together the distribution by height and by age and then made the same distribution by height and age of the remains that the North Koreans say they found there. The average age of the American lost in these areas was 22 years. The average age of what the North Koreans turned over was almost 30 years old. The average height—you know, Americans tend to be taller than Asians on average—was about 5 feet 10 inches. The average height of these remains from North Korea was down around 5'6", 5'7" inches.

So I said, look, you are paying them \$1 million for these bones that they got out of ancestor worship jars.

Mr. DORNAN. So they are Korean bones and that is why there are no skulls.

Mr. COLE. No; we get skulls from Korea. We get lots of skulls, but the faces are smashed out. The mandibles are missing.

Mr. DORNAN. Right, though you can separate an African heritage by the back of the skull and by the thickness of the skull, but an Asian, it is by the facial area?

Mr. COLE. It is the Mongolian features.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cole follows:]

MEMORANDUM

To: Mr. Norman D. Kass, DPMO

From: Dr. Paul M. Cole, Vice President for Government Programs, Defense Forecasts, Inc.

Subject: This memorandum transmits and lists the Soviet era archives obtained by DFI.

Date: March 17, 1994

Background

This section summarizes the origins of the archive research effort which produced the Soviet era documents attached to this interim report to the Department of Defense Prisoner-of-War Missing-in-Action Office (DPMO).

In 1991, Dr. Paul M. Cole, now Vice President for Government Programs at Defense Forecasts, Inc. (DFI) in Washington, DC, was introduced in a letter written by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Soviet authorities as the principal researcher on a Department of Defense study of archival records relating to the loss of U.S. service members who were unrepatriated prisoners-of-war (POW) or missing-in-action (MIA) during the Korean War. (Attachment 1.) With this introduction in hand, Dr. Cole established in Moscow with the cooperation of a range of Soviet officials one of the first post-Cold War research projects focusing on the archives of the Soviet era.

In March 1992, Secretary Cheney wrote to the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov to thank him for his assistance in establishing Dr. Cole's research effort in Soviet era archives. (Attachment 2.) Secretary

Cheney wrote the following:

In December 1991, an important step was made toward the resolution of an issue that has complicated our bilateral relations for over 40 years. With your assistance, a number of your subordinates have created a procedure to examine POW/MIA issues in the former Soviet archives.

Marshal Shaposhnikov wrote in a March 1992 letter to Secretary Cheney (Attachment 3.),

I share your concern over the fate of your fellow countrymen who disappeared or perished in World War II, over the course of the Korean War, the war in Vietnam and the Cold War.

In connection to your request, work is being carried out in the archives of the military in records related to this problem.

As a result of the archival research which began under the auspices of the American Secretary of Defense and the Soviet Minister of Defense (who later became the Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces) and was continued at DFI in Washington, DC, significant findings relating to the fate of American POW-MIAs from the Korean War have been made in Soviet era archives.

The purpose of this project's archive research in Moscow was, in Secretary Cheney's words, to obtain "access to records that can help account for missing Americans." This objective was achieved successfully. Research, which was sustained for over two years, produced significant findings which respond directly to the original purpose of this project. (By agreement with DPMO, DFI's research into Soviet era archives located in Russia ended on March 31, 1994.) The information in the Soviet era documents provided in this report clearly links, without doubt or ambiguity, Soviet authorities with American POW/MIAs in the Korean War. Further, there is ample evidence that Soviet era archives contain information that can contribute to the resolution of the fates of American POW/MIAs from the Korean

War.

Formal Submission of Documents

This interim report, associated with DFI's DoD-sponsored project "POW-MIA Research in Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and Berlin," is a formal submission to the DoD/DPMO of the documents, a total of 207 pages, obtained as a result of DFI's research effort in Soviet era archives. Included in this collection are letters written by Russian citizens who reported first-hand knowledge of American citizens allegedly sighted in the Soviet Gulag system. Some of the documents included in this report were previously provided to DPMO on a background basis. The documents submitted in this report supercede those previously submitted.

The Soviet era documents as they appear in this interim report constitute DFI's formal submission of these documents to DPMO. DFI obtained these Soviet era documents under the terms of the Cheney-Shaposhnikov agreement.

These documents are not to be released before March 31, 1994.

Assessment and Conclusions

Since 1991, the U.S. government has had access to Soviet era archives through four principal sources.

- In December 1991, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker was given archive material related to POW/MIA issues by Soviet authorities. This was, apparently, a one time document transfer.

- In late March 1992, the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs was established. The archive research associated with this Commission is on-going.
- From time to time, private researchers working in Moscow obtain documents related to POW/MIA issues.
- At the request of the Department of Defense, in December 1991 the author of this study created an archive research team in Moscow. This research effort continued until March 31, 1994.

The content of the records obtained by Secretary Baker, some of the material acquired by private researchers and an unknown portion of the documents produced by the Joint Commission have been made available to the public either in full or in summaries. With the exception of President Boris Yeltsin's remarkable letter to the U.S. Senate in June 1992 regarding POW/MIA affairs, the Russian government has taken public positions on POW/MIA issues based on the documents obtained by the Russian side of the Joint Commission.

The Russian government's position may derive from the documentation which Joint Commission researchers located in Soviet era archives. (President Yeltsin's June 1992 letter on POW/MIAs, in contrast, was not supported by any primary source evidence from Soviet era archives.) Since the Joint Commission was established as a high-level government-to-government effort, it follows that Commission researchers in Moscow would focus their research effort on high-level Soviet era documentation.

This type of Soviet documentation may not contain the evidence American authorities need in order to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues. At a high level, U.S. government documents often contain little operational information. One could reasonably conclude that similar events occurred in the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1950s.

Another factor may explain why the DFI documents contain details that are not found in material obtained by Secretary Baker or located by Joint Commission researchers. In the United States, the Department of State is the government agency that most closely follows the National Archive rules with respect to marking documents for archival purposes. The three copies of documents prepared for top political leadership (President, Vice President, Secretary of State) are usually clean when submitted to the principal decisionmakers, e.g., the documents routinely have no distribution lists or routing instructions. Markings for archival purposes are added to this type of State Department document only after these documents have been read by the designees. If Soviet archivists followed similar steps, this would explain the absence of routing sheets and distribution lists on any high-level Soviet era documents provided to Secretary Baker and the Joint Commission.

The archive research that produced the records attached to this report focused on operational files at a relatively low level within the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus one finds on these documents the registration marks and classification markings, routing slips and distribution lists intact. (Some of these marks have been redacted much in the same way documents from the U.S. National Archives are sanitized for public release.) If the Joint Commission's researchers focused on searching high-level records, this could explain why detailed information contained in the records obtained by DFI through its research team in Moscow contain information that, in some cases, contradicts the position taken by the Russian leadership.

This background may explain why the documents submitted with this report contradict the position taken by the Russian government that, among other things, Soviet forces in Korea

had no direct or systematic contact with American POW/MIAS. DFI's document collection shows, in contrast, that Soviet forces in Korea:

- Organized and maintained direct, systematic contact with American POW/MIAs from the earliest days of the war.
- Interrogated American POW/MIAs directly using Soviet personnel and indirectly through the use of North Korean and Chinese personnel.
- Deployed search teams whose mission was to locate the wreckage of American aircraft in order to transport instruments and other matériel to Soviet aerospace design and research bureaus in the USSR.
- Transported American POW/MIAs in the custody of Soviet forces, though in these documents the destinations are not named.
- Reported the results of interrogations of Americans and other data relating to American POW/MIAs to the highest levels of the Soviet government, including the Politburo.

There is much more information in these documents, but it will take more time to complete the analysis of them.

Some of the attached documents have been reduced in size in order to present them in a standard 8.5 x 11 format. Documents that show lines missing or lost characters at the end of lines were received in this form from Moscow. DFI received no originals, but only photocopies Soviet era documents.

Documents Attached To This Report

Attachment 1.

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Dr. Paul M. Cole, December 10, 1991. 1 page.

Attachment 2.

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, March 12, 1992. 1 page.

Attachment 3.

Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, March 18, 1992. 1 page.

Attachment 4.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shalin, January 13, 1951. 2 pages.

Attachment 5.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilievskii and Shtemenko, January 21, 1951. 1 page.

Attachment 6.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shtemenko, December 16, 1951. 1 page.

Attachment 7.

Telegram from Postnikov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 1 page.

Attachment 8.

Telegram from Lobov to Kigarev and Krasovski, April 26, 1952. 2 pages.

Attachment 9.

Telegram from Lobov to Vasilievski, Zhigarev and Krasovski, May 7, 1952. 6 pages.

Attachment 10.

Telegram from Bodrov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 2 pages.

Attachment 11.

Telegram from Krasovski to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page.

Attachment 12.

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Batitskii from Belov, December 17, 1950. 2 pages.

Attachment 13.

Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 31, 1950. 4 pages.

Attachment 14.

Telegram from Krasovskii to Zhigarev, November 11, 1950. 1 page.

Attachment 15.

Telegram from Merzhelikin to Schtemenko and Batitskii, November 26, 1950. 3 pages.

Attachment 16.

Telegram from Belov and Mironov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 30, 1950. 11 pages.

Attachment 17.

Fragments of interrogation records of American POWs and one Australian POW found in Soviet era archives.

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| a. Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. | 1 page. |
| b. Roland W. Parks, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| c. Charles McDonough, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| d. Frank Denstech, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| e. Edward G. Izbiky, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| f. Michael E. DeArmond, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| g. Donald W. Pinkstone, RAAF. | 2 pages. |

Attachment 18.

Complete interrogation protocol of Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 32 pages.

Attachment 19.

Partial interrogation protocol of Joseph F. Green, USAF. 6 pages.

Attachment 20.

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles W. Maulsby, USAF. 8 pages.

Attachment 21.

Complete interrogation protocol of Thomas L. Eyres, USAF. 5 pages.

Attachment 22.

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles E. Stahl, USAF. 46 pages including two maps.

Attachment 23.

Interrogation protocol cover page. 1 page.

Attachment 24.

Letter of transmittal, June 27, 1952. 1 page.

Attachment 25.

Telegram from Schtykov to Vyshinskiy, August 28, 1950. 8 pages.

Attachment 26.

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, September 7, 1950. 1 cover page plus 3 pages of text.

Attachment 27.

Telegram from Slyusarev to Bulganin and Zhigarev, December 21, 1954. 16 pages.

Attachment 28.

A collection of letters sent to Borovoy. 24 pages.

Attachment 29.

Telegram from Kasovskii to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page.



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

10 DEC 1991

Dr. Paul Cole
Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138

Dear Dr. Cole:

I am pleased to note that at the request of the Department the RAND Corporation has undertaken a study of archival records relating to the loss of U.S. Service members missing-in-action (MIA) during the Korean Conflict.

This letter should serve to introduce you as the principal researcher on this U.S. government sponsored research project, which I consider to be of the utmost importance. Though you are not a government employee, your work with RAND on this study is of great interest to us, and we sincerely hope that you will receive all assistance necessary in carrying out your research.

We will be especially appreciative of assistance by foreign governments which give you access to records that can help account for missing Americans.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, which appears to read "Dick Cheney", is located at the bottom right of the page.

МИНИСТЕРСТВО ОБОРОНЫ
ВАШИНГТОН, округ КОЛУМБИЯ

10 декабря 1991 г.

Доктору Полу Каулу
Реид Корпорейшен
Санта Моника, СА 90407-2138

Дорогой доктор Каул!

Мне представляет удовольствие отметить, что по просьбе МО Корпорация Реид осуществляет исследование архивных документов, касающихся потерь американских военнослужащих, без вести пропавших во время Корейского конфликта.

Это письмо должно представить Вас как основного исполнителя исследовательского проекта, выполняемого по заданию правительства США и которое, по моему мнению, представляет исключительную важность. Хотя Вы и не являетесь государственным служащим Ваша работа по данному исследованию осуществляемая в рамках корпорации Реид, представляет для нас большой интерес. Мы искренне надеемся, что Вы получите всю необходимую помощь для продолжения Ваших исследований.

Мы особенно высоко ценим помощь иностранных правительств, которые помогут Вам получить доступ к архивным документам и эти документы помогут нам получить информацию о пропавших американцах.

Искренне министр обороны США
Дик Чейни



THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

12 MAR 1992

Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov
Commander in Chief of the C.I.S. Armed Forces
Ministerstvo Oborony K-160
Moscow,
Russia

Dear Marshal Shaposhnikov:

In December 1991, an important step was made toward the resolution of an issue that has complicated our bilateral relations for over 40 years. With your assistance, a number of your subordinates have created a procedure to examine POW/MIA issues in the former Soviet archives.

I would like to extend my thanks to Lt. General Leonid G. Ivashov for the cooperation he has extended to the RAND Corporation, under contract from the Department of Defense, to carry out this important archival research. General Ivashov has offered the services of Colonel I. I. Kotliarov as well.

Major General Anatoli Kharkov, Director of the Institute for Military History, has offered the resources and expertise of his staff. This is a welcome contribution to this effort.

Finally, I would like to commend Colonel Valery Frontov, an officer on the General Staff, for the assistance he gave to the RAND research team during their visit to Moscow. I have been told that his work was essential.

With these excellent people committed to the resolution of the POW/MIA issue, we should be able to make quick progress in our efforts. As Under Secretary Wolfowitz and you discussed, during his recent trip to Moscow, this is an issue of great importance to the U.S. government, and to all Americans. It is essential that we resolve all outstanding questions in this area. Your support will be indispensable as we work toward final resolution of this issue.

Sincerely,

Dick Cheney

Я разделяю Вашу озабоченность по установлению судьбы своих соотечественников, пропавших без вести во второй мировой войне, в ходе корейского конфликта, войны во Вьетнаме и во время "холодной войны".

Получив на положительное решение этой благородной и гуманной задачи, с получением результатов я немедленно освободил Дво.

137531 55:2471

1. مقدمة
 2. أهداف البحث
 3. أهمية البحث
 4. نطاق البحث
 5. الأساليب المستخدمة
 6. النتائج
 7. الخلاصة
 8. التوصيات
 9. المراجع
 10. ملحق

Господину Ричарду Мейну
Министру обороны США
г. Вашингтон, Д.С.

Moscow, March 18, 1992

Dear Mr. Minister:

I share your concern over the establishment of the fate of your fellow countrymen, who disappeared/perished (could be either) in World War II, over the course of the Korean War, the war in Vietnam and during the Cold War.

In connection to your request, work is being carried out in the archives of the military department on the study of documents related to this problem.

I hope for a positive outcome to this noble and humanitarian task. Upon the receipt of results, I will immediately contact you.

E. Shaposhnikov
Marshal of Aviation

**POW/MIA ARCHIVE RESEARCH PROJECT:
UKRAINE, LITHUANIA, LATVIA,
ESTONIA, AND BERLIN**

VOLUME 1: Moscow Research

By: Dr. Paul M. Cole
DFI International,
Washington, DC

**October 27, 1994
Revised February 1995**

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The views, opinions, and findings contained in this report are those of the author(s) and should not be construed as an official position, policy, or decision of the US Government or any of its agencies, unless so designated by other official documentation.

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Summary

Background

An overview of the entire project is included in the Executive Summary. Volume 1 covers DFI International's archive research in Moscow.

From October 1993 until March 31, 1994, DFI International sustained a modest archive research effort in Moscow. This parallel research, which was commissioned by DPMO to complement its support of the US-Russian Joint Commission on POW/MIAs (USRJC), was also motivated by the lack of cooperation from Russian authorities.

In accordance with DPMO's guidance, DFI's research was suspended on March 31, 1994 and all documents accumulated (ca. 200 pages) were turned over by DFI to DPMO on March 17, April 7, and June 18, 1994.

In order to ensure the provenance of the data presented in this report, information deriving from Soviet-era archives (documents) is presented in a section separate from that based on information deriving from interviews with Soviet Air Force veterans who served during the Korean War.

In accordance with the agreement between DFI and DPMO made at the final project briefing on October 18, 1994, duplicate copies of records which have already been given to DPMO are not included with this report. Archive materials which have been submitted to DPMO are considered to be part of this final report nonetheless. At the final project briefing on October 18, 1994, DPMO expressed no interest in obtaining additional archive material (interrogation records, Soviet military operational records, exploitation of POWs for propaganda purposes, etc.) from Soviet-era archives in Russia.

Photographs which were obtained in Moscow from the Tass archives are included at Appendix C. These photographs were provided in the original to DPMO on April 1, 1994.

Purpose

The purpose of the archive research in Russia was to continue to locate previously classified files and other records in order to determine whether information concerning American citizens in general and American POW/MIAs in particular is stored in Soviet era archives located in Russia.

Documents of Particular Interest

The results of DFI's research in Moscow were positive in a number of areas. The Moscow research produced Soviet era documentation of great interest to DPMO and the USRJC.

- DFI obtained documents which the Russian side of the USRJC claims do not exist in Soviet-era archives.

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- DFI obtained complete copies of documents which had been heavily and inexplicably redacted by the Russian side of the USRJC.
- DFI's research in Moscow demonstrated without question that the Russian side of the USRJC was either withholding documents or incapable or unwilling to locate in Soviet era archives.

The DFI document collection includes records of particular interest to the American side of the USRJC.

Documents located by DFI's archive research team in Moscow are considered by DPMO and Joint Commission sources to be among the most significant obtained to date. Among the many documents obtained by DFI from Soviet-era archives, two documents and one record group attracted particular attention:

- The so-called "262" document which is the final unit history of the Soviet 64th Air Corps' activities during the Korean War¹;
- Two complete documents from the Soviet archives were obtained which pertain directly to Soviet reporting concerning the death of a USAF pilot (current casualty status MIA) during the Korean War; and
- Approximately one hundred pages of handwritten daily logs of the Soviet 64th Fighter Corps detailing combat operations in Korea.

Some of DFI's documents were presented the Russian side or referred to at the Tenth Plenum Session of the USRJC.

The DFI team in Moscow obtained daily operational summaries of the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps (IAK). Daily Operational Summary reports for the Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung, China, which were obtained by DFI cover the 24 hour periods shown in Table 1.

¹ This document, which was used as Talking Point #1 at the Tenth Plenum, is also referred to by the American side of the USRJC as Telegram No. 307717/Sh, December 21, 1954. See Tenth Plenum, p. 53 and p. 82. The Russian side of the USRJC provided a version of this document to the American side.

Table 1.
Soviet 64th IAK Operational Summaries

1951	1952	1953
October 26	January 7	July 8
December 15	January 8	January 23
December 16	May 3	April 7
	May 11	April 12
	June 11	September 13
	June 21	October 18
	July 4	December 6

The operational summaries were of particular interest to the American side of the USRJC. The 64th IAK operational summaries obtained by DFI were all given to DPMO, some as early as April 1994. Nearly three months after DFI delivered the 64th IAK records to DPMO, the American side of the USRJC twice asked the Russian side to provide daily operational records of the Soviet 64th IAK. During the Ninth Plenum of the USRJC, June 1-3, 1994, Commission Member Dr. Trudy Peterson asked the Russian side for "a copy of the daily reports of the 64th Air Corps."² Mr. Steven Pifer, Principal Deputy for Ambassador-at-Large for NIS also asked the Russian side, "We request copies of all the daily logs of the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps."³

The American view, that there are valuable data points in the daily operational summaries, was not shared by the Russian side of the USRJC. Col. Alexander S. Orlov claims to have examined files which he describes as, "basically the day-to-day activities of the 64th. That is all."⁴ Orlov, who offered no details or any other information concerning the content of these records, asserted these records are interesting, "but not for getting names."⁵ This report shows that Orlov's claim is not accurate.

Col. Viktor V. Mukhin also attempted to downplay the significance of the operational 64th IAK records, saying,

Regarding these daily journals, the combat journals as they're called, they are summaries of activities that occurred, like historical documents. I don't think that there will be much of interest in them.⁶

The daily operational summaries of the Soviet 64th IAK are, in contrast to the views of Mukhin and Orlov, a rich source of information which can be used to resolve the fates of American USAF personnel or to recommend a change of casualty status. A sample from this group of records for the twenty-four hour period ending at midnight, December 16, 1951, follows in Russian and English translation.

² Ninth Plenum, p. 41.

³ Ninth Plenum, closing session, p. 2.

⁴ Ninth Plenum, p. 17.

⁵ Eighth Plenum, p. KW-10.

⁶ Ninth Plenum, p. 41.

Б1227/х

шурша 920
Соб. секретно.

г. Москва, ул. Штольникова С.А.

д-р. Журавлев Г.П.

Комит. Пекин, ул. Красовского С.А.

Оперативная сводка № 0382. Штос 64 чак
Анбзун. 16.12.51. 24.00 Корго 500.000-412.

I.

1. Возвращение корпуса в течение светлого вре-
мени 16.12.51 влетом на मुख्यей групп противника
из положения резервиста на отрядном направлении
объектов в районе Анбзун, Талси, т.д.

Произведено 82 взлета самолета с общим
налетом 68701.53 мин., из них 303 чак - 46 самолето-
влетов с налетом 377.45 мин., 324 чак - 36 самолето-
влетов с налетом 31701.08 мин.

Восстановлен корпус извлечен один влет и один вы-
звучен бат с извлечением противника.

Всего самолетов противника и своих подруг
лет Изракозорово скардал: 449 лет, из них
303 чак: Н-37 - 58, НС-23 - 152; 324 чак:
Н-37 - 69; НС-23 - 170 лет.

[TFR 263-1]

[This document handwritten in its entirety.]

[Pages 2 and 3 of 4 are missing.]

No. 1227/k

280

Encrypted
Top Secret

To Moscow, Comrade S.M. Shepenko

Comrade P.F. Zhigarev

Copy to Peking, Comrade S.A. Krasovkij

Operational summary No. 0382. 64th IAK HQ, Antung.

Dated 16 Dec 51 2400. Map scale 500,000-1, 1941.

I.

1. On 16 Dec 51, corps' air assets on airfield stand-by intercepted enemy aircraft during the day, providing air cover for targets in the Antung-Tabin-Anju area.

82 combat sorties were flown totalling 68 hours and 53 minutes. Of these, the 303rd IAD conducted 46 sorties totalling 37 hours 45 minutes and the 324th IAD conducted 36 sorties totalling 31 hours 8 minutes.

Corps staff conducted one sortie and engaged enemy fighters once. There were no enemy or friendly losses. A total of 449 shells were expended: 58 N-37's and 152 NS-23's by the 303rd IAD; 69 N-37's and 170 NS-23's by the 324th IAD.

[TFR 263-2]

283

4.

Of the 324th IAD's 54 MIG-15's, 11 are not combat ready (1 is undergoing preventative maintenance; 5 require replacement engines; 2 need engine repairs; and 3 are under repair). There are 79 fliers - 54 are combat ready, (of these, 4 are at HQ; 6 are unpaired) 19 are ill, and 6 are on R&R. There are 38 combat ready aircraft.

II.

1. Enemy aircraft did enter the Antung AAA zone of fire, thus the 92nd AAAD did not fire.

2. On the night of 15-16 Dec 51 at 1925, one B-29 conducted reconnaissance on the Tabin and Napsi airfields at an altitude of 6300m. At 1215 on 16 Dec 51, 2 F-86's flew across the AAA zone of fire at an altitude of 2000m. Units of the 87th AAAD fired on all of the enemy aircraft. 66 88mm and 202 37mm shells were expended. There were no enemy or friendly losses.

3. Fighting strength and the locations of the AAA units are unchanged.

III.

Interrogation of two American prisoners of war, F-86 pilots shot down by ~~Corps~~ pilots in dogfights on 24 Oct 51, has revealed that the enemy has two pilots for each F-86 aircraft. This apparently is done to increase the number of personnel receiving battle experience and to decrease the workload of each flyer.

(Lobov)

[signature "Rolf Suslin"] (R. Suslin)

Original

17 Dec 51 [signature "Yataev"]

Significant Findings

According to DPMO, most of the 200-plus pages of Soviet-era archive material submitted by DFI to DPMO had not been fully analyzed or assessed by DPMO as of October 1994. In light of this, DFI reviewed the minutes of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth USRJC Plenum Sessions in order to assess the degree to which data contained in archival material obtained in Moscow compare to positions taken by the Russian side of the USRJC. In order to be comprehensive, documents obtained during the current project, plus other documents obtained previously from Soviet-era archives and submitted to DPMO, are discussed or referred to in this report.

Among the significant findings deriving from the comparison between Soviet era documents and the record of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Plenum Sessions are the following:

1. Soviet records obtained by DFI contain information which is apparently sufficient for a change of casualty recommendation for approximately 29 Korean War POW/MIA cases.
2. Soviet Air Force records contradict the summary of Korean War shoot downs summarized, allegedly from primary source material, and presented as fact by the Russian side of the USRJC.⁷
3. The Russian side of the USRJC claims to be unable to locate information in 64th IAK files concerning any USAF personnel on the USAF list of 187 MIA/POWs from the Korean War (*AFM 200-25*).⁸ DFI's research in 64th IAK files located information *by name* concerning at least one USAF MIA from the 200-25 list and could link one other name from the 200-25 list to Soviet records.
4. Col. Aleksandr Orlov claims that Soviet forces involved in interrogating American POW/MIAs in Korea, when reporting results of the interrogation of American POWs in Korea, "we never listed source. We would just go ahead and say, according to testimony provided by prisoners of war, the following information was acquired."⁹ The records of the 64th IAK demonstrate that Orlov's claim is incorrect.
5. Many Soviet records, including the 64th IAK operational summaries, refer by name to American POW/MIAs and to specific USAF aircraft registration numbers. The fates of individuals may be determined from these primary source data.

⁷ See TFR 180.

⁸ At the Ninth Plenum of the USRJC, Col. Orlov stated, "We have looked at all the files regarding 64th Fighter Aviation Corps." Col. Mukhin, when asked by Congressman Johnson, "Nothing on the 187 names?" replied, "No nothing." Ninth Plenum, p. 17.

⁹ Ninth Plenum, p. 37.

DFI International -- Moscow Report

6. Though Soviet reporting refers by name and date to many interrogations of American POWs, records of these interrogations have not been provided by the Russian side of the USRJC.
7. Some of the interrogation records of American POW/MIAs during the Korean War obtained by DFI were not provided by the Russian side of the USRJC to the American side. The existence of these records contradicts statements such as those by Cols. Mukhin and Orlov who explain the discrepancy between the large number of USAF POWs who passed through a Soviet interrogation point (262) and the small number of interrogation records provided (ca. 56). Mukhin and Orlov claim additional interrogation records do not exist because they were never forwarded to headquarters. This is not true.
8. Col. Orlov claims that the Russian side could only locate interrogation records from 1952-1953 because this is when the interrogation process became more "formalized."¹⁰ Yet the eleven page Soviet interrogation of USAF Capt. Lawrence Bach, whose F-86 was shot down in December 1950, has been in the public domain for over two years. This interrogation record, which was circulated to the entire Soviet Politbureau, including Stalin, resulted from an interrogation conducted "by a representative of Comrade Mironov." A four-page December 30 Soviet interrogation summary of further interrogations of Bach was sent to Moscow on December 31, 1950. Orlov is aware of the Bach interrogation, since it is included in a RAND report Orlov referred to more than one half dozen times at the Tenth Plenum.¹¹
9. At the Ninth Plenum, Col. Mukhin claimed, "I don't believe that our military command structure allowed the MGB access to the [USAF] pilots in China, or in Korea. . . . On the basis of documents, we have nothing at all regarding this issue."¹² At the Tenth Plenum, Mukhin dropped all references to the lack of MGB activity on Chinese territory. Documents obtained by DFI and the USRJC show that the Soviet command structure not only permitted MGB access to USAF POW/MIAs, but in some cases requested MGB participation in interrogations in China. This may explain the difference between Mukhin's beliefs expressed at the Ninth and Tenth Plenum sessions.
10. Col. Vyacheslav P. Mazurov stated that as a result of an order signed by Stalin in 1949 which banned Soviet intelligence operations, "the proposal from the intelligence leadership to set up operations targeting American POWs in Korea did not receive any support from our political circles. . . . Both the Koreans and Chinese refused to allow the Soviet intelligence service to conduct these types of activities on the territory of Korea."¹³ The Soviet intelligence organizations did so anyway. As previously documented, Soviet intelligence organs made efforts to

¹⁰ Ninth Plenum, p. 36.

¹¹ The first page from Bach's interrogation record, which clearly shows the December 1950 date, appears in *POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1* (RAND, MR-351/1 USDP, 1992), p. 168.

¹² Ninth Plenum, p. 35.

¹³ Tenth Plenum, p. 26.

recruit agents among prisoners held in POW camps in North Korea. Soviet MVD specialists were summoned by the Soviet armed forces to interrogate American POWs in China.

11. Col. Mazurov asserted in reference to a RAND report, that George Blake said, "he knows of incidents where the KGB worked with POWs." Blake never said such a thing and this statement does not appear in any report, including the one referred to by Mazurov.
12. Col. Mazurov asserts that the individuals on the 510 list "have no connection with the foreign intelligence service. We did not deal with these people."¹⁴ In fact, the KGB dealt with many of the people on the 510 as a cover for talking with Blake.
13. Col. Mazurov claims that the names on the so-called 510 list were produced by "more than one search group from my service," and that the list is complete. Yet the 510 list, allegedly derived from KGB files, does not contain the name of George Blake, though Blake's office clerk and the name of every other civilian captured with Blake is included. Mazurov should be asked why the only person known by name to have had direct contact with the KGB--indeed, Blake was recruited by the KGB while in a POW camp--is missing from the 510.¹⁵
14. Mr. K.S. Nikishkin claims "there are no documents in the Navy files" concerning the shoot down of the USAF RB-50 on July 29, 1953.¹⁶ A July 1953 telegram from Admiral N. Kuznetsov, counter-signed by Rear-Admiral Yakovlev, Director of Operations of the Navy General Staff, was sent to the Navy Commander-in-Chief and to the USSR Minister of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade N.A. Bulganin. Another telegram was sent by Admiral Kuznetsov to USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs Comrade V. M. Molotov on July 29, 1953. Another telegram was sent from Admiral Kuznetsov to Marshal Bulganin on July 29. All of these telegrams concerned the shoot down of the RB-50 on July 29, 1953.¹⁷
15. Col. Sergei Osipov asserted, in reference to the July 29, 1953 shoot down of a USAF RB-50, "among those documents which have been discovered to date there is no documentary evidence that there were any survivors in the case."¹⁸ In fact, at least three reports from N. Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Soviet Navy, to Marshal A. Bulganin, Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union and V. M. Molotov, USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs, describe in great detail the downing of the RB-50. On July 29, 1953, Admiral Kuznetsov reported to Minister Molotov, "The US SB-29 plane flew out to the area of the proposed fall of the B-50 plane, and at

¹⁴ Tenth Plenum, p. 29.

¹⁵ Mazurov said that Blake was "the well-known British agent," when in fact Blake was a *Soviet* agent. Tenth Plenum, p. 27.

¹⁶ Ninth Plenum, p. 18.

¹⁷ The telegrams cited here, which were all transferred to DPMO in the original Russian and English translation in 1993, are not duplicated in this report. According to Soviet intercepts of US Pacific Fleet communications, a US SB-29 search plane "reported to base about locating B-50 wreck, a rescue boat and seven men floating near the boat."

¹⁸ Tenth Plenum, p. 119.

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20:29 hours reported to base about locating the B-50 wreckage, a rescue boat and seven men floating near the boat."

16. Col. Orlov continues to assert that Soviet forces were forbidden to have direct contact with American POWs during the Korean War.¹⁹ Col. Orlov should be asked to explain why the Soviet officer, a Buryat Mongol named Kolya Monkuyev who impersonated a Chinese, systematically interrogated American POWs. Col. Orlov should be asked how his version of the ban on direct contact squares with the testimony of Col. Valentin S. Golobov who said, "According to Air Force traditions, the pilot who was shot down meets the pilot who shot him down."²⁰ How does this systematic, direct contact fit into the alleged "no contact" policy?
17. Col. Orlov claims there was no contact between "foreigners and any of our people." Orlov cites the experience at Poltava during World War II as evidence of this policy.²¹ Col. Orlov should be asked to explain why the Soviet security services maintained surveillance of over 700 American servicemen at Poltava, with special attention given to Americans with Russian, Jewish, or otherwise "suspicious" surnames.²²
18. Col. Orlov said, "The Rand report cites General Lobov's remark that 70 investigative groups had been created. Lobov didn't say investigative groups, but search groups."²³ Orlov's observation is incorrect on two counts. First, how would Orlov know what the now-deceased general said in an interview where Orlov was not present? Second, the report in question does not cite a "remark," rather, it cites a *telegram* that the commander of the 64th Air Corps, General Lobov, sent to Moscow in 1952.²⁴ In this telegram, Lobov referred to "search-group expeditions. . . On the average, 70 Soviet servicemen participate daily in our search groups."²⁵
19. The Russian side of the USRJC suggested it would be useful to find a veteran who participated in the Soviet search teams in Korea. DFI located and interviewed a veteran who was a member of such a search group during the Korean War.
20. Lt. Col. Sergei I. Chuvashin stated that Corps-level operational summaries which were forwarded to the Command directorate stated, "as a rule, these reports covered 10-day and 1-month periods."²⁶ In contrast to this claim, both Corps and

¹⁹ Tenth Plenum, *passim* and p. 35.

²⁰ Tenth Plenum, p. 62.

²¹ Tenth Plenum, p. 44.

²² The KGB surveillance list of over 700 American servicemen is included in DFI's report on Ukraine.

²³ Tenth Plenum, p. 55.

²⁴ Decoded Telegram Number 501817/sh (Top Secret), Lobov to Comrades A. M. Vasilevskij, P. F. Kigarev, and S. A. Krasovskij, May 7, 1952. This telegram is fully cited and the correct terminology used in the document referred to by Orlov.

²⁵ The American side of the USRJC has also referred incorrectly to "70 search groups," rather than 70 servicemen. Ninth Plenum, p. 29.

²⁶ Tenth Plenum, p. 70.

Division-level reporting occurred on a *daily* basis. Chuvashin further stated that these reports would therefore refer only to "aircraft types." In fact, the daily reports contain registration numbers of US aircraft and the names of USAF POW/MIAs.

21. Col. Orlov claims that US records are confused concerning Albert G. Tenney's rank.²⁷ This is not true. Tenney was a First Lieutenant when he was shot down on May 3, 1952. Tenney, whose casualty status has been MIA since May 3, 1952, was promoted to Captain, per Special Order 62, on April 1, 1953. Thus Tenney is referred to as First Lieutenant in contemporary casualty reports and as a Captain in current POW/MIA lists, such as the CILHI data base. What Orlov cannot explain is why Tenney, who was a First Lieutenant when the Soviet report on Tenney was written, is referred to as Captain in the Soviet records dated May 3, 1952. In other words, Soviet records refer to First Lieutenant Tenney as Captain Tenney *one year before Tenney was promoted to Captain*.²⁸
22. Col. Orlov claims, "There is not a single document signed by Razuvaev that concerns POWs, that have [sic] been found in the military archives."²⁹ Two documents obtained by DFI, signed by Razuvaev, refer directly to Major General William Dean, the highest-ranking American POW captured during the Korean War.³⁰ Razuvaev not only signed these documents, he sent one of them to the entire Politburo, including Stalin.
23. Col. Orlov asserts that "Amirov, who said that he saw a rail car with prisoners in Alma-Ata, repudiated his testimony, saying that he was misunderstood."³¹ Major Valerie Amirov neither said this nor ever retracted such a comment.

Photographs

DFI's research team searched Tass records for photographs relating to POW/MIAs. On April 21, 1994, DFI forwarded to DPMO the original of 23 photographs obtained from Tass photo archives. These photographs clearly show American POW/MIAs from the Korean and Vietnam Wars. (Photos of POW/MIAs were also obtained by the Ukraine research team. See Volume 2 of this report.)

The provenance of these photographs, which was once in doubt, is now clearly established to be Russian. Two photographs located in the Tass archives appeared in *Life* magazine on May 11, 1953 in a story entitled, "Secret Photos from the Red Korea of 1950--Some GIs Not On Exchange List." One of the *Life* photographs was clear taken seconds after one of the photos located in the Tass archives. The *Life* editors reported,

To *Life* last week came a group of photographs which, for the first time, break into the oldest and most bitter mystery of the Korean War. Checked, clearly authentic, but taken under circumstances so

²⁷ Tenth Plenum, p. 79.

²⁸ TFR 76-37.

²⁹ Tenth Plenum, p. 85.

³⁰ TFR 148-3 and TFR 148-8.

³¹ Tenth Plenum, p. 91.

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strange and perilous that their source cannot be revealed even yet, the pictures have been hidden for nearly three years. They show what befell the first American soldiers taken captive by the Reds in the first full, black month of the war. What has happened to them since in the Red retreats and prison camps is not known. . . .

The pictures were taken near and in Seoul on July 18, 21, and 22 of 1950, two weeks after the first Americans went into battle. They carry no identification of individuals, but the Americans shown must have come from the 24th Infantry Division, first and until July 20 the only US unit committed in Korea. Probably they are from the 19th or 34th Regiments.

Copies of these photographs are attached to the end of this report in Appendix C.

Why Findings May Differ

An important question is why DFI's findings differ so greatly from those of the USRJC. The answer appears to lie in the difference between archival research conducted by official and private researchers. The content of the records obtained by Secretary Baker, some of the material acquired by private researchers and an unknown portion of the documents produced by the Joint Commission have been made available to the public either in full or in summaries. With the exception of President Boris Yeltsin's remarkable letter to the U.S. Senate in June 1992 regarding POW/MIA affairs, the Russian government has taken public positions on POW/MIA issues based on the documents obtained by the Russian side of the Joint Commission.

The position of the Russian side of the USRJC may derive from the documentation which Joint Commission researchers located in Soviet era archives. (President Yeltsin's June 1992 letter on POW/MIAs, in contrast, was not supported by any primary source evidence from Soviet era archives.) Since the Joint Commission was established as a high-level government-to-government effort, it follows that Commission researchers in Moscow would focus their research effort on high-level Soviet era documentation.

This type of Soviet documentation may not contain the evidence American authorities need in order to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues. At a high level, U.S. government documents often contain little operational information. One could reasonably conclude that similar events occurred in the Soviet bureaucracy in the 1950s.

Another factor may explain why the DFI documents contain details that are not found in material obtained by Secretary Baker or located by Joint Commission researchers. In the United States, the Department of State is the government agency that most closely follows the National Archive rules with respect to marking documents for archival purposes. The three copies of documents prepared for top political leadership (President, Vice President, Secretary of State) are usually clean when submitted to the principal decisionmakers, e.g., the documents routinely have no distribution lists or routing instructions. Markings for archival purposes are added to this type of State Department document only after these documents have been read by the designees. If Soviet archivists followed similar steps, this would explain the absence of routing sheets and distribution lists on any high-level Soviet era documents provided to Secretary Baker and the Joint Commission.

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The archive research that produced the records attached to this report focused on operational files at a relatively low level within the Soviet bureaucracy. Thus one finds on these documents the registration marks and classification markings, routing slips and distribution lists intact. (Some of these marks have been redacted much in the same way documents from the U.S. National Archives are sanitized for public release.) If the Joint Commission's researchers focused on searching high-level records, this could explain why detailed information contained in the records obtained by DFI through its research team in Moscow contain information that, in some cases, contradicts the position taken by the Russian leadership. Perhaps the structure of the USRJC, which is a Presidential commission, is too formal for the type of archival research required.

This background may explain why the documents submitted with this report contradict the position taken by the Russian side of the USRJC that, among other things, Soviet forces in Korea in general and Soviet intelligence services in particular had no direct or systematic contact with American POW/MIAs.

Data Reference Point

Whenever possible, CILHI data are used in this report, particularly for current casualty status. Thus the rank of an individual MIA when lost usually differs from the rank in current CILHI records due to the fact MIAs were often promoted *in absentia*.

A. Soviet Air Force Records Associated With POW/MIAs

Soviet archives contain information which is related directly, in some cases by name, to American POW/MIA cases from the Korean War. In other cases, information from Soviet sources pertaining to USAF aircraft losses may be related to specific individuals by correlating the Soviet information with USAF records. Two facts which derive from the analysis of Soviet Air Force records deserve particular attention:

First, some USAF casualty records (293 files) contain information concerning the location of crash sites which was not reported completely or, in some cases, accurately by eyewitnesses. The purpose of the incomplete reporting was, according to Korean War veterans, to conceal the fact that USAF pilots made unauthorized combat flights into the territory of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Evidence concerning the presence of USAF combat and reconnaissance aircraft in PRC airspace presented in this report derives, in part, from Soviet and American veterans of the Korean War. Documentation from primary source Soviet Air Force records is included in this analysis.³²

Second, there is a one hour time difference in Soviet and American reporting. When reading American records, subtract one hour to match Soviet records. When reading Soviet records, add one hour to match American records.³³

A.1. Soviet-era Archive Data Relating to POW/MIAs by Name

The daily operational summaries and telegrams from the Korean combat theater to Moscow prepared by the Soviet 64th Fighter Corp include references to American POW/MIAs by name. This section examines the Soviet information in order to determine whether Soviet reporting is accurate. If Soviet reporting which refers to American POW/MIAs by name is accurate, then this suggests that other Soviet records which are not as explicit contain accurate information as well.

The names found in the Soviet records, shown as they appear in the original text, are the following:

- A.1.1. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown
- A.1.2. "Colonel Shink"
- A.1.3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney
- A.1.4. 2nd Lt. "Flenk"
- A.1.5. 1Lt. John Ellis

³² Telegram No. 481/k from Suslin in Andung, China to Comrades S. M. Shtenenko and P. F. Zhigarev in Moscow and Comrade S. A. Krasovskij in Beijing (Top Secret), April 9, 1952. "The enemy air force, in separate pairs and groups of four F-86s, systematically violates the border of the People's Republic of China and tries to attack our planes reaching the area of the airfields. According to preliminary data, five F-86s were shot down over Chinese territory by units of the corps. Of those, two F-86s were found in the region ten kilometers north-northeast of Chandyan'khehku. The pilots perished, one F-86 made a landing south of the island of Sin-to and sank, the remains are being searched for."

³³ The time difference is most likely explained by the fact USAF operations in Korea were recorded in Tokyo, Japan time (Zulu plus nine hours) while the Soviet times were recorded in Mukden, China time (Zulu plus eight, or one hour behind Tokyo time).

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- A.1.6. Maj. "Andrew Robert Makken"
- A.1.7. Col. John Arnold
- A.1.8. Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller
- A.1.9. Captain Harold Edward Fischer
- A.1.10. "MacDonnal"
- A.1.11. "Paul Niss"

A.1.1. Sergeant Herbert D. Brown

A September 23, 1951 telegram from Arkov to Zakharov³⁴ details an interrogation of Sergeant Herbert D. Brown, 307th Bomber Wing, who was taken prisoner in the region of Anchou.

According to DPMO's Korean War specialist, Sergeant Herbert D. Brown's status is POW/repatriated.

Conclusion: The telegram, though brief, is further indication of the Soviet system for extracting intelligence from American POWs in Korea.

A.1.2. "Colonel Shink"

In Operational Summary No. 00132 of the Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung for the 24 hour period ending May 11, 1952, the Soviet command reported to Moscow that information had been obtained from the diary of Capt. Albert Tenney, an F-86 pilot shot down and killed on May 3, 1952. General Lobov reported that Tenney "wrote in his log that Colonel Shink was shot down on 1 May. On that day the enemy was engaged by the 821st IAP."

Neither DPMO nor CILHI was able to match the case of "Colonel Shink" with an American POW/MIA. "Shink" may be a reference to a USAF pilot named Shinz or Shanks who, after being shot down in MiG alley on May 1, spent thirty days on the island of Sojoson-man until he was rescued and returned to US military control.³⁵

Conclusion: The Russian side of the Joint Commission should provide the American side with Tenney's diary in order to determine the original English language spelling of "Shink."

A.1.3. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney

The handwritten daily Operational Summary of the Soviet 64th Fighter Corps for the 24 hour period ending at 2400, May 3, 1952, which was signed by General Lobov and sent to Shtemenko and Zhigarev in Moscow, contains direct evidence concerning Captain Albert Tenney. The information in the Soviet document is consistent with the USAF data concerning the time of the incident, but does not support the USAF version of the crash location. According to the records of the 256th FAR of the 64th Air Corps,

³⁴ Deciphered Telegram No. 502763/sh.

³⁵ Roland Parks recalled the name and the incident in a conversation on October 18, 1994 with Paul M. Cole. He pointed out that the incident is included in Clay Blair's book, *Beyond Courage*.

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Captain Abitkovskij's group, the 821st FAR of the 190th FAD, had the mission to cover the airfields at Andung and Myaogou. The first squadron led by Major Vakhrushev (from Lieutenant Colonel Olenich's group) encountered four F-86s at 1629 in the area of Singisyu at an altitude of 8,000 meters. The enemy did not engage in battle and departed toward the south. Our fighter group began to pursue the enemy. At that time, Lieutenant Colonel Olenich transmitted by radio that he was fighting 8 F-86s in the area of the airfield. Major Vakhrushev stopped pursuing the enemy and went to the area where Lieutenant Colonel Olenich was engaged in battle.

Senior Lieutenant Mazikin saw 2 F-86s ahead of him, which were pursuing one MiG-15 at 1638 at the approach to the Myaogou airfield. Senior Lieutenant Mazikin attacked the enemy and shot down one F-86.³⁶

The body of a pilot was found in the remains of one of the F-86s shot down in the area of the Myaogou airfield. From documents, it has been established that the pilot is Captain Gilbert Tenney, who belonged to the 51st Fighter Air Group.

The information obtained by DFI from Soviet archives concerning Captain Tenney was confirmed by Joint Commission documentation, viz., TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38, obtained by the American side of the Joint Commission from its Russian counterpart on December 21, 1992.³⁷ TFR 76-37 and TFR 76-38 state that Tenney, shot down while attacking the Myaogou air base, was found dead after the crash of his F-86E. Soviet records are unclear as to the precise location of the crash of Tenney's F-86E.

According to the USAF casualty file, Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney (A0803490 16th Fighter Intercept Squadron 51st Fighter Intercept Group) was a member of a two plane flight of F-86 aircraft which departed Suwon Air Base, South Korea, on the afternoon of May 3, 1952, to perform a combat fighter sweep mission.³⁸ While making a high-speed descent over North Korea, the flight was attacked by enemy aircraft. During the engagement that followed, Captain Tenney's aircraft (F-86E, No. 50-652) was seen by the flight leader, Captain William R. "Nuts" Nowadnick (USMC), to dive away from an enemy MiG and execute evasive maneuvers, according to element leader Nowadnick, at a low altitude. Captain Tenney was informed of his low altitude and instructed to pull up. Immediately thereafter, according to the "complete and accurate" details of the crash as reported by wingman Nowadnick, Tenney leveled the wings of his F-86 which then struck the surface of the water in a low-angle high-speed glide approximately three miles off shore near the mouth of the Yalu River.

The USAF estimated the time of the crash to be 1730 hours. Enemy aircraft forced the leader to leave the area and prior to his departure he did not see Captain Tenney

³⁶ According to Nowadnick, this reference "must be of me and Tenney. We were the only ones to launch as a pair. The others launched in fours." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 28, 1994.

³⁷ TFR 76-37/8, signed by Lt. Col. Tashchan, Chief of Intelligence Unit P/P 54892, is an inventory of the personal effects removed from Tenney's body. The document is entitled, Op. No. 2, Documents from the F-86 flier Captain Gilbert Tenney shot down on 3 May 1952 in the area of Myagou Airfield (flier died). The effects included identification cards, a photograph, and a 62 page diary. Captain Nowadnick stated, "I can't imagine anyone would take all of that stuff with him. I just can't believe it. There's no reason to believe anyone would do something like that. This is weird." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 1994.

³⁸ Tenney, who was not a regular 51st squadron pilot, was apparently flying in order to maintain his certification or to accumulate enough flight time to earn combat pay.

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abandon the F-86 or the aircraft sink beneath the water. Later in the day, search aircraft returned to the scene of the crash landing. North Korean surface craft were observed in the vicinity, but no traces of Captain Tenney or his aircraft were found.³⁹ In 1953, the Secretary of the Air Force approved a recommendation from the director of USAF personnel that, in light of the fact that Tenney's plane had not been seen to disintegrate or sink, a possibility existed that favorable conditions prevailed whereby Captain Tenney survived and was rescued by North Korean surface craft seen in the area. USAF casualty affairs concluded on April 23, 1953 that Captain Tenney "will be continued in a missing in action status following the expiration of 12 months' absence." Tenney's casualty status has not changed since this determination was made.

Conclusion: There is a substantial discrepancy between Soviet and USAF records as to the location of the crash of Captain Tenney's aircraft. The Russian side of the USRJC has also presented inconsistent accounts of the Tenney shoot down. Captain Tenney's casualty record, including contemporary and subsequent statements by Captain William R. Nowadnick does not support the fact that Captain Tenney was lost on Chinese territory.⁴⁰ Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should account for their own report that Captain Tenney died "at Myaogou airfield" following, according to the Russian side of the USRJC, "transit through an interrogation point."⁴¹ The Russian side of the USRJC has therefore suggested there is direct evidence proving that Tenney survived the crash of his F-86, was found alive by Soviet forces, transported alive to an interrogation point, then onward to the Chinese mainland where Tenney, according to Russian sources, allegedly died. As noted, however, the Russian side has contradicted itself on this case thus it is impossible to reconcile the Tenney incident without additional information. [See further discussion of this case at C.2 and F.1.]

A.1.4 2nd Lt. "Flenk"

In Operational Summary No. 00173 from the 64th IAK Headquarters in Andung, the Soviet command reported on June 21, 1952, "At 1555 hours, Senior Lt. Chistyranov's group engaged four F-86's in the Singisyu region at an altitude of 7,000-8,000 meters. . . The enemy did not actively engage in battle and dove away toward the sea when under attack from our fighters. Two pilots fired upon the enemy. Senior Lt. Shishov shot down

³⁹ At the Ninth Plenary and Working Group session of the USRJC, Pavel Antonovich Koval'skii testified, "I was assigned as an engineer-designer with the Central Aero-Hydrodynamics Institute (TsAGI). At the end of 1951, or in the beginning of 1952, an F-86 Sabre, that was in good shape, arrived at TsAGI. It looked almost brand new. . . . We were given the mission of providing detailed drawings of the F-86, so that a similar aircraft could be reconstructed. We were puzzled by the fact that the aircraft was intact, and only the presence of sand in the wheel wells and fuselage, were we able to deduce that the aircraft had landed on the beach. . . . It must have been a wheels-up forced landing. There was no damage to the fuselage and there was no evident battle damage to the aircraft."

⁴⁰ Captain William R. Nowadnick said, "My statement then was true and accurate. If I were to go into China, I would not have gone there with a pilot whose capabilities I didn't know. Tenney went into the water. That is a fact. I made a couple of circles after the plane hit. Tenney was still in the cockpit. The canopy was still on." Conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 19, 1994.

⁴¹ *A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through and Interrogation Point.*

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one F-86. The pilot of the downed plane, 2Lt. Flenk of the 4th Air Group, was taken prisoner by our Korean comrades."

Information from the casualty records division of the Army Central Identification Laboratory, Hawaii (CILHI) states, "1Lt. Vance R. Frick . . . sighted four MiGs on a westerly heading, 36,000 feet altitude, six miles southeast of Uiju. The friendly flight attempted to close on the enemies in a right climbing turn which lowered their airspeed as the MiGs led them into the sun. As the friendlies were in this maneuver two MiGs attacked them from the four o'clock position high, causing the friendlies to break to the right. During this turn, Lt. Frick called, 'This is Green 2. They are shooting at me, get them off.' Lt. [William E.] Marsh had looked just prior to this and saw Lt. Frick in his four o'clock position and two MiGs were passing right in front of Lt. Marsh's plane, so he dove in a roll into the MiGs. As the MiGs passed under the flight and leveled off, Lt. Marsh found himself on the tail of one of the MiGs. Lt. Marsh tried to close on the MiG in a climb and fired a short burst observing hits on the left wing and smoke from the left side. Lt. Marsh was not given credit for a damage as he had no witness and gun camera film was not satisfactory for an assessment. No further transmission was heard from Lt. Frick. Lt. Marsh observed an F-86 spinning down three miles south of Uiju, trailing white smoke. Lt. Frick is listed as Missing in Action."

The USAF Casualty Office reported to DPMO that F-86 pilot 1Lt. Vance R. Frick, shot down and captured on June 21, 1952, was repatriated on September 6, 1953.⁴²

A 18-page interrogation protocol for "Vance R. Frick," shot down on June 21, 1952, was obtained by DPMO from Russian sources.

Conclusion: U.S. and Soviet records describe the shoot down of 1Lt. Vance Frick. No explanation has been found to reconcile the contradiction between the CILHI and USAF Casualty Office versions of 1Lt. Frick's current casualty status.

A.1.5 1Lt. John Ellis

According to Operational Summary No. 00202 from the 64th Headquarters, Andung from July 20, 1952, between 1604-1620 hours the 415th IAP, flying at 8,000 - 10,000 meters over the Sinuiju and Sakusyu area in two squadrons and one single pair, engaged a total of 20 F-86's in separate groups of two, four and eight. Eight pilots fired on the enemy. According to the pilots and gun camera data, Sr. Lt. Lepikov shot down one F-86. A search party was sent out to look for the downed aircraft.

Later in Operational Summary No. 00202, the Soviet command reported that the pilot of one of the F-86's shot down that day, "1Lt. John Ellis of the 336th Air Squadron, 4th Air Group, was taken prisoner."

USAF casualty records state that 1Lt. John G. Ellis Jr., 336th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group, flew on July 20, 1952 with a group of four F-

⁴² *The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POW's to the Soviet Union*, (Unclassified report labeled "Working Papers" subsequent to its submission to the Russian side of the USRJC), (Department of Defense: Joint Commission Support Branch, Research and Analysis Division, DPMO, August 25, 1993), p. 68.

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86's led by Major John Kozey Jr. Major Kozey sighted two MiG's six miles south of the Sui Ho Dam at 24,000 feet. Four more MiG's were sighted above these two at approximately 33,000 feet. Major Kozey closed on the right wing of the enemy aircraft but was forced to break off the attack when several MiG's began to fire on his flight. Major Kozey claimed one MiG-15 damaged.

1Lt. John G. Ellis Jr., was flying No. 4 man in Major Kozey's flight who was lost during this engagement. During this engagement, Lt. Ellis called to say he was "O.K." and was at 7 o'clock behind the No. 3 man, Major Lewis Green. Major Green checked Ellis's position, stated that Ellis had lagged behind somewhat, but had flown a variable position during the entire flight. As Major Kozey began to fire on the MiG, Major Green checked to the rear and called "Clear" to Major Kozey. At this time Major Green asked 1Lt. Ellis his position. Two such calls were made but no answer received. 1Lt. Ellis, according to USAF casualty data, was not seen or heard from until the end of the war.

Conclusion: The Soviet and U.S. records describe the same engagement. 1Lt. Ellis was captured by Soviet forces (as in the case of Major MacKenzie discussed at A.1.6.), with the assistance of Soviet forces, or at least the capture of Lt. Ellis was made known the same day as it occurred to Soviet forces. 1Lt. Ellis's casualty status, according to USAF data, is POW/RMC.

A.1.6. Maj. "Andrew Robert Makken" (Canadian)

In Operational Summary No. 00341 from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK in Andung to Moscow on December 6, 1952, an addendum to Operational Report No. 00340 for December 5, 1952 is included. The addendum reads, "On 5 December, our fighters shot down the leader of a group of four from the 51st Air Group made up of Canadian VVS trainees. The commander of the squadron, Major Andrew Robert Makken, parachuted and landed in the area of Supkhuni near the 51st anti-aircraft battery. Prior to the approach by our personnel, Maj. Makken opened fire with a pistol. He surrendered after we retaliated. He was turned over to the Chinese authorities."

A Canadian F-86 pilot, Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, 39th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron, 51st Fighter-Interceptor Group, was shot down on December 5, 1952. MacKenzie, the most publicized Canadian POW of the Korean War, was held as a political prisoner in China until 1955. MacKenzie's casualty record states, "Lost while on combat mission over NK. Sq. leader MACKENZIE was last seen at XE 4767 (6135-III)," near Uiju, North Korea. MacKenzie claimed, upon repatriation, that he had been

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shot down by an F-86.⁴³ A board of inquiry examined MacKenzie's claim after the Korean War, but the results of this inquiry are not known.⁴⁴

Conclusion: 1) The Soviet version and UN version are consistent with the capture of Squadron Leader Andrew Robert MacKenzie, a Canadian F-86 pilot who lives in Canada today. 2) The MacKenzie case confirms the direct participation of Soviet forces in the pursuit and capture of UNC air crews. MacKenzie's casualty status is POW/repatriated.

A.1.7. Col. John Arnold

Operational Summary No. 0013 from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK to Moscow from January 13, 1953, reported,

At 2150 hours, one 535th IAP MiG-15, piloted by Senior Lt. Khablev, was vectored to an enemy bomber by the RTS. Near Taegwon, the Corps Command Post's RTS 'periscopes' vectored him, from the rear, to the enemy aircraft which was at 6,500 meters and heading toward Uiju. At 2210, the enemy aircraft was again spotted by search lights at 7,000 meters. Having closed to 600 meters on the 0/4-1/4 quarter, he fired one long burst, causing the enemy plane to burst into flames. After turning left, he got back on the burning plane's tail and opened fire a second time at 300-500 meters on the 0/4-1/4 with three long bursts and expended all of his ammunition. The RB-29, covered in flames, sharply descended earthward, and crashed in Chinese territory near Ulumbej (30 km north of Andung). . . . Of the 14 crew members, 11 were taken prisoner by Chinese comrades and three were dead. Amongst the prisoners was Col. Arnold who identified himself as the commander of the 581st Air Wing of the 13th Air Army based in the Philippines. The RB-29 was from the 91st Strategic Intelligence Squadron.⁴⁵

The USAF version of events notes the aircraft, RB-29 (No. 44-62217), departed Yakota AB, Honshu, Japan at 1720, January 12, 1953 on a "Classified Psychological Warfare Leaflet Mission to North Korea." The flight plan was intended to bring the aircraft out of North Korea near Cholsan south of Sinuiju on the northwest coastline. USAF records state the RB-29 transmitted a "May Day" call at 2316 hours on January 12 and disappeared from friendly radar scopes at XE6050⁴⁶, on North Korean territory.

Conclusion: The Soviet and USAF descriptions are of the same incident. The last recorded radio transmission from the RB-29 differs from the time of the last attack by the Soviet MiG by six minutes. The discrepancy lies in whether the RB-29 was in Chinese

⁴³ Col. Fischer, who was in a Chinese prison with MacKenzie, stated, "Andy told me of his last mission. They had made an attack on some aircraft and were pulling away when he was hit. His aircraft began an uncontrollable roll since evidently his hydraulic controls had been damaged. There was only one thing he could do and that was to bail out. He pulled the handles on the ejection seat and as he separated from the seat and pulled the rip cord, an F-86 went by him. He was convinced that an F-86 had shot him down and although he tried to view this objectively, he was nevertheless a little bitter about the incident, which he had every right to be." Fischer fax to Paul M. Cole, July 11, 1994.

⁴⁴ The Director of Air Intelligence for the USAF reported on February 29, 1952, "Two sightings were made during the month which indicate that the enemy has put an F-86 aircraft into operation in Korea." FEAF Air Intelligence Summary, February 29, 1952, (Secret), SS-U-87. The Russian side of the USJIC confirmed in June 1994 that a copy of the F-86 was constructed in the Soviet Union based on an intact F-86 captured in late 1951 or early 1952.

⁴⁵ Underscored in original.

⁴⁶ USAF casualty data reports that Arnold's RB-29 was lost over map sheet no. 6134-1, in other words on North Korean territory well south of the Yalu River.

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airspace when it crashed. The USAF report on the downing of the RB-29 is consistent with the established pattern of deception in USAF records concerning flight activities over Chinese territory. In addition, crew members of the RB-29 who recalled being moved from North Korea to China said the transport occurred while the American prisoners were covered in order to block their vision.⁴⁷ Thus the Soviet description of where the RB-29 crashed would be more consistent with the subsequent Chinese action.⁴⁸ Col. Arnold's casualty status is POW/repatriated. [See related case at D.5.]

A.1.8 Lt. Col. Edwin L. Heller

Operational Summary No. 0023 from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK for January 23, 1953, notes,

At 1130, in the Sinuiju/Danu area, the 535th IAP (20 MiG-15s led by LTC Alimov) engaged 24 F-86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. Six pilots fired during the battle, the results of which are still unknown. Two squadrons of the 913th IAP (16 MiGs led by LTC Razorenov) in the Danu/Andung/Sinuiju area engaged 12 F-86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. Three pilots fired on the enemy. According to the pilots, Sr. Lt. Karpov shot down one F-86. Sr. Lt. Karpov did not return from the mission. He ejected and is currently in the vicinity of Ben'sikhu.

On 23 January 1953 while in aerial combat near Kuan'dyal⁴⁹ with his unit, the 913th IAP, Sr. Lt. Korlov shot down on F-86. The pilot ejected and was taken prisoner by Chinese comrades. He is wounded and is currently in a hospital in Andung. The downed pilot, Lt. Col. Edwin Heller, a USAF ace, is the commander of the 16th Squadron, 51st Air Group.

Col. Harold Fischer, who shot down the MiG-15 that shot down Heller, said after reviewing the Soviet version of events, "This tracks. It makes sense. I shot down the MiG that got Ed. I didn't know what happened to Ed. He just disappeared."⁵⁰

USAF casualty data state, "Lt. Heller was last seen at XE3252 (6134-4), at about 40,000 feet." Col. Heller was quoted indirectly by DPMO investigators as stating he "did not know if he was shot down over Chinese or North Korean territory" because he "became disoriented during the conduct of air-to-air combat." Heller disputes DPMO's summary of his remarks.⁵¹

⁴⁷ Two crew members, Brown and Kiba, have made this observation. See Wallace L. Brown, *The Endless Hours: My Two and a Half Years As A Prisoner of the Chinese Communists* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961), pp. 30-33. See also Steve Kiba's comments in Paul M. Cole, POW/MIA Issues: Volume I, The Korean War (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, MR-351/I-USDP, 1992), p. 203.

⁴⁸ The survivors of the RB-29 crash were held as political prisoners in China until 1955.

⁴⁹ Kuandian is approximately 60 kilometers north of the Yalu River in China.

⁵⁰ Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 8, 1994.

⁵¹ Fellow F-86 ace Col. Harold Fischer noted in reference to Heller's claim of "disorientation," "It's just not so. Ed flew way up into China routinely, usually for reconnaissance. He only recently told me just how far he was really up there. You get disoriented in clouds. You don't get disoriented that far into China during combat." Fischer discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 7, 1994. Col. Heller stated in response to the DPMO summary of his remarks, "A commanding officer of a fighter unit who doesn't know north from south, even without a compass, is a son of a bitch." Fax from Col. Fischer to Paul M. Cole, citing "a direct quote [Ed] said I could pass on to you." July 11, 1994. Col. Heller said, "That's a bunch of baloney. I don't remember telling anyone I was disoriented. I was north of the river, I just didn't know how far." Telephone conversation with Paul M. Cole, July 12, 1994.

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Conclusion: The U.S. and Soviet versions describe the same incident, though there is no explanation for the discrepancy in the name of the Soviet pilot given credit for shooting down Heller's F-86. The U.S. version of this shoot down is consistent with the pattern of deceptive reports meant to conceal the fact of USAF operations in Chinese airspace. Heller's casualty status is POW/repatriated. [See map at G.1.]

A.1.9 Captain Harold Edward Fischer

Operational Summary No. 0097 from the Soviet 64th Air Corps in Andung submitted by General Lobov to Moscow for the 24 hour period ending April 7, 1953 noted,

At 1610, six MiG-15s of the 224th FAR (led by Senior Lieutenant Anisimov) battled with four F-86s in the area of Kizjo at an altitude of 13,000 meters. At 1640 upon approach to Danu airfield, Senior Lieutenant Berelidze's pair attacked one F-86 which was pursuing Senior Lieutenant Ugryumov at an altitude of 1,000-1,500 meters. Senior Lieutenant Berelidze shot down one F-86 from a distance of 400 meters at a $\frac{1}{4}$ quartering angle. The pilot: Captain Harold Edward Fischer, service number A02204126, Flight Commander, 39th Air Squadron, 51st Wing, was taken prisoner.

Captain Fischer was flight leader of "Python" flight on a Yalu River fighter sweep on April 7, 1953. The USAF casualty file notes, "The coordinates and location [of the crash] are unknown since the wingman was uncertain of his location at the time he last saw Captain Fischer." Further, the USAF casualty file refers to the location of the dogfight as "the area." The location of the combat and the coordinates for the crash of Captain Fischer's F-86 (No. 52-2871A), which occurred at 1735 hours, were not reported accurately in the USAF casualty report of this incident.

Captain Fischer, a highly publicized political prisoner of the Chinese, was released in May 1955 after two years of solitary confinement. The casualty status of Captain Fischer, whose subsequent captivity in the People's Republic of China lasted until 1955, is POW/repatriated.

Conclusion: Soviet records track with the USAF account for this case and are more complete with respect to the location of the crash of Fischer's aircraft. The reason for the absence of a geographic description of this incident in USAF records is that USAF pilots were not authorized to cross the Yalu River on a routine basis. According to USAF F-86 veterans of the Korean War, such as Senator John Glenn, the USAF suppressed or destroyed evidence which showed American aircraft in Chinese airspace.⁵² In reality, "the area" where Captain Fischer attacked the Soviet MiGs and where his own F-86 crashed was Chinese territory. Captain Fischer was not, however, shot down. He was forced to eject after his F-86 engine ingested debris from a MiG-15 that broke up in front of Fischer's aircraft. Captain Fischer successfully ejected and was captured by Chinese

⁵² Co. Fischer remarked in 1994, "The rule was, don't cross the Chinese border. During debriefing after a mission, pilots would just give North Korean coordinates for kills and our own crashes that happened in China. It was a question of CYA. For convenience, a place south of Andung over the river was chosen for the sight where we shot down MiGs which were really shot down in China. I think that little town had more MiGs fall on it than any other place on earth." Discussion with Paul M. Cole, June 27, 1994.

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militiamen who drove him past the crash site. Fischer's casualty status is POW/repatriated.

A.1.10. "MacDonnal"

According to Operational Summary No. 102 of the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps for April 12, 1953, between 0755-0800, six MiG-15s (led by Captain Doroshenko), flying at 13000 meters in the Siodzio region, engaged four F-86s. One pilot fired. According to the pilot's report and interpretation of the gun camera footage, Captain Doroshenko shot down one F-86. According to radio intercepts, an ace from the 51st Air Group, "Mak Donnel," was shot down. The pilot ejected.

1Lt. Joseph McConnell Jr., who shot down his eighth MiG on April 12, 1953, was shot down on the same day. After successfully ejecting from his aircraft, McConnell was plucked from the Yellow Sea by a 3rd Air Rescue Group H-19 helicopter. By April 24, 1953, the newly-promoted Captain McConnell had ten kills.

Conclusion: Soviet records concerning "MacDonnal" refer to the downing of McConnell. McConnell was rescued by UN forces. McConnell, who returned alive from Korea, was subsequently killed in a test flight.

A.1.11. "Paul Niss"

On May 30, 1953, Major General Borisenko reported to the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army on "the operations of the U.S. Air Force in Korea for the period May-December 1952."⁵³ Borisenko's cable derives from the interrogation of USAF POWs in Korea. Included in Borisenko's cable is the sentence, "Especially experienced instructors at the flight schools treat the students poorly—according to pilot Paul Niss."

Of particular interest, however, are the names of the Soviet officers who, according to Borisenko, "took part in compiling the report." The Soviet officers named in Borisenko's cable are the following:

- Colonel Petrachev
- Lt. Colonel Komarov
- Colonel Voronets
- Lt. Colonel (Medical service) Drozhevkin
- Colonel Noltev (perhaps Poltev)
- Engineer Major Tikhonov

According to Soviet records obtained by DPMO, 2Lt. Niss, a F-51 pilot, was shot down on May 31, 1952.⁵⁴ The Soviet records note that 2Lt. Niss's personal documents were taken from him.

⁵³ Cable from Major General Borisenko to the Chief of Staff of the Air Forces of the Soviet Army, Operations Directorate (Secret), No. 03817, May 30, 1953.

⁵⁴ See TFR-786-41.

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Conclusion: DFI was able to match the name "Paul Niss" with an American POW/MIA named 2Lt. Paul R. Kniss (A0 1909070), who was shot down on May 31, 1952. 2Lt. Kniss's casualty status is POW/RMC.

B. 64th IAK and Other Soviet Archive Data Associated With POW/MIAs

Soviet 64th Air Corps records contain information on aircraft shoot down incidents which do not mention American POW/MIAs by name. Using USAF casualty files, a correlation made be made with American POW/MIAs for the following cases included in Soviet records:

- B.1. Pilot of F-86 shot down, September 2, 1951
- B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1951
- B.3. Interrogation of Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951
- B.4. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952
- B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 11, 1952
- B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1, 1952
- B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4, 1952
- B.8. F-86 shot down July 4, 1952
- B.9. Pilot of F-86 No. 15/24001, July 20, 1952
- B.10. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952
- B.11. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952
- B.12. Pilot of F-86 shot down, April 12, 1953
- B.13. F-84 shot down, April 12, 1953

Other Soviet-era archive documents mention by name the following USAF POW/MIAs, all of whom were shot down in the same B-29 incident on July 4, 1952:

- B.14. 1Lt. Joseph E. Moreland
- B.15. 2Lt. Francis A. Strieby
- B.16. 1Lt. Kenneth S. Brazil
- B.17. A1C Edwin D. Combs
- B.18. A1C William E. Koski
- B.19. SSgt. Charles V. Johansen
- B.20. A1C Kenneth H. Bass
- B.21. A2C Donald L. Hand
- B.22. SSgt. Bernard F. Rivers
- B.23. A1C Eugene E. Evers
- B.24. Captain Theodore R. Harris
- B.25. SSgt. Richard L. Albright
- B.26. SSgt. Clifford H. Mast

In addition, Soviet-era archive material demonstrates that the Commanding Officer of the 34th Infantry Regiment was captured alive and was not a KIA(BNR) case as shown in US records. The commander was:

- B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin

B.1. Pilot of F-86 Shot Down September 2, 1951

Operational Summary No. 0277 of the Headquarters, 64th Fighter Corps for September 2, 1951, reports that six F-86 aircraft were shot down on that day. Two MiG-15s were lost. The summary states, "The 17th Fighter Regiment (word missing) in the region of Syukusen at 1035 hours 10 F-86s at an altitude of 10,000 meters. As a result of the attack conducted against the enemy fighters by the regiment, Major Pulov shot one down from the rear below the angle of approach 0/4 at a range of 450 meters. One F-86 according to crew observations (possible "bailed out") in the air.

The 18th Fighter Regiment encountered separate pairs and groups of four of enemy fighters at 1043 hours in the region of Khanusen at an altitude of 7000-9000 meters, which were attacked by one air squadron by order of the leader. At that time new groups of enemy fighters began appearing from behind the clouds in groups of 2-4-6- F-86s, which, using their altitude advantage, attacked our fighters. Altogether as many as 30 enemy F-86 aircraft took part in the air battle. Our fighters waged battle in threes and pairs. The battle lasted 15 minutes. Two F-86s were shot down. Shooting down one enemy plane apiece were: Lt. Colonel Smorchkov, Senior Lt. Shchukin and Major Os'kin; Senior Lt. Kapitonov and Captain Gerasimenko put two F-86s out of action. The planes were shot down from the rear hemisphere below the angle of approach 04-2/4 from a range of 300-700 meters. Senior Lt. Akatov and Senior Lt. Kolpikov didn't return from the mission, presumably shot down in combat.

According to USAF casualty data, on September 2, 1951 shortly before 1255 hours, Lt. Laurence C. Layton's F-86A (No. 49-1258A) was damaged in a dogfight with enemy MiGs in the vicinity of YD 0375 (Anju/Sinanju area). After radioing that he was heading toward the coast, Lt. Layton's successful bailout at 1255 hours was observed by another F-86 pilot.⁵⁵ The position was reported to be near the mouth of the Chong Chong River, approximately six miles from the coast. Though DPMO's summary indicates that Lt. Layton is believed to have been rescued by "persons aboard a large power boat operated by the enemy," an eyewitness to Lt. Layton's contact with the water, Major Winton W. Marshall, stated on October 15, 1951, "I did not see Lt. Layton bail out nor his parachute." Major Marshall added that as Lt. Layton was advised to bail out, "My MiG-15 was hit at this time and spun and crashed into the ground."

Conclusion: With the exception of the discrepancy in the time of day, the Soviet and American records appear to describe the shoot down of Lt. Layton. Since the Soviet summary indicates that "search efforts" for the down aircraft were "being conducted" for an F-86 pilot who Soviet sources reported had bailed out, the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked to provide the results of these search efforts in order to contribute to the resolution of Lt. Layton's case. Lt. Layton's casualty status is MIA. [See F.18.]

B.2. Interrogation of two F-86 pilots, October 24, 1951

Operational Summary No. 0382 from the Soviet 64th IAK in Andung to Moscow for December 16, 1951, states, "Interrogations of two American prisoners of war, F-86 pilots shot down in dogfights on 24 October 1951, has revealed that the enemy has two pilots

⁵⁵ Lt. Layton's parachute landing at YD 0169 at 1255 hours was observed by Captain Ralph D. Gibson.

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for each F-86 aircraft. This apparently is done to increase the number of personnel receiving battle experience and to decrease the workload of each flyer."

According to USAF casualty records, 1Lt. Bradley B. Irish (AO 1911424), F-86 pilot, was shot down in the vicinity of Sinanju, North Korea on October 24, 1951.

According to USAF casualty records, Lt. Fred T. Wicks (AO 1910294) departed Kimpo air base on October 24, 1951. In the vicinity of Sinanju, the flight was attacked by four enemy fighters. Wicks's aircraft was hit by ground fire. "A garbled radio message was received from Lt. Wicks which indicated his intention to abandon the aircraft. Continuous observation of the F-86 was not maintained during its descent from an altitude of 15,000 feet, however, the plane was sighted just as it crashed to the ground and exploded." Although the aircraft was observed to explode on impact, the Commanding General, Far East Air Forces, determined that 1Lt. Wicks was an "unconfirmed prisoner of war."

Conclusion: Both Wicks and Irish were repatriated in September 1953. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked for the interrogation records of Lt. Irish and Lt. Wicks which are referred to in Soviet reporting.

B.3. Interrogation of a Meteor pilot, December 1, 1951

Operational Summary No. 0381 from the Soviet 64th IAK in Andung to Moscow for December 15, 1951, states, "The flier of a downed enemy 'Meteor' aircraft was taken prisoner on 1 December. This flier indicated that the group of 12 'Meteors' had been tasked to conduct an aerial reconnaissance of the Tajsen airfield. The mission was not carried out because the 'Meteors' were intercepted by MiG-15 aircraft and the 'Meteor' flight leader was shot down."⁵⁶

According to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) records, on December 1, 1951, F/Sgt. Ernest E. Armit (A22221), pilot of the Meteor aircraft number A77-949, was lost during a combat flight in the area south of Pyongyang and north of Kimpo airfield between Chienampo and Singye. F/Sgt. Armit was reported to be MIA. On the same mission, RAAF Meteor pilots Sgt. Bruce L. Thomson (A32427) flying No. A77-29 and Sgt. Vance Drummond (A33624) flying No. A77-251 were also shot down. Thomson and Vance, who were repatriated in Big Switch, were "unable to throw any light on the fate of F/Sgt. Armit during their de-briefings following release."⁵⁷

Conclusion: 1) It is not clear whether Soviet records refer to Armit's incident. 2) F/Sgt. Armit's current casualty status is "missing presumed dead." 3) Soviet records should be examined to determine which Australian Meteor pilot was interrogated.

⁵⁶ Four sentences were struck out in Operational Summary No. 0381, "The prisoner did not know the number of planes that were shot down. According to information from the Korean Command, the wreckage of three 'Meteor' was found. The pilots of those aircraft perished. The aircraft of the prisoner had also crashed."

⁵⁷ Letter from Donald W. Pinkstone to Paul M. Cole, August 4, 1994. Pinkstone quotes official Australian military sources in this letter.

B.4. Interrogation of F-86 pilot captured, January 7, 1952

Operational summary No. 42/K from January 7, 1952 states, "At 0849, the 196th IAP engaged up to 40 F-86 aircraft at an altitude of 10,000 m in the Bukhen area. The engagement lasted 15-16 minutes, ranged in altitude from 7,000 - 10,000 m and moved toward Anju. Ten Flyers fired on the enemy aircraft. Four F-86s were shot down. Colonel Pepelyaev, Lt. Colonel Mitusov, Captain Zaplavnij and Sr. Lt. Rud'ko each shot down an enemy aircraft

A 48-page Soviet interrogation protocol (plus one photograph) of Charles Eugene Stahl, an F-86E pilot shot down on January 7, 1952, was obtained. The Soviet interrogation record includes a drawing of an F-86 with serial number 51-651 and a photograph of 1Lt. Stahl. The interrogation record shows Stahl's take-off time to have been 09:00 (08:00 US time).

According to USAF casualty records, on January 7, 1952, 1Lt. Charles E. Stahl (A0 1911688), F-86 pilot, was lost over Namsi-dong during air-to-air combat. On April 27, 1952, 1Lt. Stahl's name was included in an enemy broadcast from North Korea and again in an article published in *Pravda* on November 18, 1952.

Conclusion: The Soviet report corresponds to the shoot down and interrogation of Charles Eugene Stahl. 1Lt. Stahl's casualty status, originally MIA, was changed to RMC when Stahl was repatriated in September 1953.

B.5. Eight bodies from one B-29 crash found, June 11, 1952

Operational Summary No. 00163 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64th IAK in Andung reports, "During the night of 11 June, a search team found the debris of one B-29 and 8 corpses to the west of Kakusan region. Furthermore, Korean and Chinese comrades reported seeing 1 B-29 fall into the sea and explode in an area 20 km southeast of Simni-do Island."

According to USAF casualty records, a B-29 (No. 44-61967A) was last seen on June 10, 1952 at 1341 hours near the bombs away position (39°41' N.-125°04' E.). Last positive radio transmission made on VHF at control point 38°15' N.-124°51' E. There were no distress signals or further transmissions of any sort. No further sightings of the aircraft were made when overdue at 0315 hours (local time) June 11, 1952, a search of the area was instituted with negative results. Among the crew of this B-29, 1Lt. Wilbur Eugene Lewis (A0 772859) was reported MIA on June 11, 1952 and has been carried in this casualty status ever since. Lewis, who in civilian life was an aircraft supervisor in a plane subassembly plant, is the only member of the missing B-29 crew listed in Air Force Manual 200-25 *Missing in Action: Korea*.

According to USAF casualty records, a B-29 (No. 44-62183) was reported to be caught in enemy searchlights, struck by rockets and destroyed in a mid-air explosion on the night of June 10, 1952. Eyewitnesses reported seeing the stricken aircraft fall to earth

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in three sections. According to USAF records, only one of the 13 member crew, Anton Brom Jr. (AO 701420), survived to be repatriated.⁵⁸

Conclusion: The Soviet records do not indicate whether the B-29 found as reported in Summary No. 00163 was shot down on June 11 or earlier. If the report concerns a B-29 found as a result of a search team sent out before June 11, then it may coincide with one of the two cases found in American sources. The Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked to provide the June 11, 1952 report of the Soviet search team concerning the B-29 and the disposition of the bodies found. If the Soviet report describes the crash of No. 44-61967A, then an additional 12 cases should be reviewed for possible change in casualty status from MIA to KIA(BNR).

B.6. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 1, 1952

In Operational Summary No. 00214 from the 64th IAK at Andung for August 1, 1952, the Soviet command reported to Moscow, "One of the downed F-86's fell 7 kilometers southeast of Sakchu. The side number is USAF 12767⁵⁹, the fuselage was marked with nine stars (each marking equates to one victory). The aircraft was destroyed, the pilot perished and his identity cannot be established."

According to a DPMO summary of USAF casualty data, Major Felix Asla Jr., who was engaged in aerial combat on August 1, 1952 near Sinuiju, became separated from his wingman.⁶⁰ He twice radioed for information as to whether visual contact could be established with his aircraft.⁶¹ The messages did not indicate that he was experiencing any difficulty at the time, although it appears that he failed to receive replies from the other pilot, who repeatedly advised that he did not have visual contact and was leaving the area. Subsequently, a report was received from a member of another flight in the area who witnessed and enemy fighter attack on Major Asla's F-86 and that his plane had lost the left wing. The aircraft was last seen spinning downward from an altitude of 23,000 feet at a point 15 miles southeast of Sakchu, North Korea at 0927 hours. A subsequent aerial search failed to reveal any trace of the missing aircraft or pilot.

Asla was not an ace. The only USAF ace with nine confirmed kills as of August 1, 1952 was 2Lt. James F. Low who had nine by June 15, 1952. Low was in the 335th FIS/4th FIW. Asla was in the 336th FIS/4th FIW. According to USAF casualty data, Asla was shot down in an F-86 with the serial number 51-2767.

Conclusion: The day, geographic data and aircraft serial number in the U.S. and Soviet accounts match the incident which resulted in the loss of Major Felix Asla. Since Major Asla's status is KIA(BNR), and since it is apparent from Soviet records that Asla's

⁵⁸ The other crew members were: Capt. Louis R. Gorrell, 1Lt. Harold R. Holmes, 1Lt. Robert B. Baumer, 1Lt. David Mandel, 1Lt. Robert E. Hudson, 1Lt. John H. Adams, S/Sgt. William A. Canning, A/1c Edgar F. Barrington, A/1c Elbert J. Reid Jr., A/1c Robert L. Ross, A/2c Thomas J. Pettit, A/2c Paul K. Kellstrom. All are listed as MIA by CILHI.

⁵⁹ The number also may read "USNF 1226720."

⁶⁰ USAF casualty data states Asla's aircraft serial number as "51-2767."

⁶¹ Asla, whose code name was Red One, asked twice, "Red Two, do you have me?" In each case the reply was "Negative."

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body was recovered by Soviet forces, the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked for information concerning the disposition of Major Asla's remains.

B.7. Eight Americans captured from B-29, July 4, 1952

According to Operational Summary No. 00186, from the Headquarters of the 64th IAK at Andung, on July 4, 1952, elements of the 351st IAP encountered a USAF B-29 while on a combat sortie. At 2246 hours, Major Karelin observed one B-29 in the searchlight beams near Khakusen at an altitude of 7200 meters and attacked it. Orienting on the flaming aircraft, the pilot conducted three more attacks and shot down the B-29. The bomber started to break up midair and fell two kilometers west of Khakusen. Four engines and the burnt fuselage were found at the crash site. According to Operational Summary No. 00186, "eight crew members of the B-29 were taken prisoner by our Chinese comrades. The shoot down of the aircraft by Major Karelin was seen from the KP IAK."

According to USAF casualty data, RB-29 (No. 44-61727) departed Yakota Air Base, Japan, at 1858 hours on July 3, 1952 for a night reconnaissance mission. Statements of repatriated crew members reveal that the RB-29 reached the Sinanju area at approximately 2330 hours and encountered sporadic ground fire directed from the bridge complex area. Shortly thereafter it was attacked by MiG-15 aircraft and severely damaged. At approximately 2343 hours, while at an altitude of 19,000 feet, the crew abandoned the aircraft which crashed some 20 miles southwest of Sinanju. Repatriate statements further reveal that Lt. Francis A. Strieby, the copilot, was the last crew member to observe Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast. Lt. Strieby states that he attempted to push Mast, the nose gunner, out the nose hatch. Mast resisted and took a swing at the copilot who left him standing beside the aircraft commander's seat. The copilot then started across the hatch toward the radio operator's position and encountered fire coming through the forward bulkhead door. This was the last he remembered prior to regaining consciousness in his parachute at an altitude of 1,000 feet.

Although some crew members believe Mast was captured and either killed or taken to Manchuria, they could give no evidence to support their belief. Of the 13 man crew, one was killed before bail-out, 11 were captured and repatriated and Mast remains MIA.⁶² S/Sgt. Richard L. Albright (18365010), another MIA case from this incident, is described in a Soviet cable to Moscow, along with Mast, as killed in the crash of the RB-29.

DPMO obtained from Russian sources the 6-page interrogation of Kenneth S. Brazil, crew member of the RB-29 shot down on July 4, 1952. This is apparently one of the eight captured Americans referred to in the Soviet operational summary.

Conclusion: The Soviet and American accounts concern the same aircraft incident. [See F.7 and F.8.]

⁶² Telegram No. 503826/III, November 26, 1952 (Top Secret).

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B.8. 1 F-86 shot down July 4, 1952

According to Operational Summary No. 00186 from the headquarters of the 64th Air Corps in Andung for July 4, 1952, two USAF F-86s were shot down by Soviet MiG-15s. One F-86 was reported shot down at 1127 hours, at an altitude of 1500-2000 meters, 20 kilometers south of Sakusyu by Senior Lt. Kruttskykh. The other F-86 was reported shot down at 1145 hours, near Chisyu-Bikhen by Senior Lt. Mishin.

USAF casualty records indicate that 1Lt. Austin Beetle (AO 840696), pilot of an F-86 (No. 50-683), was lost in air-to-air combat on July 4, 1952, at approximately 1257 hours. 1Lt. Beetle drown almost immediately after ejecting over Chodo Island. He could not be recovered with grappling hooks used by UN rescue forces even though they were no more than 300 yards away when 1Lt. Beetle hit the water.

Conclusion: The Soviet account for the 1145 shoot down appears to be consistent with the loss of 1Lt. Beetle. 1Lt. Beetle's status in CILHI data is MIA. [See F.19.]

B.9. Pilot of F-86 No. 15/24001, July 20, 1952

According to Operational Summary No. 00202 of the 64th IAK Headquarters in Andung, on July 20, 1952 between 1612-1620 hours, Maj. Zebelin's group (256th IAP), flying at an altitude of 7,000 - 13,000 meters over the Uiju/Bikhen region, engaged a total of 24 F-86s in separate groups of four. Maj. Zabelin shot down one F-86E, No. 15/24001, which crashed 12 kilometers southeast of Sinanju. The pilot of the F-86E was killed and the aircraft completely destroyed.

Conclusion: CILHI could not identify an F-86 with the registration number 15/24001. 1Lt. John G. Ellis Jr., for example, who was shot down on July 20, 1952, flew F-86 No. 492828. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to clarify this case.

B.10. Pilot of F-86 shot down, August 22, 1952

Operational Summary No. 00235 of the Soviet 64th Air Corps reports that for the 24 hour period ending August 22, 1952,

From pilot reports and photo-control data, 1 F-86 was shot down and 1 F-86 was damaged. From radio-intercept data, 2-F-86s were shot down and 1 F-86 was damaged. Flights of the 518th FAR completed their assigned mission in the area of Kajsan, Ansyu and Dzyunsan. Captain Frolov's flight encountered and engaged six F-86s in battle at 0950 in the area of [Khamisam?] at an altitude of 11,500 meters [37,350 feet]. Captain Chernavin's flight covered the attack of Captain Frolov's flight. Two pilots shot at the enemy aircraft. Senior Lieutenant [Ignatov?] shot down one F-86 from a distance of 500-600 meters at a ¼ quartering attack angle. The enemy aircraft crashed in the area of Kajsan; the [aircraft] remains were found; the pilot perished.⁶³

⁶³ Soviet Korean War veterans Col. Georgi Plotnikov and Col. General Valentin Sozinov remarked in a March 1992 interview, "The name of Major Delt came up in my conversation with General Lobov. I don't know what his position is. Be he also ejected and was captured, and then escorted somewhere. I think he was on the People's Republic of China territory." The reference to "Major Delts" has been associated with Deltis Fincher by DPMO analysts. Paul M. Cole, interview with Plotnikov and Sozinov, March 30, 1992, Moscow.

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According to the USAF casualty report, F-86E (No. 51-2866) pilot Major Deltis H. Fincher (AO 431410) departed Suwon Air Base, Korea for the Chong Chong River on August 22, 1952 to conduct a fighter sweep mission. Major Fincher was flying lead position in a flight of four F-86 aircraft. The flight entered the destination at 38,000 feet. Number 4 man called two MiGs at 10 o'clock position that were approaching 90° from the left of the flight. Number 1 and 2 men did not observe the MiGs immediately, and number 3 man told them to delay while he checked the MiGs' intentions. As the MiGs reached the 7 o'clock position, still on a 90° heading, MiG leader turned sharply in toward Major Fincher and his wingman. Major Saunders, number 3 man, called to Major Fincher to break to the left, which he did. MiG leader fired on Major Fincher, but Major Saunders did not observe strikes on Major Fincher's aircraft. Major Saunders called to Major Fincher and told him that he would try to take MiG number 2 and keep him out of action. Major Saunders moved into position and fired upon the MiG, but the MiG continued to pursue flight leader.

At this time flight leader called, "Is he still on me?" Major Saunders replied that his element was still pursuing MiG number 2. That was the last radio transmission received from Major Fincher. During the break number 2 man blacked out and did not observe any of the above mentioned action. When he regained consciousness he did not observe Major Fincher's aircraft in the area. Wingman called him several times, but Major Fincher did not acknowledge these calls. Major Fincher was last sighted at map grid coordinate 6333-II at 1049 hours. Major Fincher's casualty status continues to be MIA.

Conclusion: The positive association between the U.S. and Soviet data on the day, time, geographic location, and circumstances of this incident lead to the conclusion that the Soviet records describe the shoot down of Major Fincher. Fincher's current casualty status is MIA. [See F.2.]

B.11. Five bodies from one B-29 crash found, September 13, 1952

Operational Summary No. 00257 for the 64th IAK in Andung for September 13, 1952, reported, "From 2235 till 0106, the 87th anti-aircraft artillery division fired on 35 B-29's at altitudes ranging from 6800 meters to 7500 meters. Two B-29's were shot down and two B-29's were damaged. Part of one downed B-29 and 5 bodies were found. The search continues."⁶⁴

According to USAF records, on September 13, 1952 a B-29 (No. 44-86343) was "flying over to target when it was hit by enemy flak. It was seen to blow up in the air. No parachutes were observed leaving the plane. A rescue search for seven days with negative results. No chance for survival." CILHI records indicate that one of the 12 member crew, A/1c Fred Parker Jr., was repatriated in August 1953. Ten members of the crew are carried as BNR in the Battle Monuments list.⁶⁵ One of the crew members, 1Lt.

⁶⁴ Underscored in original.

⁶⁵ The ten are the following: 1Lt. William K. Phillis (MIA), 1Lt. Henry B. Kelley (MIA), 1Lt. Fred D. Bloesch (MIA), Capt. James A. Lowe (MIA), 1Lt. Spiro J. Peters (MIA), M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown (MIA), A/1c James O. Trosclair (MIA), A/1c Jimmie R. Hobday (MIA), A/1c James W. Kelly (MIA), and A/1c James R. Lebaron (MIA).

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Ted G. Royer, appears neither on the Battle Monuments BNR list nor on the USAF Korean War RMC list.

Conclusion: The Soviet records apparently describe the loss of USAF B-29 No. 44-86343. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to account for disposition of the five bodies which are described in the Soviet document. [See F.10.1 - F.10.10.]

B.12. F-86 Pilot Shot Down, April 12, 1953

According to Operational Summary No. 102 from the Headquarters of the Soviet 64th IAK for April 12, 1953, five USAF F-86s were shot down by Soviet forces. The reports and times of day are the following:

- At 1055, six MiG-15s from the 224th IAP (led by Captain Doroshenko), flying in the Siodzio region at 13500 meters altitude, engaged eight F-86 aircraft. One pilot, Captain Doroshenko, fired and hit one F-86.
- At 1055, six MiG-15s from the 224th IAP (led by Senior Lt. Anisimov), flying at 12500 meters altitude in the Dehehguan-dong region, engaged six F-86 aircraft. One pilot fired. Captain Lazarev shot down one F-86 at a distance of 600 meters, on the starboard beam.
- At 1105, a flight from the 535th IAP (led by Major Isakov) flying at 11000 meters altitude in the Kidzio region, engaged a pair of F-86s. One pilot fired. Captain Utkin shot down one F-86 from a distance of 350 meters, on the starboard beam.
- At 1115 hours, a pilot from the 224th IAP, Senior Lt. Berepidze, while on approach to the Andung airfield at 9000 meters altitude, attacked a pair of F-86s. He opened fire on the wingman, but no results were observed.

According to Air Force records, Lt. Robert Frank Niemann (22287A), pilot of F-86E/6 (No. 522891), was "bounced" by MiG aircraft while flying as number four, wingman to the element leader, at approximately 40,000 feet, 20 miles south of the Suiho Reservoir, on April 12, 1953. Lt. Niemann, who took off at 1115 hours, was reported to be MIA at 1225 hours the same day. Lt. Niemann was seen in a right turn with a MiG closing on his aircraft approximately 30 miles southwest of the Suiho Reservoir. Lt. Niemann's aircraft was last seen seven miles south of Sakchu.

Lt. Niemann was captured by enemy forces and subjected to interrogation. Niemann's name appears on the list compiled by the Russian side of the Joint Commission entitled, *A List of United States Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat and by Anti-Aircraft Artillery During Military Operations in Korea, Who Transited Through an Interrogation Point*. Niemann made an impression on Soviet intelligence officers because he refused to answer questions.⁶⁶ Soviet forces recorded a list of personal effects taken from Niemann.

⁶⁶ Soviet Korean War veteran Victor Bushuyev recalled, "The interrogations were easy. The only case was that of Niemann who refused to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal reason why he refused. He was in from hospital. He said it was a violation of international law." Paul M. Cole, *POW/MIA Issues: Volume 1, The Korean War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND MR-351/1-USDP, 1993), p. 142.

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Conclusion: The time of the attack (12:15 in USAF time) on the F-86 by Berepidze and the fact the attack was made on the USAF wingman, and the time Niemann was reported to be MIA (12:25) indicate that Soviet records describe the shoot down of 1Lt. Niemann. In contrast to the last sighting of Niemann's aircraft by USAF witnesses, Soviet records indicate that Lt. Niemann crashed in China near the Andung airfield.⁶⁷ Niemann's casualty status is MIA. [See F.13 and map at G.1.]

B.13. F-84 Shot Down April 12, 1953

Operational Summary No. 102 from the 64th Soviet IAK in Andung to Moscow for April 12, 1953 states, "at 1604, 8 MiG-15s from the 913th IAP (led by Captain Semenov), flying in the Bikhen region at 500m altitude, engaged 4 F-84s. 1 pilot, Captain Semenov, fired and shot down 1 F-84 at a distance of 800m on the target's rear aspect."

According to USAF records, F-84 (No. 51-4854) pilot 1Lt. James Washington Wills, Jr. (20408 AF), went into a shallow bomb run on April 12, 1953. After approximately two seconds of the explosion of the bomb released by Wills, a second explosion was observed approximately 2000 feet ahead of the bomb burst. A search of the area revealed burning wreckage of what appeared to be a crashed airplane. No parachute or sign of life was observed.

According to USAF records, F-84 (No. 51-1110A) pilot 1Lt. Lennard Owan Deluna (A0 2223617) was also shot down on April 12, 1953 at 19:51 hours during a night interdiction mission.

Conclusion: Of the two F-84s reported to be shot down by Soviet forces on this day, U.S. and Soviet records are not consistent with the loss of 1Lt. Lennard Owan Deluna, whose current casualty status is MIA. Soviet records appear to be consistent with the loss of 1Lt. James W. Wills Jr. Wills who is carried as BNR in the Battle Monuments list and MIA in CILHI records. There was no report by wingmen flying with Wills, however, of enemy aircraft activity. [See F.11 and F.12.]

B.14. - 24. Interrogation of 11 B-29 Crew Members

The B-29 case which appears in the 64th Soviet IAK daily operational summary (see B.8. above) was the subject of a 14-page telegram from General Slyusarev to Comrades Malinin and Batitski.⁶⁸ Slyusarev reported that eleven of the members of the B-29 crew shot down on July 24, 1952 had been interrogated by Soviet and Chinese forces. The Americans were interrogated, according to the telegram, were the following:

- B.14. 1Lt. Joseph E. Moreland
- B.15. 2Lt. Francis A. Strieby
- B.16. 1Lt. Kenneth S. Brazil
- B.17. A1C Edwin D. Combs

⁶⁷ Niemann's element leader, 1Lt. Donald W. Stewart Jr., who said the flight turned "left" before crossing the Yalu River, reported, "I estimated my position when I last saw Lt. Niemann as being 30 miles southwest of the Suiho Reservoir." Statement made April 14, 1953.

⁶⁸ Deciphered Telegram Msg. No. 503826/sh, November 26, 1952.

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- B.18. A1C William E. Koski
- B.19. SSgt. Charles V. Johansen
- B.20. A1C Kenneth H. Bass
- B.21. A2C Donald L. Hand
- B.22. SSgt. Bernard F. Rivers
- B.23. A1C Eugene E. Evers
- B.24. Captain Theodore R. Harris

All of these servicemen were returned to US military control after the Armistice.

Of particular interest in this telegram is the line, "Representatives from the MGB USSR and China have arrived from Peking to conduct further prisoner interrogations, in order to gain more precise information. . . The interrogation will be continued in Pekton."⁶⁹ Thus it is clear that the Soviet military permitted intelligence services to have access to American POWs and in this case invited them to participate. In addition, it is clear that Soviet intelligence organizations conducted these interrogations on North Korean territory.

Conclusion: The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to provide the MGB records of the interrogation of this crew.

B.25-26. USAF BNR Cases from the July 4, 1952 B-29 Shoot Down

In telegram No. 503826/sh discussed in B.14-24, Slyusarev reported that two members of the B-29 crew died:

- B.25. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright
- B.26. SSgt. Clifford H. Mast

Conclusion: Both of these are MIA cases. The Russian side of the USRJC should be asked to provide information concerning the disposition of the remains of Albright and Mast. If the remains were buried at the crash site an effort could be made today to recover them. [See F.7 and F.8.]

B.27. Col. Robert R. Martin

Enciphered telegram No. 406466/sh, which was sent to Deputy Chief of the Soviet General Staff Zakharov and copied to the entire Politburo, including Stalin, by Shytkov on July 24, 1950, raises an important issue. Shytkov reports that the commanding officer of the US 34th Infantry Regiment was captured. The four commanders of the 34th between June and July 1950 were the following:

- Col. Jay B. Loveless, June 25 - July 7. Relieved of command and sent to Japan.
- Col. Robert R. Martin, July 7 - July 8. Reported to have been killed in action.
- Lt. Col. Robert L. Wadlington, July 8 - July 18. Temporary commander who was not captured.

⁶⁹ This appears to be a reference to the POW came at Pyoktong.

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Col. Charles E. Beauchamp, July 18-onward. Departed Korea ca. April 1951.

Conclusion: The only commander of the 34th Infantry Regiment who is not accounted for is Robert R. Martin, whose current casualty status is MIA. [See F.17.]

C. Soviet-era Archive Data on POW/MIA Who May Have Died In Soviet Custody

Soviet archive records include information concerning the death of at least one and perhaps two American servicemen who may have died in Soviet custody during the Korean War:

- C.1. Captain Charles E. McDonough
- C.2. Captain Albert G. Tenney

C.1 Charles E. McDonough

According to USAF records, including the testimony of repatriated POW Captain Hamilton B. Shawe, the last American known to have seen Captain McDonough alive, McDonough's RB-45C (No. 48 015) departed Yakota Air Base, Japan, on December 4, 1950 for a combat reconnaissance mission over North Korea.⁷⁰ The Department of the Air Force described the route of the RB-45 as "Sinuiju eastward to Hoeryong along the North Korean border." McDonough told Shawe the RB-45 was "jumped by five MiGs" over the Yalu River.

On the first pass, his aircraft was partially crippled and he was unable to jettison his bomb bay tank which gave the MiGs an opportunity to make a second pass. On the second pass, two of his engines were shot out, and he went into a spin at about 35,000 feet. At about 1,000 feet, he finally managed to get the canopy off and bail. Major McDonough was the only one to escape from the aircraft. He landed in the burning wreckage of the aircraft and had his hands and face burned and lost his flying boots. He then evaded for three to four days, wandering around in the snow without any shoes which of course cause severe frostbite.

USAF records state with certainty that McDonough's RB-45 was shot down over North Korea. McDonough's 293 file states that the location of the shoot down was grid coordinate 6034-II. McDonough's Case Status Card states that McDonough "parachuted into crash near Sinuiju."

In a Soviet interrogation of McDonough previously obtained by DPMO, McDonough said the attack occurred "after lunch, about 2:00. ... They shot us down near the Chusan [phonetic] at about 30,000 feet [9,000 meters]. One jet plane shot us down. The plane caught fire and all three crew members bailed out. I saw one run off, I don't know where the other went to, and I landed where the plane crashed."

⁷⁰ The crew of the RB-45 included, in addition to McDonough, Colonel John R. Lovell, 924A; Captain Jules E. Young, AO800628; and co-pilot and 1 Lieutenant James J. Picucci, AO928027. In a Soviet interrogation of McDonough previously obtained by DPMO, McDonough told the Soviets on December 18, 1950, "The type of [aircraft] I fly on is the RB-45. It has a crew of three." There were four Americans on this RB-45 when it was shot down.

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In the first of two Soviet cables obtained by DFI,⁷¹ dated December 17, 1950, information concerning this RB-45 was sent from Belov to Shtemenko and Batitski. Belov reported,

An aircraft shot down on December 4, 1950 of the B-45 type fell in a region 70 km to the east of Andung. The aircraft caught fire in the air and upon falling to earth burned up completely. The crew bailed out on parachutes. The pilot, Charles McDonough, was taken prisoner.

Further, Belov reported that under interrogation McDonough said the RB-45 had been shot down at 30,000 feet [9000 meters]. McDonough is reported to have said the navigator landed and ran off. The radio operator disappeared but McDonough did not know where. There was no mention of the fourth man, Colonel John R. Lovell.

The following day, December 18, 1950, Krasovskii reported to Batiskii concerning McDonough,

I am informing you, the pilot from the downed B-45 aircraft died en route and the interrogation was not finished. I am sending you the material that I have on hand.

Col. Orlov stated with no reference to primary source data, "On 4 December 1950 a B-45 was shot down in East Andung."⁷² McDonough's Soviet interrogation record refers to the shoot down location as near the Cusan (Chosin?) reservoir.

Conclusion: A clear discrepancy exists between Soviet and American records as to the location of the November 4, 1950 crash of RB-45 No. 8015. There is substantial reason to suspect that McDonough crashed in China and no doubt was interrogated by Soviet forces. This raises doubts whether McDonough was evading after capture or was in Soviet or Chinese custody for some or all of the time between the shoot down on the fourth and McDonough's appearance in Sinuiju on the fourteenth. McDonough appears to have died in Soviet custody or at least with a Soviet witness during transport to an undetermined location where, according to Soviet reporting, the unfinished interrogation was apparently scheduled to continue. [See D.2, F.14, and map at G.1.]

C.2 Captain Albert G. Tenney

Russian sources have given three "official" versions of the fate of Captain Tenney: 1) Tenney died at Myaogou airfield; 2) Tenney died in the vicinity of Myaogou airfield; and 3) Soviet records contain no information concerning the fate of Captain Tenney.

Conclusion: Until the Russian side of the USRJC is able to resolve the contradictions in its own reporting, the possibility that Tenney was alive in Soviet custody cannot be excluded. [See F.1.]

⁷¹ Both cables have been submitted in their entirety to DPMO previously by DFI. CDR Kurt Hoffman said that neither document was accepted as a formal submission to the USRJC, thus there are no TFR numbers.

⁷² Eighth Plenum, p. KW-2.

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D. Information Obtained from Soviet Veterans Associated With POW/MIAs

Information obtained from Soviet Air Force veterans may be associated by name with the following Korean War POW/MIA cases:

- D.1. Captain William D. Crone
- D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough
- D.3. Maj. George A. Davis
- D.4. Austin W. Beetle
- D.5. "Van Paul"

D.1. Captain William D. Crone

According to DPMO's August 1993 study, *The Transfer of U.S. Korean War POWs to the Soviet Union*, Captain Crone was participating in a four aircraft combat mission in the Sinuiju area of North Korea on June 18, 1951. Approximately 30 kilometers southeast of Sinuiju, the formation was attacked by eight enemy aircraft at 25,000 feet. Captain Crone was last seen in a 360 degree tight right turn. Circumstances of his loss could not be ascertained and an aerial search revealed no clues as to his fate. USAF casualty data pinpoint the time of the crash of Crone's aircraft at 11:30 hours.

Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel Askold Germon reported in May 1994 that he was able "to determine, with a reasonable degree of reliability, the fate of William D. Crone." Working through a network of Soviet veterans and the Moscow Aviation Institute, Germon learned that on June 18, 1951 at 0946 local time in Korea, an American F-86 was rammed, or more likely was simply involved in a collision, during an air engagement with Soviet fighters. Both aircraft crashed as a result of the incident. The Soviet airman was able to parachute to safety, but the American was killed.⁷³ According to Germon, in all probability this American pilot was Captain Crone. Germon also noted that this incident was reported in the June 21, 1951 edition of *Izvestiya*. Other Soviet veterans have previously reported seeing Crone's identification card.

Conclusion: A discrepancy exists in USAF and Soviet records as to the time of the crash of William Crone's F-86. USAF records are uncertain as to the circumstances of loss, thus the estimate of the time of the crash may not be accurate. [See F.3.]

D.2. Captain Charles E. McDonough

In addition to the information obtained from Soviet archive sources, Soviet Air Force veterans provided the following information on the shoot down of McDonough's RB-45 on December 4, 1950.

Retired Soviet Air Force Colonel Askold Germon reported in April 1994 that a Captain Vidinskij was the pilot of one of four MiGs which attacked an USAF RB-45 at 11:35 hours on December 4, 1950. According to Germon's conversation with unnamed

⁷³ Germon reported in July 1994 that Crone "collided with a Soviet MiG piloted by Major Subbotin of the 176th Guards Aviation Regiment. The search group found Crone's photograph and other documents."

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individuals writing a book on the Korean War, one member of the RB-45's crew was seen leaving the stricken aircraft at 2,000 meters. According to this source, the RB-45 crashed 15 to 20 kilometers (9 to 12 miles) north of Ti-Sin (phonetic).

Col. Germon reported on May 27, 1994 additional information on the RB-45 case. According to Germon's sources, pilot A. F. Andrianov, who now lives in Moscow, received credit for shooting down the RB-45. The RB-45 was on a course from Mukden to Andung when it was intercepted. Participants in the engagement reported that they saw one American crew member parachute from the aircraft. According to Germon's conversation with the Soviet participants, the other members of the RB-45 crew were killed in the crash of the RB-45. According to Soviet documents, the wreckage of the RB-45 was collected by Soviet forces for shipment to the USSR.

In October 1994, DFI's research team met with Alexander Fyodorovich Andrianov, who described the circumstances concerning the shoot down of the RB-45 on December 4, 1950. When it was detected, the RB-45 was flying "very fast" at an altitude of 10,000 meters (33,000 feet). A flight of four MiGs (*a sveno*), including Andrianov and Alexey Kurnosov, were scrambled to intercept.⁷⁴ After approximately 80 to 100 kilometers, it seemed they would not be able to catch up with the faster American aircraft which had not yet reacted to the pursuing MiGs. When the MiGs were finally detected, the "RB-45 made a turn south to run for Japan." The RB-45 was on a southeast course over China. The turn slowed down the RB-45 enough for the MiGs to come within firing range, approximately 15 kilometers north of Andung.

Each of the four MiGs opened fire and the RB-45 was hit by all of them.⁷⁵ The RB-45 caught fire and went into a tight spin. Andrianov tracked the aircraft down to 13,000 feet where he saw one parachute deploy. He circled around the parachute, contemplating opening fire on the crewman, but did not. During this time the RB-45 crashed, so Andrianov did not have visual contact with it the entire way down. Though Andrianov heard that the entire crew on board was killed, he cannot categorically exclude the possibility that other parachutes appeared. Andrianov was by this time low on fuel and returned to Andung.

A deputy regimental political officer named Fironov interrogated the captured RB-45 pilot, Charles McDonough. Fironov noted that McDonough was heavily bandaged, in part because his mouth had been ripped apparently by the wind during the bail out. Fironov said McDonough was both "arrogant and courageous." After being interrogated by Russians in Andung, McDonough was turned over to the North Koreans who transported him across the Yalu River to Sinuiju. Fironov said the North Koreans hung a sign around McDonough's neck stating he was a US war criminal, put him on display in a

⁷⁴ The flight leader, according to Andrianov, was a pilot named Poloponov.

⁷⁵ The four pilots could not determine who should receive credit for the kill, thus they drew cards for it. Whoever drew the Jack of Clubs would win. Andrianov won and thus received credit. Soviet pilots also received bonuses for shoot downs -- 3,000 rubles for an RB-45, 2,000 for a B-29, and 1,000 rubles for a fighter.

public square, and permitted a mob to beat McDonough to death. Andrianov could not recall any information concerning the disposition of the pilot's remains.

Conclusion: Soviet Air Force veterans confirm that only one member of the RB-45 crew was observed to parachute from the stricken aircraft. The veterans have offered no evidence of other survivors. The location of the crash of the RB-45, according to Soviet veterans, was China rather than North Korea as shown in USAF records. [See D.2, F.14, and map at G.1.]

D.3. Major George A. Davis

According to Col. Germon, Davis was shot down and killed shortly after he had shot down two Soviet MiGs. "At the sight of the crash," Germon added, "besides documents the search team found his pistol. It is quite possible that he was shot down by Mikhail A. Averin." Lt. Gen. Georgii Lobov, commander of the 64th air corps, noted in his memoirs, "Our pilots shot down. . . Maj. George A. Davis, the top American ace of the war at the time (killed)."

According to the Battle Monuments list of Korean War BNR cases. According to CILHI records, Lt. Col. George A. Davis Jr. (13035A) was shot down on February 10, 1952. According to *F-86 Sabre*, Major George A. Davis, who was expected to become the Korean War's "ace of aces . . . the leading ace of the war," attacked a MiG formation at 32,000 feet (9,753m) near the Yalu, where he recorded his 13th and 14th MiG kills. During this engagement Davis was shot down by a MiG.⁷⁶ *F-86 Sabre* states that Davis was killed on February 10, 1952, during a mission near Uiju, south of the Yalu River, though there is no direct evidence pointing toward the fact of Davis's death.

USAF records indicate that Major Davis's wingman "followed him straight down and observed [Davis] pull up from dive and head southeast with wheels down and smoke coming from aircraft" after Davis was struck by MiG cannon fire near XE 3530. At XE 8070 Davis was observed to start "a large spiral to left and aircraft was seen to crash and burn at XE 8315." The wingman "due to watching for enemy aircraft did not observe whether [Davis] bailed out or not. There was snow on the ground making it difficult to locate a parachute."

Conclusion: Soviet data is consistent with USAF records on Lt. Col. George A. Davis. According to CILHI data, Lt. Col. George A. Davis Jr., whose crash date is February 10, 1952 and crash site reported to be at Anju, near the mouth of the Chong Chong River well south of Uiju, (coordinates 6233-IV or XE830150), is a Korean War MIA. According to USAF data, "due to the fact that the entire descent of Major Davis's aircraft was not observed and because of the difficulty of seeing a parachute against a background of snow that Major Davis should be continued in MIA status." [See F.16.]

⁷⁶ Robert F. Dorr, (Osceola, WI: Motorbooks International Publishers, 1993), p. 129. Maj. Davis, promoted posthumously to Lt. Col., was the only F-86 pilot to be awarded the Medal of Honor during the Korean War.

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D.4. Lt. Austin W. Beetle

Soviet Air Force veterans reported to DFI in July 1994 that Beetle "apparently was a Black man and his plane was shot down. His plane had both Korean War and World War II stars on the cabin."

According to USAF records, Lt. Beetle and his element leader, Captain Clifford D. Jolley, were engaged in an intense dogfight with several MiGs on July 4, 1952 near Sinuiju. Beetle (A0 840696, F-86 No. 50-683) was taking fire from a MiG which Jolley "slid in behind . . . and fired a short burst which ripped the right horizontal stabilizer off. The MiG immediately snapped over and spun in." A few minutes later, Beetle reported that he "was hit bad. He was over the Yalu River mouth at 25,000 feet." Both Jolley and Beetle, extremely low on fuel, steered toward Chodo Island. Jolley and Beetle both ejected. Jolley was plucked from the water by a South Korean rescue ship, taken to Chodo, then transported by helicopter to K-16 Air Base. Jolley reported that Beetle "bailed out over Chodo Island and landed at SC 5668. An Air rescue SA-16 was 300 yards from Yellow Two when he hit the water and 100 yards from him when he went under. [Beetle] was dragged under almost immediately upon contact with the water, apparently by his parachute. Crew members of the rescue aircraft used a grapple with no success."

Conclusion: The information from the Soviet Air Force veterans matches that of Lt. Beetle. According to CILHI data, Beetle's casualty status is MIA. Beetle, who was born in 1916 and thus was old enough to have been in World War II, was a Caucasian. [See F.19.]

D.5. "Van Paul"

Col. Germon reported in July 1994 that of the "15 or 16 men in the crew" of the RB-29 shot down in January 1953, "12 bailed out and the rest died. The name of one of the crew members killed was Van Paul. The pilot who shot down this airplane now lives in Kharkov."

On January 13, 1953, USAF RB-29 (No. 44-62217) departed Yakota Air Base Japan for a "mission-classified" psychological fanfare leaflet drop. The RB-29 was shot down by enemy MiGs. One of the crew members, 1Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis (A0 2091867), is currently an Korean War MIA case. (For additional information on this RB-29 incident, see the discussion of Col. John Arnold above.)

Conclusion: Germon's information is consistent with the circumstances of loss for Paul Van Voorhis, whose current casualty status is MIA. [See related case at A.1.7, F.4, and map at G.1.]

E. Uncorrelated Information From Soviet Archives

The following information from Soviet military archives concerning American aircraft shot down during the Korean War could not be correlated with data from U.S. archives. DFI International had neither the resources nor the access to relevant archive

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holdings in order to compare the following shoot downs to U.S. records. (All shoot downs were by aircraft unless noted as AAA.)

- E.1. 1 B-29, October 23, 1951, shot down by the 1777th AA Regiment.
- E.2. 1 F-86, October 26, 1951, 1000 hrs @ 8000 meters, near Dzyunsen
- E.3. 3 F-80's, October 26, 1951, 1059 hrs @ 5000 meters, near Dzyunsen
- E.4. 1 F-80, October 26, 1951, 1455 @ 2-3000 meters, south of Anju
- E.5. 1 F-86, December 15, 1951, 1025 hrs @ 9-11000 meters
- E.6. 1 F-86, December 15, 1951, 1031 hrs @ 10.5-11000 meters, south of Anju
- E.7. 1 F-86, December 15, 1951, 1028 hrs @ 11.5-12000 meters, south of Anju
- E.8. 2 F-86's, January 7, 1952
- E.9. 2 F-86's, January 7, 1952, 0849 hrs @ 7-10000 meters, near Bukhen-Anju
- E.10. 1 F-86, January 8, 1952, 0933 hrs @ 10000 meters, NE of Bikhén/Andung
- E.11. 1 F-86, January 8, 1952, 1418 hrs @ 9-11500 meters, near Anju-Taesen
- E.12. 1 B-26, May 3, 1952
- E.13. 1 F-86, May 3, 1952, 1722 hrs near Tajsen
- E.14. 1 F-86, May 10, 1952, 0732 hrs by AAA 10 km south of Sensen
- E.15. 1 F-51, May 10, 1952, 1 km SE of Kokunendon
- E.16. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2145 hrs @ 6500 meters near Sensen
- E.17. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2200 hrs @ 7800 meters 15-20 km east of Sensen
- E.18. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2225 hrs @ 7000 meters 20 km SE of Semni-do
- E.19. 1 B-29, June 11, 1952, 2145-2230 hrs, fell into the sea
- E.20. 1 F-86, June 11, 1952, 1824 hrs, near Bikhén-Ryugampo region
- E.21. 1 B-29, June 16, 1952, fell into the sea
- E.22. 1 B-29, July 4, 1952, 2210 hrs @ 7500 meters, 75 km west of Kajsyu/Tenuzen
- E.23. 1 B-29, July 4, 1952, 2246 hrs @ 7200 meters near Khakusen
- E.24. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1127 hrs @ 1500-2000 meters, 20 km south of Sakusyu
- E.25. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1125 hrs @ 1500-2000 meters, 20-25 km south of Sakusyu
- E.26. 1 F-84, July 4, 1952, 1121 hrs, near Dehehguandong, destroyed in mid-air
- E.27. 1 F-86, July 4, 1952, 1145 hrs, near Chisuy-Bikhén
- E.28. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952, 1604-1620 hrs @ 8-10000 meters, near Sinuiju

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- E.29. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952, 1612-1620 hrs @ 7-13000 meters, near Uiju-Bikhen
- E.30. 1 F-86, July 20, 1952
- E.31. 4 F-86's, August 1, 1952
- E.32. 1 F-86, August 22, 1952
- E.33. 1 B-29, September 13, 1952, 2311 hrs, 10 km SE of Sakusyu
- E.34. 1 or 2 B-29's, September 13, 1952, 2235-0106 hrs @ 6800-7500 meters, 5 bodies
- E.35. 3 F-86's, October 18, 1952, 0941 hrs @ 12000 meters, 30 km west of Pukchin
- E.36. 3 F-86's, January 13, 1953, one of which exploded in mid-air
- E.37. 1 B-29, January 13, 1953, 2125 hrs @ 7000 meters, crash near Simni-do Island
- E.38. 1 F-86, January 23, 1953, 1121-1123 hrs @ 400 meters, near Dzehguandong/Kydzio/Bugdin
- E.39. 2 F-86, April 7, 1953, 0940-0945 hrs, 20 km NE of Sensen
- E.40. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0807 hrs @ 11000 meters, near Siodzio
- E.41. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0754 hrs @ 13000 meters, near Siodzio
- E.42. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 0753-0800 hrs @ 13000 near Siodzio
- E.43. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1055 @ 13500 meters, near Deheguandong
- E.44. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1115 on approach to Andung airfield
- E.45. 1 F-86, April 12, 1953, 1105 @ 11000 meters, near Kidzio

F. Change of Casualty Status Recommendations

The first attempt to use Soviet AAA records in order to provide data on which the casualty basis of U.S. Korean War MIAs could be changed occurred in 1993.⁷⁷ A subsequent effort, which according to a Joint Commission member was also "the first time that we have been able to use both Russian and US records to resolve missing in action cases" using Soviet AAA battery records, was completed by June 1994.⁷⁸ This section is an effort to use, for the first time, the daily operational summaries of the Soviet 64th Fighter Corps' air combat operations either to resolve the fate of American POW/MIA cases or to recommend a change of casualty status.

⁷⁷ A report from Soviet AAA battery number 4510, November 23, 1951, was published in *POW/MIA Issues: Volume I, The Korean War*, pps. 119-120. The USAF personnel, carried as MIA in American records, who were reported dead in this report are the following: 1Lt. Jack A. Fisher (A0 2087035), Maj. Gordon K. Kahl (A0 0437317), and 1Lt. John Roumiguire (A0 2221990). The Soviet records are consistent with USAF Field Search Case 753.

⁷⁸ *Minutes of the Korean War Working Group, Ninth Plenum of the USRJC on POW/MIA Affairs, 1-2 June 1994*, p. 27.

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The source of information on which this section is based, i.e. the records of the Soviet 64th Fighter Corps' air combat operations, has not been made available elsewhere. It is worth recalling what USRJC member Col. Mukhin said about the operational summaries, "Regarding these daily journals, the combat journals as they're called, they are summaries of activities that occurred, like a historical document. I don't think that there will be much interest in them."⁷⁹ In contrast to Col. Mukhin's view, as shown in this report the operational summaries contain a vast amount of relevant data which provided the basis for the following recommendations for a change of casualty status.

The following POW/MIA cases are described in sufficient detail to warrant an examination of the data for the purpose of making an official change of casualty status.

F.1. Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney	FROM: MIA	TO: POW(BNR)
F.2. Major Deltis Fincher	FROM: MIA	TO: POW(BNR)
F.3. Captain William D. Crone	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.4. 1Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.5. 1Lt. Henry D. Weese	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.6. Airman 1/c Alvin D. Hart, Jr.	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.7. S/Sgt. Clifford H. Mast	FROM: POW(BNR)	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.8. S/Sgt. Richard L. Albright	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.9. 1Lt. Vance R. Frick	Reconcile CILHI & USAF data.	
F.10. B-29 Crew		
F.10.1 1Lt. William K. Phillis	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.2. 1Lt. Henry B. Kelley	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.3. 1Lt. Fred D. Bloesch	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.4. Capt. James A. Lowe	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.5. 1Lt. Spiro J. Peters	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.6. M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.7. A/1c James O. Trosclair	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.8. A/1c Jimmie R. Hobday	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.9. A/1c James W. Kelly	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.10.10. A/1c James R. Lebaron	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.11. 1Lt. James Washington Wills, Jr.	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.12. 1Lt. Lennard Owan Deluna	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)
F.13. 1Lt. Robert F. Niemann	FROM: MIA	TO: POW(BNR)

⁷⁹ Ninth Plenum report, p. 41.

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F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough	FROM: KIA(BNR)	TO: POW(BNR)
F.15. Col. John R. Lovell	FROM: KIA(BNR)	TO: MIA
F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis	FROM: MIA	TO: POW(BNR)
F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin	FROM: KIA(BNR)	TO: POW(BNR)
F.18. Lt. Laurence C. Layton	FROM: MIA	TO: POW(BNR)
F.19. 1Lt. Austin Beetle	FROM: MIA	TO: KIA(BNR)

F.1. Albert Gilbert Tenney

The report of Tenney's loss was initially thought to have been deliberately distorted by his flight leader in order to conceal the fact that the USAF, in this case at least eight F-86s, was operating in Chinese airspace against standing orders.⁸⁰ This hypothesis could not be proven. Current information is consistent with the original description of the circumstances of Tenney's loss. Captain Tenney's lead that day, Captain William R. "Nuts" Nowadnick, stated on July 19, 1994, "I'll guarantee you the aircraft hit the water and Tenney was in it."⁸¹ Tenney's MIA status was based on the observation that his aircraft was not observed to sink, the impact on the water was not necessarily fatal, and there were North Korean surface vessels in the vicinity which could have captured Tenney. In addition, Lt. Col. Nowadnick (Ret.) said, "Tenney's plane had no battle damage. 37 millimeter cannon shells leave a pretty good mark. There wasn't a mark on the aircraft. I was no more than 25 feet away during the entire descent, maybe four minutes, before Tenney struck the water at something like Mach .9."

Since Soviet records contain direct evidence concerning Tenney's death "in the vicinity of Myaogou field," the prospect for a recovery and identification of these remains is greatly enhanced.

Based on the analysis of the information obtained by DFI concerning Captain Albert Gilbert Tenney, DFI recommends the following:

- That Air Force casualty affairs change Captain Tenney's casualty status from MIA to POW(BNR) until the Russian side of the USRJC is able to demonstrate the circumstances of Tenney's death;
- That the Russian side of the Joint Commission be given the task to determine how Soviet forces disposed of Captain Tenney's body, including the burial location, and

⁸⁰ F-86 ace Col. Harold Fischer said, "Pilots routinely did this during debriefings. There was no order from above. You just did this to avoid problems or even possibly being dismissed from the Air Force." Discussion with Paul M. Cole, July 27, 1994.

⁸¹ Conversation with Paul M. Cole.

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- A request be made to the government of the PRC, the country where the grave is presumably located, for permission to recover the remains.⁸²

F.2. Deltis Fincher

Recommendation: There is not a significant discrepancy between the circumstances of loss for Deltis Fincher as described in USAF and Soviet records. Soviet records, however, state with certainty that Fincher's F-86 was found and Fincher perished in the crash. There are adequate grounds on which to question the authenticity of the Soviet records of this incident, thus the casualty status of Major Deltis Fincher be changed from MIA to POW(BNR). The Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked for information as to the disposition of Major Fincher in light of Lobov's statement that Fincher had been captured and transported to an undetermined location.

F.3. William Crone

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to question the validity of the conclusion derived from Soviet Air Force veterans and the Moscow Aviation Institute, the casualty status of Captain William D. Crone should be changed from MIA to believed to be KIA(BNR).

F.4. 1Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet archive documents which state the precise number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953 and the veracity of the reporting from Soviet Air Force veterans who provided information that "Van Paul" was one of those killed in this crash, the casualty status of 1Lt. Paul E. Van Voorhis should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR).

F.5. 1Lt. Henry D. Weese

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953, the casualty status of 1Lt. Henry D. Weese should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR)

F.6. Airman 1Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr.

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on January 13, 1953, the casualty status of Airman 1 Class Alvin D. Hart, Jr. should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR)

⁸² A complete set of Tenney's dental records, on which a positive identification may be based, exist and are available.

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F.7. Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast

Recommendation: Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on July 4, 1952, the casualty status of Ssgt. Clifford H. Mast (AF19417343) should be changed from POW(BNR) to KIA(BNR).

F.8. Ssgt. Richard L. Albright

Unless there are adequate grounds on which to challenge the veracity of the Soviet reporting concerning number of bodies found in the crash of the USAF RB-29 shot down on July 4, 1952, the casualty status of Ssgt. Richard L. Albright (AF18365010) should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR).

F.9. 1Lt. Vance R. Frick

Recommendation: Reconcile CILHI and USAF Casualty Office data.

F.10. Five members of B-29 crew shot down September 13, 1952.

Recommendation: Five of the following are confirmed dead in Soviet records. The original USAF report noted there was "no chance for survival" for the crew, though one crew member did survive. At a minimum the casualty status of five, and in view of the records perhaps all ten, of the following should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR).

- F.10.1 1Lt. William K. Phillis
- F.10.2. 1Lt. Henry B. Kelley
- F.10.3. 1Lt. Fred D. Bloesch
- F.10.4. Capt. James A. Lowe
- F.10.5. 1Lt. Spiro J. Peters
- F.10.6. M/Sgt. Nelson M. Brown
- F.10.7. A/1c James O. Trosclair
- F.10.8. A/1c Jimmie R. Hobday
- F.10.9. A/1c James W. Kelly
- F.10.10. A/1c James R. Lebaron.

F.11. 1Lt. James Washington Wills Jr.

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for disputing the veracity of USAF and Soviet records pertaining to this case, 1Lt. Wills should be reclassified from MIA to KIA(BNR).

F.12. 1Lt. Lennard Owan Deluna

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for disputing the veracity of USAF and Soviet records pertaining to this case, 1Lt. Deluna should be reclassified from MIA to KIA(BNR).

F.13. 1Lt. Robert F. Niemann

Soviet records suggest and Soviet veterans confirm, that Niemann was alive, for an unknown period of time, after he was shot down over China. Soviet veterans confirm Niemann was alive long enough for Soviet forces to record the fact that Niemann refused to answer questions during interrogation.⁸³ Niemann's personal effects were collected by Soviet forces⁸⁴ and Niemann's name was included on a list prepared by the Russian side of the USRJC, *List of US Air Force Personnel Shot Down in Aerial Combat or by Anti-Aircraft Artillery during Combat Operations in Korea and Transited Through an Interrogation Point*.⁸⁵ Three Soviet and Russians sources--Soviet document, veterans, and the Russian side of the USRJC--independently point toward the fact that Niemann survived the crash of his F-86 and was interrogated by Soviet forces.

Recommendation: Regardless of the actual location of the shoot down of 1Lt. Niemann, since the evidence strongly suggests that he was alive in enemy hands and since Soviet veterans of the Korean War have direct knowledge of Niemann alive in captivity, Niemann's casualty status should be changed from MIA to POW(BNR). The Russian side of the Joint Commission should be asked to provide further information on the Niemann case, particularly concerning the direct evidence of an interrogation record. Failing that, the Russian side should be asked to support its position by providing information on the location of Niemann at the time of death and the disposition of remains. [See map at G.1.]

F.14. Captain Charles E. McDonough

The McDonough case, indeed the fate of each crew member of the RB-45, is both unresolved and littered with contradictory evidence.⁸⁶

There are at least two "authoritative" locations for the RB-45 crash site:

- 1) Near the Yalu River (CILHI data, map grid 6332-IV, Col. Orlov from March 2, 1994); and
- 2) Near Andung, China (Soviet records and Col. Orlov's reports).

There are three conflicting versions of when McDonough was last seen alive:

- 1) "Died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site," according to "A. Orlov."⁸⁷

⁸³ *POW/MIA Issues: Volume I, The Korean War*, p. 142. The Soviet officer responsible for preparing interrogation records said, "The interrogations were easy. The only case was that of Neimann who refused to answer any questions. He was wounded and that was the formal reason why he refused. He was in some hospital. He said it was a violation of some international laws. Of course they wanted to interrogate him, but then I never saw any materials of his interrogations."

⁸⁴ TFR 76-34

⁸⁵ USAF analysis of the Korean War POW experience and Soviet records point toward the North Korean city of Sinuiju as the place referred to as "the interrogation point."

⁸⁶ On what evidence, for example, did Belov base his conclusion that the crew of the RB-45 "bailed out on parachutes?" Is it solely from McDonough's interrogation, or are there other reports?

⁸⁷ TFR 217-1, entitled "Last names of American fliers mentioned in documents of the 64th IAK [Fighter Aviation Corps], citing TsAMO, f.5, op 918795, d. 120, 559, 574.

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- 2) "Died en route," according to Soviet reporting to Moscow on December 18, 1950;
- 3) "On the night of December 16, 1950 we were both taken from the cell... Major McDonough was placed on an ox cart, and I was told by the interpreter that he was being taken to a hospital for medical attention. Since that night I have never seen or heard anything of Major McDonough, and I feel reasonably certain that he passed away or was killed," according to Captain Shawe.

There are four conflicting versions of whose custody McDonough was in when he died.

1. Repatriated POW Shawe reported McDonough was taken away on a ox cart by an unspecified captor.
2. Col. Orlov has said repeatedly that McDonough was in Chinese custody and all information in Soviet records was provided by Chinese forces.
3. Soviet records indicate that McDonough was in Soviet custody at least part of the time between the shoot down (December 4) and the day he was last seen alive (December 16 or 17).
4. Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was in North Korean custody with a Soviet political officer as an escort when he died.

To support its version of events, the Russian side of the Joint Commission presented two documents concerning the McDonough case, a handwritten note and one document which "had been cut from complete documents and taped together on a single sheet of paper."⁸⁸ The Russian interpretation of the documents is either less than competent or deliberately deceptive.

Col. Orlov passed to the American side a handwritten note concerning McDonough which the American side considered to be disingenuous. Orlov wrote that McDonough "died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site" giving the false impression that McDonough died on the same day as the crash.⁸⁹ DPMO noted, "It is likely that Orlov was trying, in his note, to present the information in a more positive light than did the original documents."

The Russian version of why two documents had been cut apart and pasted into one does not withstand careful scrutiny. Orlov asserted that the portions of the two documents redacted by the Russians "is a report that contains other things. We gave all that pertains to POWs."⁹⁰ This statement was not entirely true.

⁸⁸ TFR-242-2. DFI previously obtained and sent to DPMO complete copies of both documents. The Russian cut-and-paste job was a significant distortion of the content and format of the original documents. The Russian side summarized and redacted these documents to conceal, among other things, the fact McDonough lived for at least two weeks following the crash of his aircraft. Col. Alexander Orlov provided the American side of the USRJC a handwritten document (TFR-217-1), a summary allegedly derived from documents of the 64th IAK, which inaccurately and deceptively states that McDonough "died during evacuation from the aircraft crash site."

⁸⁹ TFR-217-1.

⁹⁰ Eighth Plenum, p. KW-9.

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- The cut-and-paste version of the two documents prepared by the Russian side deleted the date of the second document (December 18).⁹¹
- Orlov's note gives the misleading impression that McDonough died while being "evacuated" from the crash site when in fact McDonough died nearly two weeks after the crash. In that time McDonough had been interrogated by Russian forces, transported from China to North Korea, and apparently died while being transported to an unknown destination by the North Koreans with a Soviet political officer escort.

Col. Orlov insists the "Chinese did the interrogation" and shared the information with Soviet forces. The facts suggest, in contrast, that there was direct Soviet involvement with McDonough.

- Soviet reporting states clearly that McDonough was interrogated by "Kuznetsov" and the interrogation of McDonough was attested to by Major Kozlov, Senior Intelligence officer of Unit 54892.
- Soviet Air Force veterans report that McDonough was interrogated by deputy regimental political officer Fironov.
- Orlov's claim that the Chinese but not the Soviets interrogated McDonough is supposedly supported by the fact that Krasovski signed the second telegram. Orlov asserts that in his role as chief military advisor to the Chinese, Krasovski would have been informed about the McDonough interrogation. This does not withstand scrutiny.
- The cut and paste document provided by Orlov does not show the name of the Soviet officer who signed the report concerning McDonough's interrogation. In fact, the report to Moscow on the content of the interrogation was signed by Belov, the commander of the 64th IAK. Krasovski, the liaison to China, did *not* report on the interrogation, Belov did. The interrogation and report of it were all conducted by Soviet forces and transmitted within Soviet channels. There is no evidence of Chinese involvement in any of this material.
- As the commander of the 64th IAK, Belov had no liaison functions with the Chinese. Belov is reporting information derived from Soviet efforts. This is why the interrogation of McDonough was conducted by Unit 54892 and attested to by Major Kozlov. Orlov deleted Belov's name in an attempt to conceal this fact.⁹²

⁹¹ TFR-242-2.

⁹² Subsequent DFI research uncovered Soviet documents which show the channels of communication used by Soviet forces to send interrogation records to Moscow. Documents were included in the Soviet diplomatic courier pouch to Beijing and forwarded from there to Moscow. Thus the evidence shows Krasovskii's message concerning McDonough's alleged death was based on reporting obtained from Soviet forces, not Chinese.

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In response to Congressman Sam Johnson's direct question concerning the McDonough case, "This was early in the war. Did you have units there then?" Orlov responded only, "It crashed in Andung."⁹³

Four issues must be resolved before McDonough's casualty status is changed to KIA(BNR). 1) The possibility cannot be excluded, for example, that "died en route" is a Soviet euphemism.⁹⁴ 2) If "died en route" is not a euphemism, however, and if it is true that Captain McDonough indeed died on December 18, 1950 in Soviet custody en route, then the Russian side of the Joint Commission should be given the task to account for the disposition, including the burial location, of Captain McDonough's remains.⁹⁵ 3) If Col. Orlov's statement is correct, that McDonough died while being evacuated from the RB-45 crash site, on what basis is this conclusion drawn? How does Orlov reconcile this version to the report from Krasovskii to Batitskii, "the pilot... died en route"? 4) If the Soviet forces buried or witnessed the disposition of Captain McDonough's body in North Korea, as Soviet veterans report, then the location of the last known area where McDonough was seen alive by Soviet forces should be obtained from the Russian side of the USRJC.

In addition, US records suggest McDonough may not be a BNR case. In 1955, according to the opinion of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations General G. B. Erskine, "There is reason to believe Major McDonough's body is included among those which have been recovered by our Graves Registration units..." Erskine considered the McDonough case to be one "with serious domestic public relations implications."⁹⁶ Further research is required into this report by General Erskine.

Recommendation: According to family members, McDonough's casualty status was changed from MIA to KIA on the basis of repatriate testimony in 1954. McDonough is still carried by CILHI as MIA. In the absence of independent confirmation of the fact of death or additional evidence which corroborates the alleged fact of death in the Soviet archive documents, the grounds are insufficient to maintain a KIA(BNR) casualty status for Captain Charles McDonough. In light of information from Soviet archives which clearly shows direct Soviet involvement in the interrogation and transport of McDonough, facts the Russian side of the USRJC have attempted to blur or conceal, Captain McDonough's casualty status be changed from KIA(BNR) (or MIA if CILHI's data are accurate) to POW/BNR. The burden of proof in this case and the responsibility

⁹³ Eighth Plenum, p. KW-2-3.

⁹⁴ There is a precedent for this type of euphemistic Soviet-ese. After World War II, the Chief of NKVD Camp No. 188 was instructed by the Chief of the NKVD USSR Directorate for POWs and Internees, "In your wire reports about prisoner movements the word 'died' from now on should be substituted with the word 'loaded.'" Paul M. Cole, *POW/MIA Issues: Volume 2, World War II and the Early Cold War* (Santa Monica, CA, RAND, MR-351/2-USDP, 1993), p. 24.

⁹⁵ If, as reported in Soviet documents, the RB-45 crashed in China, it remains to be explained how McDonough made it to Sinuiju, North Korea where he was last seen alive.

⁹⁶ Letter from General G. B. Erskine (Secret) to Mr. Walter S. Robertson, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, October 1, 1955. 611.95a24/10-155. The "domestic public relations implications" referred to may have been the fact that McDonough's RB-45 was shot down in Chinese airspace while conducting strategic bombing reconnaissance for the Strategic Air Command. [See map at G.1.]

to account for the remains of McDonough lie with the Russian side of the USRJC. [See map at G.1.]

F.15. Col. John R. Lovell

Recommendation: According to the next of kin of Colonel John R. Lovell, a passenger on McDonough's RB-45, Lovell "was declared Killed in Action in 1954." There is no evidence showing the basis on which Lovell's casualty status was changed from MIA to KIA. Further interviews with the participants in the shoot down and collection of the wreckage of the RB-45 should be made. Pending the outcome of these interviews, and given the degree of contradiction in Soviet records and the lack of direct evidence of death, Lovell's casualty status should be changed from KIA(BNR) to MIA(BNR). [See related case at C.1, D.2, F.14, and map at G.1.]

F.16. Lt. Col. George A. Davis

Recommendation: Thus far there is no direct evidence from the archives of the 64th IAK which confirms information from Corps Commander Georgii Lobov, for example, that Davis was killed in the crash of his F-86. The authoritative source *F-86 Sabre* does not provide evidence which supports the fact of death either. USAF records show that there is a possibility that Davis managed to eject in time to save himself. It is clear that Soviet search teams located the crash site and recovered personal effects from Davis. Thus the Russian side of the USRJC should have access to archive material which will demonstrate whether Davis was captured alive or was found dead. In light of the fact that Davis, if captured, would have been of great interest to Soviet intelligence military specialists, George Davis's casualty status should be changed from MIA to POW(BNR). [See D.3.]

F.17. Col. Robert R. Martin

Recommendation: Unless there are grounds for doubting the credibility of Shytkov's report that Col. Martin was captured in July 1950, Robert R. Martin's casualty status should be changed from KIA(BNR) to POW(BNR). [See B.27.]

F.18. Lt. Laurence C. Layton

Recommendation: In light of the evidence in Soviet documents that Soviet forces were searching for Lt. Layton, and in light of the fact that Layton was known to be alive and well on the ground following his bailout, the possibility cannot be excluded that Lt. Layton was captured alive by Soviet, Chinese, or Korean forces. The recommendation to change Lt. Layton's casualty status from MIA to POW(BNR) is consistent with Air Force Manual 200-25. [See B.1.]

F.19. 1Lt. Austin Beetle

Recommendation: The circumstances of loss for Lt. Beetle are clearly consistent with a KIA(BNR) casualty status, Beetle's records should be changed from MIA to KIA(BNR). [SeeD.4.]

G. Unreported USAF Losses In Chinese Territory

American F-86 pilots had a variety of incentives to violate Chinese airspace and to conceal, to the extent possible, the true nature of this activity. Two reasons suffice for the purpose of this report. First, USAF rules of engagement banned combat sorties across the Yalu River into China except in the case of "hot pursuit." Dolphin Overton III, the first USAF F-86 pilot to be caught after making an unauthorized sortie over the Yalu, was grounded, sent home and threatened with a general court martial in order to compel him to resign from the Air Force. The only jet ace in Marine Corps history, Lt. Col. John Bolt, wrote, "If you went north of the river, it was at the risk of your professional career if you got caught."⁹⁷ As Fischer noted above, in order to avoid Overton's fate, F-86 pilots simply selected a location or a village south of the Yalu if one needed to report where a MiG or an F-86 has been shot down. This was, according to Fischer, "strictly CYA."

Second, F-86 pilots such as Air Force Ace Harold Fischer note today that one was compelled to cross the Yalu in search of Soviet MiGs simply because "that's where they were. According to Lt. Col. Bolt, "The Chinese were yelling and screaming about the 'pirates' that were coming over there, but that's where the action was." Bolt described how the desire to fight MiGs overwhelmed even the most disciplined defenders of USAF policy. Summarizing direct first-person interviews with many F-86 veterans of the Korean War, *F-86 Sabre* reported, "throughout the war, Sabre pilots crossed the forbidden Yalu to engage MiGs on their own turf, ignoring rules, politics, and direct orders telling them to stay out of Chinese airspace. At the 51st FIW, Gabreski, Jones, Mahurin, Major William Whisner, and others adopted a hot-pursuit policy, flying what they called Maple Special incursions into China when circumstance gave them a shot at a fleeing MiG pilot. These border crossings were kept secret from most other pilots."⁹⁸

These cross-border missions were an invitation to trouble. Lt. Bill Ginther came back from a mission with revealing gun camera film. He had attacked a MiG over Manchuria and, trying to escape, the MiG pilot had dived to earth, pulling out just in time to pass along the runway at the crowded Antung airfield. Ginther began firing at the MiG while flying so low that the gun camera film, as Mahurin described it, showed 'row after row of MiGs lined up on either side of the runway,' so that 'it appeared that the F-86 was flying even below the tops of the MiG tails. While enemy technicians stood on the MiGs watching, Ginther shot down his MiG, got out of the place, coaxed his Sabre home--and burned his film.'⁹⁹

Capt. Ivan C. Kincheloe, for example, recorded one of his MiG kills in the vicinity of Mukden, about 60 miles (97km) north of the Yalu.

⁹⁷ "Time Flies: The Oral History of Lt. Col. John F. Bolt, USMC (Ret.)," *Foundation*, Fall 1993, p. 99.

⁹⁸ *F-86 Sabre*, p. 130.

⁹⁹ *F-86 Sabre*, p. 130.


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Thus it is understandable that the majority of USAF losses over Chinese territory are not reported or reflected as such in US casualty records. US records are an unreliable source and offer little insight into these losses. In cases where USAF reconnaissance aircraft entered Chinese airspace on classified missions approved by the relevant USAF and FEAF authorities, documentation which accurately describes the true nature of operations of this type would have been generated by SAC and FEAF during the Korean War. In the case of unauthorized combat operations in China, however, the only extant USAF records associated with these missions do not accurately describe these missions.


G.1. Deceptive USAF Reporting on Location of Losses


As shown in Section A of this volume, USAF personnel who had direct knowledge of unauthorized combat incursions into Chinese airspace during the Korean War left an incomplete record concerning the location of the loss of US aircraft in cases where the aircraft was lost on Chinese territory. In some of these cases, Soviet Air Force records are a useful source of information as to the true location of crash sites.

The following four maps show the contrast between crash locations in USAF records and the location of the Arnold (January 13, 1953), Heller (January 23, 1953), and McDonough (December 4, 1950), and Niemann (April 12, 1953) incidents as recorded in Soviet records or reported by Soviet Air Force veterans. These four incidents were selected to illustrate that the same discrepancy occurs in F-86 repat, F-86 BNR, B-29, and RB-45 cases.









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USAF records are particularly misleading, for whatever reason, in the case of 2Lt. Roland W. Parks (23197A, Field Search Case 590), an F-86E (No. 51-2801) pilot who crashed on September 4, 1952. Major R. E. Grote, Adjutant of the 51st Fighter Interceptor Wing, summarized the "complete and accurate details of disappearance" of 2Lt. Parks in the following way:

On 4 September 1952, Lt. Parks was flying Bear two (2) in a flight of four (4) F-86 type aircraft. On a sweep over the Yalu River flight came in contact with some enemy MiG-15 type aircraft. Lt. Parks radioed that he had lost his leader and was confused about his position. Lt. Erikson made contact with him and advised him to take a southerly heading. Lt. Parks radioed that his remote compass and radio compass were inoperative. Lt. Erikson advised Lt. Parks to put the sun at three o'clock. Lt. Parks after some difficulty managed to get his position. He then called and said he was running short of fuel and would have to bail out. *He described the peninsula he was over and then said that he had flamed out and was bailing out.* Lt. Parks was last sighted at coordinates XE 4040. (emphasis added)

The USAF map enclosed in Parks' casualty file clearly indicates XE 4040 as the "aircraft last seen" location. The summary of the circumstances of Parks' crash clearly indicate his radio transmissions were being monitored by ground controllers. 1Lt. Erikson's statement of September 4, 1952 clearly states, "I told him [Parks] to describe the terrain that he was flying over. He described the peninsula he was over and I drew a picture of it on my map as he described it to me. Putting in towns, air bases and other important land marks."

On September 6, however, Captain Byron S. Worthen, the 51st Wing Intelligence Officer, wrote in his statement concerning the Parks incident:

At the debriefing of 1Lt. Lester A. Erikson, it was determined that Lt. Parks flew over water and cloud cover for a considerable distance before sighting what he described as an island surrounded by many dikes and patched water areas. He then stated it was not an island, but he determined that he was over a peninsula. He then stated that he was over a very large seaport city with a circular square in the center of that city. He described seeing several undamaged airfields loaded with MiG-15s before approaching the city. In view of this description plus the fact that his radio signal was becoming stronger, it would indicate that Lt. Parks had followed Lt. Erikson's instructions, and had placed the sun off his right wing thus assuming a southerly heading. The terrain he described above would indicate this and that he had bailed out over or near the City of Dairen, Kwantung Peninsula, of Manchuria. The description of the city fits the case perfectly. This officer feels assured that he bailed out over said city and that his aircraft landed to the south of Dairen itself.

Parks told Soviet interrogators that he flew over an airfield (probably "Dalnii"), sighted Soviet planes and radioed, "I'm probably in Port Arthur area."

Despite all of this information about the true location of the crash of Parks' F-86, USAF records indicate XE 4040 as the "aircraft last seen" location and Parks' casualty report lists the crash site as 6134-III. The official "complete and accurate details" in the USAF summary also omitted Parks' transmission which named Chinese territory by name.

The Parks case is a paradigm of how USAF pilots were reluctant to report that a fellow pilot had been lost in China, even when the evidence was abundant and compelling. The Parks case also illustrates how US archives sometimes contain

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information which answers or at least rounds out the official, but incomplete, version of events.

USAF reconnaissance aircraft shot down over China during the Korean War were, in some cases, conducting missions authorized by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) rather than missions in direct support of the Far East Air Force (FEAF). This is illustrated by the conflict between SAC and FEAF over the control of reconnaissance assets such as the RB-45.¹⁰⁰ The downing of the RB-45 on December 4, 1950, for example, coincided with one of the most intense periods of the Korean War. The Chinese People's Volunteers invaded North Korea on November 25, 1950. In response, the NSC was called into emergency session at least three times a week as the President, Secretary of Defense and the rest of the foreign policymaking circle tried to anticipate the American reaction to a variety of Chinese actions. On November 30, President Truman implied at a press conference that "the atomic bomb might be used against the Chinese and that the decision to use it would be up to the commander in the field."¹⁰¹ In addition, Truman was advised by Senator Vandenberg and others that in the event of Chinese air strikes on US forces in Korea, the Chinese should be "made to pay." Planning was undertaken to prepare strike options for the President. Three days after the RB-45 was shot down, President Truman said that if UNC troops were bombed, "every airfield in sight" would be hit in retaliation.¹⁰² Without a doubt, therefore, the USAF and the top national command authorities required intelligence on potential Chinese targets which could only be collected by overflights of Manchuria by reconnaissance aircraft such as the RB-45.

¹⁰⁰ The primary source evidence which illustrates the SAC-FEAF conflict has not been adequately researched. In addition, this discussion exceeds the scope of the issue at hand. Illustrative of U.S. archive material which supports the fact that USAF aircraft from the FEAF were operating over China under orders from SAC are the following documents: Memorandum for Generals Bradley, Vandenberg, Collins and Admiral Sherman (Top Secret) Subject: Courses of Action Relative to Communist China and Korea--Aerial Reconnaissance, January 27, 1951. Letter from Col. Winton R. Close, Headquarters Strategic Air Command (XRAY) General Headquarters Far East Command, Office of the Chief of Staff (Top Secret) To: Major General T.S. Power, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, June 6, 1951. Close wrote, "Since the JCS has given General Ridgway authority to reconnoiter Manchuria and China at his own discretion, the possibility of securing such reconnaissance now is a possibility." Letter from Col. Wintron R. Close, Headquarters Strategic Air Command (XRAY) General Headquarters Far East Command, Office of the Chief of Staff (Top Secret) To: Major General T. S. Power, Headquarters Strategic Air Command, June 29, 1951. Close wrote, "At this point I have been unable to get FEAF to set the requirement before CINCFE. FEAF claims that they must justify the selection of our reconnaissance targets to General Ridgway in order to secure his approval and that, at present, insufficient justification exists. In accordance with your instructions, I cannot put SAC in a position of justifying its requirements to FEAF or of allowing FEAF to feel that they are in a position to approve or disapprove our intended operations."

¹⁰¹ Cabell Phillips, *The Truman Presidency: The History of a Triumphant Succession* (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1966), p. 329.

¹⁰² Doris M. Condit, *History of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Volume II: The Test of War, 1950-1953* (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1988), p. 89.

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Even senior officers were not immune to the temptation to cross the Yalu against standing orders. Squadron Commander George I. Ruddell was Bolt's commander in the 4th Fighter-Interceptor Group in Korea.¹⁰³ Bolt recalled,

Ruddell wasn't getting any MiGs because they weren't coming south of the river. He'd been threatening everybody that he'd kill 'em, cut their heads off; decapitate 'em, if they went north of the river. But he weakened one night. He'd had a few drinks, and he called me into this little cubbyhole where he had his quarters. During the discussion, tears came to his eyes—running down his cheeks—as he was saying how he wanted to be a good Air Force officer, and he loved the Air Force, and if they told him to do something he'd do it. But getting those MiGs meant more to him than his career and life itself. And since he had been beating up on his own flight about not going across the river, he'd be embarrassed to ask any of them to go across the river with him. He didn't know whether they would want to fly anyway—two or three members of Dog Flight didn't like to do it. (They would have been in big trouble if they'd been identified as going up there. I don't know if the ones they picked up later on, who were shot down north of the river, were ever disciplined when the war was over. But at this time the threat was believed and hanging very heavily over you.)

So Ruddell said, 'Would you give me some of your flight? I want to go across the river; I gotta have some action.' I was going across every flight, anyway, and it was useful to have guys who didn't go across in your flight.¹⁰⁴

Bolt's reason for wanting some of the flight to stay south of the river was so radar controllers could be fooled into thinking they had the image of all of the F-86s. Those crossing the river would switch to a training frequency to eliminate the possibility of controllers overhearing, then after an exchange of code words ("Sioux," answered by "Falls," or "Twin," answered by "City"), the leader would "strangle his IFF—his squawk" and the F-86s would sail across into Chinese airspace looking for MiGs. Bolt's gun camera film clearly shows Bolt destroying MiG-15s in Chinese airspace.

H. Additional Research Required

Additional research is clearly required if DPMO intends to resolve BNR cases resulting from USAF losses over and on Chinese (PRC) territory during the Korean War. As shown in this report, without supplemental data from Soviet sources, USAF records, particularly Field Search Cases, are an inadequate source of information as to the true location of some USAF losses. A data base deriving from a systematic search of USAF records is necessary, therefore, in order to establish a foundation for further research into Soviet and, potentially, new research into Chinese records. Current legislation (Section 1033, S. 2182, *National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995*, "Contact With China on POW/MIA Issues") specifies that the Secretary of Defense "establish contact with the Ministry of Defense of the People's Republic of China regarding unresolved issues relating to American POW/MIAs from the Korean conflict." The Chinese MoD may not be, however, the appropriate Chinese entity for such a research effort. Indeed, efforts to conduct such a project with the Chinese MoD may result in a diminished

¹⁰³ "On May 18, 1953, Lt. Col. George I. Ruddell, commander of the 39th FIS/51st FIW and pilot of an F-86F called *MiG Mad Mavis* (51-12940), destroyed his fifth MiG to become the 31st jet ace of the war." *F-86 Sabre*, p. 137.

¹⁰⁴ "Time Flies...", p. 99.

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possibility to obtain information from Chinese sources related to US losses on Chinese territory.

As experience with Soviet archives demonstrates, before contact with Chinese officials is made, a coordinated, thorough search of sources other than USAF records is necessary. To approach the Chinese prematurely may result in errors, loss of credibility, and a serious delay in the pace of research. Soviet Air Force records should be thorough examined prior to any request for assistance from the Chinese. The results of such as examination, as shown in this report, will narrow significantly the number of cases to be resolved and produce accurate geographic data on crash locations and the potential location of bodies buried on Chinese territory.

From what is known at this point, the following three steps should yield significant results in the effort to resolve Korean War POW/MIA issues:

1. Complete a comprehensive review of USAF records.
2. Locate crash sites on Chinese territory using Soviet Air Force records.
3. Search for remains in China using data deriving from a comparison of USAF and Soviet records.

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Appendix A. 64th IAK operational summaries in Russian and English.
Previously submitted to DPMO.

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Appendix B. Documents obtained by DFI.

Note: Documents 1-3 have been submitted to DPMO several times. Documents 4-29 were submitted to DPMO in their entirety on March 17, 1994.

Document 1.

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Dr. Paul M. Cole, December 10, 1991. 1 page.

Document 2.

Letter from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney to Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov, March 12, 1992. 1 page.

Document 3.

Letter from Commander-in-Chief of the CIS Armed Forces Marshal of Aviation Ye. I. Shaposhnikov to Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, March 18, 1992. 1 page.

Document 4.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shalin, January 13, 1951. 2 pages.

Document 5.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Vasilievskii and Shtemenko, January 21, 1951. 1 page.

Document 6.

Telegram from Razuvaev to Shtemenko, December 16, 1951. 1 page.

Document 7.

Telegram from Postnikov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 1 page.

Document 8.

Telegram from Lobov to Kigarev and Krasovski, April 26, 1952. 2 pages.

Document 9.

Telegram from Lobov to Vasilievski, Zhigarev and Krasovski, May 7, 1952. 6 pages.

Document 10.

Telegram from Bodrov to Shalin, February 18, 1951. 2 pages.

Document 11.

Telegram from Krasovski to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page.

Document 12.

Telegram from Belov to Shtemenko and Batitskii from Belov, December 17, 1950. 2 pages.

Document 13.

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Telegram from Belov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 31, 1950. 4 pages.

Document 14.

Telegram from Krasovskii to Zhigarev, November 11, 1950. 1 page.

Document 15.

Telegram from Merzhelikin to Schtemenko and Batitskii, November 26, 1950. 3 pages.

Document 16.

Telegram from Belov and Mironov to Schtemenko and Zhigarev, December 30, 1950. 11 pages.

Document 17.

Fragments of interrogation records of American POWs and one Australian POW found in Soviet era archives.

- | | |
|-------------------------------|----------|
| a. Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. | 1 page. |
| b. Roland W. Parks, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| c. Charles McDonough, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| d. Frank Denstech, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| e. Edward G. Izbiky, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| f. Michael E. DeArmond, USAF. | 2 pages. |
| g. Donald W. Pinkstone, RAAF. | 2 pages. |

Document 18.

Complete interrogation protocol of Harold B. Kubicek, USAF. 32 pages.

Document 19.

Partial interrogation protocol of Joseph F. Green, USAF. 6 pages.

Document 20.

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles W. Maultsby, USAF. 8 pages.

Document 21.

Complete interrogation protocol of Thomas L. Eyres, USAF. 5 pages.

Document 22.

Complete interrogation protocol of Charles E. Stahl, USAF. 46 pages including two maps.

Document 23.

Interrogation protocol cover page. 1 page.

Document 24.

Letter of transmittal, June 27, 1952. 1 page.

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Document 25.

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, August 28, 1950. 8 pages.

Document 26.

Telegram from Shtykov to Vyshinskiy, September 7, 1950. 1 cover page plus 3 pages of text.

Document 27.

Telegram from Slyusarev to Bulganin and Zhigarev, December 21, 1954. 16 pages.

Document 28.

A collection of letters sent to Borovoy. 24 pages.

Document 29.

Telegram from Krasovskii to Batitskii, December 18, 1950. 1 page.

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Appendix C. Photographs

23 photographs obtained from Tass archives in Moscow. Originals were submitted to DPMO on April 1, 1994.

Mr. DORNAN. We are reaching the end of the day. Let me ask everybody on the panel this and everybody in the room this. We are going down the same path, it is obvious. We are going to spend millions of dollars, ironically, that comes from the U.S. taxpayers' treasury because of people like me and Bob Smith and a handful of Congressmen driven by concern kept alive by people like you and the Vietnamese families in the league and the alliance. We have created the funding and then we do not have any oversight, we do not track it, and we have now established a bone-hunting office that debunks and mocks the live sighting reports and accepts animals bones and almost treats the families and the Congress with this attitude of, well, they are easily satisfied if you give them the right dialog.

Yes, Bob.

Mr. DUMAS. Congressman, this is camp number 5 right here.

Mr. DORNAN. Along the river. I saw that last night.

Mr. DUMAS. There are two burial sites here with 1,500 bodies here and 1,500 bodies here. This comes from the POW's in the country that told me they buried over 1,500 right here and across the Yalu River. On this side, you have about 1,000 right here in this burial site, and you have about 1,200 right here in another burial site. So we are talking 3,000 or more bodies. Why are they looking for a plane crash site?

Mr. DORNAN. Here is what we need, then, and I am going to have to sit down and think this through with my staff. I have to go over to the Senate. I am going to see if I can get Senator Kempthorne of Idaho, who has just taken over my chairmanship on the other side from Dan Coats, who has moved to another chairmanship—their chairmanship is very dissimilar to ours in their committee and subcommittee titles—and see if we can work out congressional law that tells them, here is what we meant for you to do and here is what we want you to do and we want the cost accounting figures. Unless we get control of the purse strings, you have no control over what they are doing.

What I would say, for example, is, and this is just talking off the top of my head, shut down all the search at airplane sites right now. It is too expensive. You are copping the Vietnam model. It is a ripoff. They are going to tear our face off and the GAO audit is now out there to try and find out with six very good people what happened to \$4 million.

Here is what I suggest. We have a photograph of a major camp, camp 5. We can get testimony from people. We can do what you do at the back of Air Force magazine and Navy magazine and all the magazines, Sea Power. They run ads looking for all the people of the 380th bomb group for a reunion, to go to Tampa, FL, and all drink, and there is nothing wrong with that, to think about World War II and saving democracy.

How about running ads in these magazines, we need everybody who was in camp 5 who did come home to help us identify where the graveyards are. Here is—and if they write, you send them an overlay map of the whole area with these experts that can now take a computer and go into it three-dimensionally and turn the whole thing, like these mapping systems that I fly on a simulator that comes right across the California coast and there is Palos

Verdes to the n-th micromillimeter, and I am going, my God, what a great way to train fighter pilots going into the target.

And we say, here is camp 5 from 6 different views. Will you please identify from your memory where the graveyards were, where you carried out bodies, where you buried friends, and then we will not get radically different opinions, as Mr. Liotta said. You will get some differences.

You blend them all together and then we say to the North Koreans, we only have one project right now, one and one only, and it is on the Yalu and it is camp 5 and we know where the graveyards are. You send us there or we are not going anywhere. There will not be any millions of dollars. There will be no bone searches. We know where our bones are. We do not need you to help us or tell us. We are not going to interfere with anybody's lifestyle along the Yalu. Let us go there.

Mr. COLE. Congressman, let me make two quick points. The location of the graveyards from POW camps are well established. There is even overflight——

Mr. DORNAN. Is that not where we should start?

Mr. COLE. In my view, not the POW camps. I think we ought to start with the temporary cemeteries that were established by the Graves Registration Service that——

Mr. DORNAN. Our own cemeteries?

Mr. COLE. Our own.

Mr. DORNAN. Of course.

Mr. COLE. The second thing——

Mr. DORNAN. No; wait a minute. Remember, a graveyard at a prisoner of war camp is sort of our cemetery. We did the digging under gunpoint. We buried our men. We had little short ceremonies if they allowed us. And we know if we would do a serious——see, this is not an archival search. It is a live person search, like an oral history thing that Mr. Santoli did, where it is so inexpensive compared to all of these expensive crash site searches that have been scrubbed over by them 1 million times, particularly when it was a new airplane in theater, like an A-6 or the F-4 Phantom. The Soviets swarmed over those crash sites, for God's sake.

Mr. COLE. Sir, that is the point that just slipped my mind. Before we allow DPMO to do these so-called recoveries from the F-80 and the B-29, we have to get an assessment from the Russians if their search teams, what they did there, because their search teams hauled away equipment. They photographed the wreckage sites. They even, from time to time, buried the bodies. Ask them. Ask Toon if they have asked the Russians if they went over these sites.

Mr. DORNAN. We will put that in.

Mr. COLE. I bet you it has not even crossed their mind. But the advantage of going to the——

Mr. DORNAN. Our temporary graveyards.

Mr. COLE. Our so-called temporary cemeteries, is that you have by row and plot number, and I can give you the names of these people. You know the identification of who is supposed to be in this particular grave.

If you go to a POW camp cemetery, there are two problems. The first one was that there was no real proper burials there. They are very shallow graves and it is on a flood plain. The Yalu River

floods tremendously. It is like the Mississippi. Every now and then, it just goes berserk. So I would have a higher confidence in starting with proper graves that were identified and marked by the U.S. Graves Registration Service.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes, Bob.

Mr. DUMAS. Let me say one thing. I have done this for 46 years. He is right in what he is saying partially, not all the way. The 867 bodies that are in the Punch Bowl are unidentified. Why? They were turned over in 1954 when they were in good shape, those bodies by the North Koreans. Those bodies come from camp number 5, those 867 bodies, because Colonel Webb says, "Maybe we ought to exhume these bodies and find out what they are and who they are."

Mr. DORNAN. What colonel said that?

Mr. DUMAS. Colonel Webb, who is in the——

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, Jimmy Webb—Johnny Webb.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, Webb; at a briefing. It was at a briefing at the Pentagon—no, over here in Arlington. He said, "Maybe we ought to exhume some of these bodies and find out."

Let me tell you something. If you remember the leprosy colonies—I said this before and he called me a nut. They have been calling me a nut for 46 years because I said we had live prisoners in North Korea, and there are live prisoners in North Korea. But as far as the remains go, you have to understand, that leprosy back in the 1950's and 1940's was a no-no, not only in North Korea, China, and the Asian countries, but it was a no-no in this country, because we had two leper colonies in this country, one in Kentucky and I think the other was in Mississippi, I am not sure, two leper colonies. The ex-POW's——

Mr. DORNAN. Molokai was closed down in Hawaii.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, but the leper colonies that the POW's—like you said before, let us get these ex-POW's that came back and question them about the leper colonies, about the prison camps, where the bodies are buried. But I was told by an ex-POW that said, when you contacted leprosy, and leprosy comes from starvation, tuberculosis——

Mr. DORNAN. Dirty soil.

Mr. DUMAS. Right, that is what caused it, and our men did not have any medical treatment at all in those prison camps to speak of. So when they contacted leprosy, the Chinese were not stupid and the North Koreans. They knew they had leprosy, so they did not want to touch them. They did not want to get near them, because they figured the disease would spread throughout all North Korea, China, across the Yalu into China.

So what they did was they were releasing them to the U.N., unbeknownst to anyone in this country. They were released to the U.N. every time they came down with leprosy. They put them in Okinawa, in the leper colony in Okinawa, and on Okinawa when they died years later, or when they died, they shipped them to the Punch Bowl and they buried them in that Punch Bowl.

Mr. DORNAN. Stop right there. Have you ever heard this story, Dr. Cole, about leprosy?

Mr. COLE. No. I also have——

Mr. DORNAN. Have any of the other family members ever heard this?

Mr. DUMAS. Talk to the ex-POW's.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you heard it?

Mr. DUMAS. I am just saying what I was told by the ex-POW's, and I have contacted over 300, 400 POW's in the Korean war that had dealings with this in the prison camps.

Mr. DORNAN. Again, I am an optimist but my cynical side says, no, this sounds too conspiratorial. I resist conspiracies. But then there is the Tuskegee syphilis experiment. There are other scandals like this. There are the nuclear experiments that we are paying thousands of people. You have the brainwashing experimentation that we are now paying lots of money from. It could be possible that somebody could come back to Okinawa with leprosy.

Mr. DUMAS. Congressman, if the men died on the battlefield, right, it is possible they died on the battlefield with their dog tags still around their neck.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. So they could identify these men.

Mr. DORNAN. And the Korean families would like some of these bodies exhumed?

Mr. DUMAS. I asked them to exhume the bodies and they will not do it.

Mr. DORNAN. Who will not do it?

Mr. DUMAS. Colonel Webb said, "Maybe we ought to exhume these," so I brought it up again—

Mr. DORNAN. Colonel Webb says maybe.

Mr. DUMAS. Maybe.

Mr. DORNAN. All we have to do is draw up a congressional thing, put it in the defense authorization and tell Colonel Webb, who I like a great deal, know personally, many, many visits with him, tell him, go dig up a corner of this grave and take out 20 or 30 and see if—now we have this DNA. Maybe there is some way we can identify some.

Mr. DUMAS. The only reason they were unidentified, from what I understand, is that they could not tell the families in this country that they died in a prison camp, those men died in a prison camp.

Mr. DORNAN. I will tell you something. I never heard of 850-some people buried—

Mr. DUMAS. Colonel Webb is the one that corrected me.

Mr. DORNAN. When did you first find out that?

Ms. DUNTON. My brother went out to the Punch Bowl and someone said, "Oh, by the way, this is where the unknowns from Korea are buried and this is where the names of the missing are written on the wall." That was 1985.

Mr. DORNAN. Have you heard this, John? John has never heard it. Let me tell you something. In Vietnam, because CILHI was doing such a good job, we had trouble finding an unknown soldier from Vietnam. We got it down—I was there in Hawaii when this project was going on. They got it down finally to a small portion of bone from a crash site in Laos and they said, there is no way we are going to identify that.

It was kind of pushed, like, my gosh, are we so expert now in helicopter dust-off rescues and everything that we are not going to

come up with one missing in action soldier when we had tens of thousands in World War II, many thousands in World War II, and I never heard of this in Korea, so obviously they had no problem getting an unknown soldier from Korea. They just took one of the Punch Bowl sets of partial remains.

But in Vietnam, we have nobody, so they finally found, and I have been afraid to ask, how big a chip is it that sits in Arlington at the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier from the Southeast Asian conflict, so I am not going to forget that about the Punch Bowl. I was there Pearl Harbor week with my wife. We just decided to go there. The CODEL was not going out.

Mr. COLE. Congressman, I have to say one thing about the Punch Bowl and the unknowns there. First off, I have never heard the leprosy story. But about 450 remains that were unidentified are from the very first part of the war. The first Graves Registration Officer in Korea was a volunteer. He was a laundry officer.

Mr. DORNAN. And did not know how to identify people.

Mr. COLE. No. It was terrible conditions and all that sort of thing. After General Walker was killed, then his body was brought back and there was a hue and cry that we should repatriate the remains. They got pretty good at it, at moving the bodies from the battlefield very quickly. So the identification rate went way up. So you have about 450 from the early part of the war and you have almost an equal number, well, 400-and-something, that were part of so-called Operation Glory. Of the about 1,200 sets of remains that came back in 1954, they could not identify 400.

Mr. DORNAN. So they went through two-thirds, 800.

Mr. COLE. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. And remember, we are pushed down to the Pusan pocket. Then Inchon comes in. Then we go all the way back, and fighting back, we probably left these temporary grave sites all the way up to the Yalu. Then we get pushed down to the ragged 38th Parallel line and so now we can go back to all these in South Korean control, all of the temporary ones there, and that is what probably started coming back, but we never got to our temporary grave sites north of the current armistice line.

Mr. COLE. Exactly.

Mr. DUMAS. You asked me a question before about the Federal court case I had in 1982 and I won that case.

Mr. DORNAN. I did not know that.

Mr. DUMAS. I am the only man in history to ever win a Federal court case to get a status change in this country. No one has ever done that.

Mr. DORNAN. So you declared your brother a POW and then what?

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, they made him a POW and presumed him dead again, so I said to the judge, "If he is a prisoner of war and no one saw him die, how can you presume the man dead?" And he said to the U.S. attorney, "How can you do that?" So he said, "I will have to go back and ask the Government." So he comes back 2 weeks later and he says, "Well, there is a classification on these men to the year 2006. I cannot give you any more information than that."

But do you want to know the reason why no one has ever been classified as a prisoner of war in this country until I went to Federal court?

Mr. DORNAN. Why?

Mr. DUMAS. I spent 6 years in Federal court and I did not even have to go to Federal Court because they were carrying all these men as prisoners anyway all those years. Now listen to this. There is a document I got in Federal court and this is what it says. This is a memorandum, a U.S. memorandum, because Richard Childers—remember him.

Mr. DORNAN. Yes.

Mr. DUMAS. He looked at this and said it was a smoking gun, and this is what it said. While I was in court, this is from the Office of the Secretary of the Army. This is William Clark, the Chairman of the Military Board of Review, that your missing person's bill, and John Hall's missing person bill is going to have to deal with this, because this is William Clark signed on the bottom, his initials, Chairman of the Military Board of Review, and this is what it says.

"I have received your memo of November 17, 1982, concerning the case of Private Roger Dumas, which is presently being pursued by his brother, Robert Dumas, and a Mr. Frank Valutti, a law student. We honor agreement that every effort to keep this matter out of the public eye should be made. It is clear from your memo that you wish no additional information be provided to the Justice Department. There is also an understanding from my conversation with Maj. John Burton"—Maj. John Burton is the litigation officer in my case—"that the Army will not turn over the documents that Dumas is seeking under a court order. Because of the nature of this case and the undesirable precedent that might occur, your course of action seems appropriate."

This was presented to the judge and the Army said it was a hoax, but when I came out of court in 1986, this is in my file in Federal court. This is a routing slip from the Military Board of Review with all the Military Board of Review names on it, all the people that were on that Military Board of Review in 1982, and this is what it said.

Do you remember Jim Buckley, Senator Buckley from New York?

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. A good Republican Senator—

Mr. DORNAN. I know him personally.

Mr. DUMAS [continuing]. Who was a judge in Washington for many years.

Mr. DORNAN. The court of appeals.

Mr. DUMAS. This was written to him, but it never got to his office because they stopped it, and this was in my file in Federal court and this is what it said. "To change Roger Dumas' status to prisoner of war will cause a precedent for all the cases." In other words, if they changed him to prisoner of war before I won the case in Federal Court, the Military Board of Review, it would open a can of worms for every other case in this country, including World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf—not the Persian Gulf because that did not happen at that time.

Mr. DORNAN. We will write to 8th Army Headquarters and ask if your brother's name is on that list of 389 that they still—

Mr. DUMAS. He is on that list.

Mr. DORNAN. Is he?

Mr. DUMAS. I have the data sheets.

Mr. DORNAN. Is your brother's name on that?

Ms. MANDRA. No.

Mr. DUMAS. I have the data sheets, and I just want to say one more thing and then I want to go because I had a major operation about 6 weeks ago and it has taken a lot from me. But here is a picture of Jesse Jackson. Everybody knows who Jesse Jackson is. He ran for President in 1987. At that time, he called me and asked me if I could set up a meeting with the Ambassador of North Korea, Pak Gil Yan. This is Pak Gil Yan right here. I said, "What for?" He said, "Because I want to deal with your brother's case. I want to find out if there are any live Americans in North Korea."

So I set up the meeting at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in New York City on December 9, 1987. In that room was Jesse Jackson, Jesse Jackson, Jr., myself—

Mr. DORNAN. Now a Congressman. He is now a Congressman, Jesse, Jr.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, Congressman Jesse, Jr. This is Mr. Chang, who is back in North Korea, who was the aide to Pak Gil Yang, the Ambassador. This is Jackson, myself, and a businessman from South Korea by the name of Peter Chang Boha, but he had an office in New York. When we sat down to start the meeting, I had a tape recorder. I taped everybody in this country for 35 years. I have 500 tapes, White House tapes, Pentagon tapes. I have tapes of the North Koreans. I have 600 calls that the North Koreans taped. They do not even know it, so I do not care if they do know it.

So what happened this day was that Jackson said to the Ambassador, who is back in Korea now—he just left about a month ago—"Mr. Ambassador, if you have live Americans in your country and if you will release them to me, I will come and get them on December 24, 1987. It will be good for both our countries." And the Ambassador said, "Yes, Mr. Jackson, it would be good for both countries."

So after a little news conference downstairs in the hotel with South Korean newsmen, no American newsmen, just South Korean newsmen, he grabbed me by the arm and said, "Get upstairs. I want to talk to you." So we get back upstairs, we sat down, and he turned to me and he said, "My God, he had live Americans from the Korean War. He just told me." He said, "We are going to have to do something. We are going to have to go get these men." I said, "Okay, but do not tell the State Department. If you tell the State Department, the trip is off." This is December 9, 1987.

You can say what you want, but he gets on the phone, and I do not know who he talked to at the State Department, but when he got off the phone he said, "We are leaving on December 24." So he wrote a letter that was hand-delivered by me the following morning. I delivered the letter the following morning. I have the letter right here, two pages. I think I gave you a copy. You have it in your office.

So when he got off the phone, I said, "The trip is off," and he got mad at me. He said, "Nobody can tell me where to go. I can go anywhere in the world."

Mr. DORNAN. Sure.

Mr. DUMAS. You can go anywhere in the world but North Korea. Nobody goes to North Korea. No one in this country will ever go to North Korea.

Mr. DORNAN. The passports in those days with Albania and China.

Mr. DUMAS. Right. So what happened was I got a phone call—

Mr. DORNAN. China was out by then.

Mr. DUMAS. I got a phone call at 10 in the morning from Chicago, from his right-hand man Reverend Ahn, who is a minister, and he said the trip was off. They put sanctions on North Korea's travel to this country, the State Department, and North Korea put travel restrictions on our going to Pyongyang. That was December 9.

This man in the middle, Jackson, has never opened his mouth since that time, and he has been talked to by many reporters trying to get him to tell what that meeting was about that day. I know, because I was in the room.

Mr. DORNAN. What does he say?

Mr. DUMAS. He will not talk to anyone about it.

Mr. DORNAN. I will write to Jesse Jackson. I bump into him occasionally. I have been to his house for dinner. We have a good acquaintanceship under maybe opposites attract. But obviously, that Ambassador told him, and we will close on this.

What I have been told for the last 40 years, and I have been told this in 8th Army Headquarters in Korea. When I took a CODEL of five or six Congressmen, head of the Rules Committee, Gerry Solomon, chairman of International Relations Ben Gilman, the now much demeaned former Congressman Billy Hendon of North Carolina, David Dreier of California, number two on Rules, we all went over there on Valentine's Day 1986 to Hanoi, and we went through Korea on the way back. I said, let us see if they still use the 389 figure.

So I prepped everybody, pretended I was dumb and said to the division commander, no, the three-star commander of Korea, I said, "Are we still talking about live Americans left behind in Korea?" "Yes, sir, Congressman." "What is the number?" "Three-eighty-nine." The current Governor of Connecticut—

Mr. DUMAS. John Rowland.

Mr. DORNAN. Rowland said, "Dornan, very good. How many years ago was that?" I said, "10 years. It is still 389."

Now, here is what we are told. They all go, "What? What? What? We are coming back from Vietnam. Why did we not do something about Korea? That is a bigger number than Vietnam. Nobody says we left behind anybody in Vietnam definitively." Here is what the general officer tells me, Luck's predecessor, although I would have to go back and look up his name.

He said, "Congressman, the North Koreans umpteen times over the last"—it is 11 years ago—"three decades have said to us, 'Do you want your live prisoners back?' 'Yes, we do.' 'Then talk to us bilaterally.'" There is the punch line. Our response through our

State Department for all these years has been, no. It was a U.N. effort, our first police action. It was a joint effort. You, North Korea, were in the United Nation then. You will talk to the U.N. We will not deal with you unilaterally.

And the North Koreans would say, not an Ambassador to a Reverend Jesse Jackson would say in New York, then go to hell. We want you, the world's superpower, to deal with us unilaterally. We want to talk to you, and if you do, then we will talk about your live prisoners. Otherwise, go to blazes. We are not dealing with the U.N. We do not recognize them. It was a criminal effort. All the countries in the world ganged up on us and we do not recognize the U.N. That is what I have been told for 40 years.

Mr. DUMAS. Right, but you have to remember Solarz. Remember Solarz?

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. He went to North Korea twice, 1980 and 1982.

Mr. DORNAN. I did not know he went——

Mr. DUMAS. He went twice, because——

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, he went in 1992 after he had lost the election.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, and he went in 1980.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. In 1980, he spent 12 days and he met with Kim Il Sung for 3 days. Believe me when I tell you this. I have a 12-year dialog with the North Korean Government.

Mr. DORNAN. Right.

Mr. DUMAS. And this is what he told me, Pak Gil Yan. He said, "Solarz was in our country for 12 days and for 12 days I tried to get him to talk about the prisoner issue in my country." This is Pak Gil Yan. Ask Mr. Chong. Ask Mr. Lee. They will tell you. Do you know what he says? This is what Solarz said. He said, "I am not here to talk about American prisoners of war. I am here to talk about reunifying families in South Korea and North Korea."

So when he came back in 1980, they invited him to the mission in New York where I used to go, where I still go, and when he was at the mission here, they brought it up again. He says, "I told you, I am not interested in American POW's. I am only interested in reunification of families of South and North Korea."

And the second time he went, in 1992, they brought it up again with him in North Korea and he still refused to talk about American POW's. And I made a speech in New York City, in Manhattan, right in front of all the workers, about 5,000 people at 12 noon and I mentioned Solarz, that he went to North Korea and was told about the Americans and he did not want to talk about it, and boy, they booed him. Five thousand people were booing him in Manhattan, N.Y. This is true. This is God's honest truth.

Mr. DORNAN. This is incredible.

Mr. DUMAS. It is not incredible, Congressman. When Mr. Solarz held hearings on this right here in this room——

Mr. DORNAN. Lester Wolf from New York, who was chairman of the Asian and Pacific Subcommittee of then-called Foreign Affairs was defeated in 1980 by John LeBoutlier, who took up such an interest in this that it destroyed his freshman term and he never got reelected again. It got Billy Hendon defeated. He came back in

1984 and I got to know him, and then he got defeated again in 1986.

But that is when Steve Solarz became chairman of Asian and Pacific Affairs in January of 1981 and rode it beautifully, used it to travel more than any other Congressman in history except me, and I am 30 countries ahead of him, and then he was defeated in the Democratic primary in, what, 1992?

Mr. DUMAS. Ninety-two.

Mr. DORNAN. In 1992, and if it were not for the bounced check scandal, he would today be the Ambassador to India, and he must be very hurt that that never worked out.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes.

Mr. DORNAN. Everybody would lovingly talk about him. He was going to be the next Secretary of State under the next Democratic President, which would have been Clinton that very year. But Solarz is losing a primary. Clinton is pulling off a 43-percent victory.

I will track that down. I will ask Steve personally. We get along. But the main thing is, I smell that the North Koreans like direct, straight contact.

Mr. DUMAS. Contact, straight contact.

Mr. DORNAN. And that, they will get out of me. Mr. McCreary, is he still here? If he will come with me as the Korean expert to Korea, I will go to Korea and then go down to Vietnam.

Mr. DUMAS. One more thing too, Congressman. Jackson told a South Korean newsman that afternoon—that morning—that afternoon, I am sorry, at 2, that there were no live Americans according to Pak Gil Yan. That is what he told the South Koreans. But upstairs, he had told a different story upstairs. I think maybe he wanted to keep it quiet until he went to North Korea and brought someone home.

Mr. DORNAN. Sure. The Ambassador would have told him, if you want to come over and do this, you have to deny it right now.

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, right.

Mr. DORNAN. Look, folks. Pat, you wanted to say something?

Ms. MANDRA. One thing.

Mr. DORNAN. Does anybody in the audience want to say anything? John, do you want to ask questions? Mr. Santoli, do you have any questions? Does anybody have anything else to say? We have gone real long. I want you to understand, I am not giving anybody short shrift. There is no juice out of these hearings for me politically. Personally, it is very frustrating because I get this feeling, is this never going to end.

Yes, sir, and then, Pat, you end it. I will repeat this gentleman. What is your name, sir?

Mr. HALL. Roger Hall. I am a researcher of the Vietnam era.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, I know you, Roger, sure. Roger Hall, a researcher, said that at some point during this joint commission, the Russians said we are not holding anybody against their will, which Tok, the foreign minister or deputy foreign minister, used over and over to me in Hanoi and again in 1985 in Hanoi.

Pat, where do we go from here? Did you have a final thought?

Ms. MANDRA. Two things. One, the remains out at CILHI can be identified but it is going to take mitochondrial DNA matching to

do it. In order to do that, they have to contact the families. They do not know where the families are. None of the service——

Mr. DORNAN. How many sets of remains do they have?

Ms. MANDRA. They have 866.

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, you mean at the Punch Bowl?

Ms. MANDRA. Yes, at CILHI. I get this information from CILHI directly, that they would need——

Mr. DORNAN. I am sorry. You are right.

Ms. MANDRA. They have records——

Mr. DORNAN. You are right. You cannot get DNA. Lucy goes all the way back 2 million years, but it has to be a matriarchal line.

Ms. MANDRA. You asked where we should go from here. We need the Korean war out of DPMO. They are not doing the job. They are not going to do the job. We need it privately researched, funded, whatever it takes, but I really do not believe DPMO is going to be able to ever do that job.

Mr. DORNAN. The next 138 days, when you wake up in the morning, will go by quickly. It may be a new day if Mr. Clinton is defeated. I will talk with Speaker Gingrich about an earmark designed allocation of money. I have all the right friends on Appropriations, Bill Young, a terrific guy, Jack Murtha, used to have Bill Young's chairmanship of Defense, to get some money and say, this is to be spent on outside contracted researchers and archivists.

I just learned something very simply from Dr. Cole that has never occurred to me. I interchange these terms. A researcher is not an analyst. You can have great intelligence analysts but researchers are equivalent to the people in the field, like an air attaché in the Embassy in Moscow is the researcher. He is going out in the field. He is looking at stuff. He is covertly taking mental pictures or photographic pictures and he sends it back to DIA at Bolling and they analyze it. So now that is clear in my head.

We need outside contracted researchers for this one simply reason only that has finally penetrated my brain, that is not that dense—I like to think I am very clever—and that is simply, if you have a contracted person, you give him a contract. He has a goal. He has a starting point. He has a set budget. He has a conclusion point. He gives you work product. That is the exact opposite of somebody assigned who is “pushing papers around” and patting people on the head and then saying, “Boy, I will be glad when this job is over for me and I move on.”

Yes, sir? This has got to be the final. The gavel is in my hand.

Ms. MANDRA. Congressman?

Mr. DORNAN. No, I am sorry, Irene. Let me ask him, and then you.

VOICE. Representative Dornan, what is going to be done to move our Government to get the live POW's back from Korea?

Ms. MANDRA. And Russia.

VOICE. And Russia. Do you not think something should be done to push them, to pressure them?

Mr. DORNAN. You are probably one of those who groaned when Mr. Santoli said, ask him, Mr. Brown, when did you make this request, and he said, “This week.” The whole room groaned. Then I said, let me ask a cynical question, softening my attack. I said, “It would not be because of this hearing, would it?” “Oh, no, no, no.”

But there is the circumstantial evidence that the timing is very unfortunate.

So we will keep on them. That is where we need your help. This is Al's principal duty on my staff. John has a lot of other things to worry about, like what to pay the younger nephews and grandchildren on active duty from these military families. But as long as I have Al with me, I will stay on track. Give me your input.

If I go to Korea, and I can see it formulating in my mind, I have to go there, I will say, I want to go to the language school. Give me a break. I have a very aggressive personality but a big smiling face. Let me go to the language school. Let me see how you do it. Let me talk to these defectors. I am not going to yell at them after all of these years. After all, they bought themselves 30 wonderful years in North Korea. I will say, let me talk to them and find the one who wants to come home and say, look, do you want to face court martial? We have laws on the books. You know that. How badly do you want to get out of here?

But you heard what Ambassador Toon said. I did not argue with him, but I was rejecting it. Did you hear what he said? "Go to them and say, you bastard, you are never coming home. We do not want you back, but we want you to be cooperative now and tell us everything you can." I almost laughed out loud, but I just said, OK, he will be 80 on the Fourth of July. Goodbye.

So I want to go to these guys and say, "I will help you get home. I am a Catholic. You want to go to confession? I will forgive you. I am ordered by Jesus to forgive you. But give me something here. You take truth serum here. You polygraph here and then we will come home and I will testify at your court martial that you have already been given one hell of a sentence."

We are letting child molesters and serial killers come up for parole. Polly Klass' murderer gave the double finger to the courtroom yesterday, and Rush Limbaugh says we are more upset over that—some liberals are, that he flipped them a double bird—than they were that he killed and tortured this little girl and had her in the car maybe when the cops pulled him over.

So we will get something out of this. You just keep calling in the plays from the sidelines and I will go to Korea and maybe you can all vote to say who is the best one to go. I am looking for a new Ann Griffith with new ideas on the Korean side to go over there and not be coopted by a Federal bureaucracy.

Mr. DUMAS. One more thing, too, is you have to remember that there is a toll-free number now to the Capitol. You are going to be bothered by everybody.

Mr. DORNAN. That is right.

Mr. DUMAS. There is a toll-free number, anybody who wants it.

Mr. DORNAN. That clicks you into 224-3121, which is the—

Mr. DUMAS. Yes, something like that, but it is a toll-free number.

Mr. DORNAN. He is a workaholic and we will get something done.

Irene, you get the last word. What is it?

Ms. MANDRA. Thank you. Congressman, I just wanted you to know that the flyer that I made up I had done in Russian, and I am trying to send it over there with a little reward with his picture, my phone number and what have you, and DPMO approached the Russians and asked for addresses of asylums, because given

our men, their age and the hard life that they have lived, anyone who is alive, they take them now and throw them in asylums when they cannot work any longer. I approached them and I wanted the addresses of asylums so I could send my brother's picture and the Russians turned me down. Now, if they had nothing to hide, could they not give me the address?

Mr. DORNAN. Irene, I may be one of the world's greatest travelers and I love to travel alone, I love new experiences, and I love to just wing it. I would have gone to Ekaterinburg with you. I have been on the subways in Moscow as long ago as 1972 and 1966 and I have had a guy put his arm inside my arm, he did not speak a word of English, a young man, and eventually through sign language he says, "You want to come and hear my Nat King Cole records?" This is the summer of 1972. I am on my way to Vietnam, flew combat missions with the VNF Air Force and I said, let us go.

I go to his house. I thought, oh, my God, this is worse than poverty housing in any barrio, ghetto, or white trash area in America. The light switch had so much dirt on it from hands over 20, 30, 40 years that it was an eighth of an inch thick. I had never seen such living conditions, orange crates. And he was a young Russian who had fallen in love with America just in his head and had this record collection. And he was not a Jewish refusenik that I met with in later years, just a Russian.

We would have found somebody like that. We would have found a cab driver. You give him a few rubles and say, "Take me to where they dug up the forest, where they dug up the Czar's bones. Take me there. And after you soften them up and they think you are just a history buff," you say, "Take me"—what is the name of the prison?

Ms. MANDRA. No, I asked for addresses of asylums outside of St. Petersburg and Moscow and the Department of Defense approached the Russians and——

Mr. DORNAN. Oh, you mean you were going in the blind to try to find the asylum?

Ms. MANDRA. No. I am trying to mail flyers to these places with pictures of my brother, so I feel that if he is an inmate there, that one of the doctors or the nurses or someone would contact me, because I had "Reward, \$5,000 for this man's location," and the Russians will not give addresses to the Department of Defense. This is what the Department of Defense——

Mr. DORNAN. Here is what I am afraid of. I am afraid if I get reelected, I keep this chairmanship, and I ask to come before me the pilot of Malcolm Toon's Gulf Stream, that an Air Force pilot would tell me, "I was on every trip. I tagged along. It was all a bunch of BS and vodka and caviar and schmoozing and nobody went for the kill to say, take us to a grave and produce here." And all of this money has been spent. He says he is into his fifth year, and we have one buried American, Dunham, from an ad in Red Star that I find out was Senator Bob Smith's idea. That is not much product for 5 years of work.

That message that my chief of staff brought me was saying, "Your wife wants to see you." What she wants to know is, what happened at the hearings today because she had plenty of crying from yesterday's hearing and woke up this morning going, "Why

are you alone on this, like a lot of other projects?" But I am not alone. I have him, I have you, I have Senator Bob Smith, who is a great guy.

The subcommittee adjourns.

[Whereupon, at 8:52 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]





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